KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-detenu has filed the present petition challenging the legality and validity of the detention order passed against him by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City, on 12-12-1987, on his satisfying with respect to the present petitioner that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Sangrampure under the limits of Athwa Lanes Police Station, it was necessary to make the order directing him to be detained and accordingly, exercising the powers conferred on him under Sub-Sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1983 has passed the order of detention against him. ( 2 ) THE order of detention as also the grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on the same day i. e. 12-12-1987. On perusal of the grounds it appears that there are eight cases filed against the petitioner under the Prohibition Act wherein large quantities of country liquor were seized. There are also statements of three witnesses recorded on 9-12-1987 and 10-12-1987. ( 3 ) MR. M. C. Kapadia learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised the following contentions before us : (1) That the activities of the petitioner referred to in the grounds of detention relate to law and order situation and not public order and therefore, the detention order is bad and illegal. (2) That the order of detention is preverse inasmuch as it is passed in mala fide exercise of the powers by the detaining authority. (3) That the allegations made and conclusion reached in the ground of detention are not from the basic facts. He has clarified that this ground portions to the inference drawn with regard to the communal riots. He further submitted that the date or basic material for the said inference was not supplied to the petitioner. (4) That there is unexplained delay in considering representation of the petitioner by the State Government. (5) That the statements of the witnesses referred to in the ground are false, fabricated and imaginary and therefore, the said material should not have been relied on by the detaining authority. (6) That the inference drawn about the danger and damage to the life and property and that the petitioner is a head strong person is without any material on record. (6) That the inference drawn about the danger and damage to the life and property and that the petitioner is a head strong person is without any material on record. (7) That the order of detention is passed mechanically i. e. without veryfing the statements of the witnessess by calling them. (8) That while considering the representation of the petitioner-detenu the State Government has not looked into the parawise remarks of the detaining authority. ( 4 ) SO far as the first point with regard to public order is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. Kapadia that assuming the statements of three witnesses recorded in the case to be correct, it could disclose that the activities of the present petitioner would be at the most prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order and not the public order. ( 5 ) WITH a view to properly appreciating this contention it is necessary to see what is the meaning of the term "public order" as required to be considered by the detaining authority while passing the order of detention. It may be mentioned that enlarged meaning is given to the term "public order" under Sub-Section (4) of S. 3 of the Act and that point has been considered by this court in the judgement reported in (1988) 1 Guj LH 140 as well as by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1988 SC 1233. Thereafter this very Bench has followed the same judgements namely, in Special Criminal Applications Nos. 41/88* and 379/88**. Thereafter, now there is a settled position of law so far as this point is concerned. It is clear from the facts that there are as many as eight prohibition cases pending against the petitioner and in some cases more than 100 litres of country liquor was seized. It is clear that this petitioner is dealing with country liquor without holding licence or permit for the purpose and his activities as such are those of a "bootlegger". In view of the aforesaid judgements the activities of the petitioner could also attract the enlarged meaning of the term "public order" inasmuch as consumption of country liquor would certainly be widespread danger to the public health. In view of the aforesaid judgements the activities of the petitioner could also attract the enlarged meaning of the term "public order" inasmuch as consumption of country liquor would certainly be widespread danger to the public health. It is therefore, clear that there was enough material for the detaining authority for holding that the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It may be mentioned that the detaining authority in his affidavit-reply has also referred to this aspect in para-3 and has stated as under : reported in (1988) 2 Guj LH 363 : 1988 Cri LJ NOC 81. Reported in (1989) 30 Guj LR 18. "i say that the activities of the petitioner-detenu of selling liquor causes disturbances to public order as contemplated under Sub-Sec. (4) of S. 5 of the PASA Act. . . . . . . . . . I say that as bootlegger the activities of the petitioner is causing harm to the general public and it also causes widespread danger to the public and also to public health. . . . . . . " ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid material it is not necessary