Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, which is a Company engaged in the manufacture of electric conductors, placed order on June 11, 1982 with a company in Switzerland, for 14S Metric Tonnes of E. C. Grade Aluminium Rods, under Import Licence issued by the Government of India. The Aluminium rods were consigned in two lots, one of 75 metric tonnes by the vessel M. V. Kostrena and the balance 70 metric tonnes by the vessel M.V. Bernburg. The first consignment of 75 metric tonnes was despatched on June 28,1982. The vessel carrying the same touched Bombay on July 31, 1982 and reached the destination namely Cochin Port, on August 2,1982. 2. At the time the goods were despatched and upto July 31, 1982 the Import Duty payable on the Aluminium rods in question was 15 per cent basic duty and 15 per cent auxiliary duty (as per partial exemption notifications Exts. R1 and R2 issued by the Government of India on December 3,1981 and December 3,1982) as also additional duty of 23.1 per cent under S.3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The partial exemption was rescinded/ modified by fresh notifications dated July 31, 1982 (Exts. R3 and R4) with the result the duty payable on the import from August 1, 1982 stood enhanced to 60 per cent basic duty, 30 per cent auxiliary duty and 23.1 per cent additional duty. 3. The petitioner filed Bill of Entry for home consumption for its own use with the Customs at Cochin, in respect of the 75 metric tonnes is question on July 31, 1982 as permitted under S.46 (1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Act for short). A copy of the Bill of Entry is Ext. R5. Import duty of Rs. 5,37,670.70 as under Exts. R1 and R2 was paid on an assessment made by the Customs authorities under S.17 of the Act. Thereupon, approval for unloading and removing the goods for home consumption was accorded under S.47. Part of the consignment, namely about 40 metric tonnes, was cleared by the petitioner by August 5, 1982. The balance was not allowed to be cleared in view of "instructions from higher authorities." But no written order was issued. It was at that stage the original petition was filed for directions to the respondents to clear the goods for transport as per the Bill of Entry already filed. The balance was not allowed to be cleared in view of "instructions from higher authorities." But no written order was issued. It was at that stage the original petition was filed for directions to the respondents to clear the goods for transport as per the Bill of Entry already filed. On the petitioner's motion, an interim order was passed by this court allowing the rest of the goods covered by the Bill of Entry to be cleared, subject to the petitioner furnishing bank guarantee for Rs. 6,61,541.72, being the additional amount of duty claimed as due at the enhanced rates under Exts. R3 and R4. 4. Respondents in their counter affidavit set forth the reasons for non-clearance of the balance quantity of goods. The petitioner had been assessed to duty on the presentation of the Bill of Entry at the rates prevailing as per Exts. R1 and R2 (namely Notification Nos. 259/81 and 131/82/ Customs). Government rescinded/modified these exemptions as per Exts. R1 and R2 and passed fresh orders Exts. R3 and R4 (namely Notifications Nos. 188 and 189/82/Customs) dated July 31,1982 by which the basic duty and the auxiliary duty were enhanced to 60 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. The duty at the enhanced rates was payable from August 1, 1982. The inward entry of the vessel was only on August 2,1982. The petitioner was therefore bound to pay import duty at the rates due as per the new notifications. According to S.15 imported goods are leviable to duty at the rate prevalent on the relevant date and the petitioner was bound to make payment of the duty before clearing the goods from the Customs area. Part of the goods remained in the Customs area as defined in S.2 (11) of the Act. Such goods lying in Customs area were, under S.14), subject to the control of the officers of Customs and the respondents prevented their removal as further amounts had to be paid by the petitioner by way of duty by virtue of Exts. R3 and R.4 to the circumstances, the following endorsement was made by the Customs authorities in the Bill of Entry on August 6,1982: "Notification No, 259/81 has been rescinded on 31-7-1982. Telegram from Board received on 5-8-1982. Action is being taken to recover the short levy -- vide A. C's order in S.33/192/AP. R3 and R.4 to the circumstances, the following endorsement was made by the Customs authorities in the Bill of Entry on August 6,1982: "Notification No, 259/81 has been rescinded on 31-7-1982. Telegram from Board received on 5-8-1982. Action is being taken to recover the short levy -- vide A. C's order in S.33/192/AP. I.A.D. may note pl." As the original assessment at the old rates was manifestly wrong, the Bill of Entry was recalled for reassessment of duty. S.154 empowers the authorities to make corrections and rectify mistakes in any decision or order. The respondents have therefore acted in accordance with law in preventing removal of the balance quantity of the imported aluminium rods. The petitioner is not therefore entitled to any relief. 5. The Petitioner challenges the demand for duty at the enhanced rates on various grounds. It is contended first that under S.15 of the Act, duty is liable to be computed at the rates, and on the valuation, in force on the date on which the Bill of Entry in respect of the goods is presented. S.46 entitles the Bill of Entry to be presented one week prior to the expected arrival of the vessel. Since the Bill of Entry in this case was presented on July 31, 1982 as authorised by S.46, the duty has to be computed and paid only at the rates prevailing on that date. Though the proviso to S.15 specifies that when a Bill of Entry is presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel, it shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry, it is contended that this has to yield to the provisions of S.46 which permits filing of the Bill of Entry one week prior to the expected arrival of the ship, and hence duty is payable only at the rates prevailing on the date of filing of the Bill of Entry. 