A suit was filed by the predecessor-in interest of the respondents. The suit was for khas possession of the suit land described in Schedule-A to the plaint. The case of the plaintiff was that he allowed the defendant-appellant to use the suit land for a period of two years begin­ning from 1.6.63 by raising temporary house thereon. Accordingly, the defendant raised his temporary structure and occupied the same as permissive user with a clear understanding that he would vacate the land by removing his temporary structure at the end of the period of two years. After the expiry of 2-year period, the plaintiff demanded vacant possession of the land, but to no avail When repeated requests were made, the last of which was 22 12.65, the plaintiff states that the defendant behaved in a rude, offensive and insulting way which led the plaintiff to file a criminal case under section 352/506 of the Indian Penal Code in which the defendant was convicted under section 352 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 30/-. In the criminal case, the defendant took up a plea of occupying the suit land on the strength of agreement of purchasing the land for Rs. 7000/- or so which according to the plaintiff had no basis. As the need for the land was badly felt, the present suit for eviction was filed. In the suit, claim for compensation was also made. 2. The defendant’s case was that he had started possessing the land after an agreement to purchase 4K-15L of land on a total consideration of Rs. 8,860.00 was made. The other averments of the plaintiff were denied. As the plaintiff did not ultimately execute the sale deed in favour of the defendant pursuant to the alleged agreement, a suit for specific performance was filed, the same being T. S. 23/69 which was ultimately dismissed by the learned trial Court. The present suit and T. S. 23/69 were tried together and the present suit was decreed. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant of the present case filed appeals which were heard together by the learned District Judge who dismissed the appeals. Therefore, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant 3. Against the dismissal of the case relating to specific performance of the contract, the defendant preferred appeal to this Court which was numbered as S. A. 77/79. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant of the present case filed appeals which were heard together by the learned District Judge who dismissed the appeals. Therefore, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant 3. Against the dismissal of the case relating to specific performance of the contract, the defendant preferred appeal to this Court which was numbered as S. A. 77/79. That appeal was dismissed by this Court on 3.8.88. 4. In support of the present appeal, the main submission made by shri Goswami is that the appellant-defendant could not have been asked to vacate the premises inasmuch as the license granted to his has become irrevocable because of what has been stated in section 60 (b) of the Easements Act, 1882, hareinafter the Act, inasmuch as the appellant, acting upon the licence, has constructed work of permanent nature on the suit land by spending money on it, thereby satisfying all the require­ments of this section which reads : “60. License when revocable. A lieanse may be revoked by the grantor, unless- (a) *** ***** (b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent nature and incurred expenses in the execution”. 5. Before the submission advanced by Shri Goswami is examined, it would be apposite to state at the threshold that the aforesaid point was not urged in the way it has been advanced in this Court either before the trial Court or before the learned District Judge. Shri Barua appearing for the respondent therefore, raised an objection that this new plea may not be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court. In this connection, he referred to C. lyyappan vs. Dharmodayam Co., AIR 1966 SC 1017 , in para 8 of which this aspect of the matter has been dealt with. In that case also, a plea was sought to be taken that the appellant before the Court was protected by section 60 (b) of the Act, Tue plea, however, was not allowed to be raised because in the trial Court no plea of licence or its irrevocability was raised ; the defence taken was entirely different. This decision cannot prevent the appellant fiom taking the plea of protection of section 60 (b) of the Act in the present case inasmuch as the granting of licence and raising of structure is the case of the plaintiff himself. This decision cannot prevent the appellant fiom taking the plea of protection of section 60 (b) of the Act in the present case inasmuch as the granting of licence and raising of structure is the case of the plaintiff himself. It is no doubt true that the defence taken by the defendant in the trial Court was not one which has been advanced by Sari Goswami it was relating to agreement to purchase the suit land following which the defendant had come to occupy the suit land ; but this is not enough in my view to disallow the appellant to raise the point urged by Shri Goswami inasmuch as the same is a question of law and is based on the pleading of the plaintiff. The only factual aspect on which there may be controversy between the parties is whether the structure raised on the land was temporary or permanent in character. On this aspect also there is a report of Advocate Commissioner dated 20.2.75 and as such to decide the point raised by Shri Goswmi no new facts are required to be ascertained. It may also be stated in this connection that weakness of defendant's case cannot give strength to the plaintiff's case who has to rise or fall on the strength of his case. Three is thus no escape from examining the submission of Shri Goswami that the defendant of the present case was protected by section 60 (b) of the Act. 6. Before proceeding further, it may be stated that the Act has no application as such in this State. But then it is settled law that the principles of the same would apply in this State also in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. This was the view expressed by Tekchand J. in Jagat Singh vs. District Board, AIR 1948 Lahore 409 and by Suleman, C J., in Mathuri vs. Bhola Nath, AIR 1934 Alld 517. To be fair to Shri Barua, it may be stated that the learned counsel has not disputed this proposition. 