BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court whereby the writ petition filed by the State Bank of India that is the respondent herein, was allowed and the rule was made absolute. FACTS : ( 2 ) THE facts of this case are as follows :one David Platt Dunderdale executed a Will whereby he appointed writ petitioner the State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as State Bank) as executor and trustee, Dunderdale died on 7th October, 1964 and the State Bank of India applied for and obtained probate of the said Will from this Court on 6th August, 1965. The subject-matter of this writ petition is premises No. 350, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Road, Tollygunge, Calcutta. According to the petitioner, it is a two storeyed building with out-houses which are also dwelling units and have total land area to the extent of 4208. 04 square metres. The covered area of the building and out-houses are to the extent of 392. 14 square metre. The problem arises in view of the enforcement of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 hereinafter referred to as the "ceiling Act") which came into force so far as the State of West Bengal is concerned, on l7th February, 1976. The admitted position is that the said premises falls within the mischief of the said Act unless it is exempted under S. 19, Ceiling Act. The contention of the writ petitioner is that it is exempted in view of the provisions of S. 19 of the said Act. We may point out that so far as the State of West Bengal is concerned, the said Act came into force on 17th February, 1976. The relevant provisions of the said Act are set out hereinbelow : section 2 (a) "appointed day" means (I) in relation to any state to which this Act applies in the first instance, the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, l976 in Parliament; and (II) in relation to any State which adopts this Act under Cl. (l) of Art. 252 of the Constitution, the date of such adoption. (C) "ceiling limit" means the ceiling limit specified in S. 4. (l) of Art. 252 of the Constitution, the date of such adoption. (C) "ceiling limit" means the ceiling limit specified in S. 4. (I) " to hold" with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land, means - (q) to own such land; or (II) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. Explanation :- Where the same vacant land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in another capacity, then, for the purpose of this Act, such land shall be deemed to be held by both such persons. (Q) "vacant land" means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include (I) Land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated; (II) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and (III) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such buildingprovided that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose of daily farming or for the purpose of breeding of livestock, on any land situated in a village within an urban agglomeration (described as a village in the revenue records), then, so much extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause. Section 3. Persons not entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-s. (2) of S. 1. Section 4. Persons not entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-s. (2) of S. 1. Section 4. Ceiling limit : (1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, in the case of every person, the ceiling limit shall be, - (a) where the vacant land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category A specified in Schedule 1, five hundred square metres; (b) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category B specified in Schedule 1, one thousand square metres; (c) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C specified in Schedule 1, one thousand five hundred square metres: (d) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category D specified in Schedule 1, two thousand square metres; (2) where any person holds vacant land situated in two or more categories of urban agglomeration specified in Sch. 1, then, for the purpose of calculating the extent of vacant land held by him, - (a) one square metre of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category A shall be deemed to be equal to two square metres of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category B, three square metres of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C and four square metres of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category D; (b) one square metre of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category B shall be deemed to be equal to one and one-half square metres of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C and two square metres of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category D; and (c) one square metre of vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C shall be deemed to be equal to one and one-third square metres of, vacant land situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category D. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1), where in respect of any vacant land any scheme for group housing has been sanctioned by an authority competent in this behalf immediately before the commencement of this Act, then the person holding such vacant land at such commencement shall be entitled to continue to hold such land for the purpose of group housing; provided that not more than one dwelling unit in the group housing shall be owned by one single person;provided further that the extent of vacant land which such person shall be entitled to hold shall, in no case exceed - (A) the extent required under any building regulations governing such group housing; or (B) the extent calculated by multiplying the number of dwelling-units in the group housing and the appropriate ceiling limit referred to in sub-s. (1), whichever is less. Section 5. Transfer of vacant land. Section 5. Transfer