P. P. BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) IN these writ petitions, the petitioner which is a registered partnership firm, has challenged the validity of the proposition notices issued by the second respondent for the assessment years 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 under the provisions of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979 (in short "the Act" ). ( 2 ) BY the said notices, the second respondent has called upon the petitioner to register itself as a dealer under section 4 of the Act and to file the necessary returns. If the petitioner were to comply with these notices, it would be liable to pay entry tax as stipulated in the said notices. That is why the petitioner has approached this Court directly under article 226 of the constitution of India challenging the validity of the said notices on the ground that the second respondent acted wholly without jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notices since the goods in question, which were admittedly brought into the local area by the petitioner for sale, use or consumption do not come within the purview of item 1 in the Schedule to the Act. In the proposition notices, the reasons given by the second respondent for charging the goods in question under the Act are, to quote his own words : "you have made purchase of cotton coated fabrics from Bommasandra Industrial Estate near hosur and made entry of this item into the local area (corporation limits) of Bangalore City. The commodity dealt in by you is nothing but textiles or cotton fabrics. The Supreme Court in the case of Porritts Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR1979 SC 300 , 1989 (25 )ECR443 (NULL ), 1980 CENCUS397d , 1983 (13 )ELT1607 (SC ), (1979 )1 scc82 , [1979 ]1 SCR545 , [1978 ]42 STC433 (SC ), 1978 (10 )UJ697 (SC ) has held '. . . While in its broadest dictionary sense "textiles" means every woollen fabrics, in the every day parlance of the ordinary merchant and consumer public, it means clothing, furnishing and the like. By clothing is meant cloth used to cover or clean the body such as shirting, suiting, etc. . . . . By furnishing is meant cloth used in connection with covering and decorating walls and furniture such as curtains, carpets, bed spreads, etc. . . By clothing is meant cloth used to cover or clean the body such as shirting, suiting, etc. . . . . By furnishing is meant cloth used in connection with covering and decorating walls and furniture such as curtains, carpets, bed spreads, etc. . . . . '. The High Court of Karnataka in the case of varma Industrials Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore District, III Circle, Bangalore [1981 ]47 STC43 (Kar ) has held '. . . . Cotton fabrics would include p. V. C. rexine cloth which is manufactured with cloth as base and giving coating or coatings of polyvinyl chloride. . . . '. In view of this legal stand, your commodity falls under the purview of the Entry Tax Act, 1979. Since this commodity has entered the corporation limits from outside, you are liable to register as well as pay entry tax on the purchase made. But you have refused to register yourself and file the returns of turnover. Therefore, the aforesaid turnover tax and penalty are proposed for determination. You are also liable to pay registration fee as required under section 4 of the kteg Act, 1979 read with rule 4 of the KTEG Rules. " ( 3 ) THE petitioner having declined to comply with these impugned notices, the second respondent proposed to determine the entry tax on the total turnover of the petitioner in so far as it related to the sale of P. V. C. rexine leather cloth. ( 4 ) MR. Raghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the meaning to be given to the words in item 1 of the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act should be with reference to the provisions of that Act and not with reference to the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act (in short KST Act); that whatever may be the interpretation of the words "textiles or cotton fabrics", under the KST Act or Central Sales Tax Act (in short CST Act), that interpretation would not be applicable for considering the meaning of item 1 in the Schedule to the Entry Tax act. In substance, his argument is that the scope of the Act and the scope of the KST Actare different. Under the Act what is taxed is goods on their entry into the local area and not on their sale. In substance, his argument is that the scope of the Act and the scope of the KST Actare different. Under the Act what is taxed is goods on their entry into the local area and not on their sale. But under the KST Act what is taxed is the sale of goods and such taxation is not related to the entry of goods into a local area. ( 5 ) THIS argument is well-founded since it cannot be disputed that what is taxed as entry tax is on the entry of goods into the local area and not on the sale or consumption of goods; whereas under the KST Act, tax is either on sale or purchase of goods and not on entry of the goods into a local area. But there is a provision in the Act, namely, section 2 (B) which says that the words and expressions used in that Act, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them in the kst Act (Act 25 of 1957 ). It is common ground that the word "textiles" is not defined under the act or under the KST Act. Before we proceed further, the relevant provisions of the Act which have a bearing on this point should be considered. Under section 3 of the Entry Tax Act, there shall be levied and collected a tax on entry of the scheduled goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein at such rate not exceeding two per cent. ad valorem and from such date as may be specified, whether prospectively or retrospectively, by the State government and different dates and different rates may be specified for different local areas. ( 6 ) CHANGE in the language of item 1 in the Schedule to the Act should be noticed. Earlier, item 1 read as under : "all varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen or artificial silk including rayon or nylon whether manufactured in mills, powerlooms or handlooms and hosiery cloth in lengths. " after the amendment by Act No. 38 of 1984 with effect from 1st April, 1983, item 1 reads us under : "all varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen or artificial silk including rayon or nylon and other man-made or synthetic fabrics, manufactured in mills or powerlooms and hosiery cloth in lengths. " after the amendment by Act No. 38 of 1984 with effect from 1st April, 1983, item 1 reads us under : "all varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen or artificial silk including rayon or nylon and other man-made or synthetic fabrics, manufactured in mills or powerlooms and hosiery cloth in lengths. " The effect of the amendment is that earlier meaning given to the word "textiles" is cutdownand now it includes only textiles whether they are cotton, woollen or artificial silk including rayon or nylon and other manmade fabrics, manufactured in mills or powerlooms. So, the test for determining whether the goods in question come within the scope of item 1 in the Schedule to the Act is firstly whether it is textiles and secondly, if so, whether it is manufactured in mills or powerlooms. The case of the petitioner is that the goods in question are not textiles firstly because there is no process of weaving in making P. V. C. leather cloth and secondly that cloth is not manufactured in mills or powerlooms; but it is made by a mechanical process more particularly described in the clarification issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs on 9th February, 1972, which reads as under : "impregnated or coated fabric.- Fusible interlings are manufactured either by the extrusion coating process or the hot calender coating process on cotton or man-made fabric base. Even a visual examination of the sample will show that the polythene film is for all purpose permanently fixed to the base fabric and it cannot be easily separated. In the circumstances, the fusible interlings as well as other products made in this manner even if described as laminated fabric would be correctly classified as fabric impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials failing under item 19-III or 22 (3 ). " item 19-III relates to cotton fabrics impregnated, coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials. Item 22 (3) reads as under : "man-made fabrics : fabrics impregnated, coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials. " on a plain reading of these two items 19-III and 22 (3), it cannot be said that these fabrics are manufactured in mills or powerlooms. Item 22 (3) reads as under : "man-made fabrics : fabrics impregnated, coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials. " on a plain reading of these two items 19-III and 22 (3), it cannot be said that these fabrics are manufactured in mills or powerlooms. ( 7 ) IT is contended by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State that item 1 in the schedule is in terms similar to entry 8-A in the Fifth Schedule of the KST Act and since we have taken the view in W. P. Nos. 11213 to 11221 of 1987 and S. T. R. P. Nos. 137 and 140 of 1979 and 83 to 85 of 1978 [bharat Textile and Proofing Industries v. State of Karnataha [1988 ]71 STC10 (Kar )] that under the KST Act "textiles" include tarpaulin and P. V. C. cloth, the same meaning should be assigned to item 1 in the Schedule to the entry Tax Act. The interpretation of the relevant entry,. e. , 8-A in the Fifth Schedule to the KST act was controlled by the definition "tariff item 19" in the Central Excise Act and we have interpreted that entry in the light of the amendment made to the tariff item 19 of the Excise Act. But, it is not possible to link item 1 of the Schedule to the Act to the tariff item 19 of the Excise act since what all the Entry Tax Act says : "words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957 ). " But the word "textiles" is not defined in the KST Act and therefore it is not possible to accede to the contention of the learned Government Advocate that the meaning of this item 1 in the Act must be the same as the amended