SANKARI PRASAD DAS GHOSH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the widow of a tenant against a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of landlord for his own use and occupation and for use and occupation of the members of his family. ( 2 ) ONE Jatindra Nath Ghosh was a tenant in respect of one room at the ground floor of premises No. 19, Sibdash Bhaduri Street P. S. Shyampukur, Calcutta, (hereinafter called 'the suit-room' for the sake of convenience) under the plaintiff-respondent at rent of Rs. 14. 87 p. , per month, payable according to the English Calendar month. The plaintiff- respondent filed a suit for eviction of Jatindra from the suit-room on twofold grounds viz. , subletting and reasonable requirement of the suit-room by him for use and occupation by the members of his family. During trial, the ground of subletting was not pressed. The defence was a denial of the alleged reasonable requirement of the suit-room by the landlord for use and occupation by the members of his family. A Commissioner for local inspection was appointed in the suit for finding out the present accommodation of the landlord and the accommodation available in the suit-house. The Commissioner submitted a report. Several witnesses were examined for the plaintiff. Only one witness was examined for the tenant. After considering the evidences of these witnesses and the materials on record, the learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, who tried the suit, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has sufficiently established his case of reasonable requirement for the purpose of his own use and occupation. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed. ( 3 ) MR. Bose, the learned Advocate for the appellant has assailed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge in the court below. According to him, the learned Judge in the court below failed to consider the case in written statement that after the filing of the suit for eviction the landlord let out one room to one Shyamapada Dey within one year and six months of the filing of the suit and that another room was also let out by the landlord to one Nani Gopal Debnath within a year of the filing of the suit for eviction. The case in the written statement is that Shyamapada Dey and Nani Gopal Debnath were already tenants in the suit-house and that after filing of the suit, one room had been let out to Shyamapada Dey and another room had been let out to Nani Gopal Debnath in the inner block of the suit-house. According to Mr. Bose, the absence of any finding by the learned Judge about the letting out of these rooms to Shyamapada and Nani Gopal by the plaintiff respondent after filing the suit for eviction as well as the absence of any finding by the learned Judge about alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of the landlord, would be sufficient to justify the sending back of the suit on remand for further trial, specifically when no case was also made out in the plaint that the landlord was not in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. ( 4 ) EXT. 7 is the Report of the Advocate-Commissioner (P. W. 2) appointed in the suit. Ext. 7 (a) is his Field Book. The Report of the Advocate-Commissioner as well as the evidences of the plaintiff (P. W. 1) go to show that the plaintiff is in possession of the three rooms at the first floor of the suit-house in the inner block. It is in evidence that the suit-house, consists of two portions, front portion and the back portion, separated by a common wall. The front portion is accessible from the back portion (inner block) by a communicating door in that partition wall. In the back portion, i. e. inner block, there is a two storied building. The Field Book, Ext. 7 (a), as well as the evidence of P. W. 1 show that the plaintiff is in possession of the three rooms at the first floor in the inner block of the suit-house. One of these rooms measures 10' x 11'. The other room, which according to the evidences is in the occupation of Smt. Radha Rani Paul, brother's wife of the plaintiff, measures 10'2" X 12'4". The third room measures 11'7" X 8'10''. Its height is 7'4''. The evidences of P. W. 1 are that this room with height of 7'4" is used as Thakur Ghar for daily Sebapuja of Radha Govinda Jew by priest. The third room measures 11'7" X 8'10''. Its height is 7'4''. The evidences of P. W. 1 are that this room with height of 7'4" is used as Thakur Ghar for daily Sebapuja of Radha Govinda Jew by priest. This is corroborated by the evidence of the priest, Manindra Nath Ghosal (P. W. 3) as well as the Field Book, Ext. 7 (a ). The plaintiff is in possession of another room at the ground floor of the suit-house (room No. 7 according to the Field Book), which is used as grocery shop by the plaintiff. Some faint attempts were made to show that Radha Rani does not stay in one of the rooms at the first floor of the suit-house. Considering the evidences on record, we are unable to accept the view that Radha Rani does not stay or is not entitled to stay in one of the rooms at the first floor of the suit-house. Radha Rani and Renubala are daughters-in-law of one Sarat Chandra, one of the brothers of the plaintiff's father. According to the evidence, the suit-house belonged to Haran Chandra Paul, who died leaving four sons, Monmotho, Nirod, Sarat Chandra and Purna Chandra. The evidences are that Purno Chandra sold his 1/4th share to the plaintiffs father by a Kobala, Ext, I. The 1/4th share of Monmotho was inherited by his widow, Sailabala and after her death, that 1/4th share devolved on Nirod Prasad alias Nirod Baran, the father of the plaintiff. Kamala Bala and Usha Rani, the two sisters of the plaintiff, made a gift of their shares in the suit-house to the plaintiff by a Deed, Ext. 4. After the death of Nirod Baran the plaintiff had thus twelve annas share in the suit-house. By