of vacant land. (1) In any State to which this Act applies in the first instance, where any person who had vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of this Act, has transferred such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise the extent of the land so transferred shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person and the excess vacant land in relation to such person shall, for the purpose of this chapter, be selected out of the vacant land held by him after such transfer and in case the entire excess vacant land cannot be so selected, the balance, or where no vacant land is held by him after the transfer, the entire excess vacant land, shall be selected out of the vacant land by the transferee;provided that where such person has transferred his vacant land to more than one person, the balance, or, as the case may be, the entire excess vacant land aforesaid, shall be selected out of the vacant land held by each of the transferees in the same proportion as the area of the vacant land transferred to him bears to the total area of the land transferred to all the transferees. (2) Where any excess vacant land is selected out of the vacant land transferred under subs. (1), the transfer of the excess vacant land so selected shall be deemed to be null and void. (3) In any State to which this Act applies in the first instance and in any State which adopts this Act under Cl. (l) of Art. 252 of the Constitution no person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under S. 6 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub-s. (1) of S. 10; and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void. "section 6. Person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. "section 6. Person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. (1) Every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act shall, within such period as may be prescribed, file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling-unit therein, held by him (including the nature of his right, title or interest therein) and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain; provided that in relation to any State to which this Act applies in the first instance the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words "every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act" the words, figures and letters, "every person who held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit on or after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before the commencement of this Act and every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at such commencement" has been substituted. Section 7 provides for Filing of Statement in case where vacant land held by a person is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more competent authorities. Section 8 provides for preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit. Section 9 deals with final Statement. Section 10 provides for acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. "s. 19. Chapter not to apply to certain vacant lands. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), nothing in this chapter shall apply to any vacant land held by- (i) the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority or any Corporation established by or under a Central or provincial or State Act or any Government company as defined in S. 617, Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (ii) any military, naval or air force institution; (iii) any bank. " Explanation :- In this clause "bank" means any banking company as defined in Cl. " Explanation :- In this clause "bank" means any banking company as defined in Cl. (c) of S. 5, Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (l0) of 1949), and includes, (a) the Reserve Bank of India constituted under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934); (c) a subsidiary bank as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 138 of 1959); (d) a corresponding new bank constituted under S. 3, Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970); (e) the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, established under the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), the Life Insurance Corporation of India, established under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), the Unit Trust of India, established under the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964 (18 of 1964), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India and any other financial institution which the Central Government or the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf; (iv) any public charitable or religious trust (including wakf) and required and used for any public charitable or religious purposes : provided that the exemption under this clause shall apply only so long as such land continues to be required and used for such purposes by such trust; (v) any co-operative society, being a land mortgage bank or a housing cooperative society, registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force : provided that the exemption under this clause, in relation to a land mortgage bank shall not apply to any vacant land held by it otherwise than in satisfaction of its dues; (vi) any such educational, cultural, technical or scientific institution or club (not being a corporation established by or under a Central or Provincial or State Act referred to in Cl. (i) or a society, referred to in Cl. (i) or a society, referred to in Cl. (vii) as may be approved for the purposes of this clause by the State Government by general or special order, on application made to it in this behalf by such institution or club or otherwise : provided that no approval under this clause shall be accorded by the State Government unless that Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do having regard to the nature and scope of the activities of the institution or club concerned, the extent of the vacant land