JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - The Petitioner challenged the orders of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 contained in Annexures 5, 6 and 7. 2. Shortly stated the facts averred by the Petitioner the Managing Committee, Talapada M. E. School in Karanjia are that opposite party No. 4 was serving as an assistant teacher of the school. In course of employment as such as committed certain acts of indiscipline amounting to misconduct and so in contemplation of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against him, the Petitioner by order dated 1-7-1980 (Annexures 2 (a) and 2 (b) ) placed him under suspension and framed charges against him on 2-7-1980 (Annexure 3 (b)). Presumably because opposite party No. 4 approached opposite party -Nos. 2 .md 3, the Inspector of Schools, Mayurbhanj Circle and the District Inspector of Schools, Panchpir, respectively they advised the Petitioner in the impugned Annexures to revoke the order of suspension and permit opposite party No. 4 to resume duty on the ground that for placing him under suspension, prior approval as required by Rule 21 (2) of the Orissa Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service, of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the ?Rules?) had not been complied with rendering the order of suspension illegal and without jurisdiction. It is asserted that prior approval under Rule 21 (2) of the Rules was not at all necessary for placing opposite party No. 4 under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding and by passing the impugned orders opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 unnecessarily and having no jurisdiction interfered with the administrative affairs of the school and attempted to dent the authority of the Managing Committee to take disciplinary action against its employees. It was therefore, prayed for quashing Annexures 5; 6 and 7. 3 Opposite party? Nos. 1 and 2 alone filed counter and their defence is that charges were framed against opposite party No 4 for misconduct. In answer to the charges opposite party No. 4 submitted his explanation and after consideration of the same and upon hearing opposite,party No. 4. the Petitioner, inflicted penalty of suspension on him without obtaining prior, approval according to Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. In answer to the charges opposite party No. 4 submitted his explanation and after consideration of the same and upon hearing opposite,party No. 4. the Petitioner, inflicted penalty of suspension on him without obtaining prior, approval according to Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. As the order of suspension was passed as a measure of punishment in the disciplinary proceeding, it was necessary for obtaining prior approval according to the aforesaid rule and if it was not done, opposite party Nos, 2 and 3 advised the Petitioner to revoke the order of suspension and permit opposite party No. 4 to resume duty. As such, the orders passed in Annexures 5, 6 and 7 were perfectly justified and opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 were bound by duty to advise the Petitioner to act in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the aforesaid documents cannot be quashed. 4. At the outset there ?was controversy as to whether the order of suspension was passed on contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding or it was passed as a measure of punishment according to Mr. B. K. Patnaik, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the order of suspension .was passed in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against opposite party No. 4. In support of his contention he has drawn our attention to Annexures 2 (a) 2 (b), 3 (a) and 3 (b). From these documents it is patent that opposite .party No. 4 was placed under suspension by order dated 1-7-1980 in pursuance of a resolution of the Managing Committee dated 17-6-1986 in contemplation of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against him by framing charges on 2-7-1980 and sending the draft charges to opposite party No. 2 for favour of approval. It was also intimated to him that opposite party No. 4 had been placed under suspension. Mr. N. C. Panigrahi, learned Additional Government Advocate referred to the averments road, in the counter and urged that opposite party No. 4 submitted his explanation to defend himself of the charges of indiscipline and misconduct brought against him and he was given personal hearing, after which the Managing Committee found that the charges were fully established and so as a measure of punishment opposite party No. 4 was placed under suspension. These averments have, not been supported by any sort of documentary evidence. Suspension as a measure of punishment could not be for an indefinite period. These averments have, not been supported by any sort of documentary evidence. Suspension as a measure of punishment could not be for an indefinite period. Usually after proof of charges suspension is not infected as a measure of punishment, but if the employee has been placed under suspension in contemplation of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding or during the proceeding itself and ultimately the charges are proved against him, suspension already suffered as a punishment is imposed in addition to any other penalty if any. That apart, from the documents produced by the Petitioner it does not appear to be a case of infliction of suspension as a measure of punishment after recording ai finding against opposite party No. 4 that the charges framed against him had been established. We do not, therefore, agree with Mr. Panigrahi in this respect and hold that in, contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding opposite party No. 4 was placed under suspension. The next and the important point that now - falls for consideration is whether according to Rule 21 (2) of the Rules, it was necessary for the Petitioner to obtain prior approval of opposite party No. 2. In connection with this point, Mr. Patnaik referred to the first proviso to ?sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 of the Rule& and urged that in view of the decision reported in Managing Committee, Ranihat High School and Others Vs. Inspector of Schools, Circle-I and Another this legal point is no longer res integra and has to be decided in favour of the Petitioner. Mr. Panigrahi did not dispute the legal proposition, but on the other hand agreed that if the finding of the Court would be that the order of suspension, was passed in contemplation of a disciplinary I proceeding then the law propounded in the reported decision must have to be respected with the result of quashing the impugned Annexures as incompetent and without jurisdiction. In the reported decision the relevant provisions of rules 20 and, 21 were interpreted and it was held that it is the inherent power of every employer to suspend a delinquent employee. Exercise of this power of suspension which is inherent in the employer is subject to the first proviso in Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. In the reported decision the relevant provisions of rules 20 and, 21 were interpreted and it was held that it is the inherent power of every employer to suspend a delinquent employee. Exercise of this power of suspension which is inherent in the employer is subject to the first proviso in Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. In the sitting in which the proviso occurs and keeping the language of the two rules in view, it can be indicated that the proviso is not applicable to a case of suspension pending enquiry. In other words, the first proviso is applicable to a case of suspension as a measure of penalty as contemplated in Rule 20 (1) (e) of the Rules. This being the position of la w and our finding on facts being that the order of suspension in this case was in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against opposite party No. 4, it was not necessary for the Petitioner to obtain prior approval either from opposite party No. 2 or from opposite party No. 3 under Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. Therefore, the impugned Annexures 5, 6 and 7 were unauthorised and in excess of jurisdiction conferred by the aforesaid rule and are liable to be quashed. 6. Mr. Patnaik brought to our notice the further fact that opposite party No. 4 is no longer under the employment of the Petitioner and after obtaining a no objection certificate he has taken up employment elsewhere. Therefore, the writ petition has become infructuous. Mr. Panigrahi could not throw any light of this fact. If on account of taking up service elsewhere this writ petition has become infructuous we cannot help it. Nevertheless, since we have found on facts and law that the impugned Annexures 5, 6 and 7 were unsupportable, we cannot but direct quashing of the same so as to make them nonexistent. 7. In view of the foregoing facts, we allow the writ petition and quash Annexures 5, 6 and 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. V. Gopalaswamy, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Allowed