SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the constitution the petitioner has sought for quashing the notification bearing No. MUNICI/2/election/63-87-88 dated 10-2-1988 (Annexure 'c) issued by the Deputy commissioner and Election Officer for conducting election to the Office of the President and Vice-President of the City municipal Council, Hassan, in so far it relates to the election to the office of the President. He has also sought for further declaration that the acceptance of nomination of third respondent filed pursuant to the aforesaid notification is illegal and further to direct the Election Officer to accept the nomination of the petitioner and to proceed with the election process commenced pursuant to the notification dated: 22-10-1987 from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order of this Court. ( 2 ) AFTER the writ petition was filed, the 3rd respondent was declared to have been elected as the President of the City municipal Council, Hassan. Therefore, the petitioner sought for amendment of the petition. That application was allowed on 7-3- 1988. The 3rd respondent has filed statement of objections covering the original pleadings as well as the pleadings introduced by way of amendment. By the amendment, the petitioner has sought for quashing the declaration made by the Election Officer ' that the 3rd respondent has been elected as president of the City Municipal Council, hassan, as unopposed being null and void. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that pursuant to the direction issued by this court in Writ petition No. 13459/1987 on 24th September, 1987 to the Election Officer/deputy commissioner to hold election to the Office of the President and Vice- President of the city Municipal Council, Hassan, (for short 'cmc' Hassan) within a period of two weeks from the date of the receipt of the order; a notification dated: 22-10-1987 (Annexure 'a') was issued by the Election officer/deputy Commissioner containing the calendar of events. The last date for filing the nomination was 29-10-1987. Pursuant to the notification dated: 22-10-1987 (Annexure 'a'), the petitioner and five others filed their nominations. The last date for filing the nomination was 29-10-1987. Pursuant to the notification dated: 22-10-1987 (Annexure 'a'), the petitioner and five others filed their nominations. No doubt, the order dated: 24-9-1987 passed in the writ petition No. 13459/1987 was appealed against in W. A. No. 1855/1987 and an interim order was passed on 27-10-1987 directing that the elections as directed in the writ petition shall not be held till the decision in the writ appeal; but, nevertheless, the Election Officer was not a party either to the Writ Petition or to the Writ Appeal and the interim order was not communicated to him and it was brought to the notice of the Election Officer by the appellants in the Writ Appeal on 30-10-1987 only after the last date fixed for receiving the nominations. Therefore, the calendar of events issued as per the Notification dated 22-10-1987 (Annexure-A) did not lapse in so far it related to the stage of receipt of nomination papers; that ultimately, Writ Appeal No. 1855/1987 was dismissed on 2-2-1988; that while dismissing the writ appeal it was directed that the Deputy Commissioner shall hold the election to the office of the President and vice-President of the City Municipal Council, Hassan, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the order in accordance with law. Therefore, it is further. contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Election Officer could have only continued the election process from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order of this court and it was not at all permissible in law, for him to issue fresh calendar of events as has been done in the instant case. Hence, the election held under a fresh calendar of event is without the authority of law. In the circumstances, it is further submitted that neither the rule laid down in Muthusami's case (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 616) nor the validity of election to be challenged by way of an election petition is a bar for entertaining the writ petition and granting the reliefs in as much as it is not a case in which the election process is being interfered but it is a case in which the Election officer has to be directed to continue the election process. Hence, the case on hand does not fall within the scope of the decision in Muthusami's Case. Hence, the case on hand does not fall within the scope of the decision in Muthusami's Case. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, it is contended by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Counsel appearing for third respondent that the fact remains that the Writ Petition is filed after the election process commenced and before the election results are announced and the interim order passed on 27-10-1987 in the presence of learned Government, Advocate who accepted notice on behalf of State must be deemed to have been communicated to the election Officer on 27-10-1987 itself. Therefore, the election process was interupted even before the first stage of filing of nomination was over. Consequently, the entire calendar of events lapsed as the interim order passed on 27-10-1987 was in force till 2-2-1988 the date on which the Writ Appeal was heard and decided. It is also further contended that fresh direction