S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revisional Application, which has been heard out as a 'contested Application', is directed against Order No. 84, dated 22nd June, 1987, passed by the learned Judge, First Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Misc. Case No. 1192 6f 1985. The said Misc. case arose out of an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside an ex parte decree passed in a Suit for eviction being Ejectment Suit No. 665 of 1980 in connection with which an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was preferred for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the impugned Order the learned Judge allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condoned the delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Decree holder Plaintiff is the applicant before this Court. ( 2 ) TO appreciate the question raised by the contesting parties it would be necessary to take note of certain dates. The ex parte decree in the instant case was passed on 4th of March, 1985. The said decree was put into execution in Execution Case No. 109 of 1985. In that Execution Case the Decree holder filed an application for police help under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was registered as Misc. Case No. 579 of 1985. On or about 13th July, 1985 the notice of the aforesaid application for police help was served on the Judgment Debtor, the opposite party herein. On 28th September, 1985 the application for police help was allowed and on 9th October, 1985 possession of the Suit premises had been delivered to the Decree holder petitioner herein with police help. On 12th October, 1985 the aforesaid application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed but the application for condonation of delay in filing the same was preferred 3rd December, 1985. On 12th October, 1985 the aforesaid application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed but the application for condonation of delay in filing the same was preferred 3rd December, 1985. ( 3 ) THE delay, which has been condoned by the impugned Order, therefore, has been alleged to be two-fold -one in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13 and another in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, As regards the first-fold of delay the dispute is confined to the merits of the sufficiency of the grounds for condonation and as regards the second-fold of the delay the dispute is of technical nature. ( 4 ) THE findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, which may be relevant fear consideration in the instant matter, are as follows: (1)the delay in fling the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is roughly six months and the delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, counted from the date of filing of the former application, is about two months. (2)talk of settlement was going on between the parties for a long time, at least from 11th of August, 1983 and the terms of settlement were under consideration of the parties. (3) On 15. 2. 1985 three pay Orders acre issued in favour of the wife of the present opposite party for a total sum of Rs. 30,000 payable to the plaintiffs/petitioners and the said pay Orders were encashed on 21. 2. 1985. The case of acceptance of the said amounts by way of security towards arrears of rent and compensation for damages was not believed upon consideration of the admissions made in the Written Objection. (4)three sets of Non-Judicial Stamp papers were purchased and the Deeds of Conveyance were engrossed on such stamp papers. (5)on 1. 3. 1985 the present petitioners/decree holders made an application before the Court for early hearing of the Suit without serving a copy. (6)defendant/opposite party with an honest belief did not know about the ex parte decree till August, 1985 when notice of application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been served. (7) The defendant/opposite party was induced to believe that the Suit was going to be settled and so he did not take any step. (6)defendant/opposite party with an honest belief did not know about the ex parte decree till August, 1985 when notice of application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been served. (7) The defendant/opposite party was induced to believe that the Suit was going to be settled and so he did not take any step. (8) The defendant/opposite party was advised only to ale Objection to the application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was not advised to file any application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The advice given by Mr. Surana was wrong and constituted reasonable cause. There was no negligence or idleness on the part of the defendant/petitioner. (9)the explanation for the delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was, therefore, sufficient. ( 5 ) MR. Roychowdhury, appearing in support of the application has contended that Trial Court in exercising its discretion in condoning the delay of the first fold has acted with material irregularity. Mr. Roychowdhury has further contended that the factual findings on which such exercise of discretion has been based are not only contrary to the materials on recoils but are based on no materials whatsoever. Regarding the second-fold of delay Mr. Roychowdhury contended that the Court below exceeded its jurisdiction in even entertaining the Section 5 application not, filed along with application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) MR. Mukherjee, on behalf of the opposite party contended that application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not necessary at all that the facts found did not call for interference in Revision and that in the context of such factual, findings, the impugned Order also does not deserve interference. ( 7 ) BEFORE I enter into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned Advocates of the contesting panic on the materials in the instant case, I would like to dispose of the technical objection raised by Mr. Roychowdhury on behalf of the petitioner which goes to the root of the impugned Order. Mr. ( 7 ) BEFORE I enter into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned Advocates of the contesting panic on the materials in the instant case, I would like to dispose of the technical objection raised by Mr. Roychowdhury on behalf of the petitioner which goes to the root of the impugned Order. Mr. Roychowdhury has contended that in view of the admitted fact that the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed without being accompanied, notwithstanding