This is plaintiff's revision against the judgment and decree dated 19.3.86 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Jorhat whereby the defendant opposite party's Title Appeal No. 79 of 1984 was allowed and the plaintiff petitioner's Suit No. 48 of 1983 for ejectment was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff petitioner had filed suit against the defendant opposite party for ejectment from the house in suit and recovery of rent on the ground that the latter had committed default in payment of rent for the month of December 1982 to July, 1983 and compensation thereafter at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day until recovery of possession. 3. The defendant had contested the suit and pleaded that he was not a defaulter, that he was regularly depositing the rent in Court after the landlord plaintiff had refused to accept rent, but later the plaintiff had assured he would accept rent because withdrawal of rent from Court led to difficulties for the landlord, but the plaintiff played a trick so that he had to deposit the rent for the mofiths of December, 1982 and January, 1983 in Court. The defendant also pleaded that the bamboo bridge across the tank to the house in suit had been broken and the plaintiff landlord did not repair it so that the defendant had to use the premises for storage of his goods. The rent had been deposited in Court. 4. After the close of evidence the defendant made an application under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, and prayed that he be not ejected from the house in suit. 5. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that defendant had committed default in payment of rent, in that rent for the months of December, 1982 and January, 1983 had been deposited in Court on 3. 2. 83, and was therefore liable for ejectment. The learned trial Court further held that the defendant tenant was not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was decreed for ejectment and recovery of rent. 6. 2. 83, and was therefore liable for ejectment. The learned trial Court further held that the defendant tenant was not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was decreed for ejectment and recovery of rent. 6. In appeal, the appellate Court also held that the defendant had earned the stigma of defaulter within the meaning of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, hereafter the Act, but further held that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the provision of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly the appeal was allowed. 7. Aggrieved, the plaintiff landlord has come in revision and Shri G. Gopal, learned counsel appearing on his behalf has sub­mitted that it was the concurrent finding of the Courts below that the defendant tenant opposite party was a defaulter and was liable for ejectment under section 5 (e) of the Act, but that the learned appellate Court took an erroneous view that section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act was available for giving the relief which the defendant had prayed for after close of evidence. On the other hand, Shri B. K. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party has raised a preliminary objection and has submitted that the learned appellate Court has not recorded a definite finding that the defendant was a defaulter and the circumstance in which the rent had become due had not been properly gone into by the Courts below which clearly revealed that the plaintiff landlord had manoeuvred the situation in which he could claim that the defendant was a defaulter and that accordingly it was not correct to say that the defendant was a defaulter and had thereby incurred the liability for ejectment from the house in suit. Shri Goswami has .further argued that the benefit of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act has been given to the opposite party and that if it is held that the provision of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act was not available, since the lower appellate Court had not recorded a categorical finding on the question of default the matter be remanded to the lower appellate Court for further consideration of the question and fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. 8. 8. So far as the preliminary objection is concerted, Sri B. K. Goswami has submitted that this revision is not maintainable because the affidavit in support of the petition has been sworn by an Advocate's clerk and has cited a recent Division Bench decision of this Court Someshwar Gogol vs. State of Assam (1988) 1 GLR 440. That was a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in such a petition, the affidavit is generally the only material in support. Hence it is necessary that the affidavit is by a person who is well aware of the facts stated in the petition. A revision petition is different from a writ petition, in that the judgment and order assailed and also the record out of which the revision arises, are before *the Court and provide all the relevant necessary material for consideration and adjudication of the revision petition. The affidavit support of a revision petition thus is of little significance at the time of hearing of a revision petition and such affidavit by an Advocate's clerk, in my opinion, should not affect the maintainability of the revision petition on merits. I hold accordingly and rapel the preliminary objection. 9. I have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record. The learned trial Court had recorded the finding that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent. The learned appellate Court below also has held that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent though the Court below used the expression that 'the defendant had earned the stigma of defaulter', which without any doubt only means that the defendant was a defaulter. The facts are simple and clear that the rent for the months of December, 1982 and January, 1983 had been deposited by the tenant defendant only on 3.2.83. The facts are simple and clear that the rent for the months of December, 1982 and January, 1983 had been deposited by the tenant defendant only on 3.2.83. Proviso (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act provides that "where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due", and sub-section (4) of section 5 stipulates that "where the landlord refused to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may within a fortnight of its becoming due, deposit in Court the amount of such lent ...The tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of this section." It may thus be clear from the above provisions that the defendant tenant had deposited the rent for the month of December, 1982 only on 3. 2. 