Judgment :- 1. Ambassador Car KLH 124, which belonged to the petitioner's deceased father, had been said after his death, by the petitioner, his mother and his brother, to one Franco. This Franco and four others were arrested by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Trichur on 26-1-1988 for having contravened the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (Central Act 61 of 1985) (the Act far brevity). The car KLH 124 was seized. France, the purchaser of the car, was questioned by the Central Excise authorities and he falsely implicated the petitioner in the offence. Thereupon the petitioner moved for anticipatory bail; but was not successful. He now apprehends arrest, and further proceedings, under the Act. 2. According to the petitioner, the Act has not come into force, so that any proceedings in enforcement thereof are misconceived and illegal. He has therefore filed this Original Petition seeking direction! by way of writ of mandamus to the respondents, not to proceed with the investigation against him, under the Act. 3. The petitioner's contention is that the Act is not in force. This is despite the fact that the Central Government has issued a notification dated November 14,198S in exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (3) of S.1 of the Act appointing November 14,1983 as the date on which the said Act shall come into farce in the whole of India. The sub-section reads as under: "(3). It shall come into force on such dale as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazelle, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and for different States and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act shall be construed in relation to any Stale as a reference to the coming into force of that provision in that State." 4. The petitioner develops his contention as follows: Parliament has not fixed any date for the Act to come into force. Sub-s. (3) of S.1 specifies that the Act shall com; into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, and for different States. The Act can thus be bought into force only by a notification issued under sub-s. (3) of S.1. The Act can thus be bought into force only by a notification issued under sub-s. (3) of S.1. But, this sub-section itself has not come into force in as much as Parliament has not fixed any date on which it shall come into force. Therefore the executive Government has no power to issue any notification. Parliament has to act again to bring the Act into force, by passing appropriate legislation to bring sub-s. (3) of S.1 into operation. The notification dated November 14,1985 issued by the Central Government is therefore without the authority of law. 5. This is what the petitioner says in Para.4 of the Original Petition: "The petitioner most respectfully submits that Sub-s. 3 of S.1 of the Act has not been so far enforced so that the Central Government cannot exercise so called powers conferred by the Sub-s. (3) of S.1 to bring into force the provisions of the Act by notification. Notification No. S.O.821 (B) dated 14-11-85 by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) is seen to have been issued purporting to exercise powers under Sub-s. 3 of S.1 eventhough the said sub-s. had not been brought into force at the time of issuance of Notification. In the case of enactments which are expressed to come Into operation on an appointed day to be notified, the provision for commencement in the enactment itself should have stated that the said provision shall come into force at once while the rest of the provisions shall come into force on a day to be appointed and notified." The petitioner then proceeds to paint out the provisions of the Indian Bar Councils Act 38 of 1926 and the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963 (Act 1 of 1964). Sub-s. (3) of S.1 of the Indian Bar Councils Act which confers on the Governor General in Council the power to issue notification bringing that Act into force specifically states that, that section, and four others, namely, S.2,17,18 and 19 shall come into force at once. Similar is the provision in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, S.1(3) of which enacts that the previsions of that Act, except S.1(3) "which shall come into force at once," shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification in the gazette appoint. Similar is the provision in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, S.1(3) of which enacts that the previsions of that Act, except S.1(3) "which shall come into force at once," shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification in the gazette appoint. Petitioner points out that wherever it was so desired, the legislature had enacted that the commencement section shall come into force at once, leaving it to the executive to bring the other provisions into force on such date as it may appoint. There is no such provision in S.1(3) of the Act in question and therefore that section has never come into operation, or force. 