JUDGMENT : A.K. Padhi, J. - The Appellant challenges the conviction passed u/s 302 I.P.C. by the, Sessions Judge, Kalahandi in Sessions Case No. 48 of 1982 sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case as narrated is: On 13.10.1981 at about 10.00 A.M. one Kendu Gauda (P.W. 2) had gone to Gopalpur to purchase rice and while returning home, on the way saw the present Appellant Bhaga Gouda and Dhanu Gouda (since acquitted) quarrelling with Saiba Gouda, the deceased. Bhaga Gouda (Appellant) was armed with a 'Tangia' and accused Dhanu with a Lathi. Bhaga inflicted two blows with the Tangia on the head of the deceased and accused Dhanu gave lathi blows to the deceased. On seeing the incident P.W. 2 - came home and informed P.W. 1, the brother of the deceased regarding the incident. On getting the information from P.W. 2, P.W. 1 went to the place of assault and found the deceased lying dead in a nearby Pani Nala. As by the time P.W. 1 found the dead body it was already dark, the information was lodged on the next day i.e. 14.10.1981. The written information lodged by P.W. 1 was scribed by P.W. 3 and on completion of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted u/s 302/34 I.P.C. against the present Appellant and one Dhanu Gouda. Dhanu Gauda has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge. 3. The prosecution, to prove its case has examined nine witness. P.W. 1, the informant is the brother of the deceased. P.W. 2 is the only eye witness to the occurrence and he had informed P.W. 1 regarding the murder. P.W. 3 is the scribe of Ext. 1, the first information report and claims that both the accused persons made extra-judicial confessions before him. P.W. 4 is the witness who speaks about the discover of the axe (M.O. I), the weapon of offence, which was discovered (Tangia) on information given by the Appellant. P.W. 5 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem. P.W. 6 is the Constable who accompanied the dead body and P.W. 7 is the witness to the inquest as well as the discovery of M.O. I, the axe, P.W. 8 is the witness regarding the extra judicial confession and P.W. 9 is the Investigating Officer. 4. P.W. 5 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem. P.W. 6 is the Constable who accompanied the dead body and P.W. 7 is the witness to the inquest as well as the discovery of M.O. I, the axe, P.W. 8 is the witness regarding the extra judicial confession and P.W. 9 is the Investigating Officer. 4. The learned Sessions Judge has given the findings: (a) the death of the deceased was homicidal; (b) P.W. 2 the only eye witness, though, implicates Dhanu Gouda in his examination in chief, has stated in the cross-examination that he has only seen the assault given by Bhaga Gouda and none else on the deceased and there being no other material against Dhanu Gauda. Dhanu Gouda is not guilty and is to be acquitted. (c) Bhaga Gouda has committed the murder of the deceased. 5. For convicting Bhaga Gouda the learned Sessions Judge has relied on: (i) the direct evidence of the only eye witness (P.W. 2). (ii) the extra judicial confession of the accused persons before P.Ws. 3 and 8. (iii) the recovery of the axe (M.O. I) on the disclosure statement made by accused Bhaga Gouda as stated by P.Ws. 4 and 7. 6. Mr. S.K. Mohanty, the learned Advocate for the Appellant contends: (i) the evidence of P.W. 2 should not be accepted as he has made prevaricating statements in the chief examination and cross-examination; (ii) in the cross-examination P.W. 2 has stated that he was not examined by the police in this case, though P.W. 9 has stated that he has examined P.W. 2, but the evidence of P.W.9 should not be accepted as P.W. 2 has made a categorical statement; (iii) the extra judicial confession should not be accepted, as the exact words spoken by the accused-Appellant have not been stated by the witnesses and (iv) the recovery of the axe as stated by P.Ws. 4 and 7 do not come within the scope and mischief of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Hence it is of no avail to the prosecution and there being no other material on record, the Appellant is entitled to an acquittal. There is much force In these contentions. 7. P.Ws. 3 and 8 speak about the extra judicial confession of the Appellant and Dhanu Gouda before them. P.W. 3 has not stated the exact words stated by the Appellant. There is much force In these contentions. 7. P.Ws. 3 and 8 speak about the extra judicial confession of the Appellant and Dhanu Gouda before them. P.W. 3 has not stated the exact words stated by the Appellant. P.W. 8 has stated as follows; ...when I along with P.W. 3 were going towards our field, we saw the accused persons coming near to Rampur Block Colony. Being asked by us as to where they were going the accused persons stated to us that they have caused the death of Saiba Gouda and going to the P.S. Moreover, P.W. 3 is the scribe of the F.I.R. lodged by P.W. 1. In his statement P.W. 3 also states that he has scribed the F.I.R. from his own knowledge and after the extra judicial confession were made. But in the F.I.R. nothing has been mentioned regarding the extra judicial confession made by the accused before P.W. 3 which indicates that no such extra judicial confession has been made. Both P.Ws. 3 and 8 do not speak about the exact words stated by the accused before them, nor the witnesses speak about any previous association with the accused persons to justify the inference that the accused persons had reposed confidence in