JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava. J. 1. By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 141274 and 31178 passed by the Prescribed Authority contained in annexures 2 and 7 and the orders dated 30775 and 3875 passed by the Civil Judge, Barabanki and the order dated 5477 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Barabanki contained in Annexure 6 and certain other reliefs including that the provisions of U.P. Act No. XXXI of 1962, No. V of 1969, No. XXXV of 1970, No. XVIII of 1973, No. XI of 1974 and U P. Ordinance No. XXXI of 1976, U.P. Act No. II of 1975 and U.P. Ordinance No. 23 of 1976 be declared as ultra vires, So far as second and third reliefs are concerned, the learned counsel has not pressed. 2. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner was in the service of the Government of India and was abroad during the relevant period and never received any notice in respect of proceedings which took place at his back and when he moved application for setting aside exparte orders, it was rejected, hence this writ petition. During the course of argument it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings should have been taken in Lucknow itself and not in the district of Barabanki as the petitioner was earlier residing at Lucknow. It has not been denied by the petitioner that he had executed the power of Attorney in favour of his wife's own brother Sarfarazuzzama. By the said registered document one more person was appointed as his General Agent and upon them powers were conferred to conduct, defend and prosecute all or any cases or matters of civil, Revenue or miscellaneous nature for or against us, severally or jointly, at any stage, and in any court or Tribunal or Panchayat Adalat or any Government whatever throughout India and even Pakistan if and when necessary, those constituted and functioning now and at present and those which may be constituted hereafter in future, and in implication of and without prejudice to the generality of the above power or right. By the said document he severally and jointly, authorised his general agents, to draw up or to get drawn up, applications, petitions, objections, affidavits (including counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits). By the said document he severally and jointly, authorised his general agents, to draw up or to get drawn up, applications, petitions, objections, affidavits (including counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits). 3. In this case it appears that the petitioner himself did not file any objection when publication under section 9 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) was published and notice under section 10(2) of the Act was received by his wife's brother, the General agent, and he filed objection and engaged a counsel who appeared before the Prescribed Authority. The said attorney also filed appeals which came up for hearing before the Civil Judge and were finally heard and disposed of by the District Judge, Barabanki. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under the rules notice should have been personally served upon the petitioner, meaning thereby that the notice should have been sent to Jeddah, Embassy of India, outside the country. It has nowhere been contended by the petitioner that he gave any notice before the court concerned that notices of the case may be sent to him at his address. It has also not been stated that he took any action against his General Attorney for doing any Act which might have been detrimental to his interest. It was for the petitioner to file an objection when a general notice was issued and in response to a particular notice the General Attorney filed objection. 5. Learned counsel made reference to rule 9 of the Rules framed under the Act regarding service of notice which according to him was subsequently amended. Rule 9 reads as under : 9. The notice under Rule 8 may be served either (a) by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served, or (b) by delivering it to his agent, executor, administrator or any adult member of his family, or (c) by affixing it at the usual or last known place of abode of that person, or (d) by sending it by registered post, addressed to that person at his usual or last known place of abode, and (e) in case of an incorporated company or society, by sending it by registered post, addressed to the Secretary or other principal functionary of the company or society or by delivering or affixing at its principal office. In view of the above provision, the notice sent by the registered post which was received by someone else would be deemed to be sufficient service as in the instant case notice on behalf of the petitioner was served on none else but on his own wife's brother who was also residing in the same village. This mode of service was better titan affixation and in fact service was affected and proceedings took place and the said general attorney prosecuted the case on behalf of the appellant. The said attorney had also executed sale deeds in favour of opposite parties who have claimed right and title over the land declared to be surplus land. According to them they were in possession of the land from before abolition of Zamindari and have every right over the same. It has not been stated by the petitioner anywhere that any suit for cancellation of sale deed has been filed. Learned counsel made reference to Rao Madho Singh v. State of U.P. and others. (1977 All L.J. 817) in which case it was held: Rule 9 does not contemplate service of notice on a Karinda or an agent except in clause (d) when it may be addressed to the secretary or other principal functionary of the company or society. Hence no service as contemplated in law was affected on the tenure holder. The order, therefore, by the Prescribed Authority declaring tenure holder's land in absence of a proper service was bad. In the said case service was not affected on the General agent but on the Karinda and the Process Server reported that the person concerned was residing at Aligarh. The facts of the said case are quite distinguishable. In this case the Karinda did not file any objection. As such the contention raised by the petitioner that service was not affected on the petitioner, cannot be accepted. 6. Learned counsel here contended that the District Judge having held that the sale was for adequate consideration, the land should not have been taken to be surplus and the sale deeds being valid and for adequate consideration, the land should not have been taken to be surplus and the sale deeds being valid and for adequate consideration then under the law the said land should have been excluded from the computation of surplus land. If that be so, it is for the prescribed authority to exclude the land. So far as the question of possession is concerned, the Prescribed Authority was to apply the provisions of Section 12A (d) of the Act. If there is any calculation mistake, the petitioner can even now approach the prescribed authority for consideration that the sale deeds were for adequate consideration and as such the plots should have been excluded from the land held by him from computation for the purposes of declaring surplus area. The Prescribed Authority will correct the mistake, if any. If possession has not yet been taken, the Prescribed Authority will obviously give effect to the choice of plots to be retained or given towards surplus area. 7. With the above observations and modification, the writ petition is otherwise dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.