was issued in the Writ Appeal to hold the election to the office of the President and Vice- president within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the order meaning thereby to issue fresh calendar of events for the purpose of holding election. That even otherwise it is submitted that calendar of events is not challenged in so far it relates to the office of the vice-President of the same Municipal Council, therefore, it holds good and it must be deemed to be valid one in so far it relates to the election to the office of the Vice-President. That being so, it cannot be held to be illegal or void in so far it relates to the election to the office of the president of the same municipal Council and acceptance of contentions of the petitioner would lead to such an incongruous position which is not permissible in law in as much as the same notification cannot be good for holding an election to the office of the Vice-President and it cannot be bad in so far it relates to holding of an election to the office of the President. That at any rate having regard to the law enunciated in Muthusami's case (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 616), a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot at all be entertained either to interfere at an intermediate stage of election process or at any stage subsequent to election. That at any rate having regard to the law enunciated in Muthusami's case (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 616), a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot at all be entertained either to interfere at an intermediate stage of election process or at any stage subsequent to election. It is submitted that if the petitioner is aggrieved, he has a right to challenge the election by way of election petition as provided by the proviso to sub-section (12) of Section 42, read with Rule 15 of the Karnataka Municipalities (President and vice-President) Election Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'rules' ). Having regard to the aforesaid contentions, the following points arise for consideration: 1) Whether it was permissible for the election Officer to issue a fresh calendar of events calling for fresh nominations after the Writ Appeal No. 1855/1987 was decided on 2-2-1988? 2) Whether the interim order dated 27-10-1987 was communicated to the election Officer? if so, when? 3) Whether it is a case in which interference in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is justified? point NOS. 1 and 2 : ( 5 ) THESE two points can conveniently be considered together. The term of the Councillors of the CMC, Hassan, expired on 10-8- 87. But the elections were not held. However, the State Government in exercise of its power under the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 18 of the Karnataka Municipalities act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') extended the term of the office of the councillors till 31-12-1987. It is not in dispute in this case that the State Government has further extended the term of office of councillors because under the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 18 of the Act, the State government has power to extend the term of office of councillors for a period not exceeding 24 months, and the extended term has not yet expired. As far as the term of office of President and Vice-President of CMC, hassan, is concerned, it was limited to two years by the Government Order dated 5-3-1984 issued under sub-section (11) of Section 42 of the Act. The term of office of the president and the Vice-President also expired along with the expiry of the term of office of councillors. The term of office of the president and the Vice-President also expired along with the expiry of the term of office of councillors. While extending the term of office of President and Vice-President, the state Government by another notification dated 22-8-1987 in the purported exercise of its power under sub-section (12) of Section 42 of the Act, appointed respondents 3 and 4 in W. P. No. 13457/87 to perform the duties and exercise all the powers, of President and vice President of CMC Hassan respectively till 31-12-1987. It was the validity of this notification that was challenged in W. P. No. 13459/1987 by the two councillors viz. , Sri H. Abdul Rahim and Sri H. H. Devraj. The said writ petition was allowed on 24-9-1987, and the impugned Notification dated 22-8-1987 was quashed. The Election Officer - the deputy Commissioner - appointed under the act and the Rules was directed to hold election to the office of President and Vice- president of CMC, Hassan within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the order. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, respondents 3 and 4 in W. P. No. 13459/1987 preferred W. A. No. 1855/1987. On 27-10-1987, the appeal was admitted and the following interim order was passed:"heard. Admitted. Mr. Subba Rao, learned Counsel accepts notice on behalf of respondent 3 and 4 (Mr. H. Abdul Rahim and Mr. H. H. Devraj, petitioners in W. P. No. 13459/87 ). On our asking, Mr. Chandrashekharaiah, learned Government Advocate accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 1. Notice of this appeal be sent to respondent- No. 2. The question involved is whether the government can extend the term of the president and Vice President, in the circumstances of the case, in exercise of its Power under Section 42 (12) of the karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. Learned Single Judge has directed the holding of fresh election and the term of office has been extended upto 31st december 1987. In case the elections are allowed to be held and stay is not granted, the writ appeal is to become infructuous. In these circumstances, in the interest of justice, we direct that the appeal be set down for final hearing on 16th November 1987 at SI. No. 1. In case the elections are allowed to be held and stay is not granted, the writ appeal is to become infructuous. In these circumstances, in the interest of justice, we direct that the appeal be set down for final hearing on 16th November 1987 at SI. No. 1. As we are directing the hearing of the appeal, we grant the stay as prayed for i. e. , that the elections as directed by the learned Single Judge shall not be held till the decision in the writ appeal. " ( 6 ) NO doubt, the aforesaid interim order was passed after the Government Advocate accepted the notice on behalf of the State. But, the Deputy Commissioner/election officer was not a party either to the writ petition or to the writ appeal. The records of the writ Appeal which are also put up on the direction of the court, do not indicate that the interim order was communicated to the election Officer on 27-10-1987 or on any subsequent date. It is noticed from page 77 of the Writ Appeal records that the interim order had been despatched only on 30-10-1987. But it" does not state that it was despatched to the Election Officer/deputy commissioner, Hassan. However, the petitioner has produced an endorsement dated 27-2-1988 (Annexure-F) issued by the election Officer/deputy Commissioner, hassan stating that the interim order passed in W. A. No. 1855/1987 on 27-10-1987 was produced by Sri H. S. Prakash and H. N. Phaniraj the appellants in the writ appeal on 30-10-1987 and on such production of the order only, the Election Officer came to know of the interim order passed in the writ appeal. Thus the interim order was brought to the notice of the Election Officer only on 30-10-1987 and not earlier to that. As per the calendar of events issued on 22-10-1987 produced as Annexure-A, the last date for receipt of nominations wa s 29-10-1987. 31-10-1987 was the date for scrutiny of the nomination papers. In view of the fact that election Officer received interim order dated 27-10-1987 passed in the writ appeal on being produced by the appellants in the writ appeal on 30-10-1987, the Election Officer did not proceed with further stages of the calendar of events. 31-10-1987 was the date for scrutiny of the nomination papers. In view of the fact that election Officer received interim order dated 27-10-1987 passed in the writ appeal on being produced by the appellants in the writ appeal on 30-10-1987, the Election Officer did not proceed with further stages of the calendar of events. At this stage itself, it is convenient to deal with the contention of sri K. Subbarao, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that the interim order passed on 27-10-87 must be deemed to have been communicated to the Election officer as the State of Karnataka was a party and it was represented by Government Advocate who accepted the notice on behalf of the State and the interim order was passed on such acceptance of notice. ( 7 ) NO doubt the election officer is the deputy Commissioner and he is an official of the State Government but under the Act and the Rules. He is a statutory authority and a legal person created by the statute. The Act and the Rules confer certain powers and impose certain duties upon him. These duties are to be discharged and powers are to be exercised as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules and therefore he has to be independently made a party and he cannot be treated as part and parcel of the State for all purposes. In the absence of Election Officer being made a party to the writ appeal, any interim order passed in the writ appeal until it was communicated to him, could not or did not have the effect of staying further proceedings of the election. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent has placed reliance on a decision of this court in M. R. Channarayappa v Tahsildar and Returning Officer, Malur (1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 444 ). In that case, the Tahsildar who was the Returning officer was a party (He was respondent-1 to the writ petition) and therefore it was held that by reason of the notice taken by the government Pleader on his behalf, in law, though not in fact respondent-1 (Tahsildar and Returning Officer) had the knowledge of the order of stay before he made the declaration. Therefore it was further held that the delay, if any, in the formal communication of the order of stay lost its significance. Therefore it was further held that the delay, if any, in the formal communication of the order of stay lost its significance. In the instant case, the actual position is that the election Officer was not a party either to the writ petition or to the writ appeal. No doubt, the State of Karnataka was a party. But the state in the case of statutory authorities who have to perform the functions, discharge the duties, exercise the powers as per the provisions of the statute cannot be deemed to represent them without they being made parties to the proceeding. Such an assumption will lead to several legal complications. In