JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. 1. Two rival groups-one represented by the petitioners and the other by the respondents nos. 3 and 4, staked their claim before the Deputy Director of Education as the validly constituted Committee of Management of the Bhakt Vatsal Intermediate College, Bichhwa, district Mainpuri and asserted that they were in actual control of its affairs. By the impugned order, the Deputy Director of Education exercising powers under Section 16-A (7) of the Intermediate Education Act, has negatived the claim of both holding that neither of the two candidates (? committees) has been legally constituted nor are they in actual control of the affairs of the Institution. 2. For the petitioners it was contended relying on the decision in the case of Management Committee of the Arya Kanya Inter College, lslamnagar, Badaun v. Deputy Director of Education, III Division, Bareilly, 1983 Ed. Cases 244 that the relevant date for deciding the issue of actual control under section 16-A (7) was the date of elections which, in this case, was December 31, 1986. On that date, the previous Committee constituted on January 5, 1984 with Vishwa Nath (petitioner no. 2) as its Manager and Anokhey Lal (respondent no. 4) as its President, was, on the established facts, in actual control of the affairs of the institution. There was hence no occasion for the Deputy Director of Education to enter into the question of the validity of the fresh elections held by the two groups on December 31, 1986. In entering into that question, it was urged, the Deputy Director of Education clearly exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 16-A (7) of the Act. We are unable to agree. In the first place, the previous Committee constituted on January 5, 1984 was, as a collective body, an entity wholly distinct and different from that represented by the present Committee elected on December 31, 1986, even if Vishwa Nath happened to be the Manager of both the previous Committee as well as of the one elected on December 31, 1986 by the group represented by the petitioners. Learned counsel did not dispute that the composition of the previous Committee both as regards the incumbent of the office of the President as well as some of its members, has undergone a change in that not every one who was a member of the previous Committee is now on the new Committee represented by the petitioner group. Any control, therefore, exercised by the previous Committee of Management of the affairs of the institution would be of no avail to the present Committee represented by the petitioners which is alleged to have been elected on December 31, 1986. Indeed it is as the Manager and President of the new Committee that the petitioners nos. 2 and 3 had respectively asserted their claim before the Deputy Director of Education as constituting the Committee of Management of the institution in actual control of its affairs. Even if, therefore, it be assumed that the previous Committee was in actual control on December 31, 1986 it would not hence to the benefit of the new committee represented by the petitioners quite apart from the fact that relying on a letter of resignation stated to have been submitted by Vishwa Nath, the District Inspector of Schools by his order dated February 18, 1986 had attested the signature of Deo Singh, respondent no. 2, as the new Manager of the previous Committee. This order of the District Inspector of Schools was challenged by the petitioner in writ petition no. 5981 of 1986 in which the petitioner succeeded in obtaining an interim order on July 28, 1986 whereby the operation of the order of attestation dated February 18, 1986 passed in favour of Deo Singh had been stayed but this order was subsequently vacated on February 19, 1987. Be that as it may, the petitioners cannot found their claim on the basis of the alleged exercise of control by the previous Committee of Management. 3. Be that as it may, the petitioners cannot found their claim on the basis of the alleged exercise of control by the previous Committee of Management. 3. In the second place, according to the petitioners themselves, immediately after the two groups had held the fresh elections separately on December 31, 1986, they had approached the District Inspector of Schools for being recognized through the mechanism of attestation of the signatures of the respective managers of the two groups whereupon the District Inspector of Schools attested the signatures of the respondent Deo Singh, the Manager of the Committee elected by the respondents' group, by an order dated February 21, 1987 and immediately thereafter the petitioners themselves filed a representation before the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) which was contested by the respondents nos. 3 and 4 resulting in the impugned order. The position which, therefore, emerges is that the date on which the dispute arose immediately following the attestation of the signatures of Deo Singh the issue of actual control became inextricably mixed up with the issue of the validity of the elections. The Deputy Director of Education was, therefore, perfectly justified in examining the validity of the elections set up by the two groups. The view which we are taking is fortified by the following observations made by a Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Janta INter College, Thekma Bijauli, district Azamgarh v. The Deputy Director of Education VII Region, Gorakhpur, reported in 1982 UP LB and EC 38 : " Before the Deputy Director of Education, the question required to be decided was as to who was in control of management. This question was linked with the decision about the validity of the election pleaded by the petitioner as well as by the respondent no. 3. For this purpose the Deputy Director of Education should have examined the evidence of the parties and given a finding on the same. He did not address himself to this controversy and was led away by irrelevant consideration for deciding the dispute referred to him. As the finding given by him is based on irrelevant grounds, the order cannot be sustained. " 4. He did not address himself to this controversy and was led away by irrelevant consideration for deciding the dispute referred to him. As the finding given by him is based on irrelevant grounds, the order cannot be sustained. " 4. Further, in our opinion, where, as here, after the term of the previous Committee of Management comes to an end and fresh elections are held by two to more groups on the basis of which they claim recognition and immediately in the wake of the elections a dispute arises as to which of these warring groups is in actual control, the issue of actual control gets inevitably linked to the question about the validity of the elections. In deciding the issue of actual control in such circumstances it becomes necessary for the Deputy Director of Education in the exercise of his powers under Section 16-A (7) to investigate the validity of the elections even if in a summary way set up by the rival groups For in the scheme of the Intermediate Education Act it is important for the Deputy Director of Education to decide which of the groups should be recognized as constituting the Committee of Management so that the educational authorities may deal with that group in the context of appointment of teachers and employees, disciplinary action against the staff, conduct of examinations, payment of salary to the teachers and staff, etc. Even before Section 16-A (7) was brought on the statute book, this Court had consistently held that the power to determine such disputes was inherent in the scheme of enactment for the same reason. Section 16-A (7) merely gives a statutory recognition to that view. We therefore, find no illegality in the Deputy Director of Education investigating the issue of the validity of the elections. Even the learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted, relying on the decisions of this Court in Sudhir Kumar Pathak v. Deputy Director of Education, 1985 Education Cases 175 and Committee of Management of Subhash Uchchtar Madhayamik Vidyalaya, Rajapura (Mowana) Meerut v. Deputy Director of Education Meerut, 1985 Education Cases 148 that the Deputy Director of Education can examine the validity of the elections set up by rival groups under section 16-A (7) if the question regarding validity of the elections arises incidentally. In the present case we have demonstrated that in the facts of the case the validity of the elections had to be examined as the same had got interlinked with the issue of actual control. 5. The Deputy Director of Education has found that the elections set up by the two groups suffer from serious defects of procedure having been conducted contrary to the approved Scheme of Administration of the institution. He has further found that on the relevant date neither of the two parties was in actual control of its affairs. He has, therefore, rightly directed the District Inspector of Schools to arrange the holding of fresh elections in accordance with the Scheme of Administration within three months from the date of the order. 6. Learned counsel also contended that the Deputy Director of Education has failed to examine the issue of actual control. The submission is incorrect. The Deputy Director of Education did address himself to this issue as well and has found that neither of the two groups is in actual (control of, the affairs of the institution. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the only ground on which the learned counsel argued that the petitioners were in actual control was based on the actual control supposed to have been exercised by the previous Committee on the date of the elections. We have already rejected that ground as lending any assistance to the petitioners' claim of actual control. Lastly, it may be mentioned that the Deputy Director of Education has directed the District Inspector of Schools to arrange for the holding of the elections in accordance with the Scheme of Administration within 3 months under his supervision. We think that in the totality of circumstances of the present case that is the best solution to the problem facing the institution. This is an added ground on which we are declining to interfere in the exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.