to deal with this pointing further. Still however, as Mr. Kapadia has argued the point we would like to deal with it shortly. The statements of three persons which are referred to in the grounds of detention also speak about the activities of the petitioner considering the meaning of the term "public order" as has been pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1966 SC 740 . and followed subsequently in the case of Gulab Mehra v. State of U. P. , AIR 1987 SC 2332 . In the case of Gulab Mehra (supra) in para-15 the ratio of the judgement in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia has been stated. Thereafter in para-16 of the said judgement the Supreme Court has referred to the judgement in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 . wherein it has been laid down that "public order" is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. wherein it has been laid down that "public order" is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. " Further, it has been observed in the said judgement that "an act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its duality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. " ( 7 ) IN view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point of "public order" it is necessary to consider as to whether the statements of the witnesses Hanif and Shivlal recorded by the Police on 9-12-1987 and 19-12-1987 bring the case within the ratio of the aforesaid case. On perusal of the statement of Hanif it is clear that he has stated that present petitioner is doing business of country liquor in public at the corner of Popatsheri in Sengrampura a locality of Surat City and that number of anti-social elements are being gathered at his den and that the said den of the petitioner has become a matter of nuisance to all good citizens residing nearby. He has also stated about his own incident which took place on 28-7-1987 when he was given two hockey-stick blows by the present petitioner merely because one drunken man had dashed with his cycle. It is also stated by him in the said statement that on account of the said incident he was very much frightened and was running on the road and at that time the present petitioner chased him and that an account of that there was traffic jam and also the people on the road ran helter-skelter. He further stated that the people in the said locality had closed their doors and windows and that the public order was disturbed. ( 8 ) THE other witnesses Bipinbhai in his statement has corroborated what is stated by witness Hanif. He further stated that the people in the said locality had closed their doors and windows and that the public order was disturbed. ( 8 ) THE other witnesses Bipinbhai in his statement has corroborated what is stated by witness Hanif. The witness Shivlal whose statement was recorded on 10-12-1987 has also described the incident of 9-12-1987 wherein he intervened to save a girl she was caught by one of the persons, who had gathered for drinking at the den of the petitioner. Thereupon the petitioner was excited and he came with a Rampuri knife and to save himself the witness ran on the road, but the present petitioner chased him on account of which other people were also frightened and ran helter-skelter and the people residing in the nearby area have closes their doors and windows. When these two incidents are examined to see in which of the concentric circles they would fall, it will be seen that the activity of the petitioner is not confined only to the larger circle of "law and order" as contemplated in the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, but it would certainly fall within the circle of "public order". The question is as pointed out in the subsequent judgement of the Supreme Court that one has to consider its potentiality. Now, if these incidents are considered via-a-via bootlegging activity of the detenu it would be very clear that he is running his den in public and his customers are also misbehaving after drinking and therefore, the potentiality of such incidents can never be under-valued. If such incidents happen, apart from particular individuals who have given the statements the even tempo of life of the community of the locality would also be affected and when such things are being done repeatedly or are likely to be done repeatedly in future that would even applying the tests of the aforesaid judgements, apart from the enlarged meaning given to the term "public order" under Sub-Section (4) of S. 3 of the Act, the case is clearly within the meaning of that term "public order" as decided by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. It may be mentioned that number of judgements of this court on this point have been quoted, but in all the cases the aforesaid judgements of the Supreme Court have been followed. It may be mentioned that number of judgements of this court on this point have been quoted, but in all the cases the aforesaid judgements of the Supreme Court have been followed. Casual observations made in the peculiar circumstances of the causes decided by this court following the aforesaid judgements of the Supreme Court cannot be said to be ratio of the judgement to be applied in the subsequent cases. Whether particular facts of the case would amount to disturbance of public order or not be a question of fact to be decided in each case in the light of aforesaid judgements of the Supreme Court and each case will be governed by its own facts. In