6. The second limb of the challenge that an assessment had been completed under S.17, which admittedly resulted in a short levy. In such cases, the only remedy open to the respondents is to reopen the assessment following the procedure prescribed in S.28 of the Act. No such proceedings have been initiated. The demand is therefore illegal. 7. 6. The second limb of the challenge that an assessment had been completed under S.17, which admittedly resulted in a short levy. In such cases, the only remedy open to the respondents is to reopen the assessment following the procedure prescribed in S.28 of the Act. No such proceedings have been initiated. The demand is therefore illegal. 7. The latter contention is met by the respondents with reference to S.154 of the Act which enables them to correct, at any time, errors arising in any decision or order from any accidental slip or omission. The respondents bad committed such an error in computing the duty payable at the rates prevailing upto July 31, 1982 under Exts. R1 and R2, when the duty should have been levied at the enhanced rates as per Exts R3 and R4. 8. S.15 of the Act reads as under: "15. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of imported goods. (1) The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force, (a) in the case of goods entered for home consumption under S.46, on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of such goods is presented under that section; (b) in the case of goods cleared from a warehouse under S.68, on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse; (c) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty; Provided that if a bill of entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods are imported, the bill of entry shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards. 2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to baggage and goods imported by post." Thus the rate of duty applicable to any imported goods is that prevailing on the date on which the Bill of Entry is presented under S.46. But, if the Bill of Entry is presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel, it shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards. S.46 as pointed out earlier enables an importer to present his Bill of Entry one week before the expected arrival of the vessel. But, if the Bill of Entry is presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel, it shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards. S.46 as pointed out earlier enables an importer to present his Bill of Entry one week before the expected arrival of the vessel. Petitioner's contention is that when S.46 enables the Bill of Entry to be presented on a particular day, that must be deemed to be the relevant date for purposes of S.15 as well. The proviso to S.15 is stated to be subservient to S.46. 9. I am unable to accept this contention. S.46 only prescribes the mode, the time and the manner of presentation of the Bill of Entry. It enables an importer to present his Bill of Entry within a week prior to the expected arrival of the vessel. It is intended to facilitate an early completion of the formalities when once the anticipated date of arrival of the vessel is known. It is a facility afforded to the importer and has nothing to do with the rate of duty payable on the import. That has to be decided only with reference to S.15(1). In cases where the Bill of Entry is presented in advance of the arrival of the vessel, the presentation is fictionally postponed by the proviso to S.15(1) to the date of entry inwards of the vessel. This is for the purpose of computing the duty payable. Full effect has to be given to this, fiction. Its effect cannot be whittled down, as it has been created with the specific object of pegging the computation of duty to the date of entry inwards of the vessel. 10. S.15 proceeds on the basic principle that duty is payable as on the date of actual import. There is no question of subjugating S.15 to S.46 as the two provisions operate in different fields. S.15 is substantive while S.45 is procedural. The proviso to S.15 (1) ensures uniformity and conforms the duty payable to a sound principle, of relating it to the actual date of import. 11. The interpretation canvassed by the petitioner, will render the proviso to S.15 purposeless and inoperative. Such a result should be avoided when otherwise it is possible to give a harmonious and purposeful meaning to the two provisions. 12. 11. The interpretation canvassed by the petitioner, will render the proviso to S.15 purposeless and inoperative. Such a result should be avoided when otherwise it is possible to give a harmonious and purposeful meaning to the two provisions. 12. Admittedly the date of entry inwards of the vessel M. V. Kostrena was August 2,1982 and therefore, the duty payable has to be fixed at the rates prevailing on that date. 13. The further question is whether the demand for the additional amount of duty is invalid in the absence of proceedings under S.28. In this connection the endorsement made in Ext. R5 Bill of Entry referred to in Para.4 supra assumes importance. It is to the effect that proceedings are being taken to recover the short levy. In other words, it is recognised that there was a short levy on the petitioner. 14. S.17 postulates an assessment of the duty payable after the importer has entered the imported goods under S.46, and they are examined and tested by the proper officer. It is only after the duty, so assessed, is paid that order is issued permitting clearance of the goods for home consumption under S.47. Such an order has been issued in this case so that the stage of assessment and the stage of permission for clearance for home consumption are both past. Once an assessment is completed, and there is short levy, the only recourse left for the respondents is under S.28. Thereunder when any duty has not been levied, or is short levied, or is erroneously refunded, the proper officer may, within six months from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the duty, requiring him to show cause why be should not pay the amounts specified in the notice. The period of six months gets extended to five years in cases of collusion, or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts by the importer. After the notice to show cause is served and the importer makes his representation, the authorities mentioned in sub-section (2) shall determine the amount of duty due from the importer, and thereupon be becomes liable to pay the amount so determined. 