them. Retracted extra judicial confession can legally form the basis of conviction only if it is trust worthy free from suspicion and voluntary. In a decision reported in Heramba Brahma and Another Vs. State of Assam at paragraph 18, their Lordships have laid down as follows; We are at a loss to understand how the High Court accepted the evidence on this extra-judicial confession without examining the credentials of P.W. 2 Bistiram; without ascertaining the words used; without referring to the decision of this Court to be presently mentioned wherein it is succinctly stated that extra-judicial confession to afford a piece of reliable evidence must pass the, test of reproduction of exact words, the reason or motive for confession and person selected in whom confidence is reposed. In Rahim Beg and Another Vs. State of U.P. this Court: while examining the evidence, as to extra judicial confession made by two accused to Mohmed Nasim Khan (P.W. 4) observed that; "There was no history of previous association between the witness and the two accused as may justify the inference that the accused could repose confidence in him. In Rahim Beg and Another Vs. State of U.P. this Court: while examining the evidence, as to extra judicial confession made by two accused to Mohmed Nasim Khan (P.W. 4) observed that; "There was no history of previous association between the witness and the two accused as may justify the inference that the accused could repose confidence in him. In the circumstances, it seems highly improbable that the two accused would go to Mohmed Nasim Khan and blurt out a confession. Relying on the aforesaid principles the irresistable conclusion is that the so called extra judicial confession cannot be accepted and acted upon against the Appellant. Since P.Ws. 3 and 8 have not stated the exact words spoken by them, and when the Appellant reposed confidence and made the extra judicial confession, the evidence of the P.Ws. have to be discarded and cannot form the basis of conviction. 8. The next item of evidence which has been relied on by the prosecution is the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 7 regarding the discovery of the axe. P.W. 4 has stated that: Accused Bhaga while under police arrest stating to have kept the tangia led me and the police to a Kendu bush at Sargiguda Bhata and brought out the tangia which he had concealed inside the Kendu bush which was seized by the police under seizure list Ext. 3. Ext. 3/1 is my signature thereon. M.O. I is the tangia which the accused gave recovery, which had concealed inside the Kendu bush and seized under seizure list, Ext. 3 P.W. 7 has stated as follows; Being asked by the police the accused Bhaga stating to have concealed the tangia under a Kendu bush led us and the police to the Kendu bush where he had concealed the tangia and gave recovery of the tangia which the police seized under seizure list. Ext. 3. Ext. 3/2 is my signature thereon. M.O. I is the tangia which the police seized under seizure list, Ext. 3. On production of the accused. What is admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act is the information received from an accused as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. Ext. 3. Ext. 3/2 is my signature thereon. M.O. I is the tangia which the police seized under seizure list, Ext. 3. On production of the accused. What is admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act is the information received from an accused as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. In other words, the pre-condition to bring Section 27 into operation is that the discovery of a fact must be deposed to and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. "Information" used in Section 27 means the content or substance of a statement. Therefore, the exact information given by the accused while in custody or in other words, the statement made by the accused must be recorded by the Investigating Officer and if pursuant to such information or statement recovery is made, then that information or statement becomes admissible u/s 27. But in the present case, neither the Investigating Officer nor the witnesses in whose presence the accused is said to have given the information have indicated the exact information or statement made by the accused and, therefore, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is wholly inapplicable. Though Section 27 of the Evidence Act has no application, yet the fact that while in custody the accused led the police and the witnesses to a Kendu bush and brought out a tangia (M.O. I) which was thereupon seized, would be relevant and admissible as a piece of conduct of the accused u/s 8 of the Evidence Act. In view of the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 7, discussed earlier, and to the same effect is the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 9), the fact that the accused led the police while in custody to a Kendu bush and brought out a tangia (M.O. I) can be utilised as a piece of incriminating conduct on the part of the accused. But the said piece of incriminating evidence by itself cannot be said to be conclusive and on that basis alone, conviction of the Appellant u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, cannot be sustained. 9. But the said piece of incriminating evidence by itself cannot be said to be conclusive and on that basis alone, conviction of the Appellant u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, cannot be sustained. 