definition of "tariff item 19" of the Central Excise Act. There is no provision either express or implied at all in the Act that this entry should be understood in the same manner as the definition of "tariff item 19" of the central Excise Act. Thus construed, it is clear that P. V. C. leather cloth is not "textiles" with a cotton base which is manufactured in mills or powerlooms. There is no provision either express or implied at all in the Act that this entry should be understood in the same manner as the definition of "tariff item 19" of the central Excise Act. Thus construed, it is clear that P. V. C. leather cloth is not "textiles" with a cotton base which is manufactured in mills or powerlooms. If that be so, the meaning to be given to the word "p. V. C. leather" cloth is the meaning that is generally given to that word in ordinary common parlance. That is the test prescribed by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR1980 SC 1552 , 1980 (6 ) ELT383 (SC ), (1980 )4 SCC71 , [1980 ]3 SCR1109 , [1980 ]46 STC256 (SC ). ( 8 ) WE will first take up the earlier case of the Supreme Court in Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR1979 SC 300 , 1989 (25 )ECR443 (NULL ), 1980 cencus397d , 1983 (13 )ELT1607 (SC ), (1979 )1 SCC82 , [1979 ]1 SCR545 , [1978 ]42 stc433 (SC ), 1978 (10 )UJ697 (SC ). In that case, the point for consideration was whether cotton and woollen "dryer felts" manufactured by the assessee would come within the meaning of the word "textiles" and therefore exempt from the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. In that case, it is common ground that the word "textiles" was not linked to the definition of "cotton fabrics" as defined in tariff item 19 of the Central Excise Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court adopted the common parlance test and observed as follows : "now, what are 'dryer felts' ? They are of two kinds, cotton dryer felts and woollen dryer felts. Both are made of yarn, cotton in one case and woollen in the other. Some synthetic yarn is also used. The process employed is that of weaving according to warp and woof pattern. This is how the manufacturing process is described by the assessing authority in its order dated 12th november, 1971 : 'the raw material used by the company is cotton and woollen yarn which they themselves manufacture from raw cotton and wool, and the finished product, called "felts", are manufactured on powerlooms from cotton and woollen yarn. This is how the manufacturing process is described by the assessing authority in its order dated 12th november, 1971 : 'the raw material used by the company is cotton and woollen yarn which they themselves manufacture from raw cotton and wool, and the finished product, called "felts", are manufactured on powerlooms from cotton and woollen yarn. ' Duryer felts' are, therefore, clearly woven fabrics and must be held to fall within the ordinary meaning of the word 'textiles'. We do not think that the word 'textiles' has any narrower meaning in common parlance other than the ordinary meaning given in the dictionary, namely, a woven fabric. There may be wide ranging varieties of woven fabric and they may go on multiplying and proliferating with new developments in science and technology and inventions of new methods, materials and techniques, but none the less they would all be textiles. The analogy of cases where the word `vegetables' was held not to include betel leaves or sugarcane is wholly inappropriate. There, what was disapproved by the court was resort to the botanical meaning of the word 'vegetables' when that word had acquired a popular meaning, which was different. It was said by Holmes, J. , in his inimitable style : 'a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. ' Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. The reason is that, as pointed out by Story, J. , in Two hundred Chests of Tea (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 430, the legislature does 'not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists'. But here the word 'textiles' is not sought by the assessee to be given a scientific or technical meaning in preference to its popular meaning. It has only one meaning, namely, a woven fabric and that is the meaning which it bears in ordinary parlance. But here the word 'textiles' is not sought by the assessee to be given a scientific or technical meaning in preference to its popular meaning. It has only one meaning, namely, a woven fabric and that is the meaning which it bears in ordinary parlance. It is true that our minds are conditioned by old and antiquated notions of what are textiles and, therefore, it may sound a little strange to regard 'dryer felts' as 'textiles'. But it must be remembered that the concept of 'textiles' is not a static concept. It has, having regard to newly developing materials, methods, techniques and processes, a con-tinually expanding content and new kinds of fabric may be invented which may legitimately, without doing any violence to the language, be regarded as 'textiles'. Take for example rayon and nylon fabrics which are now become