Judgment :- 1. I am of the opinion that this Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The question raited relates to recruitment of Sepoys in the Central Excise Department. The petitioner was an aspirant for selection. He underwent the physical test successfully. He was also interviewed. But he was not selected, according to him wrongfully and for extraneous reasons. Therefore he seeks the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to appoint him as a Sepoy. 2. Counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the jurisdiction of this court is excluded by S 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 13 of 1985 (the Act) read with Art.323A(2)(d) of the Constitution of India. He points out that the Original Petition relates to recruitment to the Civil service of the Union, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal under S.14 of the Act, the relevant clause of which reads: "(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;" 3. Faced with this difficulty, counsel for the petitioner valiantly attempted to salvage the writ petition with the contention that the Act applied only to persons who were already is service on the date on which it came into force, and that it was not intended to apply to future appointments. Faced with this difficulty, counsel for the petitioner valiantly attempted to salvage the writ petition with the contention that the Act applied only to persons who were already is service on the date on which it came into force, and that it was not intended to apply to future appointments. In support, he relied on the preamble to the Act, which runs as under: "An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any Stale or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of (any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Art.323-A of the Constitution) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." Stress was laid on the words, "disputes and complaints with respect to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts." The word used being 'appointed', the preamble conclusively establishes that the Act is intended to apply only to persons already in service. If the Act were intended to apply to future appointments as well, the language employed should have been "appointed or to be appointed". 4. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded, though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear, must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would b5 justified in resorting to it, may, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general, though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application. (Burrakur Coal Co. (Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India A.I.r. 1961 S. C. 954) The preamble may be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one meaning, but it cannot be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended, the operative provisions of statute (State of Rajasthan v. Leela (A. I. R.1965 S. C. 1296). S.14 inter alia vests the Central Administrative Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over matters in relation to, or concerning recruitment to any All India Service or any civil service of the Union. "Recruitment" in the Section is not restricted to recruitment by transfer of persons already in service. It is of wide amplitude and can take within its ambit, direct recruitment as well. There is, and there can be, no ambiguity in the meaning of the word "recruitment" in S.14. The Section on its plain language mult therefore apply even to future direct recruitments. The preamble cannot be resorted to, to interpret and restrict the scope of S.14 when its language is clear and unambiguous, and there is no absurdity or anomaly to be avoided. As stated in Burrakur Coal Co. case we cannot start with the preamble and read down the plain language of S.14. If the petitioner's contention is to be accepted clause (a) of S.14(1) will be rendered otiose and there will be practically no occasion for applying it at all. 5. Even otherwise, I am not inclined to accept the petitioner's contention regarding the scope of the preamble itself. The raison d'etre for the introduction of Art.323-A and 323-B in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976 and the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, following it, are explained by Ranganath Misra J. in Para.15 and 16 of his judgment in Sampath Kumar v. Union of India 1987(1) SCC.124. The Constitution Amendment was the culmination of the debates and deliberations, spread over almost two decades, for exploring ways and means, for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interests of public servants as also the country. The Tribunal was contemplated as a substitute to take over a part of the existing backlog, and a share of the normal load, of the High Courts, and not as supplemental to the High Courts in the scheme of administration of justice. The Tribunal was contemplated as a substitute to take over a part of the existing backlog, and a share of the normal load, of the High Courts, and not as supplemental to the High Courts in the scheme of administration of justice. Expeditious disposal of service matters and relief to the High Court by appointing a substitute forum for adjudication of such disputes were the twin purposes of the Constitution Amendment and the subsequent Act. If this be the scheme of the legislation, the purpose will stand defeated by limiting the operation of the Act to existing employees alone. 6. It has to be noticed that a statute is applied not on the date of enactment but as on the date of enforcement (Kunhammed Kayi v. Premalatha 1962 KLT. 366 (F.B ). Its meaning has to be gathered with reference to the point of time when the cause is brought or dispute is raised for adjudication. Any person in service at that time is a person "appointed" and therefore within the ambit of even the preamble. The word "appointed' is only descriptive of the persons to whom the Act applies and not indicative of the time of appointment. It is intended to describe the persons to whom the Act applies as those in public service and not as those already in service. 7. In either view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the petitioner's contention. The Original Petition is therefore not maintainable. 8. There is no provision for transfer of the Original Petition to the Central Administrative Tribunal as prayed for by the petitioner. S.29 applies only to cases pending at the commencement of the Act. 9. The Original Petition is therefore dismissed. This will not preclude the petitioner from moving the Tribunal appropriately under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Issue carbon copy of the judgment to the parties on usual terms. Dismissed.