JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - Whether a proceeding initiated under inherent jurisdiction to set aside a decision rendered by the District Judge allowing an appeal heard ex parte and pending before him on the date of commencement of Orissa Act 2 of 1983 is a 'pending appeal' so as to stand transferred to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner by reason of the transitory provision contained in Section 8 (2) of the Amendment Act? 2. Such was the question that was mooted before a Division Bench of this Court. There was a difference of opinion, Brother P. C. Misra. J. was of the view that in the absence of specific provision transferring 'all miscellaneous matters in respect of appeals disposed of prior to the date of commencement of the amending Act' were not to stand transferred. Brother G. B. Patnaik, J. however, held that having regard to the object and purpose of the Amendment Act, there could be no doubt .that by abolishing the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge and investing the same in the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, the Legislature intended that the District Judge could not exercise any power in any matter even ancillary to or in relation to the appeals under the Act'. That is how the "matter has come before me. 3. The learned Judges have succinctly stated the factual details and I need not reproduce the same. A broad out-line would serve the purpose: Aggrieved by an order directing eviction the Petitioner moved the District Judge in appeal registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 42 of 1981 - impleading the Estate Officer, the State of Orissa and the Registrar of the High Court as Respondents. The appeal was allowed on 10-9-1981. On 19-2-1982, the Registrar of the High Court moved the District Judge to set aside the ex parte decision in exercise of inherent jurisdiction and rehear the appeal. The application was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1982. During the pendency of the proceeding, the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 for short, the Principal Act, was amended by Orissa Act 2 of 1983, hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act'. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner was substituted by the Amending Act as the appellate forum, in place of the District Judge. Section 8 (2) of the Amending Act provided as follows: 8 (2). The Revenue Divisional Commissioner was substituted by the Amending Act as the appellate forum, in place of the District Judge. Section 8 (2) of the Amending Act provided as follows: 8 (2). All appeals filed u/s 9 of the Principal Act and pending in the Court of a District Judge on the date of commencement of this Act shall stand transferred to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the concerned premises are situate and shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions contended in that section. 4. Objection was raised to the jurisdiction of the District Judge to hear the miscellaneous proceeding after the date of commencement o~ the Amending Act. Having regard to the provisions contained in Section 8 (2), the objection was sustained and the learned District Judge directed transfer of the miscellaneous proceeding to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the premises were situate, for disposal. vide Annexure-1. The Petitioner sought a certiorari from this Court for the quashing of the decision. 5. The arguments advanced before the Division Bench were pursued with vigour and persuasion by the learned Counsel for the parties. Mr. R K. Mohapatra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has urged that having regard to the clear language of the transitory provision a proceeding for setting aside an ex parte order is not pending appeal so as to stand transferred on the Amending Act coming into force. He has further submitted that the conclusions cannot be supported by application of Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act. Mr. B. B. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand, has resisted the submission of the counsel for the Petitioner urging that having regard to the intention of the Legislature in Section 8 (2) of the Amending Act, the District Judge cannot have any residuary jurisdiction. 6. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right. The vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides specifically or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. Alterations in the form of procedure ate retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be (per Lord Blackburn in James Gardner v. Edward A, Lucas (1987) 3 A. C. 582. Alterations in the form of procedure ate retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be (per Lord Blackburn in James Gardner v. Edward A, Lucas (1987) 3 A. C. 582. The rule is clearly established that, apart from any specialy circumstances appearing on the face of the statute in question,statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective-per Lord Alverstone in King v. Chandra Dharma (1906) 2 K. B.335. Hence, it is not disputed that appeals from orders passed by the Estate Officer would lie to the appropriate Revenue Divisional Commissioner irrespective of whether the cause of action arose before or after the commencement of the Amending Act, what about the pending appeals? If there were no provision like the transitory provision contained in Section 8 (2), the District Judge by reason of section. 5 (2) of the Orissa General Clauses Act would not lose jurisdiction to hear the appeals pending on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. Section 5 ( e) reads as hereunder: 5. Effect of repeal-Where any Orissa Act repeals any enactment hither to made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not. xx xx xx xx (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege, obligation liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. The enquiry then would be directed to ascertain if a contrary or different intention appears from the Amending statute. The proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities (State of Punjab v. Mohan Singh AIR 1955 S.C. 84 , referred with approval at in Jayantilal Amrathlal Vs. The Union of India (UOI). At this stage my brethren differed. Brother P. C. Misra, J. took the view that having regard to the language, a proceeding for setting aside an ex parte decision was not covered by the provisions of Section 8 (2) of the Amending Act, whereas brother G. B. Patnaik, J. held that having regard to the intention of the Legislature embodied in the said provision, a contrary intention was clear and discernible. 7. The question, therefore, turns on interpretation of Section 8 (2). What does it mean? 7. The question, therefore, turns on interpretation of Section 8 (2). What does it mean? What construction should be put on it ? Is it permissible to delve into and gather the hidden or supposed intention of the Legislature? The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to 'expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver (Craies on Statute Law, 17th Edition). Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature-Arburton v. Loveland (1832)2 DCl. (H. L.) 483, Lord Herschell in Gox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App 506, observed: If the language of the legislature, interpreted according to the recognised cannons of construction, involves this result your Lordships must frankly yield to it, even if you should be satisfied that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature. (Emphsis added). A stature may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made, that is to say, a casus omissus should neither be created nor supplied. It was observed by Lord Parker, C.J. in R. v. Oakes (1959)2 QB. 350, as follows: Where the literal reading of a statute......... produces an intelligible result......there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of Parliament. (Emphasis added). Craies has noted quoting Blackburn, J. in Rex v. Cleworth (1884) 4 B.& S. 927, as a general rule if it appears that the class or thing, which it is sought to bring within the Act (under consideration) was known to the Legislature at the time when the Act was passed, and that class is omitted, "it must be supposed to have been omitted intentionally". Where the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the Courts to consider, the general rule being not to import into the statute words which are not to be found. Where the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the Courts to consider, the general rule being not to import into the statute words which are not to be found. Where, however, the words are ambiguous or their import is doubtful or obscure, it is open to the court to try and get at the meaning of what was intended by considering the consequences of either constructions. Where reading the enactment in its ordinary sense results in manifest injustice or inconvenience, whereas reading it in the other way in which it is capable, there will be no absurdity, injustice or inconvenience, there would be justification for not reading it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning. Therefore it has been observed: If a too literal adherence to the words of the enactment appears to produce an absurdity or an injustice, it will be the duty of a court of construction to consider the state of the law at the time the Act was passed with a view to ascertaining whether the language at the enactment is capable of any other fair interpretation, or whether It may not be desirable to put upon the language used a secondary or restricted meaning, or perhaps to adopt a construction not quite strictly grammatical. ( Craies on Stature Law). In Anandji Haridas and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh and Another it has been said: as a general principle of interpretation where the words of a statute are plain precise and unambiguous the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself....... It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the evils, if any which the statute was intended to remedy or of the circumstances which led to the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question. 8. The Amending Act was brought on the statute book with a view to lessening the load on the Court of the District Judge and expediting disposal of appeals under the Act. That was the clear and manifest intention. 8. The Amending Act was brought on the statute book with a view to lessening the load on the Court of the District Judge and expediting disposal of appeals under the Act. That was the clear and manifest intention. Taking away the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge was the object and purpose. Against the aforesaid, let us construe Section 8 (2) of the Amending Act. It says that all appeals filed u/s 9 and pending in the court of District Judge on the date of commencement of the Amending Act would stand transferred to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner. It has not been contended that the language used in Section 8 (2) is not clear, precise and unambiguous. It expressly provides for appeals filed u/s 9 and pending on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. It uses the word 'pending' in contra-distinction to the expression disposed of. The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge that other matters besides appeals were pending before the District Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Principal Act. Nevertheless it specifically made provision for transfer of pending appeals. It has been contended that interlocutory matters like receivership and injunction stand transferred to the transferee Court with the transfer of the appeals. That is so because such interlocutory matters arise in course of and form part of the pending appeals. Can a proceeding for setting aside a decision rendered ex parte be nomenclatured as appeal? The appeal is no more subsisting. It is disposed of closed and dead. The application is for reviving or resurrecting the disposed of dead appeal. That which being accepted would give rise to a consequence is not and cannot be equated and identified with the consequence unless so ordained by the statute. Then how can such an application be called an appeal? Besides, Section 8 (2) refers to appeals filed u/s 9 whereas, an application for .setting aside an ex parte decision is filed under the inherent jurisdiction. Hence, an application for reviving an appeal filed u/s 9 on a plain construction of the language cannot be called an appeal. It would be permissible to probe and gather the intention of the Legislature if the language was not plain and clear. Assuming the Legislature intended otherwise, the intention is not manifest in clear and precise words. Hence, an application for reviving an appeal filed u/s 9 on a plain construction of the language cannot be called an appeal. It would be permissible to probe and gather the intention of the Legislature if the language was not plain and clear. Assuming the Legislature intended otherwise, the intention is not manifest in clear and precise words. Rather the clear, precise and unambiguous words convey and are susciptible to the only interpretation, namely, pending appeals only would stand transferred. If the Legislature intended otherwise nothing prevented it to enact appeals and all matter relating to, arising out of, ancillary to or connected with the appeals and pending before the Distinct Judge shall stand transferred from the date of commencement of the Amending Act. In my humble opinion, the Legislature intended to transfer the appeals only for their expeditious disposal. Such interlocutory matters as the present one were either not present to its mind or left untouched by the transitory provision. It was observed by Lord Chancellor in Brophy v. Attorney General of Manitoba 1895 A.C. 202 . The question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. I close the discussion with an observation of Lord Scarman, which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of Indian, We are to be governed not by Parliament's,intention but by Parliament's enactment." 9. I would, therefore, hold agreeing with Brother P. C. Misra, J. that the District Judge had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the application filed for the setting aside of a decision rendered ex parte. I would, therefore, vacate the impugned order Annexure-1 and direct the District Judge to dispose of Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1982 on merits in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. 10. In the result, the writ application is allowed. No order is necessary in the Civil Revision and the same is disposed of. Final Result : Allowed