JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, Member - These are two reference made by Addl. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut through which by his order dated December 23, 1986 has recommended that the revisions be allowed and the order of the Assistant Collector 1st Class, Muzaffarnagar dated January 7, 1986 rejecting the application of the revisionist dated December 19, 1985 for impleadment be set aside and that the decree dated September 30, 1985 also be set aside and the revisionist be ordered to be impleaded and that the cases be remanded back to the trial court for fresh hearing. 2. The facts of these cases in brief are that two separate suits were brought by Smt. Bala and Smt. Bauhati under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which were decreed on September 30, 1985 on the admission of Manga defendant, the other defendants being the Gaon sabha and the State. On December 19, 1985 two applicants were moved by the revisionist through one of which it was requested that the decree dated September 30, 1985 be set aside and the revisionist be impleaded because they had purchased ?rd share of land from Manga defendant through a registered sale deed dated May 26, 1984 and that Manga Was not entitled to file any compromise and to the suit decreed. The trial court found that since the case had already been decided and there was no case pending before it on the date of the applications, hence neither the decree could be set aside nor the revisionist could be impleaded as defendant. This order was challenged in revision. The learned Additional Commissioner came to the finding that a decree had been obtained collusively and that both the revisionist were necessary parties in suits, hence they were entitled to be impleaded as defendants. He has, therefore, recommended for the impleadment of the revisionist and for setting aside the decree dated September 30, 1985. 3. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties. Perused the record. 4. He has, therefore, recommended for the impleadment of the revisionist and for setting aside the decree dated September 30, 1985. 3. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties. Perused the record. 4. It was argued on behalf of the revisionist that Manga had already sold ?rd of his share to the revisionist on May 26, 1984 that before the institution of the present suit and that they had applied for mutation which was contested by the plaintiff as well as defendant Manga and during the pendency of those mutation proceedings this suit was filed in order to defeat the interest of the revisionist. It was, therefore, contended that the decree passed by the court had been obtained by fraud and so deserved to be set aside and the revisionists are entitled to be impleaded as defendants so that their rights may not be prejudiced. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party argued that on the date of the suit the names of the revisionist had not been brought or record and no mutation had been effected in their favour. It was further argued that the application for mutation was contested by the plaintiff as well as defendant Manga, hence there was no necessity for the plaintiff to have impleaded them as a defendant because the plaintiff never recognised the right or title of the revisionist. It was further stressed that if the revisionist had applied to the court during the mids of the suit then of court their prayer might have carried more weight but after suit once had been finally decided there is no question of reopening it because the revisionist are mere stranger in the suit and are not party thereto hence they have no right to get the decree set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. It was further submitted that the provision of Section 121 C.P.C would not be attracted because a decree passed in the suit cannot have any effect on the title of revisionist and they can easily getting title declared through a separate suit and, therefore, when an alternative remedy is open it should be illegal for the court to decide its power under Section 151 of C.P.C. 6. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. Admittedly the name of the revisionist had not been mutated before the suit was instituted, hence the names of the revisionist had not been brought or record they could not be deemed to be a necessary party not the suit failed for their non-impleadment. consequently on the date of the filing of the suit the revisionist were strangers and, therefore, they could not be brought within the meaning of party in the suit. In such circumstances they would not be competent to move an application under order 9 rule 13 C.P.C. As reads the provisions of Section 151 of C.P.C. also I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party because the provision of this Section can be utilised only when no alternative remedy is open to the parties and a gross injustice in going to be done to him. In the instant case the revisionist have full opportunity to file a regular suit to get the title declared and the decree of the present suit would not cause any adverse effect on the same, hence the order for setting aside the decree would be nothing but unlawful. In such circumstances the order passed by the trial court is perfectly valid and does not deserve to be interfered with. The reference has wrongly been made on inadequate grounds, hence it is rejected and the revisions are dismissed. This order shall govern Ref. No. 35(z) of 1986-87/Mazaffarnagar.