required bona fide for the purposes of such institution or club and other relevant factors; (vii) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any other corresponding law for the time being in force and used for any nonprofit and non-commercial purpose; (viii) a foreign State for the purpose of its diplomatic and consular missions or for such other official purposes as may be approved by the Central Government or for the residence of the members of the said missions; (ix) the United Nations and its specialised agencies for any official purpose or for the residence of the members of their staff; (x) any international organisation for any official purpose or for the residence of the members of the staff of such organisation; provided that the exemption under this clause shall apply only if there is an agreement between the Government of India and such international organisation that such land shall be so exempted. (2) The provisions of sub-s. (1) shall not be construed as granting any exemption in favour of any person other than an authority, institution or organisation specified in sub-s. (1) who possesses any vacant land which is owned by such authority, institution or organisation or who owns any vacant land which is in the possession of such authority, institution or organisation : provided that where any vacant land which is in the possession of such authority, institution or organisation, but owned by any other person, is declared as excess vacant land under this chapter, such authority, institution or organisation shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this chapter, continue to possess such land under the State Government on the same terms and conditions subject to which it possessed such land immediately before such declaration. Explanation :-- For the purpose of this sub-section the expression "to possess vacant land" means to possess such land either as tenant or as mortgagee or under a hirepurchase agreement or under an irrevocable power of attorney or partly in the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. "s. 20. Power to exempt. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this chapter,- (a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter; (B) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter;provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. (2) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this chapter shall apply accordingly. " ( 3 ) IT was argued before the learned single Judge that upon interpretation of the provisions of the said Act, particularly S. 19 thereof, the expression 'hold' in S. 3 and in S. 19. " ( 3 ) IT was argued before the learned single Judge that upon interpretation of the provisions of the said Act, particularly S. 19 thereof, the expression 'hold' in S. 3 and in S. 19. Ceiling Act, does not indicate any contrary intention and as such the State Bank of India ought to be exempted from the operation of the Act since holding of any vacant land by a trustee has not been included in a separate category. It was further contended that the land or property held by the State Bank of India as a trustee is so held as a owner thereof and, therefore, S. 3 does not have any manner of application to any vacant land held by the State Bank of India quo trustee. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the State it was submitted as follows : The State Bank of India has been appointed as an executor and trustee under the Will. The legal rule of the State Bank of India as an executor and trustee is on behalf of the estate left behind by a deceased for distribution of assets to the beneficiaries. The legal ownership did not vest on the petitioner Bank. It was merely functioning as an executor of a Will and not or as a Bank as that of a Banking Institution as contemplated under S. 24 of the Act of 1976. The exemption granted under S. 19 is applicable to the land when the State Bank of India held the land as owner and not on behalf of certain other legatees and as such the bank was not entitled to obtain the benefit of the exemption under S. 19. The Bank had no right over the usufruct, but is only entitled to a remuneration for acting as executor of such estate of a deceased person under the Will and is not entitled to protection or benefit under S. 19 of the Act. In any event, it was submitted that under S. 211, Succession Act, the estate vests in executor and administrator for the purpose of representation. The right to represent the estate for such purpose is not the same as to right with the beneficial interest and the petitioner, State Bank of India, has as such only a limited interest in the property. The right to represent the estate for such purpose is not the same as to right with the beneficial interest and the petitioner, State Bank of India, has as such only a limited interest in the property. ( 5 ) THE learned Judge held as follows :"turning on the principal question, as regards exemption under S. 19 of the Act of 1976 in the normal course of events, holding of any vacant land as owner thereof in so far as the Bank is concerned would not pose any difficulty. But the question arises as to whether S. 19 would have any play and exclude the Bank when the property is being held as an executor trustee as in the case under consideration. Section 2 (1) (ii) at this juncture comes in aid and it clarifies the legislative intent since the statute provides that 'to hold' means, " to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as the mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement. " Admittedly the Bank is holding the property as an executor. "executor" is a legal representative and the property of a trustee vests on to the executor immediately upon the death of the testator. The property upon the death of the testator, in my view, cannot remain in medio, but must vest into somebody. It is at this juncture and prior to the actual disbursement of the property that the respondent-authority