the delay in filing the same, by any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, the learned Judge failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law by not directing dismissal of the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in limine particularly when even in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, there is no explanation whatsoever of the delay in filing the said application. Mr. Mukherjee, has endeavored to meet the said point of Mr. Roychowdhury by arguing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not provide for filing of an application and as such the delayed filing of the application under the aforesaid Section is wholly irrelevant. On a careful reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it appears that it only empowers a court to allow a litigant to avoid the mischief arising out of his failure to do the particular act of filing the appeal or the application within the prescribed period by accepting explanation for the delay that occurs that Section 5 requires is existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or application within the prescribed period. Prescribed period has been defined under Section. 2 Clause (j) as the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is clear, therefore, that absence of explanation for a belated filing of the application for condonation of delay would not be relevant for judging the sufficient of the cause for belated filing of the substantive application or appeal. Instances are there when at the hearing on oral prayer such delay has been condoned. If this view is accepted, in the instant case the technical flaw raised by Mr. Instances are there when at the hearing on oral prayer such delay has been condoned. If this view is accepted, in the instant case the technical flaw raised by Mr. Rowchowdhury does not present any difficulty particularly when even the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure contained the material explanation for the delay in filing the same beyond the prescribed period. On condonation the prescribed period of limitation for an application or appeal stands extended and the belatedly filed application is deemed to have been filed within time. ( 8 ) MY view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act or on its own words does not necessarily require a formal application for enabling the Court to consider the sufficiency of the grounds for the delay will also be confirmed if the provisions of Order 41, Rule 3a of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1976, are considered which specifically provide that in the case of an appeal under the Code filed beyond the period of limitation for the same, it must be accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This provision clearly exhibits the intention of the legislature that invoke such appeals in other causes or in general no application is necessary required for sustaining a prayer under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Even in ease of Order 41, Rule 3a of the Code at Civil Procedure, Courts of Law have laid down that this is merely directory and not mandatory and as such belated Section 5 application does not in any way meet the maintainability of the connected appeal. Calcutta Law Journal 446 as also a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others v. Raichandi Nath Sahay reported in AIR 1983 page 189 ). No explanation for the delay in filing the same, therefore, is called for though it may be a very relevant material for considering the bona fides of the party praying for condonation of the delay. The technical objection raised by Mr. Roychowdhury therefore, fails and is overruled. ( 9 ) NEXT I proposed to deal with the contentions on merit of the impugned Order. As I have already indicated, the learned Judge, while passing the impugned Order, recorded certain endings of fact. The technical objection raised by Mr. Roychowdhury therefore, fails and is overruled. ( 9 ) NEXT I proposed to deal with the contentions on merit of the impugned Order. As I have already indicated, the learned Judge, while passing the impugned Order, recorded certain endings of fact. It is well established that sitting in Revision such findings of fact are not ordinarily interfered with unless the same are vitiated by jurisdictional errors or perversity. It is also well established that in exercising its discretion for condonation of delay a Court of Law should liberally apply the provisions of Section 5 for advancement of justice. The substantial cause which has keen pleaded on behalf of the opposite party in justification of his prayer for condonation of delay, was failure of his lawyer in the Court below to tender proper advice. The learned Judge upon consideration of the materials has arrived at the factual findings which I have already summarised hereinbefore. ( 10 ) THE factual materials alleged to have been overlooked by the learned Trial Judge in arriving at the aforesaid factual conclusions, namely, the contradictions in the statement of the witnesses of the failure on the part of the defendant/tenant to ask for necessity of filing an application under order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure or negligence of the lawyer of the defendant to afford proper legal advice do not appear to have been overlooked by the learned Trial Judge in arriving at the aforesaid factual inclusions. No doubt there are some contradictions in the evidence of learned lawyer Mr. Surana and his clerk but those contradictions are of such minor nature that sitting in Revision I do not feel inclined, on the basis of such contradictions to upset such endings of the fact of the Lower Court. The Court below came to positive finding that the defendant/petitioner was not aware of the ex parte decree till he received the application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the learned Advocate Mr. The Court below came to positive finding that the defendant/petitioner was not aware of the ex parte decree till he received the application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the learned Advocate Mr. Surana gave a wrong advice to the petitioner and consequently he could not file the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and lastly, that the circumstances did not show that the petitioner was at all negligent of or he sat idle, which findings cannot be said to be perverse on the materials before the Court. ( 11 ) IN the result, the Revisional application fails and is dismissed. In the special facts of this case, each party will bear his own cost. Application dismissed