N.C. SHARMA, J.—This is a second appeal by the defendant tenant against the decree of the Additional District Judge No. 1 Jodhpur, passed in Civil First Appeal No. 13 of 1985 on October 21,1986 affirming the decree dated January 22, 1985 passed by the Additional Munsif No. 1, Jodhpur for ejectment of the appellant from the premises detailed and described in para No. 1 of the planit of Civil Suit No. 314 of 1977 instituted by the respondent-landlord against the former. It was not in dispute between the parties that the defendant-appellant was tenant of the respondent in a malia, and Saal over it with front dagla situated in Kapra Bazar, Jodhpur and that the appellant carried on his business under the name and style of Modi Radio Service in the said premises. The dispute between the parties was about the rate of rent of the premises stipulated between them and with regard to the date from which the rent was due against the appellant. According to the respondent land-lord the suit premises were taken on a monthly rent of Rs. 35/- under a rent note dated August 9, 1975, while according to the appellant-tenant, he had initiaily taken on rent the suit premises in the year 1969 on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-which was later on increased to Rs. 25/- per month. According to the plaintiff, the defendant-appellant had neither paid nor tendered rent to her from January 10,, 1976 and on the date on which the suit was filed an amount of Rs. 521.50/-was in arrears against the appellant on account of rent from January 10, 1976 to April 7. 1977. The plaintiff had further claimed damages for use and occupation with effect from April 8, 1977 upto the date of the filing of the suit. On the other hand, the version of the defendant-appellant was that he had paid the entire rent to the plaintiff respondent upto March 9, 1977 and the amount claimed by the plaintiff was not due against him. 2. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed three issues. The first issue was to the effect as to whether the defendant had put his signatures on a blank stamp paper whereupon the plaintiff later on fraudulently got a rent note written mentioning therein the rate of rent as Rs. 35/- per rnonth instead of Rs. 25/- per month? The first issue was to the effect as to whether the defendant had put his signatures on a blank stamp paper whereupon the plaintiff later on fraudulently got a rent note written mentioning therein the rate of rent as Rs. 35/- per rnonth instead of Rs. 25/- per month? This issue was framed on the basis of the plea taken by the appellant in para 2 of the written statement. The second issue was to the effect as to whether the defendant had paid rent to the plaintiff upto March 9, 1977 and was he, therefore, not a defaulter? Last issue was about relief. 3. It appears that on September 1, 1978, the trial court, after hearing the parties and on the basis of the material on record, provisionally determined the amount of rent under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short hereinafter, the Act") to be deposited in Court by the appellant or paid to the landlord for the period from January 10, 1976, to September 9, 1978 amounting to Rs. 1120/- and an amount of Rs. 86 80 as interest, in all Rs. 1206, 80p. The defendant was directed to pay this amount to the plaintiff after depositing the same in Court within 15 days from the date of the determination. It may be mentioned that against this order, the defendant filed appeal No. 85 of 1978 before the District Judge, Jodhpur which was dismissed on July 23, 1979. The defendant-appellant diposi-ted an amount of Rs. 200/- as rent in Court on September 15, 1978. He further deposited an amount of Rs. 1006/- on account of rent in the trial Court on November 30, 1978. Thus the defendant had deposited in the trial court a total amount of Rs. 1206/-on account of arrears of rent. This total amount was deposited upto November 30, 1978. It may be mentioned that time for making deposit had been extended by the trial court on a petition filed by the defendant on October 3, 1978 by its order dated November 3, 1978. 4. It would, however appear that while the trial court by its order dated September 1, 1978 had determined a total amount of Rs. 1206.80 as arrears of rent and interest, but the defendant-appellant had deposited an amount of Rs. 1206/- in Court. 4. It would, however appear that while the trial court by its order dated September 1, 1978 had determined a total amount of Rs. 1206.80 as arrears of rent and interest, but the defendant-appellant had deposited an amount of Rs. 1206/- in Court. Thus there was a deficit of 00.80. P. in deposit No deposit of rent for the period subsequent to September 9, 1978 was made by the defendant-appellant in the Court and nor paid to the landlord. The plaintiff-land-lord, therefore, made an application on December 17, 1979 that the defendant had neither deposited the entire amount of rent and interest provisionally determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act and nor he has complied with the provisions of sub-section (4) of the said section. It was, therefore, prayed that the defence of the appellant against eviction be struck out. This application was decided by the trial court on September 19, 1980 upholding the version given by the plaintiff in his application dated December 17, 1979. The trial court by its order dated September 19, 1980 Struck out the defence of the defendant-appellant against eviction and proceeded with the hearing of the suit. Ultimately the trial court decided both the i sues framed by it against the defendant and decreed