JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - Defendants 1 to 4 have filed this second appeal against the concurrent decisions of the Courts below decreeing the Plaintiff's suit in part. 2. Respondents 1 to 8 filed the suit, O. S. No. 210 of 1974-1 in the Court of the Munsif, Puri against the Appellants and the Respondent No. 9 for declaration of their title over plot No. 1062 under Khata No. 181 with an area of A0.34 decimals in village Birabalabhadrapur, for recovery of possession of the same from the Defendants and also for declaration of their right of way over plot Nos. 1061 and 1063 belonging to the Defendants. The suit was filed by them in their representative capacity on behalf of the Brahman Mahajana of village Birabalabhadrapur under Order I, Rule 8. Civil Procedure Code. The lower appellate Court dismissed the suit relating to Plaintiffs' claim of right of way. No appeal or cross-objection has been filed by the Plaintiffs against that part of the decree. As such the Plaintiffs' claim of right of way over the aforementioned two plots does not arise for consideration in this appeal. Relating to the relief or declaration of title and recovery of possession of plot No. 1062 both the Courts below have decreed the Plaintiffs suit. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the Plaintiffs' case was tbat plot No. 1062 initially belonged to one Baidyanath Sarangi who died leaving two sons Dinabandhu Sarangi and Artatrana Sarangi. In the partition between Dinabandhu and Artatrana each got half share in the suit plot. On 30th of July, 1946 Artatrana sold his half share in the suit plot to Dinabandhu by the registered sale deed Ext. 7. Thus Dinabandhu became the sole owner of the suit plot. Subsequently on 7-4-1956 Dinabandhu sold the suit plot to the Plaintiffs by the registered sale deed Ext. 1. It transpires that on 3-2-1954 Artatrana executed the sale deed marked Ext. A in favour of one Jagannath Mohanty in respect of the entire suit plot and the said Jagannath Mohanty sold the property to Defendants 1 to 4 by the sale deed executed on 14-8-1967-Ext. B. According to the Plaintiffs, the sale deed (Ext. 1. It transpires that on 3-2-1954 Artatrana executed the sale deed marked Ext. A in favour of one Jagannath Mohanty in respect of the entire suit plot and the said Jagannath Mohanty sold the property to Defendants 1 to 4 by the sale deed executed on 14-8-1967-Ext. B. According to the Plaintiffs, the sale deed (Ext. A) executed by Artatrana in' favour of Jagannath was an invalid and inoperative document which passed no title in favour of the transferee since by the date of its execution the former had lost right, title interest and possession over plot No. 1062. As a necessary consequence of this, the Plaintiffs contend that the sale deed executed by Jagannath in favour of Defendants 1 to 4 was also invalid, inoperative and passed no title to them. It is the further case of the Plaintiffs that Dinabandhu remained in exclusive possession of the suit plot since 30-7-1946 and after 7-4.1956 the Plaintiffs remained in possession of it. Neither Artatrana nor Jagannath nor Defendants 1 to 4 ever possessed the suit land. After the sale in their favour Defendants 1 to 4 tried to disturb the possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit plot due to which a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code was initiated between the parties. The said proceeding terminated in favour of the Defendants. Hence the suit for the reliefs noticed earlier. 4. Defendants 1 to 4. the main contesting parties in the suit, while admitting that the suit plot belonged to Baidyanath and it was partitioned between Dinabandhu and Artatrana after the death of Baidyanath, pleaded that the suit plot was exclusively allotted to Artatrana. It was the further case of the said Defendants that Artatrana never sold the suit plot or his share therein to Dinabandhu but sold it to Jagannath on 3-2-1954 by the sale deed Ext. A. The Defendants also claimed to have perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession. 5. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that the Plaintiffs have right, title interest and possession in the suit property and Defendants had not acquired title to it by adverse possession. A. The Defendants also claimed to have perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession. 5. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that the Plaintiffs have right, title interest and possession in the suit property and Defendants had not acquired title to it by adverse possession. On these findings the trial Court decreed the suit, declared the right, title and interest of the Plaintiffs over the suit land and directed Defendant No. 1 who had taken delivery of possession of the same in the proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code to redeliver possession of the lands to the Plaintiffs. 