P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THIS is a civil revision petition under Section 25-B (8)of the Delhi Rent Control Act by the landlord for setting aside thejudgment dated 28/08/1985, of Shri Ajit Bharihoke, Additional Rentcontroller, Delhi, by which he dismissed the eviction petition brought bythe petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence coveredby clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Controlleract (for short the Act ). ( 2 ) THE findings of the Additional Rent Controller that the petitioneris the landlord co-owner of the property in question and the premises whichcomprises of only one room one the ground floor of house No. 9/6544, Galino. 2, Dev Nagar, New Delhi stands let out to the respondent-tenant forresidential purposes only are not disputed before me. It is also indeed notdisputed that the family of the petitioner comprises of herself, her husbandand four daughters out of whom one stands married during the pendencyof the eviction case and admittedly is presently residing with her husbandin Delhi. The other three daughters of this petitioner at the time of thefiling of the petition were studying in 10th, 7th and 3rd classes. The petitionwas filed in May 1983. said daughters have now grown in ages and are agednow 20, 25 and 12 years respectively The married daughter is now agedabout 24 years. It was also not disputed before me that there is an almostinhabitable tin-shed measuring about 4 X 5 at the top floor of the housewhich cannot be treated as a room. Ex. A1 is the map of the property inquestion and admittedly the petitioner and her family members are inpossession of the whole of the first floor comprising of two bed rooms ofaverage size and portion of the ground floor comprising of drawing roommeasuring 13 -6"x9 and a covered verandah measuring 13 -6"x6 -10"besides kitchen, bath and W. C. Respondent is the only tenant in the housein a room marked a on the ground floor which has separate entrancefrom the back lane. Respondent has been the tenant in the said room since1945. The petitioner became owner of this property in the year 1975. Respondent has been the tenant in the said room since1945. The petitioner became owner of this property in the year 1975. Inthe eviction petition the petitioner pleaded that she needed one separatebed room for her eldest daughter and another bed room for the otherthree daughters and one bed room for her husband and herself and thereis no dining room available and the petitioner s husband, being Manager (Accounts) in a reputed company, namely, Usha International Limited, hasto hold meetings in the house with different officials and thus, there is nosufficient reasonably suitable accommodation available to the petitionerand her family members dependent on her for residence purpose. Thelearned Additional Rent Controller after recording the evidence gave afinding that the petitioner and her family members are La possession ofreasonably suitable residential accommodation and thus, he negatived theground of eviction. There was not present any iota of convincing evidenceon the record that the petition had been brought actuated by any malafidereasons. The petitioner had become owner-landlady of the respondent since1975 but she brought this eviction petition only in June 1983. Earlier herdaughters were young, the petitioner did not think of setting up this groundof bonafide requirement for residence. It is not the case of the respondentthat any other litigation was brought by the petitioner to put pressure onthe respondent to vacate the premises earlier. Even the Additional Rentcontroller has not given any finding that the petitioner had demandedany increase in rent from the respondent at any time or the petitioner hadany intention of selling the property in question after getting it vacatedfrom the respondent; rather the statement of the petitioner s husband, whoappeared as attorney of the petitioner, as AW4, that petitioner and herfamily members have no other house in Delhi had remained unchallenged. It was really far-fetched plea taken by the respondent that the petitionerhas intention of selling the property in question. Even the learned counselfor the respondent did not advance any arguments imputing any malafideto the petitioner inifiling the eviction petition. His contention has beenthat the petitioner and her family members are in possession of reasonablysuitable accommcdation and thus, the petitioner does not require bonafidethe premises in question at all and in that way the petition for eviction onthe ground of bonafide requirement for residence is malafide. His contention has beenthat the petitioner and her family members are in possession of reasonablysuitable accommcdation and thus, the petitioner does not require bonafidethe premises in question at all and in that way the petition for eviction onthe ground of bonafide requirement for residence is malafide. He has alsocontended that since the petitioner s eldest daughter has been married andis living with her husband, the need of the married daughter could not beat all looked into. in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 Rajdhani Law Reproter 19. He has argued that he isaware that in some other cases decided by this Court (all of Single Bench) aview has been expressed that need of the married daughters, who often visittheir parents, has to be taken into consideration while assessing the requirement of the landlord for more accommodation. So, he has stressed that asthere is conflict of law present on this point, the matter should be referredto the larger Bench for having an authoritative view on this point. ( 3 ) IT is true that in the eviction petition the petitioner did plead thatone bed room would suffice for her three daughters but in evidence theattorney and husband of the petitioner made a categorical statement withregard to the ages of the daugthers at the time of making the statementand he deposed that at least two bed rooms are needed for three daughtersout of whom two have grown up. It is also well settled law that change incircumstances of the landlord s family during the pendency of the evictioncase can be looked into in order to assess the requirement of the landlord formore accommodation. At the time of filing of the eviction petition the pleawas taken by the landlady that one bed room was sufficient for threedaughters but that is not conclusive as with the passage of time the needto have more bed rooms for grown up daughters has to be given dueimportance. So, even if for the sake of arguments, the need of the marrieddaughter is not taken into consideration even then the fact remains thatnow the landlady does require one bed room for herself and her husband andanother bed room for one of the grown up daughters and another bedroom for the other two daughters. So, even if for the sake of arguments, the need of the marrieddaughter is not taken into consideration even then the fact remains thatnow the landlady does require one bed room for herself and her husband andanother bed room for one of the grown up daughters and another bedroom for the other two daughters. The grown up daughters do need exclusiveaccommodation not only for use as bed rooms, but for carrying on theirstudies as well. So, there is immediate need of the landlady for having threebed rooms when admittedly the landlady is in possession of only two bedrooms. The covered verandah which also serves as a passage to theprawing room obviously cannot be used as a bed room The tin-shed on thetop floor also is not capable of being used as a bed room. So, the Additionalrent Controller was not right in holding that thepetitioner landlady and herfamily members are in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation. Theadditional Rent Controller gave this finding ingnoring the subsequent eventsof the three daughters having grown in ages since the filing of the evictionpetition and he also did not care to give importance to the statement ofpetitioner s husband with regard to the necessity of having atleast twobed rooms for the three daughters out of whom two have already grown up. ( 4 ) IT has been consistently held by this Court in Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Sehgal, 1976 RCR 249, Ram Nath Tandon v. Ramesh Kumar Bajaj,1982 (l) RCJ 531 and Smt. Uma Rani @ Om Wati v. Vinod Kumar Dubey,1982 (2) RCJ (SN) 91, that the landlord s requirement to have separate roomfor each of his grown up children must be given due importance. So, onthe face of it, the finding of the Additional Rent Controller is perverse whichneeds to be set aside by this Court. It is well settled that if a finding hasbeen given by the Controller ingoring some important piece of evidence orby mis-interpreting the evidence, then such finding can always be set asideby this Court exercising its power of revision conferred by Section 25-B (8)of the Act. ( 5 ) A new point has been urged by the learned counsel for therespondent that this Court should keep in view the comparative positionsof the landlady and the tenant and determine the comparative hardship ofthe two parties. ( 5 ) A new point has been urged by the learned counsel for therespondent that this Court should keep in view the comparative positionsof the landlady and the tenant and determine the comparative hardship ofthe two parties. No plea of hardship was raised before the Additionalrent Controller either in the written statement or in evidence. However,an affidavit has been filed by the respondent giving out his plight. Therespondent, who has been residing in this premises since many years,is now aged about 83 years and is stated to have almost gone blindand is maintaining himself from pension of Rs. 405. 00 per mensern and isstated to be looking after his son s wife and two children aged 4 yearsand two years of that son. He had two sons, one was Swaran Singh whohad separated from the respondent and is stated to have died. I am toldat the Bar that widow of Swaran Singh is also dead and there is onlyone issue of Swaran Singh. No reference is made in the affidavit to thatissue and the property which Swaran Singh was occupying. However, it ismentioned in the affidavit that Lal Chand, who was the second son ofthe respondent, was missing for about an year. He has also mentioned thatthe amount, which he got as gratuity and provident fund was deposited byhim in his son s name, is also not available to the respondent. The factsmentioned by the respondent in his affidavit are really heart-rending but thiscourt is not to decide the case on the basis of any emotions. I haveall the sympathy and compassion for the respondent but the law, asit stands, does not provide for any scope for this Court to mouldthe relief keeping in view the comparative hardship of the petitioner andthe respondent. This lacuna in the Delhi Rent Control Act was highlightedby this Court in Harbhajan Dass v. Tilak Raj Mehta, 1980 (2) RCJ 780 . It was pointed out in this judgment that the Rent Control Acts in Bombay,and Rajasthan do provide for provisions to enable the Court to evaluatethe comparative hardship and the comparative need between thelandlord and the tenant and work out an equitable arrangementbut no such provision exists in the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was pointed out in this judgment that the Rent Control Acts in Bombay,and Rajasthan do provide for provisions to enable the Court to evaluatethe comparative hardship and the comparative need between thelandlord and the tenant and work out an equitable arrangementbut no such provision exists in the Delhi Rent Control Act. It wasalso pointed out that Rent Acts of Rajasthan, West Bengal andbombay also provide for passing of an order of eviction in respect of partof the demised premises and it was recommended that the Parliament maytake up the question