a case where such statutory authorities are not parties and an order is passed by a court preventing them from proceeding with election process, as in the instant case, or doing a certain thing, until it is communicated to them by the court or brought to their notice, they are entitled to proceed with the election process or continue to discharge the legal duties as per law. Of course, such authorities whether they are parties to the proceeding or not, once the order passed by a court is communicated to them by the court or comes to or brought to their notice, from that moment they are not entitled to proceed further in the matter except as per the directions contained in such an order of the court. In the instant case, the fact that the Government advocate was directed to take notice on behalf of the State did not amount and could not be considered in law as amounting to an instant intimation of the interim order to the election Officer. The Election Officer came to know the order only on 30-10-1988 when the appellants in the writ Appeal produced a copy of the interim order dated 27-10-1987 passed in the Writ Appeal. By that time, the first stage of the calendar of events viz. , the last date for receipt of nominations had been over and six councillors had filed their nominations to the office of the President as per the endorsement dated 27-2-1988 (Annexure-G) issued by the Election Officer. In Mulraj v Murti Raghunathji Maharaj (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1386) the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect of an order of stay passed by the superior court. In Mulraj v Murti Raghunathji Maharaj (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1386) the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect of an order of stay passed by the superior court. The Supreme Court has approved the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in bossesswari Chowdhurany v Horro Sundar mozumdar (1896-97) 1 Cal. W. N. 226 as laying down the law correctly. In para 5 of the judgment, the decision of the Calcutta high Court in Besseswari Chowdhuran's case is quoted which reads thus:"an order staying execution of a decree against which an appeal is pending is in the nature of a prohibitory order and as such would only take effect when communicated. If a property is sold before such an order is communicated to the court holding the sale, such sale is not void and cannot be treated as a nullity. "after quoting the aforesaid passage from the decision of the High Court of Calcutta, the supreme Court has held thus:"8. We are of opinion that the view taken in Bessesswari Chowdhurany's case (1896-97) 1 Cal. W. N. 226 is the correct one. An order of stay in an execution matter is in our opinion in the nature of a prohibitory order and is addressed to the court that is carrying out execution. It is not of the same nature as an order allowing an appeal and quashing execution proceeding. That kind of order takes effect immediately it is passed, for such an order takes away the very jurisdiction of the court executing the decree as there is nothing left to execute thereafter. But a mere order of stay of execution does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. All that it does is to prohibit the court from proceeding with the execution further and the court unless it knows of the order cannot be expected to carry it out. Therefore till the order comes to the knowledge of the court, its jurisdiction to carry on execution is not affected by a stay order which must in the very nature of things be treated to be a prohibitory order directing the executing court which continues to have jurisdiction to stay its hand till further orders. Therefore till the order comes to the knowledge of the court, its jurisdiction to carry on execution is not affected by a stay order which must in the very nature of things be treated to be a prohibitory order directing the executing court which continues to have jurisdiction to stay its hand till further orders. It is clear that as soon as a stay order is withdrawn, the executing court is entitled to carry out execution and there is no question of fresh conferment of jurisdiction by the fact that the stay order has been withdrawn. "the jurisdiction of the court is there all along. The only effect of the stay order is to prohibit the executing court from proceeding further and that can take effect when the executing court has knowledge of the order. The executing court may have knowledge of the order on the order being communicated to it by the court passing the stay order or the executing court may be informed of the order by one party or the other with an affidavit in support of the information or in any other way. As soon therefore as the executing court has come to know of the order either by communication from the court passing the stay order or by an affidavit from one party or other or in any other way the executing court cannot proceed further and if it does so it acts illegally. . . . . "while dealing with the effect of an order of stay and an order of injunction, it is further observed thus:"10. As we have already indicated, an order of stay is as such a prohibitory order as an injunction order and unless the court to which it is addressed has knowledge of it, it cannot deprive that court of the jurisdiction to proceed with the execution before it. But there is one difference between an order