M. B. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition the contention of the petitioners is that the suspension order (Annexure A) dated 24-4-1987 be quashed and set aside as they are acquitted by the Criminal Court (the petitioners have produced the acquittal order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Karjan on 30/01/1988 in Criminal Case No. 503 of 1987 As per the said order the petitioners along with other persons were prosecuted for the offences punishable under Secs. 224 223 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code. In that case the petitioners were accused Nos. 7 and 8. The Court has arrived at the conclusion that accused Nos. 1 to 6 of that case absconded from the Court custody from Karjan sub-jail by breaking open the Jail. It also arrived at the conclusion that the said accused caused grievous hurt to witness Ranjitsinh Kanaksinh and convicted them. With regard to the case against the present petitioners (accused Nos. 7 and 8 of that case) the Court held that before prosecuting the petitioners sanction under Sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not obtained. It also observed that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused No. 8 was at the relevant time on duty. It observed that the world taken from the petitioners was against the rules. On the aforesaid grounds the Judicial Magistrate acquitted them. ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that once the acquittal order is passed against the petitioners the impugned suspension order would not survive and the petitioners are required to be reinstated in service. ( 3 ) IN my view this submission is without any substance because if we refer to the suspension order Annexure A it is clear that the petitioners are suspended pending departmental enquiry and not pending criminal trial. At present the departmental enquiry is not over. Hence it cannot be said that once they are acquitted in criminal case the petitioners are required to be reinstated in service. Their suspension order continues till the departmental enquiry is over. ( 4 ) MR. Oza learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently relied upon the judgment in the case of State v. B. C. Dwivedi [1983 (2)] 24 (2) GLR 1315. Their suspension order continues till the departmental enquiry is over. ( 4 ) MR. Oza learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently relied upon the judgment in the case of State v. B. C. Dwivedi [1983 (2)] 24 (2) GLR 1315. In that case the Division Bench decided the Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed in the Special Civil Application. The Court held that merely because the acquittal appeal has been preferred it cannot be said that the trial continues. The alternative contigency of suspending a Govt. employee is contemplation of disciplinary proceeding or its pendency was also not in existence since no inquiry has been initiated such less no charge-sheet has been issued though the respondent was suspended so back as 30/09/1980 and the corruption cases ended by his acquittal on 6/01/1982 In the present case the petitioners are not suspended pending criminal proceeding. The petitioners are suspended pending departmental enquiry. Therefore ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment would have no bearing. ( 5 ) FURTHER learned Advocate Mr. Oza relied upon the State Government Circular issued in General Administration Department of 8/07/1970 which was considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. The Court relied upon paragraph 3 of the Circular which reads as under:"3 However if the acquittal in a prosecution case or seeing aside of an order of dismissal removal etc is on technical ground and not on the merits of the case there should be no objecting to proceedings being initiated in such cases. Government is however pleased to direct that even in such cases the Government servants should not be placed under suspension again after reinstatement in service i. e. fresh prosecution or departmental inquiry against them if considered necessary should be instituted and completed expeditiously without placing them under suspension". ( 6 ) AS against this Circular? Mr. Dave learned Additional Govt. Pleader appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the Government has clarified the position by issuing further Circular on 31/03/1971 and its relevant part is as under:" The phrase suspension made with the specific object of prosecution or pending prosecution by necessary implication excludes suspension ordered on account of an alleged misconduct with a view to taking departmental proceedings against the Government servant and for which purpose a preliminary enquiry may be held or investigating continued. Merely because in the course of such proceedings it is decided to servant him and he is prosecuted the initial character of the suspension ordered is not altered. The suspension in such case would sat automatically terminate on acquittal by Court but it would only be terminated by another order of the authority concerned and until such further order is made terminating the suspension the Government servant has no right to be reinstate in service if be is say reinstated on acquittal find departmental enquiry is held against him the whole period of suspension can be regulated pending upon the result of the enquiry. It is only where the suspension is ordered consequent to a original offence being registered and last the Government servant or a compliant lodged or charge-sheet prosecuted against him in a Court or where in the order the intention to prosecute him is mentioned or it is specifically mentioned that the suspension is ordered pending his prosecution the phrase suspension made with the specific object of prosecution or pending prosecution would be applicable. (Emphasis added)"in my view the aforesaid Circular is absolutely clear. It clarifies the point on that if the suspension has been made with a specific object of prosecution or pending prosecution then as soon as the person is acquitted he is required to be reinstated in service. But once the delinquent is suspended pending departmental enquiry merely because in the course of such departmental proceedings he is acquitted then the suspension order in such case would not automatically terminate on acquittal by the Court but it should only be terminated by another order of the authority concerned and until such further order is made terminating the suspension the Government servant has no right to be reinstated in service. The said Circular clarifies that when the person is suspended only pending his prosecution then the Circular dated 13/04/1970 would be applicable. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the aforesaid question is decided by the Division Bench of this Court. ( 7 ) MR. Oza learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners further relied upon the Division Bench judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. ( 7 ) MR. Oza learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners further relied upon the Division Bench judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. 