6. On appeal by Defendants 1 to 4, the lower appellate Court by the impugned judgment confirmed the aforesaid findings of the trial Court and the decision decreeing the Plaintiffs' suit. It is relevant to state here that the appellate Court at the first instance by judgment dated 2-1-1980 remanded the suit for deciding the additional issue as to the right of way and further directed the learned Munsif to give an opportunity to the parties to prove Ext. 7, that is, the original sale deed executed by Artatrana in favour of Dinabandhu in respect of the suit land, since the document had been marked as an exhibit u/s 90 of the Evidence Act after the close of the Defendants case without proper proof of custody of the document and without giving any opportunity to the Defendants to adduce rebuttal evidence. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties before the trial Court in pursuance of the order of remand the lower appellate Court came to hold that the original sate deed (Ext. 7), a document more than 30 years old was produced from proper custody and there was no suspicious circumstances to question the document. Accordingly the Court held that the presumption as to its due execution is to be drawn u/s 90 of the Evidence Act. It appears from the judgment that the' Court below on a thorough discussion of the oral and documentary evidence led in the case held that Ext. 7 was duly executed; there was absolutely no, evidence that the suit plot exclusively fell to the share of Artatrana; Artatrana had no title to convey to Jagannath the vendor of Defendants 1 to 4 and consequently Jagannath had no title to convey to them under Ext. 7 was duly executed; there was absolutely no, evidence that the suit plot exclusively fell to the share of Artatrana; Artatrana had no title to convey to Jagannath the vendor of Defendants 1 to 4 and consequently Jagannath had no title to convey to them under Ext. B and execution of the sale deed by Dinabandhu in favour of the Plaintiffs was duly proved by p.w. 1 and therefore the Plaintiffs had title to the suit land. The Court below considering the plea of the Defendants regarding perfection of title to the suit property by adverse possession held that the Defendants failed to establish their claim of title to the suit property by adverse possession. 7. By order dated 6-11-1980 this Court admitted the second appeal for examination of the questions of law that even if presumption was raised u/s 90, Evidence Act on the ground that the sale deed was 30 years' old and was being produced from proper custody, the said presumption did not extend to the contents of the document and therefore the Courts below erred in law in holding that title passed to the vendee Dinabandhu under the sale deed Ext. 7 and that the learned Munsif misinterpreted the order of remand passed by the first appellate Court and did not record any finding about the proof of custody and execution of Ext.. 7. The aforesaid two points were pressed by the learned Counsel for the Appellants at the hearing of the case. 8. No doubt, the position is well settled that the presumption as to documents purporting or proved to be thirty years old and produced from any custody, which the Court in the particular case considers proper extends to execution and attestation of the document and not to its contents; in other words as the express language of the section shows, if the preconditions of the age of the document and proper, custody are established, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such documents, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. See Ramakrushna Mohapatra and Others Vs. See Ramakrushna Mohapatra and Others Vs. Gangadhar Mohapatra and Others, Subudhi Padhan v. Raghu Bhuyan 27 (1961) C.L.T. 41) 26 and Ghurahu and Others Vs. Sheo Ratan and Others. In the present case, the pre-conditions mentioned above are covered by concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below. The document (Ext. 7) has been found to be more than thirty years old and that it has been produced from proper custody. The question now raised is that giving the full benefit of the provisions of Section 90 of the Act, the Plaintiffs may be presumed to have established due execution of the document but they are still required to establish by evidence as any other fact, the contents of the document, particularly those relating to passing of consideration, delivery of possession etc. On the face of it, the contention appears to be correct, but on perusal of the pleadings of the parties and the judgments of the Courts below I do not find that the Defendants took the stand denying the contents of the sale deed (Ext. 7). Their specific stand was that no such sale deed was executed by Artatrana in favour of Dinabandhu. In the absence of pleading naturally the trial Court framed no issue regarding the passing of consideration or any other assertion made in the sale deed. Therefore, in such circumstances the Appellant cannot be permitted