that view of the matter the decisions of this Court cited by Mr. Kapadia are of no help to him and therefore, it is not necessary to deal with them in detail. In above view of the matter as do not find any substance on this point. ( 9 ) THE second point raised by Mr. Kapadia is to the effect that detention order is perverse inasmuch as the detaining authority has passed the same in mala fide exercise of the powers. However, his submission was confined only to the point that the proposal for detention is mechanically accepted by the detaining authority and therefore, it is mala fide exercise of the powers. ( 10 ) WHEN Mr. Kapadia was asked as to how the said point is raised in the petition he has stated that this point is not raised in the petition. When this point is not raised in the petition and when no amendment for the purpose of raising this point is made, we did not allow him to raise this point as the respondents would not have any opportunity to meet with the point by filing affidavit-in-reply. In that view of the matter Mr. Kapadia has not made any submission on this point. Therefore, this point is rejected. ( 11 ) THE third point raised by Mr. Kapadia is that the conclusions in the grounds of detention are not from the basic facts. In that view of the matter Mr. Kapadia has not made any submission on this point. Therefore, this point is rejected. ( 11 ) THE third point raised by Mr. Kapadia is that the conclusions in the grounds of detention are not from the basic facts. In other words, he has submitted that the inference and/or conclusion drawn about the apprehension with regard to the possibility of communal riot by the detaining authority is without any basis of factual data and that if there is any basics material or data for the same it is not supplied to the petitioner-detenu. ( 12 ) THIS point has been raised by the petitioner in para-11 of the petition. Affidavit-in-reply is filed by the detaining authority on this point wherein it is specifically stated that it is not correct to say that the detaining authority wherein it is specifically stated that it is not correct to state that the detaining authority has not disclosed the material on which the conclusions regarding likelihood of communal disturbances is based. Further, it is pointed out in the said affidavit that it is clearly mentioned in the grounds of detention that the persons who have given their statement against the detenu that the petitioner-detenu is very head-strong and dangerous person and they apprehend danger to their lives and properties from the petitioner-detenu and that the petitioner-detenu has given threats to kill him (Hanif ). He has also referred to page 45 of the compilation which is the statement of witnesses Hanif. On perusal of the said statement it is clear that the present petitioner had given threat to the said witness that in case he files any complaint before the Police he (Hanif) will be murdered. In the said affidavit-in-reply it is also clarified that out of the persons who have given statements, one witness is Muslim and he has stated that if he comes to know about the statement given by the said witness against him, there is all possibility that he along with his supporters may take revenge on the witness and that at the eleventh hour the supporters of Mulim witness also gather and there are possibilities that it may ignite communal riot. ( 13 ) IT may be stated that on the basis of the aforesaid material the conclusion about the likelihood of communal riot is based. ( 13 ) IT may be stated that on the basis of the aforesaid material the conclusion about the likelihood of communal riot is based. Therefore, this is not a case in which there is no material for drawing such inference. It also cannot be said to be purely imaginary. This is also not a case in which the copy of the statement is not given to the petitioner. The statement of witness Hanif is at page 45 of the petition itself which is filed by the petitioner and this indicates that copy of the statement of Hanif was given to him at the time when the grounds of detaining were served on him. The Police Commissioner is in-charge of the whole city and he knows which are the sensitive areas and what are the causes which may ignite communal riot. When on the basis of the aforesaid material he has drawn the inference about likelihood of communal riots, it cannot be said to be without any basis of material and/or imaginary. In view of the fact that the statement of Hanif and other witnesses are given to the petitioner-detenu, it cannot be said that the factual data on which the inference of likelihood of communal riot is drawn, was not supplied to the petitioner. In that view of the matter we do not find any merit in this contention raised by Mr. Kapadia on behalf of the petitioner. ( 14 ) THE next contention raised by Mr. Kapadia is about unexplained delay in considering the representation by the State Government. The petitioner has raised this point in para 7 of the petition where he has submitted that he has made the representation to the State Government through jail on 22-12-1987 and that the respondent was bound to consider the representation of the petitioner at the earliest point of time. It is further submitted that there is great delay in considering his representation and therefore, the petitioners continued detention has become illegal. ( 15 ) IT may be stated that in the petition no factual data is given. However, in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Gujarat in para 7 it is stated that the petitioners representation dated 22-12-1987 submitted to the jail authority was received by the jail authority on the same day at 16. ( 15 ) IT may be stated that in the petition no factual data is given. However, in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Gujarat in para 7 it is stated that the petitioners representation dated 22-12-1987 submitted to the jail authority was received by the jail authority on the same day at 16. 