1984 (2) SLJ 347 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of Nagpur City v. Ramchandra 1981 (2) SCC 714 . In the case of Corporation of Nagpur City (supra) while dealing with this question the Supreme Court held as under:"6 The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the Criminal Court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continuo a departmental inquiry on the very sine charges or grains or evidence beat the fact remains however that merely because the accused is acquitted the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any was fettered. However as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worth while to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. It however the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and goad grounds the proceed with the inquiry it can certainly do so In case the respondents are acquitted we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked sad the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority choose to proceed with the inquiry Mr. Sanghi states that if it is decide to continue the inquiry so only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed be will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the Criminal Court If the respondents are convicted then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow". Sanghi states that if it is decide to continue the inquiry so only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed be will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the Criminal Court If the respondents are convicted then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow". From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court cannot be said that the Supreme Court has laid down that in all cases where the delinquents are acquitted in a criminal prosecution then their suspension requires to be quashed and set aside. May be because of facts of that particular case Court has directed that the order of suspension shall be revoked. ( 8 ) IN the case Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh Anr. (supra) the Himachal Pradesh High Court was dealing with Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 The Court was required to consider sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 which inter alia provides that a Government servant shall be desired to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority; (A) with effect from the date of his detention if he is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge of otherwise for a period exceeding forty-eight hours; (B) with effect from the date of his conviction if in the event of a conviction for an offence he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding fourtyeight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsory retired consequent to such conviction. In paragraph 11 the Court has held that the impugned order of suspension was apparently made in order to give effect to the fiction created by sub-rule (2) of Rule 10. The Court further considered the question whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the continued operation of the order of suspension is legal and proper and is reasonsbly justified in the eye of law. The Court held that after the acquittal order the delinquent is required to be reinstated in service and observed that if the acquittal appeal are allowed and the petitioner is convicted there is nothing to prevent the competent authority from dealing with the petitioner in accordance with law. The Court held that after the acquittal order the delinquent is required to be reinstated in service and observed that if the acquittal appeal are allowed and the petitioner is convicted there is nothing to prevent the competent authority from dealing with the petitioner in accordance with law. After holding this the Court referred to the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment in the case of Corporation of Nagpur City and held that the direction given in the aforesaid case indicates that ordinarily where a delinquent who has been hauled up before the Court for trial on certain charges is acquitted the order of suspension should be revoked and the delinquent should be reinstated even if the authority chooses to proceed departmentally against the delinquent. With respect. it is difficult to accept the last observation made by the Himachal Pradesh High Court because the Supreme Court has nowhere laid down that once the person is acquitted even though the departmental enquiry is pendings and even though suspension order is passed pending departmental enquiry he is required to be reinstated and suspension order requires to be revoked. Further in that case the Court was dealing with sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 and in the light of the said sub-rule the Court has observed as stated above which would have no bearing with regard to the circulars issued by the State of Gujarat. The said Circular specifically provides that the suspension would not automatically terminate on acquittal by the Court. It is provides that only where the suspension is ordered consequent to a criminal offence being registered against the Government servant or a complaint being lodged or charge-sheet presented against him in a Court or where in the order the intention to prosecute him is mentioned or it is specifically mentioned that suspension is ordered pending his prosecution then and then suspension would stand terminated after the acquittal. ( 9 ) LASTLY Mr. Oza learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied upon the judgment in the case of S. R. Balakrishnan Nair v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices 1982 (1) SLJ 545 wherein the Court dealt with the question whether the order of deemed suspension in the circumstances of the case could be sustained or not. In that case the petitioner was working as Assistant Post Master of Cochin Post Office. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. In that case the petitioner was working as Assistant Post Master of Cochin Post Office. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner was convicted. On the next day of the convection the petition was dismissed from service. The appellate Court acquitted the petitioner against which the State preferred criminal appeal. The State appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner moved the respondent by application to reinstate him in service consequent upon his acquittal. In reply to that application he was informed that the order of dismissal had been set aside a further enquiry would be held under provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 and that he would be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from 31-3-1979. Thereafter he was served with the chargesheet under Rule 14 of C. C. S (C. C. A.) Rules. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid deemed suspension order and the charge-sheet. The rule considered Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules and held that the petitioner can to deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appellant authority if the set aside enquiry against him is on the same allegations on which the penalty was originally imposed on him. The Court further arrived at the conclusion that the allegations in the charge-sheet are dissimilar and therefore Rule 10 (4) was not attracted. Hence it quashed set aside the deemed suspension order. In my view from the facts and the has laid down an the aforesaid decision it is clear that it has no bearing or application to the present case and its citation in the present case is absolutely irrelevant. ( 10 ) IN this view of the matter this petition is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. However looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and as the suspension order Annexure A is of April 1987 the respondents are directed to finalise the departmental enquiry as expedition as possible all in any case within four mantas from the date of the receipt of the writ of the Court. Application dismissed. .