JUDGMENT : P.B. Sawant, J. 1. The petitioner was employed as a Typist with the respondent-corporation from May, 1980. On account of an incident of a quarrel between her and another employee on April 28, 1983, she was served with a charged-sheet on May 12, 1983 and was also suspended from service from that day. She replied to the charge-sheet on May 24, 1983. Subsequently, an enquiry officer was appointed and an enquiry fixed. On account of her illness, she wanted an adjournment of the enquiry which was not granted and the enquiry proceeded ex parte. The enquiry officer held the charges proved and recommended dismissal, as a result of which she was dismissed from service with effect from July 22, 1983. The departmental appeal filed against the order of dismissal failed, and as a result the petitioner approached the Labour Court by her complaint u/s 28 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). To this complaint, the Corporation filed its written statement. In the enquiry the petitioner concluded her evidence on April 24, 1985 and on the same day the respondent-corporation filed a pursis before the Labour Court stating in clear terms that the corporation would rely upon the documentary evidence already produced before the Labour Court and did not wish to lead any oral evidence. The Labour Court on the basis of the evidence on record, held that the departmental enquiry was not fair and proper and granted reinstatement to the petitioner with full back wages. 2. The Corporation thereafter preferred a revision u/s 44 of the Act before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court by its impugned order of August 7, 1986, confirmed the finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was not fair and proper. However, ignoring the pursis filed by the Corporation before the Labour Court, remanded the matter to the Labour Court for giving an opportunity to the respondent corporation to lead its evidence on the merits of the charges against the petitioner. It is aggrieved by this order of remand that the petitioner had filed the present writ petition. 3. Mr. However, ignoring the pursis filed by the Corporation before the Labour Court, remanded the matter to the Labour Court for giving an opportunity to the respondent corporation to lead its evidence on the merits of the charges against the petitioner. It is aggrieved by this order of remand that the petitioner had filed the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Sawant for the respondent-corporation tried to defend the order of remand on the ground that the Labour Court should have first come to the conclusion that the enquiry was not fair and proper and then called upon the parties to lead evidence on the merits of the case, if they desired to do so. The corporation was not given any such opportunity by the Labour Court. Mr. Sawant also submitted that the pursis which was given before the Labour Court was confined only to the decision on the first issue viz., whether the enquiry was fair and proper and had nothing to do with the merits of the charges. There are two circumstances which militate against this argument. The first is that, in the pursis, no such distinction is made by the Corporation. The pursis reads as if the corporation did not want to lead any oral evidence even on the merits of the charges against the petitioner and was content with the production of the documentary evidence alone. Admittedly the documentary evidence was not confined only to the first issue but also related to the merits of the charges against the petitioner. The second and the most important circumstance which is against this submission of the Corporation is that in the revision application filed before, the Industrial Court no grievance is made against the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Labour Court had not given the Corporation an opportunity to lead its evidence, oral or documentary, on the merits of the charges against the petitioner. On the other hand the revision application defends not only the propriety or the enquiry but also the evidence with regard to the merits of the charges before the departmental enquiry officer. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate the reasoning of the Industrial Court. Obviously, the Industrial Court has passed the impugned order of remand even without a relief-being claimed to that effect: by the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate the reasoning of the Industrial Court. Obviously, the Industrial Court has passed the impugned order of remand even without a relief-being claimed to that effect: by the Corporation. It also appears from the decision of the Industrial Court that it has completely ignored the pursis given by the corporation before the Labour Court. In the circumstances, the impugned order, is clearly unsustainable and has to be set aside. 4. In the result, the petition succeeds. The Rule is made absolute with costs. Pursuant to the order of this Court passed on November 6, 1986 while admitting the petition, the petitioner was reinstated in service in November, 1986. There is no grievance that she has not received her full salary since that date. However, according to the petitioner, she has not been paid her full salary for the period May 12, 1983 till her reinstatement in November, 1986. The respondent-corporation will, therefore, pay to the petitioner all her salary during the said period minus the amount which may have been paid to her as suspension allowance. Needless to say that since the petitioner has been reinstated in service with full back wages, she will be entitled to all other consequential reliefs as if she has continued in service throughout. The respondent-corporation should pay the arrears of salary as above, if not paid already, within two months from today.