JUDGMENT 1. - The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Madan Lal filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Chittorgarh for injunction against the defendants-respondents No. 2 and 3 and defendant-appellants. It was dismissed. On appeal, it was decreed. The defendant-appellants filed the above noted second appeal in this Court on 18-12-1974. During its pendency, the defendant-appellant No. 1 Bhanwar Lal died on 31-12-1982 and the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 died on 30-10-1983. On 17-4-1986, applications were moved by the defendant-appellant No. 2 Kishan for setting aside the abatement of the apaeal, for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased Bhanwar Lal and Madan Lal and for the condonation of the delay in moving them along with his affidavits. The legal representatives of the plaintiff-Madan Lal have seriously opposed the applications. At the time of the arguments, the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased Bhanwar Lal was not pressed as he was sued in a representative capacity vide order-sheet dated 10-2-1988. 2. The defendant-appellant No. 2 Kishan has stated in para No. 7 of his affidavit filed in support of his application for condonation of delay that he is an illiterate person, he was ignorant of the law under which the legal representatives of a deceased party were required to be brought on record within certain time and due to his bonafide mistake, delay occurred in moving the said application. The legal representatives of the deceased Madan Lal have not controverted these facts in their replies dated 24-4-1986 and 18-8-1986. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant Kishan has contended that the appellant Kishan is admittedly an illiterate villager, he was not knowing the law under which it was necessary to bring the legal representatives of a deceased-party within 90 days and it is itself a good ground for condoning the delay. He also contended that the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Madan Lal also did not inform the court about the death of his client Madan Lal as required under Order 22, Rule 10A, CPC and if he had informed, the defendant-appellant would have definitely moved an application for bringing his legal representatives on record within limitation. He also contended that the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Madan Lal also did not inform the court about the death of his client Madan Lal as required under Order 22, Rule 10A, CPC and if he had informed, the defendant-appellant would have definitely moved an application for bringing his legal representatives on record within limitation. He relied upon Gangadhar v. Raj Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 1202 ; Shital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India , AIR 1985 SC 1 ; Ram Sumran v. D.D.C., AIR 1985 SC 606 and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anant Nag v. Katigi, AIR 1987 SC 1353 . 4. In reply, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased Madan Lal that ignorance of law is no excuse and if it is accepted, every body would start putting it forward on every occasion. He also contended that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 10A, CPC do not extend the period of limitation for moving an application for bringing the legal representatives on record on the failure of the counsel of a deceased-party to intimate the Court about his death. He further contended that ignorance of law is not a sufficient cause within the meading of Order 22, Rule 9(2). Civil Procedure Code He also contended that in the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the earlier decisions reported in Union of India v. Ramcharan AIR 1904 SC 215 and Rangubai v. Sunderbai, AIR 1965 SC 1794 of three Hon'ble Judges have not been considered and the judgments of the larger benches are to be preferred to judgments of smaller benches as laid down in Mathu Lal v Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 and all the aforesaid rulings relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant are of benches of two Hon'ble Judges. He further contended that it has clearly been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hukam Singh v. Bhanwar Singh ILR (1954) 4 Raj 351 (DB) that ignorance of law is no excuse and this decision has subsequently been followed in Chhitar Mai v. Sheo Narain 1976 WLN (UC) 174 . He also relied upon Roopa v. Kanji 1983 RLR 698 ; Vidhya v. Ramdan 1987 (2) RLR 253 and Nanda v. Laxman AIR 1982 MP8 . 5. He also relied upon Roopa v. Kanji 1983 RLR 698 ; Vidhya v. Ramdan 1987 (2) RLR 253 and Nanda v. Laxman AIR 1982 MP8 . 5. Admittedly, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Madan Lal died on 3010-1983 and applications for setting aside the abatement of the appeal for bringing his legal representatives on record and for condonation of delay were moved on 17-4-1986 along with his affidavits and condonation of the delay has been sought on the ground that the appellant Kishanlal was ignorant of the law requiring the bringing of legal representatives on record within 90 days of the death of a party. Thus the only question for consideration here is whether it is an acceptable ground for condoning the delay or not. It has been observed in Hukum Singh v. Bhanwar Singh ILR (1954) (4) Raj. 351 at page 363 , cited by the learned Counsel for the legal representatives as follows. In the cases cited above by the appellant's learned advocate, the learned Judges appear to have taken a compassionate view on account of the hard circumstances obtaining in those cases. But with great respect to the learned Judges, we find ourselves unable to agree with the proposition that delay may be excused on account of the ignorance of law. Ignorantia juris neminem excusat is a fundamental priniciple of jurisprudence. "The Rule", says Salmond, "is absolute, and the presumption irrebuttable. No diligence of inquiry will avail against it, no inevitable ignorance or error will serve for justification...Men are conclusively presumed to know the law, and are dealt with as and ought to know it--The evidential difficulties in the way of the judicial recognition of such ignorance are insuperable, and for the sake of any benefit derivable, therefrom, it is not advisable to weaken the administration of justice by making liability dependent on well-nigh inscrutable conditions touching knowledge or means of knowledge of the law. Therefore, a mere plea of ignorance of law cannot, in our opinion, form a good basis to condone its breach. It has been followed in Chhitarmal v. Shivnarain 1976 WLN (UC) 174 . 6. But now the settled law is that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. There is no such maxim known to law. It has been observed in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. It has been followed in Chhitarmal v. Shivnarain 1976 WLN (UC) 174 . 