9. So far as the evidence of P.W. 2, the eye witness is concerned, the examination in chief P.W. 2 has stated that saw accused Bhaga Gouda was holding a tangia and accused Dhanu Gauda inflicted blows with the tangia on the head of the deceased as a result of which the deceased fell down, Accused Dhanu Gauda gave lathi blows to the deceased." In the cross-examination P.W. 2 has stated that: At first Bhaga Gouda inflicted blow with tangia on the head of the deceased. Bhaga Gouda dealt tangia blow standing behind the deceased. Due to assault, the deceased fell down with his face down-words. The second blow by tangia given by Bhaga Gouda hit on the left side of the head of the deceased that is one inch above the left ear. The second blow extended from the head up to left side check. After seeing these two assaults, I left the place of assault. Besides these two assaults by Bhaga Gouda I have not seen any other assault. P.W. 2 though specifically implicated Dhanu as one of the assailants of the deceased, he has resiled from the same and in the cross-examination, has made a positive statement that he has not seen any other assault except those given by Bhaga Gouda thereby contradicting his own version in the chief examination. Besised this prevaricating statement made by P.W. 2, though P.W. 9 states that he has examined P.W. 2, but P.W. 2 stated that he has not been examined by the police. In the case diary which was there in the record and was perused by us it also appears that the statement of P.W. 2 is not at a place where it should have been and in fact it appears to have been inserted. In the premises, we entertain a doubt as to whether P.W. 2 was at all examined by the police. The categorical statement of P.W. 2 is that he has not been examined by the police should be accepted in the circumstances. At any rate no reliance can be placed on the testimony of such a witness. In Ugar Ahir and Others Vs. The categorical statement of P.W. 2 is that he has not been examined by the police should be accepted in the circumstances. At any rate no reliance can be placed on the testimony of such a witness. In Ugar Ahir and Others Vs. The State of Bihar their Lordships have held: The maxim falsus in une, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes accross a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embolishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the Court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. In Badri Vs. State of Rajasthan their Lordships have stated in paragraph 12 that: Since under the Evidence Act no particular number of witnesses are required for the proof of any fact, it is a sound and well established rule or law that quality and not quantity or evidence matters. In each case the court has to consider whether it can be reasonably satisfied to act even upon the testimony of a single witness for the purpose of convicting a person. Their Lordships further held that: If a witness who is the only witness against the accused to prove a serious charge of murder can modulate his evidence to suit a particular prosecution theory for the deliberate purpose of securing a conviction, such witness cannot be considered as a reliable person and no conviction can be based on his sole testimony. In Lakshmi Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar it has been held: ...This is a case where it is not possible to disengage the truth from falsehood to shift the grain from the chaffy The truth and falsehood are so enextricably mixed together that it is difficult to separate them. Indeed if one tries to do so it will amount to reconstructing a new case for the prosecution which cannot be done in a criminal case. In Harun Tirkey and Others Vs. Indeed if one tries to do so it will amount to reconstructing a new case for the prosecution which cannot be done in a criminal case. In Harun Tirkey and Others Vs. The State their Lordships in paragraph 13 have held: It must always be remembered that in criminal trials when a particular witness or batch of witnesses are shown to have swerved from the path of truth, either by suppression or by embellishment of facts which are untrue such evidence must, as a rule, be discarded in absence of any independent and reliable corroboration by aid of which the truth out of the tarnished evidence can be shifted and falsehood distinguished. Once It is found that a witness is lying in part in absence of any sure test to distinguish the truth from falsehood in the case, the whole testimony becomes discredited and cannot be relied upon for any purpose whatsoever. P.W. 2 has tried to implicate Dhanu as one of the assailants of the deceased while in the cross-examination he had resiled from it and has stated that he has only seen Bhaga assaulting. This is a vital contradiction. He was not examined by the police as stated by him P.W. 2 does not appear to be a truthful witness and his evidence does not inspire confidence. There is no other material or evidence on record to act upon and maintain the conviction of the Appellant. The learned Sessions Judge has not weighed the Intrinsic value of the evidence and circumstances on record. 10. In the premises aforesaid, we hold that the prosecute on has failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused-Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The conviction of the Appellant u/s 302, I.P.C. and the sentence thereunder passed by the learned Sessions Judge, are accordingly set aside and the accused is set at liberty forthwith. G.B. Patnaik, J. 11. I agree.