Judgment :- 1. When a plaintiff failed to remit deficit courtfees, the suit was dismissed with costs. His application for restoration of the suit as per Order IX R.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short'the Code') was also dismissed. Then he filed another application, after remitting the deficit court fee, for enlargement of time for payment of deficit court fee. The lower court allowed the application by the impugned order and restored the suit. This revision is at the instance of the defendant. 2. Facts which are not disputed are these; The trial court found that court fee in full bad not been paid hence the plaintiff was directed to pay deficit court fee before 14-11-1986. The time was extended on five occasions and it was finally posted to 31-3-1987. On that day the plaintiff was heard but as the deficit court fees were not paid, the court dismissed the suit. The present application, quoting S.148,149 and IS1 of the Code, was filed after the dismissal of the other application for restoration of the suit filed under Order IX R.9 of the Code. Learned Munsiff noted that the reasons for not remitting deficit court fees within the time allowed have not been disputed. Hence be felt that the application should be allowed since it is the just and reasonable course in the circumstances. 3. Two main contentions have been raised in this revision. The first is that, since the dismissal of suit was on merits he has the remedy to file an appeal. The second contention is that court's power to enlarge time cannot be exercised or even invoked when there is no suit or action pending. In support of the first contention, learned counsel brought my attention to the fact that a decree bad already been drawn up by the trial court subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and that toe suit was dismissed by pronouncing a judgment. 4. The snort judgment reads thus: "Additional court fee not paid. Plaintiff present in person. Heard. No valid explanation to offer. The only inference ('information') is that he has no more interest in the suit. Hence dismissed with costs". It is not necessary to consider whether dismissal of the suit consequent on non-payment of the deficit court fees will amount to a decree, in view of S.2 (2) of the Code which defines the word "decree". No valid explanation to offer. The only inference ('information') is that he has no more interest in the suit. Hence dismissed with costs". It is not necessary to consider whether dismissal of the suit consequent on non-payment of the deficit court fees will amount to a decree, in view of S.2 (2) of the Code which defines the word "decree". As per the said sub-section the decree "shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint". Order VII Rule H enjoins on the court to reject the plaint when the plaintiff fails to supply requisite stamp (court fee) within the time fixed by the court. The remedy of appeal is therefore implicit in it. This Court has held in Janaki Amma v. Krishnan (1978 KLT. 463) that neither the Code nor the Court Fee Act enables the court to dismiss a suit on merits for non-payment of court fees and in such cases "even if the court uses the word dismiss and purports to dismiss the suit itself, the same would in fact amount only to rejection of the plaint ". I have no reason to dissent from the aforesaid view. 5. The real question, therefore, is whether the court has power to enlarge or extend time on an application filed after the expiry of the time when no suit or action is pending. Learned counsel referred me to the decision of a single judge in Tarapada v. Nepal Gazi (AIR 1965 Calcutta 354) in which it is held that the court has no jurisdiction under S.148 to condone the delay and enlarge the time if the application has been filed after the expiry of the time originally fixed. The Supreme Court decision in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das (AIR. 1961 SC. 882) cited before the learned judge was distinguished in that application for extension of time was filed before the expiry of the time originally granted. The Supreme Court held in the said decision that the court is not powerless to enlarge time to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made for extension. Of course, in the said case the party made the application for extension of time before the time fixed had run out, though the application came on for bearing only after the expiry of the said time. Of course, in the said case the party made the application for extension of time before the time fixed had run out, though the application came on for bearing only after the expiry of the said time. The point of difference on facts, as noted by the learned single judge of the Calcutta High Court seems to roe to be too tenuous for non-application of the ratio laid down in Mahanth Ram Das' case. It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not suggest even impliedly that courts would become powerless if the application reaches after the expiry of the time. With great respect, I express my difficulty to accept the point of distinction made out by the learned judge of the Calcutta High Court for not following the ratio laid down in Mahanth Ram Das' case. 6. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gobardhan Barsati (AIR. 1972 Allahabad 246) has taken a different view. In that case an application for restoration of suit was allowed on payment of costs and deficit court fees by a particular date on condition that in case of default, the application for restoration shall stand rejected. But the cost was not paid within the time fixed. The application for extension of time was filed by the plaintiff only after the expiry of the time. The question was referred to a Full Bench because of the earlier view adopted by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gaya Din v. Laila Prasad (AIR 1936 Allahabad 477) The Full Bench held that the Court has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out, to extend time even when the application for extension is made after the expiry of the time fixed, The Full Bench differed from the Division Bench mostly inspired by the new approach tersely delineated by Hidayatullah J. (as be then was) in Mahanth Ram Das' case. 7. Neither in S.148 nor in S.149 of the Code is there any inhibition against enlargement of time on the ground that the time originally fixed has expired. The contention that power under the Section should atleast have been invoked before the expiry of the time, is too technical a view which has no justification for the object sought to be achieved through the said provisions. The contention that power under the Section should atleast have been invoked before the expiry of the time, is too technical a view which has no justification for the object sought to be achieved through the said provisions. S.14S itself contains the indication that the legislature intended enlargement or extension of time to be granted "even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired". By insisting that the application should be filed before the expiry of the time, a new restriction is invented without being warranted by the provisions. In a different context, a single judge of this Court has observed that time can be enlarged or extended "even on a motion made after the time originally fixed or granted has run out" (vide Krishnan v. Navoorkanika Rawther,1977 KLT 886). Though the context of the decision is consideration of S.11(2)(c) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the power of the court under S.148 was also dealt with in the decision. Later a Division Bench has approved the said decision in Sreedharan v. Muhammed Kunhi (1978 KLT 20). These decisions also support the view that the power under S.148 of the Code can be exercised or even invoked after the expiry of the time originally granted, provided there are good reasons for extending time. I therefore, conclude that the court below had not acted outside its jurisdiction when it enlarged or extended time for remittance of the deficit court fees. Hence the order warrants no interference. C.R.P. is accordingly, dismissed. Issue carbon copy on usual terms. Dismissed.