6. But now the settled law is that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. There is no such maxim known to law. It has been observed in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 S.C. 621 at page 629 para 6 , as under:- "Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. It is often said that every one is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement: there is no such maxim known to the law. Over a hundred and thirty years ago, Maule, J., pointed out in Martindale v. Falkner (1846) 2 QB706 ."There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the laws it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so." Scrutton, L.J., also once said. "It is impossible to know all the statutory law, and not very possible to know all the common law." But it was Lord Atkin who, as in so many other spheres put the point in its proper context when he said in Evans v. Bartlam 1937 AC 473 ,"--the fact is that there is no and never has been a presumption that every one knows the law. There is the rule the ignorance of the law does not excuse, a maxim of every different scope and application. Article 141 of the Constitution enshrines that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within territory of India. As such these observations of the Supreme Court are binding upon me. In Nanda v. Lachhman , AIR 1982 M.P. 8 , M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 62 , has not been referred to. It may also be mentioned here that delay in moving the application for bringing legal representatives on record on account of ignorance of law of limitation was excused in Krishan Mohan v. Surpati Banerjee AIR 1925 Calcutta 684 , Ramchandra v. Sabhapati AIR 1928 Madras 404 , Mehar Singh v. Sohan Singh AIR 1936 Lahore 710 and Abdul Latif v. Fazl Ali, AIR 1979 Calcutta . 7. 7. It has been observed in Shital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1 at page 3 para 6, as follows: The second error was that once an appeal is pending in the High Court, the heirs are not expected to keep a constant watch on the continued existence of parties to the appeal before the High Court which has a seat far away from where parties in rural areas may be residing, And in a traditional rural family about the father may not have informed his son the litigation in which he was involved and was a party. Let it be recalled what has been said umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted and not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties. 8. It has been observed in Ram Sumaran v. D.D.C., AIR 1985 SC 606 , as follows- "It is true that no steps were taken by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5'on record for about 6 years even though according to respondent No. 4 the appellants knew about the death of respondent No. 5. But merely because no application was made by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record we do not think that in the circumstances of the present case that would be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application of the appellants for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record because the appellants are admittedly from the rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that every one knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 should have been granted. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the abatement, if any, shall be set aside and the legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 5 shall be brought on record and the writ petition shall be remanded to the high Court for disposal according to law. 9. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the abatement, if any, shall be set aside and the legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 5 shall be brought on record and the writ petition shall be remanded to the high Court for disposal according to law. 9. It has been observed in Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Katigi AIR 1987 SC 1353 at page 1354 para No. 3 , as follows- "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that- [1] Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; [2] Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; [3] "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner; [4] When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, case of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay; [5] There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk; [6] It must be granted that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 10. The provisions fixing a particular time for making an application for bringing legal representatives on record with the consequence of the suit or appeal abating, if no application is made within time, have been enacted for expeditious disposal of cases in the interest of proper administration of justice. It is a matter of great concern and serious thought that if a poor, illiterate and ignorant litigant fails to move such an application within 90 days, his case stands abated while it is not decided for decades by Courts. This appeal is pending since December 18, 1974. 11. In Hopa v. Kanji 1983 RLR 698 , no ground for the delay has been disclosed and application was held to be mala-fide. It is correct that the decision reported in Union of India v. Ramchandran (deceased), AIR 1964 SC 215 , was given by three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. It has been held in it that mere allegation about belated knowledge of death of opposite party is not sufficient and the reasons leading to not knowing of death within reasonable time must be stated. Ignorance of law of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record within 90 days was not under consideration in it. In , facts were totally different. It was an appeal against preliminary decree, legal representatives were not brought on record, though they were brought on record in proceeding relating to the preparation of the final decree. 12. It may also be mentioned here that the learned Counsel for the eceased-respondent Madanlal did not intimate the Court about the death of his client as required under Order 22, Rule 10-A, Civil Procedure Code If he would have moved an application giving intimation of his death, the learned Counsel for the appellant would have taken steps in time for bringing his legal representatives on record. It is also not the case of the respondents that the appellant Kishan acted with some ulterior motives or with malafides in moving the said applications with great delay. 13. It is also not the case of the respondents that the appellant Kishan acted with some ulterior motives or with malafides in moving the said applications with great delay. 13. In view of all these facts, circumstances and authoritative observations, the applications of the appellant Kishan dated 17-4 1986 for condoning the delay, for setting aside the abatement and for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Madanlal on record deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, the applications are allowed. The legal representatives of the deceased-respondent Madanlal are brought on record. Amended cause title will be filed within a month.Order passed. *******