Judgment S. K. Jha, A. C. , L. P. N. Shahdeo, JJ. 1. This writ application the only point convassed at the Bar, to which question only our attention was pres sed, is as to whether the award dated 27/4/1982 as contained in Annexure-2 is legal or not. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has pressed our attention on the point that the award dated 27/4/1982 is illegal as the management cannot fall within the sweep of Sections 2 (oo) and 25-F at the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . In other words, it has been argued that without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F, the order contained in the impugned award (Annexxre-2) is wholly illegal as the petitioners name having been struck-off from the rolls of the management amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Sec.2 (oo) of the Act. Admittedly, the petitioners name was struck-off from the rolls of the company with effect from 7/11/1973. The question as to whether this striking-off the petitioners name from the rolls of the company amounts to retrenchment or not. A plain reading of the provisions of Sec.2 (oo) of the Act does bring the meaning of striking-off the name of an employee from the rolls of a company, which reads thus :- "2 (oo ). retrenchment means the terminrtion by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman ; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of Contained ill-health. " 3. Admittedly it does not fall within either of the Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 2 (oo) of the Act nor does it show that the impugned order was passed as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. Manifestly, therefore, the order of striking-oil the name of the petitioner from the rolls of the company would be covered by the term retrenchment as defined in Sec.2 (oo) of the act. Manifestly, therefore, the order of striking-oil the name of the petitioner from the rolls of the company would be covered by the term retrenchment as defined in Sec.2 (oo) of the act. If it falls, as we have already said so, within the meaning of term "retrenchment" then it is well-settled that the provisions of Sec.2 5-F will come into play and non-compliance of the provisions of Sec.25-F will reader the order of retrenchment as invalid. It is admitted that if the impugned order against the petitioner by the management is brought into within the sweep of Section 2 (oo) of the Act, then as a necessary corollary the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Act must be brought into play and the conditions as laid down in Section 25-F must be followed which in this case, has not been done. 4. We have stated so only on the plain reading of the two different statutory provisions of the Act. We may, however,. now refer to the judicial precedent, which fortifies us in our view. We shall enumerate only by way of sample the decisions of the Supreme Court while dealing this point. In the case of State Bank of India V/s. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 SC 1111 Krishna Iyer, J. , speaking for the court, held that termination for any reason whatsoever in section 2 (oo) are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is has the employees service been terminated? verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the Master or the running out of the stipulated terms. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from section 25-F (b) is inferable from the proviso to Sec.25-F (a ). 5. The same principle has been adopted in the case of Santosh Gupta V/s. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 in which it has been held that the expression "termination of service for any reason whatsoever" in Sec.2 (oo)coveres every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in Sec.25f or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act. In the aforesaid case the employees had been discharged from the service of the master which was held to be an act of retrenchment and, therefore, the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Act had to be complied with. 6. Without multiplying the number of decisions we may now refer to one of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Singh V/s. Reserve Bank of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 132 in which it has been held that the striking-off the name of a workman from the rolls by the employer amounts to termination of service and such termination is retrenehment within the meaning of Sec.2 (oo) if effected in violation of the mandatory provision contained in Sec.25-F and is invalid. That is exactly the position in the instance case. The petitioners name has been struck-off from the rolls of the company. It, therefore, immediately attracts the provisions of Sec.2 (oo) and amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of that statutory provision. 7. That being so, it has been held, as we do hold in this case, that the violation of the mandatory provision contained in Sec.25-F invalidates the striking-off the name of the petitioner from the rolls by the employer and it must be treated as a termination of service. Then as a necessary corollary it follows that if the provisions of Sec.2s-F which are mandatory have not been complied with, as they have not been complied within the present case, then such a retrenchment could not countenance the scrutiny of law. Therefore, as a necessary corollary it follows that if it was in violation of the mandatory provision contained in Sec.2s-F, as is also the case here before us, then invalidates the order of retrenchment. No other view is possible since there are catena of decisions of the highest court of the land as also of this court taking the same view. Therefore, there is no use multiplying the judicial precedents by number. 8. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the striking-off the petitioners name from the rolls of the company would at once be struck down as no retrenchment under Sec.2 (oo) of the Act can be made without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Act. 9. 8. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the striking-off the petitioners name from the rolls of the company would at once be struck down as no retrenchment under Sec.2 (oo) of the Act can be made without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Act. 9. In the result this application is allowed and it is held that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been in continued service from 7th November.1973 which is the date of the striking-off the petitioners name from the rolls of the company. The petitioner, as a necessary corollary, will also be entitled to all the benefits of his service from that date. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.