7. What Shri Barua has however, contended in this regard is that the defendant not having constructed structures on the land “acting upon the licence”, section 60 (b) of the Act cannot protect the defendant. In this connection, reference has been made to Gujarat G & M Co. 7. What Shri Barua has however, contended in this regard is that the defendant not having constructed structures on the land “acting upon the licence”, section 60 (b) of the Act cannot protect the defendant. In this connection, reference has been made to Gujarat G & M Co. vs Motilal H. S. & M Co., AIR 1936 PC 77, In this decision, it was stated that a person does not “act upon a licence” if he does work and incure expensts on his own property as he can do that without anyone's licence. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down by the Privy Council. Reference has also been made by Shri Barua to Shankar vs Gangabai, AIR 1976 SC 2506 , in para 14 of which it was stated that to get protection of section 6C (b) of the Act, the work executed must have been done “acting up n the licence” which aspect was found missing in that case. Shri Goswami has, however, stated that the present is a case not covered by the aforesaid decisions inasmuch as so far as the case at hand is concerned, it is almost an admitted position so far as the plaintiff is concerned that the defendant had acted upon the licence by raising the structure on the land belonging to the former. The only disputable question could be, on the case of the plaintiff, whether the works executed are of a permanent character. That the defendant had incurred expenditure in the execution cannot also be disputed or denied. 8. Having cleared the way for section 60 (b) of the Act to operate, let it be seen whether in the present case the requirements of this section are fulfilled or not. Shri Goswami has urged that even if the case of the defendant as regards the construction of structures following an agreement to purchase the land is disbelieved, as it has been by all the Courts (including this Court-see its decision in S. A.77/79 disposed of on 3. 8. 88), the applicability of section 60 (b) of the Act is writ large on the face of the record. As already stated, the only controversy could be about the nature of the work executed by the tenant. In this connection, reliance has been placed by Shri Goswami on the aforesaid two decisions of the Lahore and Allahabad High Court. 8. 88), the applicability of section 60 (b) of the Act is writ large on the face of the record. As already stated, the only controversy could be about the nature of the work executed by the tenant. In this connection, reliance has been placed by Shri Goswami on the aforesaid two decisions of the Lahore and Allahabad High Court. In the Lahore case sinking of a well, erection of a boundary and a pucca gate were regarded as work of permanent character. As these constructions were made acting on the licence, the protection of the aforesaid section was made available to the defendant. In the Allahabad case, it was stated that even a mud house or kuchcha house may be a work of permanent character. In that case, though the house had tiled roof and was not very high but had stood the wear and tear for over 60 years, if not more, was regarded of such a character as to allow the benefit of section 60 (b) of the Act. 9. Let it be seen what is the character of the house with which we are concerned. On this aspect, we have the report of the Advocate Commissioner according to whom the house is “semi-per­manent” with half-wall and C. I. Sheet roofs. The plinth, pucca walls etc including the foundations seemed to be “some years old”. Shri Goswami urges that this construction has to be regarded as of permanent character. Though the expression “work of a permanent character” has not been defined in the Act, I would think that some guidance may be obtained in this regard from the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, wherein “permanent structure” has been defined. I have referred to this Act not because it applies to the present case, but because it throws some light on the question at hand. This Act has dealt with the rights of lessees of non-agricultural land in urban areas of this State whereas we are concerned with rights of licensees of such land. I have referred to this Act not because it applies to the present case, but because it throws some light on the question at hand. This Act has dealt with the rights of lessees of non-agricultural land in urban areas of this State whereas we are concerned with rights of licensees of such land. The expression “permanent structure” has been defined in section 3 (d) of this Act as below :- “Permanent structure' means a structure made of cement-concrete, stone, brick, iron aluminum, asbestos or wood or any combination of these materials : Provided that the building with bamboo or ekra walls and thatched roof shall also be regarded a permanent structure if its frame is constructed of any of the materials mentioned above.” If this definition is applied, the structure existing on the land has to be regarded as permanent in nature. Even otherwise, I would think that the type of structure found on the land by the Advocate Commissioner would be work of a permanent character. 10. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, I am not addressing myself to the question whether present was a case where lease or license was granted to the defendant, on which aspect of the matter also I was addressed by both the learned counsel. 11. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I would hold that the plaintiff could not have obtained khas possession of the land in the present suit. The appeal is, therefore, allowed by dismissing the suit.