R. J. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioner has prayed for an appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 24-4-1979 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 644 of 1978 as also for quashing the orders passed by the authorities below. The further prayer made in the petition is that the matter be remanded to the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. Mehmadabad for disposal in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 32 (1b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the petitioner has claimed that he was in possession of the land in question as a tenant on 15 and that thereafter he submitted an application under Sec. 70 read with Sec. 32 (1b) of the Act for claiming possession of the land. That application was dated 15-7-1976. The petitioner has claimed that in the said application his case was that he was the tenant of the land in question that he had submitted an application on 5-5-1973 to the Mamlatdar that he had submitted a fresh application on 24 through his Advocate and that as there was no reply from the Mamlatdar the petitioner had submitted a fresh application on 15 The said application dated 15-7-1976 was rejected by the Mamlatdar on the ground that since the possession was not with the landlord the application of the petitioner cannot be allowed. The petitioner had pursued the matter further before the Deputy Collector by way of an appeal being Tenancy Appeal No. 148 of 1977. The learned Deputy Collector came to the conclusion that the said application of the petitioner was barred by time. On merits also he had reached the conclusion against the petitioner. The petitioner had pursued the matter further before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and as per the order in question impugned in this petition the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the said application of the petitioner was time barred. The Tribunal also reached the conclusion that on merits the case was in favour of the petitioner. The Tribunal however rejected the revision application before it as barred by time. Hence the present petition. The Tribunal also reached the conclusion that on merits the case was in favour of the petitioner. The Tribunal however rejected the revision application before it as barred by time. Hence the present petition. ( 3 ) SO far as the aspect of limitation is concerned it is necessary to consider Sec. 32 (1b) of the said Act. This section provides that an application pursuant to the said section could be either on the application filed by the tenant or suo motu by the Mamlatdar concerned. The facts of the present case clearly reveal that the application filed by the petitioner before the Mamlatdar was clearly beyond time. The question therefore is whether the said application could be considered as one where the Mamlatdar could invoke his jurisdiction under the said Sec. 32 (1b ). It is pertinent to note that so far as exercise of powers by the Mamlatdar is concerned there is no such time limit prescribed. It is therefore open to the Mamlatdar to start a suo motu enquiry under Sec. 32 (1b ). This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra. In the case of Rasulmiya Rehmanmiya v. Patel Lalbhai Shankerbhai [1983 (1)] XXIV (1) GLR 714 it has been held by this Court as under (at page No. 720 of GLR):"if a competent officer under the Bombay Tenancy Act decides the matter on merit even though the said decision may not be supportable by a given provision of law it can still be sustained under any other provision of the Tenancy Act. The Mamlatdar has been advisably entrusted with suo motu power by the Legislature to entertain any appropriate case under Sec. 32 (1b) even if the aggrieved tenant might not have applied within time for redress of his grievance. Section 32 (1b) is a beneficial provision enacted with a view to protect the rights of illiterate and ignorant tenants who might have been duped by their crafty landlords into giving up possession of their lands contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Such tenants might skip the period on one years limitation as provided by the statutory Rules. (Rule 15 (A) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules 1956 However they are given a locus poenitentiae in the form of invocation of suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar for getting justice. Such tenants might skip the period on one years limitation as provided by the statutory Rules. (Rule 15 (A) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules 1956 However they are given a locus poenitentiae in the form of invocation of suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar for getting justice. Their time barred applications seek to do nothing else but to inform the Mamlatdar about the injustice done to them. Once convinced the justness of the grievance put forward by such a tenant if the Mamlatdar proceeds to deal with the case under Sec 32 (1b) on merits only inference that can follow from such a course adopted by the Mamlatdar is that be has thought it fit to invoke his suo motu powers which are not subject to any period of limitation". The present case is clearly governed by the ratio of the said decision. As stated above the Tribunal has decided the said revision application before it on 24-4-1979 and the decision cited above was not then available to the Tribunal. In view of the said decision learned Advocate Mr. Supehia for the respondent No. 3 one of the contesting respondents has fairly submitted that the position is set atleast by the said ratio on the aspect of limitation. The judgment and order of the Tribunal therefore on the aspect of limitation cannot by sustained. ( 4 ) AS stated above the Tribunal