or injunction and an order of stay arising out of the fact that an injunction order is usually passed against a party while a stay order is addressed to the court. As the stay order is addressed to the court, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand; if it does not do so, it acts illegally. As the stay order is addressed to the court, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand; if it does not do so, it acts illegally. Therefore, in the case of a stay order as opposed to an order of injunction, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand and further proceedings are illegal; but so long as the court has no knowledge of the stay order, it does not lose the jurisdiction to deal with the execution which it has under the Code of civil Procedure. "in the instant case, the order passed by this court in W. A. No. 1855/1987 is as follows :". . . . . WE grant the stay as prayed for i. e. , that the elections as directed by the learned Single Judge shall not be held till the decision in the writ appeal. "thus the aforesaid interim order is both in the nature of stay as well as an injunction prohibiting the holding of election. In the case of an injunction, as pointed out by the supreme Court, it is normally passed against a party. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the Election Officer was not a party to the writ appeal or to the writ petition. Whether the aforesaid interim order is construed as an order of stay or as an order of injunction, in either case, it was necessary to serve on the Election Officer or to bring it to his notice in order to have its effect and deprive the election officer from his jurisdiction to proceed with the election. In the instant case, the interim order was brought to the notice of the Election Officer only on 30-10-1987. By that time, the last date for filing the nominations was over. This aspect of the matter, with reference to the records of the writ appeal, has already been adverted to in para 6 of this order. However, the fact remains and it is undisputed that on 30-10-1987, the appellants in the writ appeal produced a copy of the interim order dated 27-10-1987 before the Election Officer. From that date, he has not proceeded with the further stages of the calendar of events. However, the fact remains and it is undisputed that on 30-10-1987, the appellants in the writ appeal produced a copy of the interim order dated 27-10-1987 before the Election Officer. From that date, he has not proceeded with the further stages of the calendar of events. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, it is contended that the interim order passed in the Writ Appeal on 27-10-1987 was published in all the leading newspapers; therefore, Deputy Commissioner/election Officer must have become aware of the interim order before 30-10-1987. In para 4 of the additional statement of objections filed on 14-3-1988, the 3rd respondent has averred thus:"4) It is submitted that the interim order was passed in W. A. No. 1855/1987 on 27-2-1988 and the same had been published in all the leading newspapers and the Deputy Commissioner and the present petitioner were also aware of the said interim order. In fact, the appellants in the said appeal and the petitioner in this writ petition belong to the same party. Therefore, the petitioner was also aware of the said interim order passed on 27-2-1988 itself. Therefore, once the petitioner was aware of the interim order that was passed in the earlier writ appeal. Therefore, he cannot say that one stage of the election had been completed in pursuance of the election notification dated 22-10-1987. " ( 9 ) THE date mentioned as 27-2-1988, as submitted by the learned counsel, is obviously a typographical error. Whereas it ought to have been 27-10-1987 itself. To prove the fact that the interim order dated 27-10-1987 passed in the writ appeal was published in the leading newspapers, no copy of any one of such newspapers is produced along with the statement of objections. There is no evidence to show that the interim order had appeared in the newspaper and that newspaper had reached the Deputy Commissioner before 30-10-1987. Mere fact that the interim order appeared in the newspapers, it does not lead to an inference that the Election Officer had the knowledge of the interim order. There is no obligation on the part of any person or the Authority to read the newspapers. Mere fact that the interim order appeared in the newspapers, it does not lead to an inference that the Election Officer had the knowledge of the interim order. There is no obligation on the part of any person or the Authority to read the newspapers. It will be hazardous to attribute knowledge of the interim order to the Election Officer merely on the ground that it was published in the newspapers without the further proof that such publication of the interim order was brought or had come to the notice of the Election Officer earlier to 30-10-1987. The Election Officer has himself stated in the Endorsement dated 27-2-1988 (Annexure-F) issued by him, that it was brought to his notice only on 30-10-1987 by the appellants in the writ appeal. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that the Election Officer had the knowledge of the interim order dated 27-10-1987 before 30-10-1987. The interim order passed in the writ Appeal on 27-10-1987 had not been either communicated or brought to the notice of the Election Officer before 30-10-1987. The contention is accordingly rejected. ( 10 ) IT is settled position of law that whenever the election process is interrupted by an order of the court on termination of the proceedings before the court, wherein the steps already taken for holding the election are not set aside or no direction is issued nullifying or infructuating the steps already taken to hold the election, the election process has to be continued from the stage at which it was interrupted provided the ultimate order of the court does not state otherwise. Provided further that as per the calendar of events issued for holding the election, at least the first stage of receiving the nomination paper had been completed by the time the interim order was either communicated or brought to the notice of the authority conducting the election. In the instant case, the first stage of the calendar of events viz. , the receipt of the nomination papers was over by the time the interim order was brought to the notice of the Election Officer. The writ appeal was ultimately dismissed on 2- 2-1988. While dismissing the writ appeal, the division Bench directed as follows:". . . . 15. By virtue of the interim order, holding of the election in question was stayed. Consequently, it is necessary to issue a fresh direction. The writ appeal was ultimately dismissed on 2- 2-1988. While dismissing the writ appeal, the division Bench directed as follows:". . . . 15. By virtue of the interim order, holding of the election in question was stayed. Consequently, it is necessary to issue a fresh direction. Accordingly, we direct the election officer/deputy commissioner, appointed under the Act to hold the election of the President and vice-President of the City Municipal council, Hassan, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt this order in accordance with law. The learned government Advocate shall communicate this order to the concerned authority expeditiously. " ( 11 ) IT is further contended by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent that the aforesaid direction amounted to directing the Election Officer to hold a fresh election. Therefore, the Election Officer was justified in issuing a fresh calendar of events. The aforesaid direction only directs to hold the election in accordance with law. Further this direction is issued keeping in view the steps already taken by the Election Officer to hold the election pursuant to the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition. The legal position in such cases is that the election process has to be continued from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order. ( 12 ) SIMILAR question arose in T. N. Ballari gowda v Taluka Agricultural Produce Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. ,? (W. P. No. 2600/1973 decided on 7-9-1973 ). The leatned Single Judge, (K. Jagannatha Shetty, j) (as he then was) of this court observed thus:". . . 2. The first contention urged by Shri viswanatha Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Bye-law 28 (b) which was certified by the Registrar was not approved by the General Body. The second contention was that even if the said bye-law is valid, it cannot take away the right of the petitioners to continue in office atleast for a full term of three years from the date of their election. The third and the last contention urged by him was that the Returning Officer has no jurisdiction to continue the process of election from the stage at which it was interrupted by the interim order of this court in W. P. 2225/of 1972. 3. I will take up the third contention first, for consideration. The third and the last contention urged by him was that the Returning Officer has no jurisdiction to continue the process of election from the stage at which it was interrupted by the interim order of this court in W. P. 2225/of 1972. 3. I will take up the third contention first, for consideration. It is one of the settled principles that if any process of election is interrupted by the order of any court and if the proceedings are terminated upholding the steps taken by the Returning Officer, the normal rule is that the Returning Officer should continue from the stage at which it was interrupted by the order of the court and he should not take de novo proceedings for holding election. In that view, the returning Officer has correctly taken steps to hold the election. " ( 13 ) EVEN in Muthsami's case (A. I. R. 1988 s. C. 616) the Supreme Court has directed the Returning Officer to proceed with the election in accordance with law from the stage at which it was interrupted by the order of the High Court. The direction issued by the Division Bench in WA. No. 1855/1987 to hold election to the office of the President and the Vice President of the CMC, Hassan, in accordance with law could only mean that the election process was to be continued from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order. The Division Bench was informed of the fact that the holding of election was stayed. This is clear from the earlier portion of para 15 of the order which is already reproduced. Para 15 starts with the following sentence:"by virtue of the interim order, holding of election in question was stayed. Consequently, it is necessary to issue a fresh direction. "that being the position, the Election Officer could not have issued fresh calendar of events covering the stage which had already been covered under the earlier calendar of events before it was interrupted by the interim order. The stage of filing of nominations was over. Fresh calendar of events could have been issued only from the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers and onwards. The stage of filing of nominations was over. Fresh calendar of events could have been issued only from the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers and onwards. Whereas in the instant case, the Election Officer has started a de novo proceeding by calling for fresh nominations and thereby he has abandoned the first stage of receiving the nominations which had been completed under the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987 (Annexure-A ). The Election officer had no authority or jurisdiction to abandon the completed portion of election process. He could have only proceeded from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order. Thus by doing so, the Election Officer acted without jurisdiction. Accordingly, points 1 and 2 are answered as follows: The election Officer acted without jurisdiction in issuing a de novo calendar of events calling for fresh nominations, he should have issued calendar of events covering the stages which had remained to be covered as per the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987. As per that, the stage of filing of nomination papers was over by 30-10-1987. Therefore, the fresh calendar of events could have been issued only covering further stages of election process. Point No. 2, the Election Officer had not been served with the interim order dated 22-10-1987 passed in the Writ appeal No. 1855/1987 nor he had the knowledge of the order till 30-10-1987. POINT NO. 3: ( 14 ) SECTION 42 of the Act provides for election to the office of the President and vice President. It also provides for determination of election dispute relating to the election to the office of the President and vice-President, by a prescribed Judicial officer. Rule 15 of the Rules provides that the validity of the election of the President or the Vice-President may be called in question by a petition presented to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area within which the election has been or should have been held within seven days from the date of declaration of the election by any candidate at such election or by three or more councillors joined together as petitioners. The petitioner herein no doubt has filed the nomination pursuant to the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987. But he has not filed the nomination pursuant to the fresh calendar of events dated 10-2-1988 (Annexure-C ). The petitioner herein no doubt has filed the nomination pursuant to the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987. But he has not filed the nomination pursuant to the fresh calendar of events dated 10-2-1988 (Annexure-C ). If at all he had to file an election petition, it could have been done only in if two other councillors had agreed to join him. Further Rules 15 and 16 of the rules limit the scope of the election petition and also the reliefs to be granted by the district Judge: ( 15 ) SUB-RULE (5) of Rule 15 of the Rules reads thus:"the petitioner may claim any of the following declarations: a) that the election of the returned candidate is void; b) that the election of the returned candidate is void and that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. "rule 16 of the Rules further provides that the District Judge may, after such enquiry as he deems fit and after giving an opportunity to be heard to the parties to the proceedings, make an order.- a) dismissing the petition; or b) declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void; or c) declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. From Rules 15 and 16 of the Rules, it is clear that neither the election petitioner can claim and obtain a direction to the Election Officer to proceed with the election from the stage at which it was interrupted by the interim order passed in the Writ Appeal nor the District judge can grant such a relief. He is an election Tribunal and not a court. He does not enjoy inherent powers. He cannot grant any other relief except those confessed on him by the Rules. In the election petition the election of third respondent could have been declared as void. But, in that event, a fresh election was to take place on calling for fresh nominations. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the reliefs sought for in the writ petition are available to the petitioner in an election petition under Rules 15 and 16 of the Rules. But, in that event, a fresh election was to take place on calling for fresh nominations. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the reliefs sought for in the writ petition are available to the petitioner in an election petition under Rules 15 and 16 of the Rules. In Muthusami's case (AIR 1988 s. C. 616) on which great emphasis is laid by learned counsel for third respondent, no doubt, it is held that it is not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the election process at an intermediate stage after the commencement of election process and before the declaration of results of the election and disputes about special rights are to be decided separately as per the provisions of the statute. Following the said decision, I have held in Writ Petition No. 19159/1987 (Dr. S. Bheemappa and Another v the Returning Officer and Others decided on 22-8-1988) that it is not appropriate to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at the intermediate stage of election process. But the case on hand does not squarely fall within the ratio decidendi of the decision in Muthusami's case in as much as it is not interfering with the election process, it is rather directing the Election officer to proceed with the election process in accordance with law from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order of this court. The election held in accordance with the calendar of events issued on 22-10-1987, the validity of such election can still be challenged in an election petition filed under rule 15 of the Rules. But that has not been done in the instant case in as much as the elections are proposed to be held de novo. The calendar of events issued on 22-10-1987 as per Annexure-A had not lapsed. Even then, fresh calendar of events has been issued calling for fresh nominations. While dealing with points 1 and 2, this aspect of the matter has been considered. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to repeat the same. That being so, it is not possible to hold in the instant case that this is a case in which the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not called for. While dealing with points 1 and 2, this aspect of the matter has been considered. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to repeat the same. That being so, it is not possible to hold in the instant case that this is a case in which the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not called for. If jurisdiction under Article 226 is not exercised, the election held de-novo by issuing fresh calendar of events which is not permissible in law will be allowed to stand. In other words, the court will allow the unauthorised act to perpetuate. ( 16 ) IT is next contended that fresh calendar of events which is common to both the offices i. e. , President and Vice-President holds good in so far as the election to the office of the Vice President is concerned, therefore, the same cannot be interfered with in respect of election to the office of the president. Hence taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, it is submitted that interference is not called for. The petitioner has filed the nomination for contesting the election to the office of the President pursuant to the calendar of events issued on 22-10-1987. He has not filed the nomination to contest the election to the office of the Vice-President. The fact that the notification dated 10-2-1988 (calendar of events) in so far it relates to the vice-President is not challenged does not take away the right of the petitioner to challenge the same in so far it relates to the office of the President. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that as the election to the office of the Vice- President held under the fresh calendar of events dated 10-2-1988 is not challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs in so far it relates to the election to office of the President of the City municipal Council, Hassan. The contention is accordingly rejected. Point No. 3 is answered in the affirmative. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I make the following order: i) Writ petition is allowed: ii) Declaration made by the Election officer as per Annexure-H dated 1-3-1988 that the 3rd respondent is declared to have been elected unopposed as the President of the city Municipal Council, Hassan, is quashed. Point No. 3 is answered in the affirmative. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I make the following order: i) Writ petition is allowed: ii) Declaration made by the Election officer as per Annexure-H dated 1-3-1988 that the 3rd respondent is declared to have been elected unopposed as the President of the city Municipal Council, Hassan, is quashed. The fresh calendar of events dated 10-2-1988 (Annexure-C in so far it relates to the election of the office of the President of CMC, Hassan, is concerned, is quashed. In other respects, it is not disturbed. iii) The Election Officer/the Deputy commissioner, Hassan (resppn- dent-1) is directed to proceed with the election process commenced from the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987 (Annexure- A) from the stage it was interrupted by the interim order dated 27-10-87 passed in W. A. No. 1855/87. In other words, as already pointed out, the Election Officer has to proceed from the stage of scrutiny of the nomination papers received for the election to the office of the president, CMC, Hassan, as per the endorsement dated 27-2-1988 (Annexure-G) pursuant to the calendar of events dated 22-10-1987 (Annexure-A) and to cover the other stages by issuing a fresh calendar of event in respect of those stages within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Sd/- (K. A. SWAMI) judge soon after the pronouncement of the order, it is submitted by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned counsel for 3rd respondent that as the election of the 3rd respondent is quashed and as he desires to avail the remedy of appeal and as he is functioning as the president of the C. M. C. Hassan, to enable him to avail the right of appeal, the operation of the order just now pronounced may be stayed for a period of two weeks. Accordingly, the operation of the order is stayed till 6-5-1988. --- *** --- .