the plaintiffs suit for ejectment from the suit premises and for arrears of rent with effect from September 10, 1978 and also for Rs. 00 80 which was deficiently deposited by the defendant in the court. The defendant preferred Civil First Appeal No. 13 of 1985 which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge No. 1 Jodhpur on October 21, 1986. The defendant has come in second appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. R.K. Thanvi appearing for the tenant has strenuously contended that the plaintiff-respondent had filed the suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground that the defendant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for more than six months. It was urged that in such suits, if the tenant deposited the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, no decree for eviction could have been passed against him by the trial court. It was urged that in such suits, if the tenant deposited the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, no decree for eviction could have been passed against him by the trial court. According to him, the trial court should have given to the tenant the benefit of sub-section (6) of section 13 of the Act and it should not have passed a decree for eviction against the appellant on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act. It was pointed out that the trial court committed illegality in wrongly determining the provisional rent on September 1, 1978 for the period subsequent to that date i.e. upto September 9, 1978 while according to law the trial court should have determined the amount of rent up to the end of the month previous to that in which the determination was made i.e. only upto August 9. 1978. It was, therefore, contended that it was wrong to hold that the defendant had deposited Rs. 00.80 P. less in Court. In any event, it was argued that the deficit deposit was of a very petty amount and the trial court should not have struck out the defence of the appellant against ejectment under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act. Lastly, it was urged that burden of proving issues No. 1 and 2 was wrongly placed on the defendant and these issues were not rightly decided by the trial court. 6. When the second appeal was admitted on January 12, 1987, it was mentioned that the following two substantive questions of law are involved in the appeal. (1) Whether the trial court was justified in passing order dated 1.9.78 of provisional determination of the rent in which the rent was determined upto 9.9.78? (2) Whether the trial court was justified in striking out the defence of the defendant under section 13(5) of the Act? 7. So far as the first point is concerned, the language of sub-sec, (3) of sec. (2) Whether the trial court was justified in striking out the defence of the defendant under section 13(5) of the Act? 7. So far as the first point is concerned, the language of sub-sec, (3) of sec. 13 of the Act is very clear which inter-alia provides that "such amount shall be calculated at the rate at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of 6% per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination." It was admitted case of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant had executed the rent note in her favour on August 9, 1975 on a monthly rent of Rs. 35/-. It was stipulated in the rent note that the defendant will pay rent on 10th of every month. It was thus clear that on September 1, 1978 when the trial court provisionally determined the amount of rent under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, only rent for the period upto August 9, 1978 was due upto the end of the month previous to that in which the determi-nation was made. The trial court was therefore not justified in making determination of the amount of rent for a period subsequent to the date on which the determination was made. It can not, therefore, be said that the defendant had deposited any deficient amount in the court of Rs. 00.80 as held by the court below and a decree for ejectment can not be passed against the defendant-appellant on the ground that he had made a deficient deposite of Rs. 00.80 in the amount of rent and interest for the period upto which the determination could be last made under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act. 8. As a matter of fact, the second substantial question of law framed in this appeal is a very material and important question to be decided It is an admitted fact that after the deposit of a total amount of Rs. 8. As a matter of fact, the second substantial question of law framed in this appeal is a very material and important question to be decided It is an admitted fact that after the deposit of a total amount of Rs. 1206/- by November 30, 1978 in respect of arrears of rent and interest upto the period ending September 9, 1978, the defendant - appellant admittedly did not continue to deposit in. court or pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent for the period subsequent to the period upto which the provisional determination had been made by the trial court by the trial court by 15th of each succeeding month within time or within any permissible extended time at the monthly rate at which the rent was provisionally determined by the court under sub-section (3). It is pertinent to note that sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act contemplates two kinds of deposit by the tenant or payment of monthly rent to the land-lord. The first kind is of that amount which the tenant has to deposit according to the amount provisionally determined by