JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. 1. This petition is at the instance of a Pradhan resident of village Ruhailki Dayalpur, Pargana Block and Post Bhagwanpur, Tehsil Roorkee district Saharanpur. He challenges two orders, one of the Prescribed! Authority dated 15 December, 1986 and a subsequent order of the lVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, dated 6 March, 1987 in revision, by which, in effect the election of the petitioner as Pradhan has been set aside. 2. Two issues were raised in the election petition filed by the respondent no. 3, Hukam Singh. The first issue was whether the votes cast which ought not to have been included, were counted to declare the petitioner elected as Pradhan. The second issue was that the petitioner did not have the status to hold the office of a Pradhan as he has not attended the age of 30 years. The qualification of age has been prescribed under section 5-B of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. If the second issue, as determined, by the two courts below is upheld then the election of the petitioner as a Pradhan has rightly been set aside. The arguments on behalf of the petitioner are in reference to his age when he sought election as a Pradhan. The other issue has not been debated. Learned counsel for the petitioner, unfortunately did not take recourse to refer to the two impugned orders and has submitted more law without the facts, in reference to the context. 3. There has been a discrepancy in the age as had been declared on behalf of the petitioner and thus, the issue whether he was qualified to hold the office of a Pradhan on the date when he filed his nomination for seeking this office. 4. It is the contention of the respondent No. 3 that as on the date when the nomination paper was submitted the petitioner was less than 30 years of age. The entire facts had been seen thread-bare by the Prescribed Authority who held by an order of 15 December, 1986 that the petitioner did not have the requisite age of 30 years as has been stipulated under section 5-B, aforesaid. Thus, from very inception he did not have the qualification to hold the office. The entire facts had been seen thread-bare by the Prescribed Authority who held by an order of 15 December, 1986 that the petitioner did not have the requisite age of 30 years as has been stipulated under section 5-B, aforesaid. Thus, from very inception he did not have the qualification to hold the office. The election was basically set aside on this ground The issue of age was debated before the two courts below. The learned District Judge has examined every aspect of the matter which was debated before the Prescribed Authority. The respondent placed the record before the Prescribed Authority to show that at the time when the uncle of the petitioner had been declared a guardian by the court of the District Judge in a case registered as No. 52 of 1960, the age of the petitioner was declared as seven years. The petitioner has a brother. At the relevant time his brother's age was set as 9 years The uncle was appointed guardian for both The guardian at that relevant time was in the best position to know of the age of the petitioner. The decision in the case in which the petitioner's uncle, Kashmira Singh had been appointed as a guardian, set the petitioner's age as 1-7-1953. The age of the petitioner on the date of filing the nomination paper was reckoned from this date. It was less than 30 years. The presumption of his age could have been rebutted and the best evidence was with the petitioner. He had an opportunity to rebut the age which has been set down by the District Judge in Case No. 52 of 1960 when he had been made ward of his uncle. The learned District Judge, in the revision, was of the view that should the petitioner have produced the High School Certificate, it would have been a circumstance to be considered. But the petitioner did not produce the High School Certificate and he is otherwise a graduate. The fact that the petitioner had the best evidence but would not place it before the Court, leads the court to presume that he did not desire the best evidence to come on record. Thus, presumption of withholding the best evidence must be, and was correctly drawn against the petitioner. This is the principle under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Thus, presumption of withholding the best evidence must be, and was correctly drawn against the petitioner. This is the principle under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, 1872. For bringing this situation the petitioner has himself to blame unless the age in the High School Certificate was such that it would not have aided the petitioner's case. 5. When the petitioner would not produce his High School Certificate, the contesting respondent placed the Transfer Certificate from the Primary Pathshala at Rukhailki Dayalpur where the age of the petitioner had been shown exactly as the one declared by the court of the District Judge when the petitioner had been placed as a ward of a guardian, his uncle Kashmira Singh. 6. The age as has been given in the electoral roll was changed when it was revised. This aspect was also noticed by the two courts below implying thereby that the petitioner had a design to advance his age for no other purpose than to take an advantage to meet the qualification of age for seeking an office of a Pradhan under section 5-B. It has not been the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the record as noticed by the two courts below is incorrect. The submission of the correctness of the petitioner's age by medical examination was noticed by the learned District Judge. This medical examination to explore the petitioner's age was an exercise in futility as the best evidence of age was in the petitioner's hand and he would not place it before the court. The medical examination would never give the exact age and the learned District Judge was not wrong when he tried to presume that the High School Certificate in the possession of the petitioner ought to have been placed at the Bar of the Court. This the petitioner would not do and consequently the two courts below paid no credence to the assessment of age as may have been as a consequence of a medical examination. 7. Upon the facts as are contained and are noticed by the two courts below it is difficult for this court to come to a conclusion that any of the orders suffer from any error, manifest or otherwise or from any illegality or perversity to occasion interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition is, thus, dismissed. Petition dismissed.