JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BOTH the appeals have been taken up for analogous hearing in view of common questions of law arising in similar facts. In Criminal Appeal no. 171/83 a buffalo belonging to the complainant Gayaprasad was stolen and allegedly recovered from the possession of the accused. The trial Court found the offence proved and convicted the accused directing the buffalo to be returned to the complainant. The accused preferred an appeal before the Court of Sessions challenging his conviction but without impleading the complainant as a party to appeal. By judgment dated 8-7-1980 the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, the accused was directed to be acquitted and at the same time the seized buffalo was directed to be delivered to the accused/appellant. ( 2. ) IN Criminal Appeal No. 172/83 there were five buffaloes and two calves belonging to the complainant Ramprasad which were stolen and allegedly recovered from the possession of the accused. The trial Court found the offence proved and convicted the accused. As to disposal of property separate miscellaneous proceedings were directed to be drawn up. The accused filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions challenging his conviction. The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, the accused was acquitted and at the same time the five buffaloes and two calves were directed to be returned to the accused/appellant. Here also the complainant was not joined as party to the appeal. ( 3. ) IN both the cases the Appellate Court also did not notice the complainants. ( 4. ) ON becoming aware of the orders relating to the disposal of property, the respective complainants secured copies of the appellate judgments and have filed these appeals. In both the cases the Court of Sessions passed the appellate judgments incorporating order as to disposal of the property on 8-7-1980. The respective appellants gathered knowledge of the orders on 3-1-1983 and 5-1-1983 respectively when they were noticed for production of the buffalo/buffaloes and calves which were placed in their interim custody. On 18-2-1983, these appeals were filed, after securing copies of the judgments. These dates are not in dispute. ( 5. ) BEFORE appeals could be heard on merits, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 herein that the appeals were barred by time and hence should be dismissed in limine. On 18-2-1983, these appeals were filed, after securing copies of the judgments. These dates are not in dispute. ( 5. ) BEFORE appeals could be heard on merits, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 herein that the appeals were barred by time and hence should be dismissed in limine. Article 115 (b) (ii) of limitation Act, 1963 reads as under : The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 contends that the starting point of limitation would be the date of the order and calculating therefrom the appeals filed by the appellants are hopelessly barred by time. He submits that in interpreting the provisions of limitation equitable considerations are out of place and strict grammatical meaning of the words must be given eftect to. To this the learned counsel for the appellant replied that anamolous situation would arise if this approach were to be adopted because limitation would start running from the date of the order while the person affected would not even know that a order had been passed. The learned counsel submitted that whenever the law gives a right of appeal, the provisions should be so construed as to enable the right being exercised and not killed. ( 6. ) IT will be useful to take light from a few decisions of the Apex Court in order to gather the meaning that ought to be assigned to the phrase the date of order. In Raja Harish Chadra Raj Singh vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another, AIR 1961 SC 1500 , the provisions in the Land Acquisition Act providing for commencement of period of limitation for making a reference application from the date of Collectors award came up for interpretation. Their lordships observed "where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, either actual or constructive, is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, either actual or constructive, is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore the expression the date of the award used in proviso (b) to section 18 (2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. It will be unreasonable to construe the word from the date of the collectors award used in the proviso to section 18 in a literal or mechanical way. This view was reaffirmed in State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 . Again in Assistant Transport Commisioner, lakhnow vs. Nand Singh, AIR 1980 SC 15 the problem posed before Their lordships of the Supreme Court was that an appeal under section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, governed by a limitation of 30 days from the date of the order was within limitation calculated from the date of communication of the order but not from the date of the order. Their Lordships observed "it is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the Office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. . . . On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act that was the date on the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date. " ( 7. ) THE above reasoning applies a fortiori to the facts of the present case. It has already been stated that the trial Court passed orders which protected the rights of the complainants. " ( 7. ) THE above reasoning applies a fortiori to the facts of the present case. It has already been stated that the trial Court passed orders which protected the rights of the complainants. On appeal preferred by the accused, the orders were set aside without noticing the complainants. The complainants had no means of knowing that orders to their prejudice have been passed unless and until they were noticed for production of the property in their custody. Recently, in rajkumar Dey vs. Tarapada Dey, AIR 1987 SC 2195 , posed with the problem of calculating a period of limitation, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pressed into service the two legal maxims - (i) the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and (ii) an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In the opinion of this Court, in the context of an order relating to disposal of property passed by a Court under section 452 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 where the party affected was not before the Court, nor noticed, the expression - the date of the order as occurring in Article 115 of Limitation Act, 1963 shall have to be construed and read as the date of the knowledge of the order, for on start of period of limitation. The appeals are, therefore, held to be within limitation. ( 8. ) SEVERAL contentions touching the merits of the cases have been raised but the appeals are being disposed of on a short ground and it would suffice to note the facts and law relevant to that only. In both the cases the Court of sessions acquitted the accused/appellants because the offence was not held to be proved. Positive findings have not been recorded as to whether ownership or right to possession by any of the contending claimants was made out. The appellate Court followed the principle that in the event of acquittal the property should be returned to the person from whose possession it was seized. There cannot be a quarrel with the principle but fault lies with the manner in which the appellate Court arrived at applying it. ( 9. The appellate Court followed the principle that in the event of acquittal the property should be returned to the person from whose possession it was seized. There cannot be a quarrel with the principle but fault lies with the manner in which the appellate Court arrived at applying it. ( 9. ) SECTION 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contemplating an order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial does not contemplate a notice or hearing to be given to the parties likely to be affected by the order as to disposal of the property. However, in A. Madhavan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 sc 1829, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the exercise of discretion conferred by section 517, Criminal Procedure Code (section 452 of the new Code) is inherently a judicial function. In that case a gun seized from an accused was directed to be confiscated, but without giving an opportunity or being heard to the accused specifically with regard to that matter. Such an order was held to be arbitrary and unjudicial. In Bachraj Dugar vs. Narendra Kumar singh, 1979 Cri. L. J. 116, the High Court of Gauhati said although Section 452, criminal Procedure Code, providing for disposal of property in its custody at the conclusion of trial does not require issuance of notice to anyone, it is but necessary that prior notice should go to such of the persons who are likely to be affected by the order that may be passed under the section. The above said law is nothing but projection of rule of natural justice that no order shall be passed to the prejudice of anyone unless he had an opportunity of being heard in that behalf. ( 10. ) THE principle applies a fortiori to the present case. As stated, in one case the trial court had directed the seized property to be returned to the complainants, while in the other separate miscellaneous proceedings were directed to be drawn up for determining the entitlement as to disposal of the property. In one case there was a right accrued in favour of the complainant. In the other case, the complainant got a manifested right of being heard. Such an order could not have been set aside by the appellate Court without giving the complainant an opportunity of being heard. In one case there was a right accrued in favour of the complainant. In the other case, the complainant got a manifested right of being heard. Such an order could not have been set aside by the appellate Court without giving the complainant an opportunity of being heard. It was expected of the accused appellant challenging his conviction and also praying for release of the seized property in his favour to have impleaded the complainant as a party to the appeal. In any case it was obligatory on the part of the appellate Court to have noticed the complainant before the order as to disposal of the property could be reversed or modified. The decision in State Bank of India vs. Rejendra Kumar Singh and another, AIR 1969 SC 409, clinches the issue. Their Lordships while dealing with section 517 of old Criminal Procedure Code said it is true that the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. But though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice, there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order of return of the seized property. Thus an order of the High Court reversing the order of the Sessions Court directing disposal of property under section 517, without giving notice to the person to whom the property is directed to be delivered by the Sessions Court, is vitiated by law. ( 11. ) IT follows that the orders as to disposal of the property made by the court of Sessions are vitiated and deserve to be set aside. The question would still be what should be the appropriate direction to be made. The judgments in so far as they acquit the accused are not under challenge because of the State having chosen not to prefer appeals against acquittal. Though, section 452, Criminal procedure Code, speaks of passing an order for disposal of property at conclusion of an inquiry by trial Court, it does not in so many terms say whether such an order should form part of the judgment of acquittal or conviction itself or may be passed separately. Though, section 452, Criminal procedure Code, speaks of passing an order for disposal of property at conclusion of an inquiry by trial Court, it does not in so many terms say whether such an order should form part of the judgment of acquittal or conviction itself or may be passed separately. A Division Bench of High Court of Patna observed in deopujan Mahto vs. Kukur Ahir, AIR 1940 Patna 198, section 517 cannot be read as requiring that the order for disposal of property must be passed simultaneously with the judgment of the case unless words that are not in the section are read into it. The order may be passed at the time of the conclusion of the trial or at a later date. Although the passing of such order should not be unreasonably postponed, still the lapse of time does not relieve the Court of the duty and the corresponding jurisdiction to pass orders for the disposal of property which is in the Courts custody or under its control. It would, therefore, be a matter to be decided in each case, in the background of the facts and circumstances emanating therein whether the Court would feel inclined in incorporating the order as to the disposal of the property in the main judgment or having resolved the principal controversy would choose to draw up separate ancillary proceedings directing disposal of the property after giving an opportunity of being heard to the persons likely to be affected by the order as to disposal of property. In the present case it appears to be proper to set aside only that much part of the impugned judgments which directs the disposal of the stolen property and to send the matter to the trial Court for such disposal. ( 12. ) BOTH the appeals are allowed. Orders as to disposal of property made by the trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court are set aside. Instead it is directed that the trial Court shall register separate miscellaneous judicial cases regarding disposal of the seized property. It shall notice the State, the accused and the complainant and also any other person who may appear to it as interested in or likely to be affected by the disposal and pass an order under section 452 of criminal Procedure Code after giving them due opportunity of being heard. It shall notice the State, the accused and the complainant and also any other person who may appear to it as interested in or likely to be affected by the disposal and pass an order under section 452 of criminal Procedure Code after giving them due opportunity of being heard. As the matter is old one, the cases would be disposed of expeditiously and as far as practical within six months from today. ( 13. ) BEFORE parting, it will be proper to take notice of yet another submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants herein. It is submitted that the buffalo in the interim custody of Gayaprasad and buffaloes except one in the interim custody of Ramprasad have already died and, therefore, the question of their return would not arise. The liability of a person in interim custody shall have to be determined with reference to sections 151, 152 of the Contract Act and the terms of the Supradnamas executed by them. It shall be open to the complainant/appellants to raise the contention before the trial Court and the trial Court would take care of their grievance and deal with the same in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.