Hansaria, J. — By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the constitution of the Regional Tran­sport Authority (RTA), Nagaon, vide Notification No. TMV. 48 / 81/315 dated 24th May, 1986. The decisions taken by the aforesaid RTA in its meetings held on 23.9.86, 24.9.86 and 3.10.86 have also been questioned. 2. The attack on the validity of the constitution of the aforesaid RTA is on the ground that one Shri Girin Das was appointed a member of the RTA, Nagaon. This challenge is founded on the ground that Shri Das had financial interest in a transport under­taking, he being a permit holder in respect of an All-India tourist omnibus. Section 44 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereina­fter the Act, would not permit such a person to be made a member of the RTA. 3. There is no dispute at the Bar that Shri Das could not have been made a member of the concerned RTA. Indeed, after the Rule was issued in the present case on 27.11.86, it was declared vide Government Notification No.TMV.48/81/PMI/l dated 23.2.87 that Shri Das would cease to be a member of the RTAt Nagaon. Thus, the need of issuing a writ of quo warranto relating ,to Shri Das being a member of the RTA has ceased, ,to exist. 4. Shri Bhattacharjee has, however, urged that the decision take in the aforesaid meetings of the RTA cannot be give a effect to because of the fact that Shri Das had participated in the same. On the question of participation of Shri Das, there is a controversy inasmuch as, according to the State, Shri Das was not officially present in the meetings. This stand has been taken because in the attendance sheet of the meetings, signature of Shri Das is not to be found. To counter this stand of the State, the petitioner hat filed affidavits of Shri K.P. Barua and Shri A.K.Das wherein these two learned members of the Bar have stated that Shri Das had participated in the deliberations of the aforesaid meetings. To counter this stand of the State, the petitioner hat filed affidavits of Shri K.P. Barua and Shri A.K.Das wherein these two learned members of the Bar have stated that Shri Das had participated in the deliberations of the aforesaid meetings. On the face of these two affidavits, we would accept that Sri Das had attended the meetings in question The pertinent point is whether due to his participation it can be held that the entire proceeding-of the RTA had become tainted with the result that no effect can be given to the decisions arrived at in the aforesaid meetings. 5. After the matter was once heard, we set down the Rule for further hearing on two aspects of the case : (i) whether the petitioner is estopped in challenging the illegality in question; and (ii) whe­ther the doctrine of de facto has any application in the present case, and, if so, what is the effect of the same. Learned counsel for the parties were heard on these aspects of the matter and we are of the view that the proceedings of the aforesaid meeting would be protected by the doctrine of de facto. Before looking into the scope of this doctrine, we may state that the present is not a case where the appointment of Sri Das has been challenged in a collateral proceeding inasmuch as in the present case Shri Das has been made a respondent and a writ of quo warranto has been sought relating to his appointment as a member of the RTA. 6. The necessity and scope of the doctrine of de facto was examined in State of Haryana vs. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd, AIR 1977 SC 237 . Id, this case, mention was made of what has been stated in Cooley's "A Treaties on the Constitutional Limitations” In this authoritative work, a distinction was made between an officer de jure and an officer de facto. As to the second type of officer, it was stated that it is .one who by some colour of right, is in possession of -an office and for the time biin.5 performs his duties with public acquiescence though having no right in fact. As to the second type of officer, it was stated that it is .one who by some colour of right, is in possession of -an office and for the time biin.5 performs his duties with public acquiescence though having no right in fact. It was further pointed out that for the sake of order and regularity and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and inse­curity of private right, the act of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except under certain circumstances. 7. In Gokaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473 , the doctrine of de facto was explained as below in para 15 :- "A Judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who Holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief.". 8. In Puspa Devi vs. M.L. Wadhawani, AIR 1987 SC 1748 , the questi­on examined was whether the recording of statement by a non-gazetted officer could be relied upon for the purpose of passing an order under the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. 1974. It was stated in para 21 of this judgment as below : "Where office exists under the law it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of its acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with insignia of the office and exercises its powers and func­tions. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, borne of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief". 9. The aid of this doctrine was also taken in Beapor Sahayak (P) Ltd. vs. Vishwa Nath, AIR 1987 SC 2111 . In this case, a person had been appointed without his possessing the requisite experience. 9. The aid of this doctrine was also taken in Beapor Sahayak (P) Ltd. vs. Vishwa Nath, AIR 1987 SC 2111 . In this case, a person had been appointed without his possessing the requisite experience. It was held that such a person could not be said to holding the office as an usurper but would be deemed to be holding under the colour of lawful authority and being of this view the validity of the orders passed by such a person were held to be valid with the aid of de facto doctrine. 10. This being the position in law relating to the doctrine of de facto,, we are satisfied that the decisions taken in the aforesaid meetings of the RTA cannot be invalidated on the sole ground .that respondent No.6 could not have been appointed as a member Of the RTA, Shri Bhattacharjee contends that de facto doctrine would have no application where the statute provides for a disqua­lification or disablement in appointing anybody to the public office in question. It is urged by the learned counsel that section 44(2) of the Act had created an embargo on any person having any financial interest to become a member of the RTA. We do not think if the doctrine of de facto would cease to operate in such a case inasmuch as the qualifications to hold a public post may either be laid down in positive terms, or could be spelt out by mentioning disabilities. The mere fact that section 44 (2) had provided some disqualification would not, therefore, be enough in our view to make the doctrine of de facto inapplicable. 11. In this context, Shri Bhattacharjee also referred to Sudhir Kumar vs. State Transport (Appellate) Authority, AIR 1962 Assam 94, in which the entire proceedings of the meeting of the RTA was held to be vitiated on the ground that one Shri Goswami who .had handed over charge to his successor as District Transport Officer before the meeting was held had participated in the deliber­ations of the meeting in his capacity as District Transport Officer who was ex-officio Secretary of the RTA. Relying on this decision, it is contended by the learned counsel that the entire proceedings of the meetings at hand should also be held to be vitiated. Relying on this decision, it is contended by the learned counsel that the entire proceedings of the meetings at hand should also be held to be vitiated. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment shows that the effect of the doctrine of de facto was not gone into at all. This decision, therefore, cannot assist the petitioner. 12. In view of all that is stated above, we are satisfied that the decisions arrived at by the RTA in its meetings held on the afores­aid dates did not become illegal n the sole ground of respondent No. 6 having been illegally appointed as a member of the RTA. 13. Another objection has been taken relating to the participation of respondent No. 6 in the meetings of the RTA. The same is that he had a bias relating to some persons who had applied for permits inasmuch as they were relatives of respondent No. 6. Though it it correct that some of the relatives of respondent No.6 had applied for permits, but none of them was granted any permit as stated by Shri Chaliha. learned Government Advocate. 14. For the aforesaid reason, the case of the petitioner that participation of respondent No. 6 made the entire proceeding of the RTA illegal cannot be accepted. Haying come to this conclusion, we are not examining the question whether the petitioner is estopped in challenging the illegality in question because of its participation in the meetings without raising any objection relating to membership of Shri Girin Das. 15. In the result the petition is dismissed. The stay order passed earlier stand vacated. Manisana, J. — I agree.