15. Though the endorsement in Ext. After the notice to show cause is served and the importer makes his representation, the authorities mentioned in sub-section (2) shall determine the amount of duty due from the importer, and thereupon be becomes liable to pay the amount so determined. 15. Though the endorsement in Ext. R5 stated that proceedings to recover the short levy are being initiated, it is the admitted case that no notice to show cause was issued within the period of six months provided in sub-section (I) of S.28, nor any determination made thereafter under sub-section (2) of that section. The respondents are not therefore justified in demanding any further amount from the petitioner by way of short levy in respect of the import in question. 16. However, the demand is attempted to be salvaged with reference to S.154 of the Act which reads: "S. 154, Correction of clerical errors, etc. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in any decision or order passed by the Central Government the Board or any officer of Customs under this Act, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may, at any time, be corrected by the Central Government, the Board or such officer of customs or the successor-in-office of such officer, as the case may be." As to how S.154 is invoked is referred to in Para.4 and 7 above. 17. The question therefore is whether toe respondents could relate their action to S.154. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of a similar provision in the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, in Master Construction Co. v. State of Orissa AIR 1966 SC 1047. The court observed as follows in para 7: "The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under this rule is limited and is confined only to the correction of mistakes or omissions mentioned therein. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation; a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. There is another qualification, namely, such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, 'it is not an error which depends for its discovery, or elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the court. There is another qualification, namely, such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, 'it is not an error which depends for its discovery, or elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the court. The obvious instance is a slip or omission to embody in. the order something which the court in fact ordered to be done, This is sometimes described as a decretal order not being in accordance with the judgment But the slip or omission may be attributed to the judge himself.-He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be the judge's inadvertence or the advocate's mistake! But however wide the said expressions are construed, they cannot countenance a re-argument on merits on questions of fact or law, or permit a party to raise new arguments which be has not advanced at the first instance " (underlining mine) 18. An error liable to be corrected under S.154 is one arising out of a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. An order which truly reflects the intent of the maker thereof at the time he made it. however erroneous it may be, cannot be treated as one vitiated by error arising out of an accidental slip or omission merely because subsequent events demonstrate it to be plainly erroneous. The test to decide whether an error is liable to be rectified under S.154 is to ascertain whether the maker thereof would have intended to pass such an order, and whether be would have understood that as the proper order on his knowledge of the facts, or the law on that date. Viewed in this angle, the order of assessment in this case which had been made on August 2,1982 is not capable of correction under S.154. May be, the assessing authority was unaware of the notifications Exts. R3 and R4. But the assessment truly reflected what be intended to do. There was no slip or omission on his part as he understood the law, and the rate of duty to be paid on that date. May be, the assessing authority was unaware of the notifications Exts. R3 and R4. But the assessment truly reflected what be intended to do. There was no slip or omission on his part as he understood the law, and the rate of duty to be paid on that date. It was only subsequent information received by him on August 5,1982 that rendered the assessment erroneous. That does not however justify the proceedings under S.154. When once the assessment is completed, any short levy thereunder could be rectified only by proceedings under S.28. The respondents themselves understood it only that way as is evident from the endorsement in Ext. R5 The attempt of the respondents to take shelter under S.154 is not, in the circumstances, sustainable. 19. The contention of the respondents that so long as the goods are in the Customs area they are entitled to demand additional amounts does not stand to reason. The demand has to be based on an assessment. Such an assessment in this case raised demand only for the duty as per Exts. R1 and R2. Any revision thereof could only be after following the procedure prescribed by S.28. The mere presence of the goods in the Customs area will not enable the respondents to detain, or prevent their clearance so long as there is no valid assessment or proceeding to sustain the additional demand. 20. No other contentions are raised by either party. The original petition has therefore to succeed on the second of the points raised by the petitioner. The original petition is allowed. Since the goods have already been released, the only relief called for is a declaration that no further amounts are payable by the petitioner by way of duty for the import in question and that the bank guarantee furnished by them pursuant to the interim order of this court will stand cancelled.