a deed dt. 21-3-66, Ext. 2, Radha Rani and Renubala, the two daughters-in-law of Sarat Chandra, sold their 1/4th share interest in the house to the plaintiff. There was an agreement between the plaintiff, Radha Rani and Renubala at the time of execution of the Decree, Ext. 3, about payment of monthly maintenance by the plaintiff to Radha Rani and Renubala and right of residence in one room for each of them in the suit-house till their deaths. It is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that Renu Bala is dead. Radha Rani still alive. As per the Deed of Agreement, Ext. 3, about payment of monthly maintenance by the plaintiff to Radha Rani and Renubala and right of residence in one room for each of them in the suit-house till their deaths. It is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that Renu Bala is dead. Radha Rani still alive. As per the Deed of Agreement, Ext. 3, Radha Rani is entitled to possess one room in the suit-house till her death. It is not challenged in evidence by D. W. 1 that the plaintiff is not in possession of three rooms at the first floor of the suit-house. This is not also challenged in the written statement. In these circumstances, there is nothing to interfere with the finding of the learned Judge in the court below that out of three rooms in the possession of the plaintiff-respondent at the first floor of the suit-house, one room is used as bed room, one room is used by Radha Rani and the remaining room is used as Thakur Ghar. It is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that he has a kitchen at the ground floor at the back portion of the suit-house. That kitchen is with tile shed. The plaintiff (P. W. 1) states that he requires the suit-room so that he can give his eldest son in marriage. It is not disputed in the evidence that the plaintiff stays at the first floor of the suit-house along with his wife, his four sons and Radha Rani. Even D. W. 1 does not dispute in his evidence that the plaintiff stays at the first floor of the suit-house along with his wife and four sons, D. W. 1 has stated that he has heard that Radharani lives in her father's premises and not with the plaintiff. This is hearsay evidence and no reliance can be put on it. One bedroom cannot but be insufficient for the plaintiff, his wife and his four sons including his eldest son, who is employed, even according to D. W. 1, and cannot be given in marriage because of lack of accommodation. In these circumstances, there is nothing to interfere with the finding of the learned Judge in the court below that the plaintiff has sufficiently established his case of reasonable requirement for the purpose of his own use and occupation. In these circumstances, there is nothing to interfere with the finding of the learned Judge in the court below that the plaintiff has sufficiently established his case of reasonable requirement for the purpose of his own use and occupation. Apart from requiring a room for giving his eldest son in marriage, the plaintiff also requires a room for user as study-cum-sitting room of his son, as observed by the learned Judge. It is no doubt true that it is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that Shyama Kumar Dey and Nani Gopal Debnath are his tenants. The case in the written statement about letting out of one room to Shyama Kumar Dey within one year and six months of the filing of this suit on 7-12-72 and about letting out of another room to Nani Gopal Debnath within one year of the filing of the suit, has not at all been proved in evidence. There is no evidence by D. W. 1 in the matter. The evidence of P. W. 1 is that he let out two rooms to Shyama Kumar Dey in 1968 and that Nani Gopal Debnath was inducted, more than 10 years before the date of his giving evidence on 28-11-76, in respect of one room. The evidences of P. W. 1 do not show any letting out of any room by the plaintiff to any tenant after the filing of the suit. The evidence of P. W. 1 shows that previously he had filed Ejectment Suits Nos. 1130 of 1965 and 768 of 1966 against his tenant, Jatindra for eviction of Jatindra from the suit-room on the ground of default in payment of rent and that both these ejectment suits were dismissed with costs. There is nothing on record to show that any of these ejectment suits were filed on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. The dismissal of those two ejectment suits does not thus debar the plaintiff from filing the present suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit room for his own use and occupation. The first contention of Mr. Bose for sending the suit back on remand thus fails. The dismissal of those two ejectment suits does not thus debar the plaintiff from filing the present suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit room for his own use and occupation. The first contention of Mr. Bose for sending the suit back on remand thus fails. ( 5 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, for getting a decree for eviction under S. 