30 hours and it was forwarded with a forwarding letter dated 23-12-1987 to the Government and it was received on the very same day i. e. on 23-12-1987 and that immediately the same was placed by the Department to the under Secretary Shri Rao on the very day. It is further stated that Mr. Rao in his turn submitted the same along with the file before the Additional Chief Secretary on 24-12-1987 and the Additional Chief Secretary after fully considering the same rejected it on 28-12-1987 inasmuch as 25th, 26th and 27th December were public holidays and the petitioner was informed about the rejection of his representation by letter dated 30-12-1987. It is therefore, clear that on 23-12-1987 the representation was received by the Department and on 24th December 1987 it was placed before the Addl. Chief Secretary and it was decided on the next working day i. e. 28th December 1987. Therefore, it is clear from the facts of the case that the representation has been promptly dealt with by all concerned and there is no delay much less unreasonable delay which requires to be explained. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, Mr. Kapadia submits that delay from 23-12-1987 to 28-12-1987 has not been explained. The submission of Mr. Kapadia is not correct in view of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Deputy Secretary as mentioned earlier. The question that is posed is as to why the representation was sent to Mr. Rao, Under Secretary before it was sent to the Addl. Chief Secretary who is the final authority to decide the representation is not relevant at all. It may be that all the papers with regard to the petitioners detention might be with the Government and ultimately the said papers might have been placed before the final authority to decide the representation. Still however, assistance is needed from the subordinate officers and that is the reason why the papers were placed before the under Secretary with a view to immediately focussing attention on the most important and vital aspect of the matter. Still however, assistance is needed from the subordinate officers and that is the reason why the papers were placed before the under Secretary with a view to immediately focussing attention on the most important and vital aspect of the matter. Such practice would also help the highest authority to take prompt decision in the matter particularly when it is submitted with all the papers of the case. In that view of the matter we do not find any substance in this contention of Mr. Kapadia. ( 17 ) THE next contention that is raised by Mr. Kapadia is that the statements of three witnesses which are referred to in the grounds of detention are false, fabricated and imaginary. This contention is raised by the petitioner in para 5 of the petition. ( 18 ) ON this point affidavit-in-reply is filed by the detaining authority and in para 4 thereof, he has denied the allegations made in para 4 of the petition. It is further pointed out in the said reply that the incidents narrated by the witnesses are believable as the statements are believable, as the statements are recorded by the responsible officer of the rank of Police Inspector Shri A. C. Parmar heading the Prevention of Crime Branch, Surat City. It is further stated that there is no reason to doubt the honesty and integrity of such a responsible officer. It is further stated that he has subjectively satisfied himself that the statements of the witnesses are true and believable and that there is no reason to disbelieve the facts stated in those statements. It is further stated that the affidavit of Shri A. C. Parmar will be filed to support his aforesaid contents. ( 19 ) MR. A. C. Parmar, Police Inspector, PSB Surat City has also filed his affidavit and in para 2 thereof he has clearly stated that the statements of three witnesses were recorded by him and that the said witnesses are genuine witnesses and the statements were recorded as per their say. It is further stated that the witnesses are independent and they have given their statements voluntarily. He has denied that said statements are got up or concocted. He has clearly stated that the statements are genuine and not fictitious. According to him, the paid witnesses stay in Surat and they are very much in existence. It is further stated that the witnesses are independent and they have given their statements voluntarily. He has denied that said statements are got up or concocted. He has clearly stated that the statements are genuine and not fictitious. According to him, the paid witnesses stay in Surat and they are very much in existence. It is also pointed out that the addresses of the said witnesses are also properly given in the grounds of detention. ( 20 ) THUS, in view of aforesaid two affidavits, one of the detaining authority and the other of the Police Officer who has recorded the statements, it cannot be said that the said statements are purely imaginary and that they are the statements of fictitious persons. It also cannot be said that the said statements are false and/or got-up statements in view of the specific reply given by Mr. A. C. Parmar. It is important to note that at affidavit-in-joinder has been filed challenging the verocity of the affidavit filed by the detaining authority of Shri A. C. Parmar. The said affidavit fully supported by the statements of the witnesses there is no reason to believe that the said statements are false, fabricated and imaginary. In that view of the matter we reject this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. . ( 21 ) MR. Kapadia next contended that the inference drawn about the danger or damage to the lives and properties and that the petitioner is a head-strong and dangerous person, are without any material on record. ( 22 ) THIS contention is stated for being rejected simply because there is statement of Hanif a copy of which is also given to the detenu. Similarly, there is also statement of Shivlal, copy of which is also given to the petitioner detenu. These two statements clearly disclose as to how a headstrong and dangerous person the petitioner is and how the activities of the petitioner as a bootlegger are dangerous to the lives and properties of the public. Hanif in his statement has stated about the activity of the petitioner as a bootlegger and running of den for selling the country liquor in public and further about gathering of anti-social elements at the petitioners den. Hanif in his statement has stated about the activity of the petitioner as a bootlegger and running of den for selling the country liquor in public and further about gathering of anti-social elements at the petitioners den. He has also described about the incident of 26th July, 1987 and the effects of the petitioners chasing this witness clearly disclose as to how head-strong and dangerous person the petitioner is. Similarly, the incident narrated by Shivlal Ranchhoddas also discloses that no person should interfere with even misbehaving of the petitioners customers misbehaviour on the public at large is clearly reflected in his statement. ( 23 ) APART from this in the grounds of detention as many as eight cases which are pending against the petitioner have been quoted and perusal of the said cases wherein large quantities of country liquor is seized, clearly show that the petitioner was indulging in bootlegging activity on a very large-scale. When the persons are consuming such country liquor certainly that would affect their health and, therefore, on the basis of the material when the inference is drawn about the wide-spread danger to the public health, it cannot be said to be without any material on record. It is important to note that the detaining authority in his affidavit-in-reply has also dealt with this aspect and stated that as bootlegger the activities of the petitioners are causing harm to the general public as also cause wide-spread danger to the public and public health. When such material is there on record against the present petitioner, it cannot be said that the aforesaid inference drawn by the detaining authority against the petitioner with regard to widespread public danger to public health is without any material on record. ( 24 ) IN that view of the matter Mr. Kapadia has submitted that in the affidavit-in-reply the detaining authority has stated as under :"i say that this cannot is clearly stated in the grounds of detention and the some is supported by the statements of witnesses and other relevant material. "mr. Kapadia has emphasised the words "other relevant material" and submitted that the detaining authority has not specified the same and has considered the material which is not supplied to the petitioner. "mr. Kapadia has emphasised the words "other relevant material" and submitted that the detaining authority has not specified the same and has considered the material which is not supplied to the petitioner. When we read the affidavit we should read the same reasonably and particularly when reference is made with regard to the grounds of detention and statements of witnesses, it means the other material of which copies are supplied to the petitioner which would include Chehra Patrak as well as F. I. R. In that view of the matter we do not find any substance in this submission made by Mr. Kapadia on behalf of the petitioner-detenu. ( 25 ) THE next point urged by Mr. Kapadia is that the detention order is passed mechanically inasmuch as the detaining authority has not verified the statements of the witnesses by calling them. This point is raised by the petitioner in para 11 (C) wherein it is stated that it is for the detaining authority to ascertain the genuinness of the statements himself and not by the proposing authority and the detaining authority has failed in discharging his duty as to verification of genuineness of the statements of the witnesses. ( 26 ) ON this point affidavit-in-reply is filed by the detaining authority wherein he has denied that he has mechanically accepted the proposal of the detention without screening the material. According to him, he had perused the material placed before him and after due consideration of the same he was subjectively satisfied to the effect that detention order is required to be issued against the detenu. Further, he has specifically stated that the factum of witnesses whose statements are recorded was verified by him and he has denied that he has failed to discharge his duty as alleged. The detaining authority has further stated that he has personally verified the witnesses whose statements are recorded and that there is no question of verifying the same by any other independent agency. ( 27 ) AT this juncture it is important to note that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the same cases certain observations were made by this very Bench in some other judgements with regard to the verification of the statements of the witnesses considering it to be desirable to avoid such contention being raised. ( 27 ) AT this juncture it is important to note that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the same cases certain observations were made by this very Bench in some other judgements with regard to the verification of the statements of the witnesses considering it to be desirable to avoid such contention being raised. What is necessary is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and for arriving at subjective satisfaction the detaining authority himself has to apply his mind on the materials placed before him. If at all he has doubt about the veracity of the statements recorded either he himself can verify the same or he can ask any other subordinate officer to verify the case. The detaining authority can also verify the statements from the officer who has recorded the same. There is no statutory provision for verifying such statements by the detaining authority through the persons other than those who recorded the same and than specific averments are made in the affidavit-in-reply which have remained uncontroverted there is no reason to disbelieve the said statements. Therefore, the contention on the point that the detention order is passed by the detaining authority mechanically without verifying material cannot be accepted. ( 28 ) AT this juncture it could be desirable to point out that the said statements bring out same material with regard to the petitioner qua certain incidents which took place as mentioned in the statements. There will also be grounds to indicate about the activity of the present petitioner as a bootlegger was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That would be a separate ground because now the "ground" is given wider meaning after the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta reported in AIR 1986 SC 687 . When the order of detention is passed on the basis of statements of witnesses as well as on the basis of other cases filed against the detenu, then the detention order can be sustained on the other grounds assuming that the ground with regard to the material disclosed in the statements of the witnesses is invalid for any reason whatsoever. When the order of detention is passed on the basis of statements of witnesses as well as on the basis of other cases filed against the detenu, then the detention order can be sustained on the other grounds assuming that the ground with regard to the material disclosed in the statements of the witnesses is invalid for any reason whatsoever. Section 4 of the PASA Act clearly provides that detention order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one of acts of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not promimately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. It is also provided in clause (b) of the said section that the Government or the officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. In that view of the matter apart from our aforesaid view, this order of detention can be sustained on the ground that as many as eight prohibition cases are filed against the petitioner-detenu and looking to the large quantities of country liquor raised in those cases from the petitioner the activities of the present petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the enlarged meaning of the term "public order" as given in Sub-Sec. (4) of S. 3 of the Act. We, therefore, do not find any merit on this point. ( 29 ) THE last contention raised by Mr. Kapadia is that while considering the representation the State Government has not looked into the para-wise remarks of the detaining authority. This contention has been raised by the petitioner in para-11 (f) of the petition it is inter alia stated therein that the copy of representation dated 22-12-1987 was received by the detaining authority on 28-12-1987. ( 30 ) HOWEVER, that statement made by the petitioner does not appear to be correct as Mr. R. R. Tripathi the learned A. G. P. has placed in our hands the original file of the detaining authority wherein it is shown that the detaining authority has received the representation on 29th December 1987 and disposed of the same after carefully considering it, on the same day i. e. 29-12-1987. R. R. Tripathi the learned A. G. P. has placed in our hands the original file of the detaining authority wherein it is shown that the detaining authority has received the representation on 29th December 1987 and disposed of the same after carefully considering it, on the same day i. e. 29-12-1987. ( 31 ) IT is also submitted in the said paragraph that sub-clause (2) of Cl. 19 of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (Prevention of Anti Social Activities) Order, 1985 requires that the jail authority should also forward a copy of the representation to the detaining authority and the detaining authority shall forward the same with remarks to the Government with utmost expedition. It is further submitted that the said provision of the said order is not complied with and, therefore, the order of detention is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India as the State Govt. has not followed the fair and reasonable procedure before rejecting the representation of the detenu. ( 32 ) IT may be mentioned that S. 3 of the PASA Act provides that the Government has authority to frame general or special order to prescribe conditions with regard to place as well as conditions with regard to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline. There is no other section in the Act which empowers the Government to impose conditions with regard to detention except S. 5. Condition of sending a copy of the representation to the detaining authority and the detaining authority forwarding the same with remarks to the Government with utmost expedition prima facie does not appear to be a condition contemplated by Sub-Section (a) of S. 3 of the Act. However, it is not necessary to dialate such on this point as the validity of the said condition has not been challenged before us. At this juncture suffice to say, before the approval of the order of detention passed by the authorised officer as contemplated by S. 3 (a) of the Act it would be necessary for him to consider the representation. After the approval of the said order under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India it would be the duty of the Government to consider the same. After the approval of the said order under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India it would be the duty of the Government to consider the same. When the provision is made for forwarding representation with remarks of the detaining authority to the Government with utmost expedition, that is with a view to enabling the Government to promptly decide the representation of the detenu. ( 33 ) IT appears from the file of the Government with regard to the petitioners detention that the order passed by the detaining authority on 12-12-1987 has been approved by the Government on 15-12-1987 and thereafter the representation was made by the petitioner to the Government, a copy of which was also sent by the jail authorities to the Government. The detaining authority, as mentioned earlier, received the same on 29-12-1987 while the Government has decided the representation on 28-12-1987. It may be stated that at the time when the order was approved by the Government, it had all the papers relating to petitioners detention. In the present case the Government received the representation on 23-12-1987 and decided the same on 28-12-1987. Till that date the detaining authority has not received the copy of the representation made by the petitioner and, therefore, there was no question of sending the remarks by the detaining authority to the Government as the detaining authority did not know about making of representation by the petitioner to the Government. In the present case it is true that the Government before deciding the same did not receive the remarks from the detaining authority. The Government as the superior authority could have called for the remarks from the detaining authority, but that would have unnecessarily prolonged the consideration of the representation made by the petitioner particularly in view of the fact that the Government was already in possession of all the papers relating to the petitioners detention. The Government as the superior authority could have called for the remarks from the detaining authority, but that would have unnecessarily prolonged the consideration of the representation made by the petitioner particularly in view of the fact that the Government was already in possession of all the papers relating to the petitioners detention. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is clear that with a view to promptly deciding the representation made by the petitioner instead of waiting for the remarks of the detaining authority, the Government took advantage of the papers relating to petitioners detention lying with it and decided promptly the representation made by the petitioner which action of the Government is consistent with the spirit and intention of S. 3 of the Act as also Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. ( 34 ) IN this case Mr. M. P. Rao, under Secretary has filed affidavit-in-reply wherein it is inter alia pointed out that the contention regarding inviting remarks/opinion of the detaining authority is without any substance. It is further pointed out in the said affidavit-in-reply that when the detaining authority makes the report to the State Government entire papers are submitted to the State Government for seeking its approval and that the relevant material is available to the State Government to consider the representation of the detenu. In the present case as stated earlier, on 15-12-1987 the State Government has approved the order of detention. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case it appears that absence of opinion/remarks of the detaining authority no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. In that view of the matter we do not agree with the contention raised by Mr. Kapadia that in absence of remarks/opinion of the detaining authority the decision of the Government rejecting the representation made by the petitioner violates Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence we reject this contention also. ( 35 ) ALL the contentions raised before us fail and, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. Rule discharged. .