to raise the question for the first time in second appeal. Further, different High Courts have held that in appropriate circumstances while drawing presumption u/s 90 of the Act the Court may also take the contents of the document to have been proved. Here, I may refer to two decisions. In Krishna Ayyar v. Muthulakshmi Ammal AIR 1934 Mau 169, it was observed that in so far as the question is whether the vendee made enquiries as to the necessity for the loan and what representations the vendor or others made to him it is clear that both the vendor and vendee being dead, and the transaction being an ancient one, evidence will not be usually available on this point unless possibly the evidence of some other person from whom the vendee made enquiries. In the absence of any such evidence the recitals in the document can be relied upon. In the absence of any such evidence the recitals in the document can be relied upon. The Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore AIR 1916 P. C. 110, and of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Narain and Another Vs. Mt. Nandrani Kunwar and Others. Similarly in the case of Bai Sakinabai and Ors. v. Golam Rasul Umarbhai Shaikh AIR 1981 Guj. 142 , it was held that once the- statements are proved to be signed by persons concerned, they by themselves must be held to prove the admissions contained in the statements signed by the persons concerned and it is not necessary to examine anyone else in proof of these statements. The Court further observed that it IS true that u/s 90 of the Evidence Act the documents are presumed to be duly executed if they are more than thirty years old, there is no presumption about the contents of these documents being true, but in the instant case once the execution of the document is presumed, it will show tbat the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title who was the signatory to the document had executed the same. Once that is established by Section 90 of the Evidence Act, it would amount to an admission on the part of the executant, that is, Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title about the truth of the statements mentioned therein. Consequently the recitals can go in as admissions on the part of Its executant, i.e., predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff in view of the combined effect of Sections 17, 18 (2) and 21 of the Evidence Act. The Court also held that the recitals of the document can go in evidence under the provisions of Section 32 (2) of the Evidence Act as it is a statement made against the proprietary interest of a person who is dead. 9. In view of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. I find no substance in the first contention raised on behalf of the Appellants that even if Section 90 of the Evidence Act is held to apply to the sale deed (Ext. 7) there being no presumption as to correctness of the content of the document the said sale deed could not be relied upon by the Plaintiffs. 10. I find no substance in the first contention raised on behalf of the Appellants that even if Section 90 of the Evidence Act is held to apply to the sale deed (Ext. 7) there being no presumption as to correctness of the content of the document the said sale deed could not be relied upon by the Plaintiffs. 10. The second point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants relates to interpretation of the directions contained in the remand order passed by the .first appellate Court. I have carefully perused the said order. I find no support for the contention raised by the learned Counsel, that the appellate Court had required the trial Court to recorda finding about proof of custody and execution of Ext. 7. In the remand order the first' appellate Court required the trial Court to do two things one to decide the additional issue relating to the claim of right of way and further to give an opportunity to the parties to prove the original sale deed (Ext. 7) since the document had been marked as exhibit u/s 90 of the Act after close of the Defendant's case without proper proof of custody of the document and without giving opportunity to the Defendants to adduce rebuttal evidence. Therefore there was no specific direction in the remand order that the trial Court should record its findings on the question of proper custody and execution of the sale deed Ext. 7. This point is also of little consequence since the first appellate Court, the final Court of' fact on consideration of the evidence recorded by the trial Court after receiving the case on remand, came to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances established from evidence. Ext. 7., could be held have come from proper custody and its due execution could be presumed u/s 90 of the Act. 11. On the discussions and the analysis in the foregoing paragraphs, I find no merit in the second appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 300/-. Final Result : Dismissed