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for the sake of brevity), the landlord is to prove (a) reasonable requirement of the premises in the occupation of the tenant for his own use and occupation if he is the owner and (b) absence of possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation by him. The absence of any alternative reasonably suitable accommodation is thus a fact to be proved also by the landlord in order to get a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation. In the plaint, there is no case by the plaintiff that he is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. Though the suit is founded under S. 13 (1) (ff) of the Act, wherein it is enjoined that it is to be proved that the landlord is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, no case had been made out in the written statement about any alternative suitable accommodation of the plaintiff. No issue was raised in the court below about any alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of the plaintiff. Even in the Memorandum of Appeal filed in this Court no case has been made out by the appellant about any alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of the plaintiff. It is to be stated, in this connection, that the appeal is being proceeded with not by the original tenant, Jatindra, who died during the pendency of the suit, or by his widow Bibhabati, who died after the filing of this appeal. Narendra Nath Ghosh, the present substituted appellant, is the brother of Bibhabati, widow of Jatindra. He is in possession of room No. 10 in the front portion of the suit-house. The suit-room is room No. 11, which is just beside room No. 10 in the possession of the appellant as per the Commissioner's Report, Ext. 7. Narendra Nath Ghosh, the present substituted appellant, is the brother of Bibhabati, widow of Jatindra. He is in possession of room No. 10 in the front portion of the suit-house. The suit-room is room No. 11, which is just beside room No. 10 in the possession of the appellant as per the Commissioner's Report, Ext. 7. Though no objection has been taken by the original defendant or the substituted widow of the original defendant or the present appellant about the existence of any alternative suitable accommodation of the plaintiff, Mr. Bose has asked us to send back the suit on remand for re-trial after giving opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint by stating that he has no alternative suitable accommodation. Mr. Bose has referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, AIR 1975 SC 1146 and has contended that as S. 13 (3a) of the Act has been given retrospective effect by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act XXXIV of 1969, it is to be proved by the plaintiff that he has no alternative reasonably suitable accommodation before getting a decree for eviction in this suit. Mr. Bose has also referred us to a single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sibapada Roy v. Sudhangsu Kumar Sen, AIR 1980 Cal 90 and has contended that as no finding has been recorded by the court below about the absence of any alternative suitable accommodation of the plaintiff the decree passed by the court below lacks in inherent jurisdiction of the court to pass it. We have carefully considered the matter. The expression used in S. 13 (1) (ff) of the Act is, "such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation". This expression came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhairab Chandra v. Randhir Chandra, AIR 1988 SC 396 . The view of the Supreme Court is that the condition imposed by this expression may not be strictly attracted to a case wherein the landlord is already in occupation of a portion of a house and was for eviction of a tenant from another portion of the house, for getting additional accommodation in the house. The view of the Supreme Court is that the condition imposed by this expression may not be strictly attracted to a case wherein the landlord is already in occupation of a portion of a house and was for eviction of a tenant from another portion of the house, for getting additional accommodation in the house. The view of the Supreme Court is that if a contrary view is taken, it would lead to a landlord being asked to disrupt the family and to provide accommodation for the members of his family at different places. The present suit by the landlord is a suit for additional accommodation in a house, a portion of which is being occupied by the landlord. Though a case ought to have been made out in the plaint that the landlord was not in possession of any alternative suitable accommodation, the absence of such a case in the plaint does not, according to us, justify a remand of the suit to the court below for making out such a case in the plaint and thereafter trial of the suit against on such a case, when it is not even the case of the appellant in this appeal that the plaintiff has any alternative reasonably suitable accommodation. In the absence of any case in the pleadings or any suggestion in the evidence about any alternative accommodation of the plaintiff, it cannot be stated that the parties had this question in mind at the time of trial in the court below. Even then, in this Court, the appellant had sufficient opportunity to allege in the memo of appeal that the plaintiff-respondent had an alternative reasonably suitable accommodation. In the absence of any such case by the appellant in the Memo of Appeal filed in this court, we are not inclined to send back the suit on remand for fresh trial on giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint by insertion of the fact that he his not reasonably suitable accommodation other than, in the suit-house. In view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Bhairab (supra), the single Bench decision of this court that if there be no finding recorded by the court passing the decree for eviction under the Act, that the landlord was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, the decree would be bad for want of inherent jurisdiction of the Court, can no longer be good law. In the case of Bhairab (supra) there was no finding by the court passing the decree for eviction that the landlord was in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, even then, the decree for eviction passed in that case by the trial court was sustained by the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) BOTH the contentions of Mr. Bose fail. The appeal is to be dismissed. ( 7 ) THE appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the court below are affirmed. In the special circumstances of this appeal, the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. ( 8 ) L. M. GHOSH, J. : - I agree. Appeal dismissed.