has also proceeded to consider the case on merits. As stated above both the authorities below have held against the petitioner on merits. The Tribunal however has reached a different conclusion on merits than the one reached by the authorities below. ( 5 ) IN this connection it is necessary to refer to Sec. 76 (1) (c) of the said Act which is reproduced below:" 76 Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act 1957 an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any older of the Collector except an order under Sec. 32p or an order in appeal against an order under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 32g on the following grounds only (A) xxx xxx xxx (B) xxx xxx xxx (C) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice"the legislature has therefore advisedly provided that if there is the failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice then also the power of revision can be exercised. Examining the case in the light of the above principle it would seem that the Tribunal has correctly acted on the said principle in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no dispute that petitioner Bhaikha was the tenant of the land upto 1955-56. There is also no dispute that on the appointed day namely 15 petitioner-Bhaikha was a tenant on the land in-question. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons of deceased Bai Noorbai Gafurbhai. Said Noorbai as it appears from the record of rights was the owner of the land. It has been alleged that she had entered into a Banakhat in the year 1960 in favour of respondent No. 3 and that as against the consideration of Rs. 10 0 she had handed over possession to respondent No. 3 of the land in question. So far as said Banakhat is concerned the first thing to be noticed is that the same is not a registered document. It has not been referred to in any document upto the time the said application was filed by the petitioner. It has also not even been referred to in the sale deed in respect of the land in question that came to be executed on 17-6-1974. It has also not been appreciated by either of the authorities below as to why there was such a time-lag between the execution of the Banakhat and the execution of the ultimate sale deed. It has also not been appreciated as to why the said Banakhat has not been referred to anywhere for a long period of 14 years. It has also not been appreciated by either of the authorities below as to why there was such a time-lag between the execution of the Banakhat and the execution of the ultimate sale deed. It has also not been appreciated as to why the said Banakhat has not been referred to anywhere for a long period of 14 years. Apart from this aspect the stamp of said Banakhat is of the date 2-6-1960 and has been purchased not by respondent No. 3 or by said Noorbai or by anyone on behalf of either of them but has been purchased by one Vasava Kalyanbhai Bhailalbhai and that too of village Vithalpura even though both said Noorbai and respondent No. 3 belonged to Mehmadabad. None has explained satisfactorily as to why the said stamp had to be purchased from Vithalpura instead of from Mehmadabad itself where such stamp was available. None has also explained the connection between Vasava Kalyanbhai Bhailalbhai and respondent No. 3 or said Noorbai if there was any connection. None has also stated in evidence as to from where said consideration of Rs. 10 0 came. None has also explained as to why the sale deed was not executed immediately when full consideration amount was received. It is difficult to appreciate that the said sale deed was not executed earlier simply because registration fee and charges were required to be paid. It seems that the authorities below have merely looked at the form of the transaction and have not taken into consideration the broad probabilities of the case which indicated in the direction that the whole transaction was a sham and bogus one. All these important aspects have been correctly taken into consideration by the Tribunal. There is no reason to reach a conclusion that the power under Sec. 76 (1) (c) has been illegally or wrongly exercised by the Tribunal in the above connection. It therefore seems that the approach of the Tribunal has been what it should be. ( 6 ) IN this connection Mr. Supehia learned Advocate for the Respondent No. 3 has invited my attention to the decision in the case of Raj Madhavsang Gulabsang v. Parmar Ranchhodbhai Gulabsang and Ors. (1976) XVII GLR 689. It therefore seems that the approach of the Tribunal has been what it should be. ( 6 ) IN this connection Mr. Supehia learned Advocate for the Respondent No. 3 has invited my attention to the decision in the case of Raj Madhavsang Gulabsang v. Parmar Ranchhodbhai Gulabsang and Ors. (1976) XVII GLR 689. It was stated on the basis of the observations made in paragraph 8 of the judgment that in the present case the evidence had been appreciation by the authorities below and the Tribunal ought not to have disturbed the finding arrived at by the lower authorities since what the Tribunal had done was only appreciation of evidence. It is difficult to agree with the said submission in view of what has been provided under the said Sec. 76 (1) (c) and also in view of the manner and the approach that the Tribunal has adopted in the present case. ( 7 ) IN view of all the aforesaid the petition is allowed. The judgment and orders at Annexures A B and C are hereby set aside. The matter is now remanded to the Mamlatdar and A. L T. Mehmadabad for proceeding further with the application of the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 32 (1b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 Rule is made absolute accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .