Judgment :- 1. A litigation which commenced two decades ago is still away from its terminal periphery. During its chequered history, this case reached the High Court on an earlier occasion. This is the second time that this Court is called upon to decide this case. The only question to be determined now is whether the person who signed the plaint is the duly authorised agent of the person who figures as the plaintiff therein. If the answer is in the negative, the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of valid plaint. 2. The suit is for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove portions of a sun-shade and window-shutters projecting into the property of the plaintiff. The name of the plaintiff as shown in the plaint is John John who was residing at Madras when the suit was instituted. But the plaint has been signed by his brother Kurian who claims that John has authorised him to institute the suit. The defendants contended, inter alia, that Kurian is not the authorised agent of the plaintiff. Other contentions raised regarding the merits of the case are not very material for the purpose of this appeal. It is enough to point out that the trial court first repelled the contentions of the appellants and decreed the suit and the District Court dismissed the appeal, but the second appeal filed in this Court was allowed and the case was remitted to the trial court for disposal of the suit afresh. The question which this Court considered earlier was whether the signatory in the plaint is a recognised agent of the plaintiff as envisaged in 0.3 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short'the Code'). This Court then held that the said Rule has no application in this case. However, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit after deciding the question whether the person who signed the plaint has been duly authorised as provided in 0.6 R.14 of the Code. After remand, the trial court found that Kurian was authorised by the plaintiff to institute the suit. Upon this finding, the trial court decreed the suit without considering the other contentions on merits as the learned Munsiff took the view that other issues concerning merits of the suit has already been determined before the remand. After remand, the trial court found that Kurian was authorised by the plaintiff to institute the suit. Upon this finding, the trial court decreed the suit without considering the other contentions on merits as the learned Munsiff took the view that other issues concerning merits of the suit has already been determined before the remand. The appellants again went in appeal, but the appellate court Ibis time, after concurring with the trial court's finding that Kurian is the duly authorised agent of the plaintiff, remanded the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit after considering the merits of the case. The said remand order is challenged by the appellants in this appeal. 3. 0.6 R.14 of the Code reads thus: "Pleading to be signed. Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf". What is meant by the expression "duly authorised" in the aforesaid Rule? Learned counsel for the appellants contended that any authorisation without compliance with R.24 of the Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice (which was in force when the suit was instituted) cannot be recognised in law as the special rule under the Civil Rules of Practice prescribed a particular mode to make the authorisation. (Rule 23 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice is identically worded and hence reference to one of them would be sufficient). The said rule in the Civil Rules of Practice reads as follows: "Signing or verification by agent. If any proceeding which, under any provision of law or these rules, is required to be signed or verified by a party is signed or verified by any other person on his behalf, a written authority in this behalf signed by the party except in the case of persons under disability, shall be filed in court, with an affidavit by such person verifying the signature of the party, and stating the reason of his inability to sign or verify the proceeding". No written authority has been produced either by the plaintiff or by Kurian in support of the case that Kurian has been duly authorised to institute the suit. No written authority has been produced either by the plaintiff or by Kurian in support of the case that Kurian has been duly authorised to institute the suit. Nor has Kurian filed an affidavit verifying the signature of the plaintiff stating the reasons of plaintiff's inability to sign in the plaint. The particular rule in the Civil Rules of Practice (quoted above) applies only to cases where proceedings are required to be signed or verified by parties concerned. The said rule need not be imported to a case where plaint or written statement can be signed, as sanctioned by the substantive law, by any other person duly authorised by the party concerned. 0.6 R.14 permits such a course to be adopted in making the pleadings. The scope of 0.6 R.14 is not to be curtailed or restricted by unduly reading of Civil Rules of Practice into it. Nor could the sanction offered by the substantive law be stultified by resort to the rules framed under such law. The proviso in R.14 (of 0.6) does not insist on production or even creation of a power of attorney or written authorisation. There is nothing in the said provision suggesting that a written authorisation is indispensable for the proper compliance thereof. Case law seems to be very much in support of the view that even oral authorisation would be sufficient to constitute due authorisation. (Vide Bengal Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal, AIR 1943 Calcutta 13; Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai, AIR 1948 Madras (Vol. 35) 369; Sarju Prasad v. Badri Prasad, AIR 1939 Nag 242; and Netram v. Bhagwan, AIR 1941 Nag. 159. Those decisions were referred to and discussed in detail by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramachandra (AIR 1961 Bombay 292). The Bombay High Court, in concurrence with the preponderant view held that oral authorisation is good enough to constitute a valid authorisation under 0.6 R.14 of the Code. In lyakku Mathoo v. Julius (AIR 1962 Kerala 19) absence of a written authority was considered to be a defect in constituting due authorisation, but the said decision can be distinguished on facts since the suit was instituted on behalf of a plaintiff residing abroad permanently. Raman Nayar, J. (as be then was) has observed in the said decision that in such cases the proviso to 0.6 R.14 does not apply. Raman Nayar, J. (as be then was) has observed in the said decision that in such cases the proviso to 0.6 R.14 does not apply. The upshot of the discussion is that there is compliance with the requirements in 0.6 R.14 of the Code if there is satisfactory material to show that the signatory in the plaint had the authority of the plaintiff to to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff and such authority need not necessarily be in writing. 4. In this case there is reliable material to show that the plaintiff had. in fact, authorised the signatory to institute the suit. Both the courts below have referred to an affidavit sworn to by the plaintiff in support of I.A.550/71. The plaintiff has stated in categorical terms in the said affidavit that his brother Kurian has been authorised by him to institute and prosecute the suit. The said material is more than sufficient to show that as a matter of fact Kurian has been authorised by the plaintiff to institute the suit. As such, the person who signed the plaint must be held to have valid authority to sign the plaint. There is no reason to interfere and hence the appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.