very popular for making wearing apparel. When they first came to be made, they must have been intruders in the field of 'textiles' because only cotton, silk and woollen fabrics were till then recognised as 'textiles'. But today no one can dispute that rayon and nylon fabrics are textiles and can properly be described as such. We may take another example which is nearer to the case before us. It is common knowledge that certain kinds of hats are made out of felt and though felt is not ordinarily used for making wearing apparel, can it be suggested that felt is not a 'textile' ? The character of a fabric or material as textile does not depend upon the use to which it may be put. The uses of textiles in a fast developing economy are manifold and it is quite common now to find 'textiles' being used even for industrial purposes. If we look at the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, we find in Chapter 59 occurring in section XI of the First Schedule that there is a reference to 'textile fabrics' and textile articles, 'of a kind commonly used in machinery or plant' and clause (4) of that chapter provides that this expression shall be taken to apply inter alia to 'woven textile felts. . . . . of a kind commonly used in paper-making or other machinery. . . . '. . . . . of a kind commonly used in paper-making or other machinery. . . . '. This reference in a statute which is intended to apply to imports made by the trading community clearly shows that 'dryer felts' which are 'woven textile felts of a kind p. n. 43 commonly used in paper-making machinery' are regarded in common parlance, according to the sense of ordinary traders and merchants, textile fabrics. We have, therefore, no doubt that 'dryer felts' are 'textiles' within the meaning of that expression in item 30 of Schedule B. " in this view of the matter, the Supreme Court held that "dryer felts" under the Punjab General sales Tax Act was "textiles" and therefore it was not liable to sales tax. ( 9 ) A similar point came up for consideration in the later case of the Supreme Court in Delhi cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR1980 SC 1552 , 1980 (6 )ELT383 (SC ), (1980 )4 SCC71 , [1980 ]3 SCR1109 , [1980 ]46 STC256 (SC ). Though, in that case, the relevant entry in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was linked to item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, the Supreme Court examined the general question of interpretation of statutes in tax matters and observed as follows : "in determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled, it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted. " In our view, since item 1 in the Schedule to the Act is not defined in the KST Act, we have to construe it in the sense in which it is understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it and it is their sense which should prevail over any technical or scientific definition of that entry. In this case, we are concerned with P. V. C. leather cloth. It is they who are concerned with it and it is their sense which should prevail over any technical or scientific definition of that entry. In this case, we are concerned with P. V. C. leather cloth. There is no dispute about the process of making P. V. C. leather cloth in terms of the clarification issued by the Central Government. On a plain reading of that process, it cannot be said that P. V. C. leather cloth could be understood as we understand textiles in trade parlance. Further, it is not the case of the Revenue that P. V. C. cloth could be made either in mills or powerlooms. Therefore, this cloth is decidedly out of the scope of item 1 of the Schedule to the Act and accordingly it is not exigible to entry tax. ( 10 ) THE second respondent has relied on the decision in Varma Industrials Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore District [1981 ]47 STC43 (Kar ). That decision does not deal with item 1 of the Schedule to the Act. But, it deals with the relevant entry in the KST Act. We have noticed earlier that the meaning to be assigned to item 1 of the schedule to the Act cannot be the same as the meaning to be assigned to the relevant entry in the kst Act as the word "textiles" is not defined either under the Act or under the KST Act. The meaning to be given to this word in the Act is not statutorily linked to the amended definition of "cotton fabrics" in tariff item 19 of the Central Excise Act and therefore the proper test to interpret item 1 in the Act is the one as stated by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth Mills case AIR1980 SC 1552 , 1980 (6 )ELT383 (SC ), (1980 )4 SCC71 , [1980 ]3 scr1109 , [1980 ]46 STC256 (SC ). We have applied this ruling of the Supreme Court to the facts of this case and in our view this decision supports our finding that P. V. C. leather cloth is not textiles within the meaning of item 1 of the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act. For these reasons, these petitions are allowed and accordingly the impugned proposition notices are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties to bear their own costs.