claimed its application in so far as the petitioner-Bank is concerned. In the event, the property cannot remain in medio, the ownership ought to vest into somebody and in this case into the petitioner-Bank. The submission of the learned Additional Advocate-General that under S. 211, Succession Act, that the estate vest in the executor and administrator for the purpose of representation only and the right to represent for such purpose is not the same as the right to hold the property with beneficial interest cannot, in my view, be accepted. The statute recognises the right of even a tenant in the matter of holding of such vacant land or that of a mortgagee or even under a hire-purchase agreement. The statute recognises the right of even a tenant in the matter of holding of such vacant land or that of a mortgagee or even under a hire-purchase agreement. The statute thus makes it clear that whosoever holds vacant land either in the capacity of a true owner or in the capacity of tenant or mortgagee, shall come within the four-corners of S. 3 with the exception as mentioned in S. 19. The exemption granted is not restrictive in nature but absolute. The language of S. 19 makes it clear and categorical that Chapter-III would not have any application to any vacant land held by any Bank. There is neither any restriction as noted above nor any condition attached thereto and as such, in my view, whether as owner or as an executor even though not true owner, the Bank can claim exemption from the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1976. An attempt on the part of the respondent-authority was made to suggest that in the event the Court allows exemption so far as the Bank is concerned in regard to the applicability of this Act, then it would mean and imply that in order to avoid the applicability of the Act of 1976 owners of land would appoint the Bank as an executor and thereby retain the vacant land contrary to the legislative intent. In my opinion, the said contention also has no force since avoidance in future does not and cannot arise in regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1976. " ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved by the same, the State and its Officers have preferred this appeal. ARGUMENTS : ( 7 ) TO appreciate the contentions raised in support of the writ petition, we called upon the writ petitioners to make their submissions fitst in support of the writ petition and the judgment. Mr. Biswarup Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the State Bank of India has drawn our attention to various provisions of the Ceiling Act, Succession Act, State Bank of India Act and Banking Regulations Act which we have quoted above. Mr. Biswarup Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the State Bank of India has drawn our attention to various provisions of the Ceiling Act, Succession Act, State Bank of India Act and Banking Regulations Act which we have quoted above. On the question whether at the time of the Ceiling Act coming into force so far as the Dunderdale's estate is concerned, State Bank which was appointed both as executor and trustee under the Will was acting as a trustee as the administration of the estate as executor was completed. In this context he has drawn our attention to the affidavit of Rabindra Nath Bhattacharya affirmed on 15th of February, 1988 pursuant to our directions. In the said affidavit it is, inter alia, stated as follows :--"4. The State Bank of India assumed the Office as appointed by the said Will and applied for probate before this Hon'ble Court and such probate was granted on or about August 6, 1965 and respondent 1 craves leave to refer to the said probate at the time of hearing. 5. A copy of the affidavit of assets affirmed on 28th July, 1965 is annexed hereto marked "a". 6. The State Bank of India duly paid the estate duty due on the said estate of the said deceased as assessed. A certificate of the Controller of Estate Duty dated 21st June, 1965 showing that no estate duty in respect of the property passing on the death of the said deceased was due, is annexed hereto marked "b". Also annexed hereto marked "c" is a letter dated 6th May, 1965 from the State Bank of India to the Advocates-on-records Sandersons and Morgans enclosing cheque for the payment of Rs. 86,702. 75 p. pursuant to demand by the Assistant Controller, Estate Duty. 7. So far as the payment of the pecuniary legacies enjoined by the said Will, the same were paid as stated hereinbelow : -" Mrs. Marry Anne Phillips nee V on Rotoff paid 1. 000 on 14-2-1967 through our London Office from the assets thereat. Sri Ram Rikh Singh paid on 31-1-1966 for Rs. 5,000/ -. Sri Kartick Nayak paid on 2-2-1966 for Rs. 10,000/ -. Sri Russi Nayak paid on 8-2-1966 for Rs. 3,000/ -. Marry Anne Phillips nee V on Rotoff paid 1. 000 on 14-2-1967 through our London Office from the assets thereat. Sri Ram Rikh Singh paid on 31-1-1966 for Rs. 5,000/ -. Sri Kartick Nayak paid on 2-2-1966 for Rs. 10,000/ -. Sri Russi Nayak paid on 8-2-1966 for Rs. 3,000/ -. '' The aforesaid payments were duly intimated to Sandersons and Morgans, Advocates-on-records of the State Bank of India by letter dated February 4, 1988, a copy of which is annexed hereto marked 'd'. Copies of receipts and/or discharge given by the legatees are annexed, and also included in Annexure-'d' hereof. ( 8 ) THE funeral expenses of the said deceased were duly paid and so were his tax liabilities under Income-tax Act and Wealth-tax Act. His funeral expenses were duly paid to Lawrence and Company as will appear from the said affidavit of assets in Annexure-'a' thereto as also his other debts referred to therein. There were no other debts of the deceased to be discharged and no claims apart from what is stated above were received by the State Bank of India. "8. In this context we may also refer to the relevant portions of the Will of Dunderdale which provides as follows :-"1. I bequeath the following pecuniary legacies free of all duties :- (a) To Mary Anne Pillips (nee von Rotoff) residing at No. 19, Royd Street, Calcutta, the sum of 1,000/- (Pounds one thousand sterling) or the equivalent in Indian Currency whichever he prefers. (b) To Ram Rikh Singh of 14 Raidaspuri, Post Office and District Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, India the sum of Rs. 5,000/- ( Rupees five thousand ). (c) To Kartick Nayak of village Kulassar, Post Office Rai Sunakhela, District Puri India the sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand ). (d) To Russi Nayak of village Kulassar aforesaid the sum of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand ). 