83 much after the expiry of fourteen days of the rent for December 82 having become due and thus had clearly committed default in payment of rent. 10. The submission of Shri Goswami, learned counsel for the opposite party is that the Courts below had not taken into con­sideration the circumstance of the earlier conduct of the parties and of the fact that the bamboo bridge had been broken and the plaintiff did not repair the same and hence it could not be said that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent. I think the submission is not tenable in view of the clear provision of law and the admitted facts that rent for the month of December, 1982 was due and it was not paid in accordance with the provision of law under sub section (4) of section 5 of the Act within a fortnight of its having fallen due. I am inclined to think that in view of the above facts it is not possible to take the view that the defendant had not committed default in payment of rent for the month of December, 1982. I am inclined to think that in view of the above facts it is not possible to take the view that the defendant had not committed default in payment of rent for the month of December, 1982. The earlier conduct of the parties and the fact that the bamboo bridge was broken and was not repaired in my opinion would not make any substantial difference to the fact that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent because in case the plaintiff landlord did not accept rent the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act were available and if the bamboo bridge had not been repaired, etc. the tenant defendant could seek appropriate remedy under the provision of section 7 of the Act, and accordingly, it shall in my opinion not be correct to take the view that, where the landlord had failed to perform certain obligations as alleged by the defendant for which the defendant could seek proper remedy under the provisions of the Act, the defendant tenant had not committed default in payment of rent and had not incurred the the liability for ejectment under section 5 of the Act. 11. Shri Goswami, learned counsel for the opposite party has cited B. S. Sarma vs. on the death of J. K. Garodia (1984) 2 GLR 182 to contend that the defendant was not defaulter. The authority is not attracted for the reasons that in the said case, there was settled practice between the parties in regard to the manner of payment of rent and the defendant having had acted in accordance with the agreed system, it was held that he was not a defaulter. On the facts of the present case, the. authority has no application because no such settled practice had been established. 12. The next question is whether the provisions of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act are: available and could be invoked for the benefit of the defendant tenant. On the facts of the present case, the. authority has no application because no such settled practice had been established. 12. The next question is whether the provisions of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act are: available and could be invoked for the benefit of the defendant tenant. Section 114 said above reads : "Relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent-Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pay or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture ; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred." 13. It may be noted that under the general law of Transfer of Property Act, the lessor has the right anytime he likes to terminate the tenancy and eject the losses for the obvious reason that after all it is his property. The provision of section 114 vest the Court with the discretionary power to provide relief to a lessee whose tenancy has been forfeited by the lessor for non-payment of rent. The lessor had the right to forfeit tenancy for non-payment, as security for the rent, so where the lessee offered compensation at the hearing of the suit, the Court had the power to grant relief against ejectment. 14. The Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act 1972 (and similar earlier laws) is a special law to regulate the rights and duties of the lessor an1 the lessee, as provided in the special la<v itself and I am inclined to think that to the extent the rights and duties of the lessor and the lessee as laid down by the special law, supplant or modify the rights and duties in the general law of Transfer of Property Act. A very important provision of the special law in its section 5 is that the lessor (landlord) cannot eject the lessee or cannot get a decree for recovery of possession of the premises unless the grounds in the proviso (a) to (f; of its subsection (1) are made out. The lessor's right to re­cover possession by ejectment of the lessee as and when desired under the general law of Transfer of Property Act cannot be exercised, in the present case, unless the tenant has committed default by not paying the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the premises within a fortnight of its falling due as stipulated in proviso (e) of sub-section (I) of section 5. In such circumstances, under the special law now regulating the right of lessor or lessee it is not a case of forfeiture of tenancy on non-payment of rent, under the Transfer of Property Act” 15. In Pradesh Kumar vs. Binod Behari Sarkar, AIR 1980 SC 1214 the landlord had sued the tenant for ejectment on grounds of default in payment of rent, under the similar Uttar Pradesh law which restricted the landlord's right to eject the tenant, in that he could sue the tenant only on grounds of default in payment of rent etc., the tenant claimed Benefit under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court had given the relief under section 114. The first appellate Court repelled the prayer under section 114. The second appeal to High Court repelled the prayer under section 114 and it was dismissed. The matter was taken to Supreme Court where it was held : "As the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) are applicable, the terms of the lease deed become irrelevant. The only question that arises and which was seriously contended for on behalf of the respondent is that in addition to the safe guards provided to the tenant under the Act, he is also entitled to the benefits of S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act restricts the rights of the landlord to have the tenant evicted. But for the statutory provisions, the 'landlord would be entitied to evict the tenant according to the terms of the contract or the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act restricts the rights of the landlord to have the tenant evicted. But for the statutory provisions, the 'landlord would be entitied to evict the tenant according to the terms of the contract or the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. As the Rent Act has restricted the power of the landlord to evict the tenant except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the terms of the contract and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to that extent are no longer applicable. " It was further held : "In the case before us, it is not in dispute that after the Rent Act came into force, the landlord cannot avail himself of clause 12 which provides for forfeiture, even if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for over two months. The landlord cannot enter into possession forthwith without notice. The only remedy for him is to seek eviction under the provisions of the Rent Act. In such circumstances the tenant cannot rely on S. 114 of Transfer of Property Act and claim that he should be given an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent, even though the requirements of S. 3 (1) had been fulfilled." It was also further held : "Ws are satisfied that once the requirements of Rent Act are satisfied, the tenant cannot claim the double protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of the contract." 16. In B. M. Sackar vs. T. R. Prasad, (1987) 2 GLR (NOC) 10 it has been held that the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act 1972 takes away the contractual of statutory rights under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 17. In my opinion, the provisions of section 114 of the Transfer' of Property Act, 1882 not being available could not be invoked and the learned appellate Court below erred in exercising jurisdiction thereunder which requires to be corrected. 18. The revision is allowed. The decree for ejectment passed by the learned trial Court is restored. Parties to bear their own costs. The defendant opposite party is allowed one month's time from today to vacate the premises.