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1988 DIGILAW 168 (GAU)

Durga Bala Das v. Chitrabala Das

1988-09-08

S.N.PHUKAN

body1988
The present petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22/1/86 passed by the learned Asstt. District Judge, Barpeta in Title Appeal No. 26/a5. By the said judgment and order the learned Asstt. District Judge affirmed the judgment and decree dated 27/4/85 passed by the learned Munsiff No. 1. Barpeta in Title Suit No- 36 of 1981. 2. The respondent herein as plaintiff filed a, suit for eviction of the present petitioner from the suit premises. There is not dispute that the present petitioner was a tenant in respect of the suit premises under the present respondent and that the rate of rent was Rs. 175/- per month. The decree for eviction was prayed for on two grounds, namely, defaulter and that bonaflde requirement of the landlord. Both the learned trial Courts found that the present petitioner was a defaulter and that the suit house is required bonafide by the landlord. 3. The first contention of Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the judgment is bad in law as issues were not framed regarding defaulter and bonaflde requirement. Issue No. 4 runs as follows : "Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises?” Under the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted are laid down. On perusal of the pleadings of the parties, I find that the landlord pleaded two grounds as stated above and the tenant also stated his defence in respect of said two grounds. So the parties went into trial knowing the case of the opposite side. Issue No. 4 as stated above is wide enough to include the above two grounds for ejectment. As the parties knew the case of the opposite side, no prejudice would be caused for non framing of specific issues re­garding bonafide requirement and defaulter. I am, therefore, of the opinion that though no separate issues were framed for the above two grounds of ejectment, Issue No. 4 is wide enough to include these two grounds and non framing of two separate issues did not cause any prejudice to the present petitioner. 4. Mr. Goswami has drawn my attention to Manas Kamal Bhowal vs. Satyendra Ch. Gupta, (1982) IG. 4. Mr. Goswami has drawn my attention to Manas Kamal Bhowal vs. Satyendra Ch. Gupta, (1982) IG. L. R. 653 wherein this Court held that if there is no findings regarding proof of genuine need of the landlord for the premises, there is a jurisdictional error. In Mtdhurilata Devi vs. Sri Gourapada Basak, (1984) I G. L. R. 392, this Court held that in case of bonafide need the onus of proof lies on the landlord. In Shri Monoranjan Chakravorty vs. Shri Nalini Ranjan Chakratorty and another, (1984) 2 G. L. R. 194 during the pendency of the suit the landlord died, but during trial bonafide requirement of legal heirs was not proved and this Court held that the bonafide requirement of original landlord might not be the bonafide requirement of legal heirs. 5. Mr. Goswami has urged that the landlord in the instant case has failed to discharge the onus of proof of bonafide requirement inasmuch as in the plaint it is pleaded that the suit house is required for use of unemployed sons of the plaintiff, whereas the husband of the plaintiff stated during examination that the house is required for his fish business, In my opinion, there is no contradiction inasmuch as if the suit premises is required by the father for expanding his business, it may include requirement of his sons also as there is nothing on record to show that the sons are living separately. As the family is living jointly, if the suit premises is needed, as stated above for expanding the business of the family, It can be taken as bonafide requirement of the plaintiff. Hence the contention of Mr. Goswami has no force. 6. Mr. Goswami has drawn my attention to the judgment of the learned lower Courts and has urged that the Courts illegally placed on the defendant the onus of proving that she is not a defaulter. Mr. Goswami has also drawn my attention to the evidence of P. W. I and has urged that the plaintiff ought to have proved the accounts maintained for the rent and also should have examined Rama-krishna who according to P. W. I used to collect rent. The tenant has pleaded that she is not a defaulter and that she used to pay the rent and obtained the signature of the rent collector on a book maintained by her. The tenant has pleaded that she is not a defaulter and that she used to pay the rent and obtained the signature of the rent collector on a book maintained by her. The learned Court rightly held that as the defendant admitted that she used to take a receipt on the said book, the book should have been produced. In my opinion, this finding of the learned trial Court did not amount to placing the onus of proof on the defendant. This is only question of appreciation of evidence. In my opinion the learned trial Court rightly held that non production of book maintained by the defen­dant is fatal. That apart, the defendant also took the plea that she adjusted the rent against repairs done by her for the suit premises. It is for the defendant to prove that amount was spent for repairs of house and the said amount was accordingly adjusted towards the rent. The learned lower appellate Court rightly held that the defendant was a defaulter as she did not produce any document in support of her claim that the amount for repairs was adjusted towards rent. 7. Mr. Goswami has urged that the learned lower appellate Court did not consider the evidence on record. I have perused the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court and I am of the opinion that the learned Court duly considered relevant evidence in respect of defaulter and also bonafide requirement and contention of Mr. Goswami has no force. 8. From what has been stated above, I held that the present petition is without merit and liable to be dismissed which I hereby do. 9. In the result, the petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.