2. 5,000/- ( Rupees five thousand ). (c) To Kartick Nayak of village Kulassar, Post Office Rai Sunakhela, District Puri India the sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand ). (d) To Russi Nayak of village Kulassar aforesaid the sum of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand ). 2. I appoint the State Bank of India hereinafter called 'the Bank') to be Executor of this my Will and I direct the Bank after paying the said legacies and my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses to hold all the residue of my estate movable and immovable and wheresoever situate (hereinafter called 'my residuary estate') upon trust to sell call in and convert my residuary estate into money with full power to postpone such sale calling in and conversion for such length of time as the Bank shall think fit and upon trust to invest the proceeds of such sale calling in and conversion in such investments as to the Bank may seem fit and proper (the Bank being hereby expressly absolved from all liability for any loss resulting from any investment made by it) and to hold such investments and all parts of my residuary estate as shall for the time being remain unsold or unconverted upon trust to pay the net income of my residuary estate to Bijay Pal Singh son of the said Ram Rikh Singh for his life and after the death of the said Bijay Pal Singh upon trust as to both the capital and income of my residuary estate for the issue of the said Bijay Pal Singh and equally between them if more than one or if he shall die without issue (whether before or after my death) upon trust to pay such net income to the said Kartick Nayak and after the death of the said Kartick Nayak upon trust as to both the capital and income of my residuary estate for the issue (including any adopted child) of the said Kartick Nayak and equally between them if more than one. " ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY he has submitted that the function of the bank as Executor has come to an end as the administration of the estate as Executor was complete and the Bank had started to function as trustee when the Ceiling Act came into operation. " ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY he has submitted that the function of the bank as Executor has come to an end as the administration of the estate as Executor was complete and the Bank had started to function as trustee when the Ceiling Act came into operation. In this connection he has drawn our attention to Chhatra Kumar Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah, 58 Ind App 279 (page 297); W. O. Holdsworth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 887 at page 891 (Para 22) and (Kadiyala) Venkata Subarna v. (Katreddi) Ramayya AIR 1932 PC 92. ( 10 ) ON the merits he has repeated his submissions made before the trial Court and relied on the reasoning of the learned trial Judge. In this context, he has submitted further that the question of referring to the preamble of the Ceiling Act or any other extraneous evidence does not arise in the present case. The language of the Act is clear. The definition of 'holding' is given and the bank is the only person who was holding the property at the relevant time. This clearly comes within the scope of the exemption under S. 19, Ceiling Act. In this connection he has also drawn our attention to Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 196l SC 418; Attorney General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49, 62; State of Gujarat v. Parshottamdas Ramdas Patel, AIR 1988 SC 220 ) (Paras 3 and 9 ). So far as the validity of the Act is concerned, he had drawn our attention to Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, AIR l98l SC 234 and Maharao Sahib Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1650 . ( 11 ) MR. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for one of the purchasers admitted that the properties held by private trustees are not exempted. He has submitted that the holding of properties is part of carrying out the statutory duties of the Banks. It is to protect the carrying out of the statutory activities of the Banks that the exemption has been granted. In this context he has drawn our attention to the relevant provisions of the State Bank of India Act and Banking Regulation Act. ( 12 ) MR. It is to protect the carrying out of the statutory activities of the Banks that the exemption has been granted. In this context he has drawn our attention to the relevant provisions of the State Bank of India Act and Banking Regulation Act. ( 12 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has drawn our attention to the supplementary affidavit and submitted that at the relevant time the administration was not completed. In this connection he has drawn our attention to S. 211, Succession Act and AIR 1938 Cal 714, (Kulwant Bewa v. Karamchand Sain) corresponding to ILR (1939) 1 Cal 21 at pages 33 and 34. He has submitted that regarding the holding of property no restricted interpretation is to be given. In this connection he had drawn our attention to Ummachikannummal Mohammed Pathummal v. Bhargavan Rajan, AIR 1964 Ker 258 . He has submitted that restricted interpretation to be given to the relevant portions of the section. So far as the position of executor is