Raghuvir C. J. — This Reference is made under clause (1) of section 64 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The two questions are : - (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that notwithstanding section 34 (1) (c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the value of the share of the lineal descendants of the deceased in the joint family property was not includible in the deceased for rate purposes ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the share of the deceased in the value of the goodwill of the firm was not includible in the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased? Ram Kumar Sovasaria died at the ripe age of 82 on August 19. 1971 at Tinsukia. This reference relates to his estate. In this case accountable person is Murarilal Sovasaria. The deceased during his life time was the Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family. He was the partner of a firm M/S Sovasaria Motor Parts and Accessories, Tinsukia upto April 3, 1971. As a Karta he was a partner in another firm M/S Durga Motor Stores at Gauhati The Hindu Joint family possessed a building referred as Assam Type building let out to a tenant. The family owned a dwelling house. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty at Dibrugarh ascertained the value of movables of the deceased at Rs. 94,434/- . The value of the joint family properties in respect of which there was cessor was valued at Rs. 61,000/- under section 34 (1) of the Act. The share of the deceased as a lineal descendant was ascertained at Rs. 1,03,666/-. A sum of Rs. 9,450/- was added as goodwill of M/S Durga Motor Stores at Gauhati. In appeal by the accountable person the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty, Eastern Zone, Dibrugarh allowed the appeal in part. The assessee before that authority referred a decision of the Madras High Court in ITR 91 page 24 (V. Devaki Animal vs. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Madras) and argued section 34 of the Act should not be enforced in ascertaining the value of the estate of the deceased. The second question raised was with respect to goodwill not to add Rs. The second question raised was with respect to goodwill not to add Rs. 9450/-to the estate of the deceased. The appellate authority followed the Madras decision and deleted the sum of Rs. 1,03,666/- but rejected the contention as respects goodwill of the firm. The accountable person and the revenue both filed appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Oauhati. The Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Appellate Authority as respects the deletion of Rs. 1,03,666/- and deleted the addition of Rs. 9450/-relating to goodwill. Thus, the appeal of the accountable person was allowed. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. Hence the two questions in this Court. As respects the first question, we see in 91 ITR 24 the Madras High Court had struck down section 34 (1) (c) of the Estate Duty Act as discriminatory therefore violative of Article 14 of the Cons­titution. That decision was followed by the appellate authority and by the Appellate Tribunal. We may mention that the Tribunal at Gauhati is not bound by the decision of this Madras High Court but the decision has a persuasive value. The Tribunal has not committed any error if the Madras High Court's decision was followed by them. The Supreme Court this aspect was considered AIR 1962 SC 1893 (Eastern India Comml. Co. vs. Collector of Customs) at page 1905 observed "We, therefore hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the state is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding ••-" since there was no decision of this Court the Tribunal therefore was not wrong in following the Madras decision if it appealed to their good sense. In the case of Allahabad High Court in (1980) 3 Taxman 232 (CIT vs. Babu Ram Kicha) held that Tribunals in the country are bound to follow the decision of the High Courts where it is located. It is settled the Tribunal or the High Court and for that matter even the Supreme Court cannot declare any provision ultra vires while exercising power under the Act. But the Allahabad High Court held that the Madras decision is binding all over the country. This we state is widely stated. The next case is 127 ITR 512 ( Commissioner of Income-tax, M. P. vs. Vrajlal Manila! But the Allahabad High Court held that the Madras decision is binding all over the country. This we state is widely stated. The next case is 127 ITR 512 ( Commissioner of Income-tax, M. P. vs. Vrajlal Manila! & Co ) a case from Madnya Pradesh High Court, curiously considered vires of the Act while the Court considered decisions of two High Courts, the Madras High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court and agreed with the conclusion of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Bombay High Court in 113 ITR 589 (Commissioner of Income-tax, Vidarbha vs. Smti Godavaridevi Saraf) referred to the Supreme Court decision which we have cited earlier and stated at page 59 that section 140 A (3) was already declared ultra vires by a competent High Court in the country and Tribunals acting anywhere in the country have to respect the law laid down by a High Court. We have already considered this aspect earlier when we referred to Allahabad decision. In exercising jurisdiction as a Court of reference we cannot declare any provision of the Estate Duty Act ultra vires. Therefore, we choose not to follow the decision of the Madras High Court. For the purpose of this case we do not order to delete Rs. 1,03.666/-on the ground that section 34 (1) (c) of the Act is ultra-vires. That amount has to be reckoned as the estate of the deceased. There is another aspect of the question where a dwelling house of the family was valued at Rs. l,28,ODO/-and only one third has been reckoned as the lineal descendants share of the deceased. In this regard we follow the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which judgment one of us Raghuvir J., (as he then was) was a party. In that case it was held-"the value of the residential house has to be exempted under section 33 (1) (n) read with section 39 (1) and 39 (t)of the Act, and once the entire value of the house which is within the limit of exemption allowed under section 33 (1) (n) is exempted." The revenue authorities will have to compute the tax liability deleting Rs. 42,666/- . In that view, the first question is answered in the negative against the assessee in favour of the revenue. 42,666/- . In that view, the first question is answered in the negative against the assessee in favour of the revenue. The second question relates to "goodwill whether the share of the deceased in the value of the goodwill of the firm computed at Rs. 9.450/- is includible in the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased. On this aspect we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 90 ITR 400 (S. Devraj vs. C.W.T. Mad.). It is not necessary we should repeat the reasoning in this case over again. Therefore, we hold the Tribunal was justified in holding the goodwill of the firm is not to be included. The first question is answered in the negative in favour of the revenue against the assessee. The second question is answered in affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. No costs Srivastava, J — Iagree.