of amending the Delhi Rent Control Act in order toincorporate such provisions in the Act as well, but in spite of this theparliament has not yet amended the Act to incorporate such provisions inthe Act. So, this Court is helpless in going into the question of comparativehardship of the landlord and tenant while deciding the present case. Counsel for the respondent also cited Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoonquamarain, 1987 Rent Cases 260, wherein the Supreme Court observed asfollows: "the rent restricting acts are beneficial legislations for the prorection of the weaker party in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these balance harmoniously therights of the landlords and the obligations of the tenants. The Rentrestriction Acts deal with the problem of rank renting and shortageof accommodation. It is in consonance with the recognition of theright of both the landlord and the tenant that a harmony is soughtto be struck whereby the bonafide requirements of the landlordsand the tenants in the expanding explosion of need andpopulation and shortage of accommodation are sought to beharmonised and the conditions imposed to evict a tenant are thatthe landlord must have bona fide need. "it was also observed in this very judgment as follows : "rent restriction law would provide a habitat for the landlord orlandlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat-that right the landlord must seek elsewhere. " ( 6 ) THESE observations of the Supreme Court are of no help to therespondent in the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court, it hasbeen proved that the landlady had let out some accommodation instead ofusing that acommodation for her own needs and that letting was sought to,be justified on the ground that landlady has a right to earn income by lettingout her property in view of Article 300-A of the Constitution. In the case before the Supreme Court, it hasbeen proved that the landlady had let out some accommodation instead ofusing that acommodation for her own needs and that letting was sought to,be justified on the ground that landlady has a right to earn income by lettingout her property in view of Article 300-A of the Constitution. In this context. the Supreme Court negativing the claim of landlady made those observations. If the landlady bonafide requires some accommodation for her own residence,it is really axiomatic to say that she could let out whatever accommodation becomes available to her for occupation as residence and then seekeviction of the tenant from another accommodation on the ground ofbonafide requirement. In this context, the Supreme Court held that suchcomforts which the landlady seeks byletting out other accommodationsthe rent restriction law would notcountenance. Such is not the case here. ( 7 ) I may mention that in Ram Prakash Saroj v. Mohinder 1981 (1)RCJ 770, Uttam Chand Suri v. Smt. Ram Murti Gupta, 1980 (2) RCJ 410,and Khurshid Holder and others v. Mst. Zubeda Begum, ( 1979 (1) RCJ 621 , itwas held that the need of married daughter visiting the parents has to bealso hept in view while assessing the bonafide need of the landlord for moreaccommodation. In the case of Sat Pal (supra) reference is made to Ajitsingh v. Inder Saran, 1977 (1) RCR 602, wherein it was held that to allowthe owners to evict a tenant to provide for the occasional guests of theowners would be virtually restoring to them the unrestricted rights to movein their own property which is not what is intended by Section 14 (l) (c) andonly the reasonable need of the landlord is to be kept in view and it washeld that need of the married daughter or other guests of the landlord are notbe taken into consideration while assessing the need of the landlord for moreaccommodation. In Dr. B. R. Malhotra v. M. R. Kukreja, 1988 (1) RCR220, a case decided by me, I had observed that need of the visiting closerelations of the landlord including all the married daughters has to begiven due importance. The case of Sat Pal (supra) was not brought tomy notice at that time. The word "himself" appearing in Section 14 (1) (e) would not mean that only the physical need of residence of the landlordis to be taken note of. The case of Sat Pal (supra) was not brought tomy notice at that time. The word "himself" appearing in Section 14 (1) (e) would not mean that only the physical need of residence of the landlordis to be taken note of. After all a human being is not only a physicalbeing but is also an emotional and social being. It is the need of thelandlord himself that comtemplates taking into consideration the need ofthe family members living with him, may be those family members arenot financially dependent on the landlord. Similarly, it is the emotionalneeds of the landlord that necessitate the visits of married daughters to bishouse often and keeping in view the way of living of our society, it is alsoclear that such married daughters stay with their parents quite for sometime every year. So, as a broad proposition of law it cannot be statedthat need of married daughter cannot be at all taken into considerationwhile assessing the need of the landlord for more accommodation. I wouldhave made reference to a larger Bench in order to resolve this conflict oflaw appearing in judgments of this Court, all decided by Single Benches,but in the present case, I have assessed the need of the landladywithout taking into consideration the need of the married daughter. Hence,it is not a fit case for making reference to the larger Bench for resolving thesaid conflict of law. ( 8 ) IN view of the discussion above, I allow the civil revision andset aside the impugned judgment and pass an eviction order against therespondent, but in view of the pitiable condition of the respondent-tenant,i grant him two years time for vacating the premises. The parties are,however, left to bear their own costs throughout. Civil Revision allowed.