JUDGEMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 3.12.75 passed by the learned District Judge, Murshidabad in Title Appeal No. 281 of 1972 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 15.7.72 passed by the learned Munsif, Additional Court, Kandl in Title Suit No. 12 of 1972. 2. The admitted facts are that the suit-land originally belonged to Sisir Kumar Mukherjee, predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 2 to 13, who held the same as a raiyat. He had in his possession agriculture land exceeding the limit of 25 acres. He submitted a return in ‘B’ form under to a 6(5) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). In 1956 and thereby opted to retain some lands including the suit land. A Khanda Khatian was accordingly prepared and the rent was assessed at Rs. 27.22 for the retained lands. Thereafter by a registered sale deed dated 14.5.57 he sold the suit-land to the plaintiff appellant for valuable consideration. By a government notification dated 21.1.58, Rule 4A was inserted in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules thereby prescribing a procedure for choosing lands which an intermediary is entitled to retain under s. 6 of the Act. The said Sisir Kumar Mukherjee being a big raiyat, a case was started against him by the Revenue Officer for ascertaining the land which he was entitled to retain under the Act and in the proceeding he submitted afresh a return in 'B' form on 15.4.58 under Rule 4A and thereby chose to retain some lands but excluding the suit land. A new Khanda Khatian was created cancelling the previous one and the suit land was shown as vested land Defendant No. 1. State of West Bengal, refused to accept rent from the plaintiff after 1372 B.S. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the State of West Bengal from interfering with his possession of the suit land. 3. State of West Bengal, refused to accept rent from the plaintiff after 1372 B.S. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the State of West Bengal from interfering with his possession of the suit land. 3. The learned Munsif has found that as the plaintiff's vendor duty retained the suit land by submitting a ‘B’ form under s. 6(5) of the Act in 1956 and thereafter transferred the suit-land to the plaintiff in 1957 for valuable consideration, the plaintiff has acquired right, title and interest to the suit-land and he cannot be divested of his title by a fresh exercise of option by submitting ‘B’ form under Rule 4A in 1958 excluding the suit property. Plaintiff's vendor should not be allowed to practise fraud upon the plaintiff and the statute. In the opinion of the Learned Munsif the suit-land already retained and sold by the plaintiff's vendor who was a big raiyat ought to have been treated as retained by him in the subsequent proceeding under s. 6 of the Act. According to the Learned Munsif, other Khas land retained by the vendor of the plaintiff equal to the amount of the suit land ought to have been deducted and shown as vested land. The learned Munsif accordingly passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. 4. In the appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal, the learned District Judge who heard the appeal took a contrary view Relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Roy v. Land Reforms Officer & ors. (1975(2) Calcutta Law Journal 326) he has held that an intermediary who has filed choice earlier can claim a further right to revise his option and file a fresh return in the prescribed form or manner under Rule 4A. (1975(2) Calcutta Law Journal 326) he has held that an intermediary who has filed choice earlier can claim a further right to revise his option and file a fresh return in the prescribed form or manner under Rule 4A. The return filed earlier under s. 6(5) is not unauthorised but the subsequent insertion of Rule 4A and form gives him a further right and opportunity to amend, elect or alter his choice and to file a return in the prescribed manner or form within the time prescribed in the Rule Plaintiff's vendor Sisir Kumar Mukherjee had, therefore, every right to file a revised return in form ‘B’ after Rule 4A came into operation and the return in ‘B’ form filed by him on 15.4.58 (Ext D) must prevail over the return which he had filed on 1.3.56 (Ext E/1). The plaintiff, therefore, did not acquire right, title or interest to the suit-property. He accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. 5. The point that falls for determination in this appeal is whether a big raiyat who has retained some land by exercising his option in ‘B’ form and thereafter transferred the said land to a third party for valuable consideration can be allowed to exercise a flesh option subsequently after the insertion of Rule 4A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules showing the same as excess land. 6. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants supporting the reasoning’s of the learned Munsif has contended that in such a case a big raiyat could not alter his choice in respect of the land already retained and transferred to a third party for valuable consideration and that the land should be treated as retained land of the big raiyat in the subsequent proceeding under s. 6 of the Act. The learned Advocate for the State has on the other hand relying on the decision of the Division Bench referred to above, contended that the big raiyat was at liberty to revise his option in a subsequent return in 'B' form submitted under Rule 4A and the option exercised therein would prevail upon the earlier option. 7. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants has substance and merits acceptance. In Lakshmi Narayan's case (supra) the facts were different. 7. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants has substance and merits acceptance. In Lakshmi Narayan's case (supra) the facts were different. After filing a return in form 'B' on 7.9.56 as per s 6(5) of the Act, the appellant did not transfer any land After Insertion of Rule 4A on 21.1.58, the appellant was served with notices and orders purporting to be made and issued under s 10(2) of the Act and Rule 7(1) of the Rules framed thereunder by the Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer, Suri with, out giving him any opportunity its file a return in form ‘B after insertion of Rule 4A. It has been held that after the mode has been prescribed by the Rules, the appellant who had already made his choice earlier, can claim a further right or opportunity as per Rule 4A, to revise his return so filed or to file a fresh return in the manner or form prescribed. The return which the appellant filed prior to the prescription of the made, was certainly not unauthorised but the subsequent incorporation of Rule 4A and the prescribed form gives the appellant a further right to amend elect or alter his choice and to file a return in the prescribed manner or form within the time as prescribed by the Rule. Rule 4A is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, when the manner, the method and the form have been prescribed prospectively, the appellant is entitled to claim an opportunity to submit a return re-electing thereby his choice in the mode prescribed by the Rule. This decision applies to a case where the intermediary has not made any subsequent transfer and was in Khas possession of the lands which he chose to retain by the earlier choice. The decision is not an authority for the proposition that even when the intermediary has transferred land retained by him by an earlier choice, to a third person for valuable consideration he is entitled to alter or revise his choice in respect of such land subsequently after insertion of Rule 4A. In such a case, the right of a third party has already accrued and to allow the intermediary to make a fresh choice in respect of such land to the detriment of the interest of the transferee is to encourage practising fraud not only upon the transferee but also on the statute. In such a case, the right of a third party has already accrued and to allow the intermediary to make a fresh choice in respect of such land to the detriment of the interest of the transferee is to encourage practising fraud not only upon the transferee but also on the statute. This appears to be against the intention of the Legislature and public policy. Under sub-s. 3 of s. 5A of the Act, after the transfer in the mischief period is found on enquiry to be bona fide such land if retained by the transferee, may be taken into account in calculating retainable land of the transferor as if such land had never been transferred by the transferor to the transferee and were retained by the transferor. Though s 5A does not apply in term in the facts of this case the intention of the Legislature is clear that the ceiling of land that can be retained by an intermediary includes the land transferred by him. The total land retainable by an intermediary must include the land transferred by him even after the date of vesting. The land so transferred should be deemed to have been retained by him. Otherwise, an intermediary would be given an opportunity to practise fraud on the transferee and also on the State. After already receiving consideration from the transferee be would then be entitled to receive compensation from the Government. He would be allowed to defeat the object of the Act by retaining in effect more lands in excess of the prescribed ceiling. In my opinion, an intermediary is not entitled to revise or alter his choice in respect of land, which he previously retained and transferred to a third party in a subsequent return submitted after insertion of Rule 4A. The suit land must, therefore, be held to have been duly retained by the transferor before transfer to the appellant Plaintiff-appellant, therefore, acquired valid title to the suit land it may be mentioned here that the Government is at liberty to deduct land equivalent to the amount of the suit land from the Khas land retained by the transferor in an appropriate proceeding. 8. For the foregoing reasons, I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 8. For the foregoing reasons, I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. I make no older as to costs in this appeal. Oral prayer for stay made by the State is refused. Appeal allowed.