the court under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act. The second kind is of the amount which a tenant has to continue to deposit in court or pay the land-lord month by month, of the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which the determination has been made under sub-section 3 of sec. 13 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of sec. 13 provides for the consequence of non-deposit or non-payment of either or both of these amounts. Sub-section (5) reads as under:— "If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit." The language of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section is very clear, explicit and unambiguous. A tenant has not only to make deposit or payment of the amount of arrears of rent provisionally determined by the court under sub-section (3) of section 13, but he has also to continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made as provided in sub-section (4) of section 13. If default is made in either or both of these two deposits of payments, the court has jurisdiction to strike out the defence of the tenant against eviction and it shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. 8. I may also refer to sub-section (6) of section 13 of the Act which reads:— "(6) If a tenant makes deposit of payment as required by sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in cl. (2) of sub-sec. (1) shall be passed by the court against him." The expression "If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4)" used in the sub-section (6) of section 13 contemplates not only deposit or payment of the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) but it also contemplates the deposit or payment of rent month by month subsequent to period upto which the determination has been made. Sub-section (4) of section 13 refers to both these deposits or payments and it is only when full compliance of sub-section (4) is made that the tenant will be protected from eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act, whether rent was due against the defendant with effect from January 10, 1976 as pleaded by the plaintiff or whether the defendant had already paid rent upto March 9, 1977 as pleaded by him. It should not be lost sight of that the determination of the amount of rent under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act is only provisional and consequently the deposit is also provisional subject to the final decision of the suit. This proposition is amply borne out from the provision contained in sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 13 of the Act and also by the express wordings of sub-section (5) of section 13 that the court should proceed with the hearing of the suit. 9. I am of the considered opinion that the defendant-appellant was bound under sub-section (4) of section 13 to continue to deposit in court or pay to the land-lord month by month the monthly rent subsequent to September 9, 1978, by the 15th of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). In the instant case, admittedly the defendant neither deposited in court nor paid to the landlord the monthly rent month by month in respect of the period from September 9, 1978 to January 9, 1985 up to which the suit was decided by the trial court. When he made such continuous default for a period of about 6-1/2 years in the monthly deposit and payment of monthly rent during the pendency of the suit after September 9, 1978, his defence against eviction was rightly struck out by the trial court. 10. It may be observed that the scheme of s. 13 of the Act is that a tenant is protected from eviction from the premises let out to him unless any of the grounds specified in cl. (a) to (1) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 are satisfied. But this protection is available only when the tenant is ready and willing to pay rent of the premises to the full extent allowable by the Act. The very starting language of sub-section (I) of section 13 says that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of a landlord, evicting a tenant so long he is ready and willing to Pay-rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act". This necessary requirement of readiness and willingness to pay rent amply finds incorporation in sub-section (3) and sub-section (4 of sec. 13 of the Act. Any failure on the part of the tenant to comply with the requirements of-sub-section (4) of section 13 would disentitle him to the protection against eviction. Before part with this judgment, I may refer to certain decisions relied on behalf of the defendant-appellant. 11. The first decision relied upon is in the case of Shamlal Vs. Upbhogta Sahakari Samiti Jodhpur(1). I have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Shamlals case and clearly this judgment is very much distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In Shamlals case (supra), there was no dispute whatsoever between the parties about the rate of rent or about the period from which the rent was due against the tenant. In that case the defendant appeared on August 4, 1975 and submitted an application. The court considered that the only controversy between the parties related to costs and interest. In Shamlals case (supra), there was no dispute whatsoever between the parties about the rate of rent or about the period from which the rent was due against the tenant. In that case the defendant appeared on August 4, 1975 and submitted an application. The court considered that the only controversy between the parties related to costs and interest. His Lordship M.C. Jain, J. has himself observed in para 10 of the reported judgment as follows: — "The defendant wanted to avail the benefit of sub-section (4) of section 13 is manifest from his conduct of depositing the rent together with interest there-on and it is further evident from the application submitted by him under section 13(7) on 11.8.1975. .......... .......... .......... The amounts of rent and interest have been deposited, so the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs suit be dismissed with costs. .......... .......... .......... The controversy regarding interest ceased the very moment when interest was deposited by the defendant........................ Thus there was no controversy whether plaintiff was entitled to interest.......... .......... .......... I have already stated that the claim of interest is not in controversy." The above observations clearly go to show that in Shamlals case neither the rate of rent nor the liability to pay the amount claimed by the landlord and nor the interest amount were in dispute. Consequently, therefore, when the tenant deposited the amount determined under section 13(4) of the Act, the suit was liable to be dismissed. 12. Next decision relied upon is in the case of Miss Santosh Mehta Vs. Omprakash (2). That was matter governed by section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the language of sub-section (7) was differently worded inasmuch as to the word "may" was used in that sub-section instead of the word "shall" His Lordship Krishna Aiyer J. himself observed as under:— "It will be noted that sec. 15 (7) of the Act is not couched in mandatory language. It uses the word "may"................... The change of the words "the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck" or to the words "the controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out" is clearly deliberate modification in law in favour of the tenant. 15 (7) of the Act is not couched in mandatory language. It uses the word "may"................... The change of the words "the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck" or to the words "the controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out" is clearly deliberate modification in law in favour of the tenant. Under the old Act the court had no option but to strike out the defence if the failure to pay or deposit is proved." The language of section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Act uses the word "shall" and not the word "may". I may refer in this Court in the case of Firm Kriparam Ganesh Lal Vs. Vijay Kumar Goyal (3) in which his Lordship Byas J., speaking for the Bench held that the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of section 13 are imperative, mandatory and of compulsory force and not as merely a directory or permissive. 13. The learned counsel for defendant-appellant also relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganesh Prasad Shah Kesari Vs. Laxminarain Gupta (4). Ganesh Prasad Shahs case related to Bihar Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act and the language used in section 11 A of the Bihar Act was materially different from that of sub-sections (4) & (5) of section 13 of the Rajasthan Act, This distinction was clearly pointed out in the Bench decision of this Court in Firm Kriparam Ganeshilals case (supra). 14. I may also refer to one more single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Surajnarain Vs Smt. Laxmi Devi decided by his Lordship G.M. Lodha J (as he then was). The decision in Surajnarains case also confirms with my view. His Lordship observed in paras 10 to 13 of the reported judgment as under: — "10. A comprehensive reading of Section 13 as a whole and of its subclauses is that the intention of the legislature was that in a suit based on default of payment of rent, the defendant-tenant need not be ejected, shows his readiness and willingness to pay the rent by first depositing the ariears of rent as determined under sub-seetion (3) within the period mentioned in sub-section (4) and then further making a regular payments month to month. I am convinced that both these conditions are essential, inseparable and indivisible. I am convinced that both these conditions are essential, inseparable and indivisible. The moment the tenant commits default in either of the two, he can do so at his own peril by exposing himself to the consequences of eviction. Sub-clause (5) further confirms the view which I am taking inasmuch as it makes no distinction between the first clause or the second clause of sub-section (4). Contrary to it, it uses the words "any amount". The word any is significant. The legislature has used the word any to point out that there are two conditions in clause (4), and if any of the conditions is not fulfilled by the tenant, the court has got no option but to strike out the defence against the eviction. Once the penalty prescribed in sub-clause (5) comes into play, a tenant cannot be saved from the consequences of eviction, as the defence umbrella provided by sub-section (6) to fails to protect him, because the sine qua non or rock of application of sub-sec. (6) again is making deposit as required by sub-section (1). A combined comprehensive reading of sub-section (5) and (6) makes it clear that the Legislature has emphasised the complience of sub-clause (4) in unequivocal terms. The object is very obvious that the tenant should be vigilant if he wants to take benefit of sub-clause (6). In my judgment, therefore, the courts below rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent. The second appeal has no merit in it and it is dismissed with costs to the plaintiff-respondent.