concerned, he has submitted that the executor as such cannot get more right than the deceased. He has submitted that had the testator been alive, he could not get any such exemption. In this connection he has drawn our attention to Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohan Gossain, (1879) ILR 4 Cal 1 at page 5. He has also drawn our attention to various provisions of Wealth-tax Act and Income-tax Act as to the meaning of the expression 'holding' or 'owner'. He has next submitted that the trustee is not a full owner of the estate; only a restricted power is given to him. In this connection he has drawn our attention to Ss. 36, 47 and 48, Trusts Act. On the question of "legal ownership" and "beneficial ownership", he has drawn our attention to Ramabai v. Raghunath, AIR 1952 Bom 106 . On the question of the Principles of Interpretation of Statute, he has drawn our attention to Mohindar Singh v. Ramindar Singh, AIR 1944 PC 83 and A. C. Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of I. T. West Bengal, AIR 1955 SC 661 . * or Bengal Immunity co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar - Ed. ( 13 ) MR. On the question of the Principles of Interpretation of Statute, he has drawn our attention to Mohindar Singh v. Ramindar Singh, AIR 1944 PC 83 and A. C. Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of I. T. West Bengal, AIR 1955 SC 661 . * or Bengal Immunity co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar - Ed. ( 13 ) MR. Dutt, the learned Advocate, whom we had requested to appear to assist the Court, places the relevant sections of the Ceiling Act and submits that the intention of the Legislature was to give relief to the Bank using land not only for its own benefit but also for others. Mr. Biswarup Gupta, learned Counsel in his reply has submitted that it is merely fortuitous and not intended that the private trust held by the private person or person is not to be entitled to exemption. Here the 15th March, 1964 is the date of the Will and the 7th October, 1964 is the date of death of Dunderdale. It is not possible for any one to judge the intention of the testator. Further he has said that nobody else can be called to be the owner of the land. ( 14 ) WE shall first report to the decisions cited before us. So far as the legal position of. the trustees and the executors are concerned following decisions were cited. ( 15 ) IN the case of W. O. Holdsworth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 887 the Supreme Court held as follows : -"whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (11 of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. Section 3 of that Act defines a trust as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner; the person who accepts the confidence is called the 'trustee' : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the 'beneficiary' : "the beneficial interest" or "interest" of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; the subject- matter of the trust is called "trust property" or "trust money". (Para 22)"these definitions emphasize that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He no doubt holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions "for the benefit of" and "on behalf of' are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings. The former connotes a benefit which is enjoyed by another thus bringing in a relationship as between a trustee and a beneficiary or cestui que trust, the latter connotes an agency which brings about a relationship as between principal and agent between the parties one of whom is acting on behalf of another. Section 11 (1) therefore can only come into operation where the land from which agricultural income is derived is held by such common manager, receiver, administrator or the like on behalf of, in other words as agent or representative of persons jointly interested in such land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom. Even though such persons were the beneficiaries cestui que trust under a deed of trust, they would not be comprised within the category of persons on whose behalf such land is held by the trustees and the trustees would not be included in the description of common manager, receiver, administrator or the like so as to attract the operation of S. 11 (1 ). Trustees do not hold the land from* which agricultural income is derived on behalf of the beneficiaries but they hold it in their own right though for the benefit of the beneficiaries. " (Para 23)"the beneficiaries are also not necessarily persons who are jointly interested in such land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom. The term "jointly interested" is well known in law and predicates an undivided interest in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom as distinguished from a separate or an undivided interest therein. " (Para 23)"the beneficiaries are also not necessarily persons who are jointly interested in such land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom. The term "jointly interested" is well known in law and predicates an undivided interest in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom as distinguished from a separate or an undivided interest therein. If on a true reading of the provisions of the deed of trust the interest which is created in the beneficiaries is a separate or undivided interest of each of the beneficiaries in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom, merely because they have a common interest therein, that cannot make that interest a joint interest in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom. The words "jointly interested" have got to be understood in their legal sense and having been used in a statute are not capable of being understood in a popular sense as meaning a common interest or an interest enjoyed by person in common with another or others. " (Para 24) ( 16 ) IN the case of Bholanath Shaw v. Badrinath Shaw reported in AIR 1974 Cal