6. This contention of the petitioner is made without reference to the provisions of S.3(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1987, which reads: "Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day. then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent, in the case of an Act of Parliament of the President." What applies to an Act, must equally apply to a provision in the Act. In the absence of any specification of the date on which sub-s. (3) of S.1 is to come into operation, S.5(1) of the General Clauses Act makes it operative from the date on which the Act received the assent of the President, namely September 16, 1985. Therefore and going by the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner himself, sub-s. (3) of S 1 of the Act has come into operation on September 16,198S. The Central Government issued the notification only thereafter on November 14,1985. By the very operation of S.3(1) of the General Clauses Act read with S 1 (3) of the Act, the notification in question is valid, and within the powers of the Central Government. 7. In this connection, it has to be noted that as per the prevailing legislative practice, it is not always that the legislation is brought into force at once, on its receiving the assent of the President. In most of the cases, the Act leaves it to the executive to fix the date on which it shall come into force, having regard to various factors which the executive may have to take into account before enforcing it. In most of the cases, the Act leaves it to the executive to fix the date on which it shall come into force, having regard to various factors which the executive may have to take into account before enforcing it. The necessary rules may have to be framed, notifications issued, officers empowered and requisite machinery provided before the Act could be brought into force. All this may take time, and it is therefore that the Legislature often leaves it to the executive to fix its own date for the commencement of the Act. The legislature lays down the policy of the law, and leaves it to the executive to enforce it at such time as they may deem fit. 8. A provision like S.1(3) of the Act is a common feature in almost all modern legislation. It is only in exceptional or stray cases that one comes across a provision like those in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 or the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The general run of statutes contains only previsions like S.1(3) of the Act. If the petitioner's contentions are to be accepted, numerous enactments which have been enforced, and understood as having been in force, for decades past, will be rendered ineffective. Even many of the laws, relating to taxation which provide the mainstay of the Central and State revenues, will be left inoperative. There will be practically no law in this country except perhaps stray enactments. S.1(3) has therefore to be read in a pragmatic sensible way, not hypertechnically, but reasonably, consistent with the all-round legislative practice, to avoid unintended, startling and absurd results. Parliament cannot be assumed to have legislated for the sake of legislation, or to make pointless legislation, or indulge in futile exercises (See Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1987 S C. 1454 Para.9). It cannot be assumed that Parliament enacted a law which was incapable of being brought into force without a further Parliamentary exercise. Such a duplication of the legislative process could not have been intended. Therefore, and merely for the reason that S.1(3) enacts that the Act shall come into force on such late as may be appointed by notification, it does not imply that S.1(3) itself is inoperative without a further mandate from Parliament. Such a duplication of the legislative process could not have been intended. Therefore, and merely for the reason that S.1(3) enacts that the Act shall come into force on such late as may be appointed by notification, it does not imply that S.1(3) itself is inoperative without a further mandate from Parliament. S.1(3) has to be understood as referring to the other provisions of the Act which shall come into force on such dates as may be appointed, but that S.1(3) itself comes into operation at once by virtue of S.5 (1) of the General Clauses Act. 9. This view of the matter finds support in the derision of the Supreme Court in Thangal Kunju Musallar v. Venkatachalam AIR 1956 S.C 264 Travancore Act 14 of 1124 M E. had been passed by the Travancore Legislature on March 7, 1949. S.1(3) thereof provided that it will come into force on such date as the Travancore Government might by notification appoint. No such notification had been issued before July 1, 1949 when the States of Travancore and Cochin integrated to form the United State of Travancore-Cochin. On July 1, 1949, the new State promulgated Ordinance 1 of 1124 ME. whereby all the existing laws of Travancore were continued to be in force till altered, amended or repealed by competent authority. Existing law of Travancore was defined to mean any law in force in the State immediately prior to 1-7-1949. It was thereafter, and only on July 26, 1949 that a notification was issued under S.1(3) of Travancore Act 14 of 1124 bringing it into force retrospectively from July 22, 1949. 10. The argument before the Supreme Court was that since Act 14 of 1124 M E. had not been brought into force prior to July 1, 1949, it was not an existing law to be continued by Ordinance No.1 of 1124, and therefore the subsequent notification issued on July 26, 1949 bringing that Act into force was wholly ineffective. In that connection, the Supreme Court had to deal with the question as to whether the Act was an existing law on July 1, 1949. Their Lordships had to consider the effect of a provision like S.1(3). In that connection, the Supreme Court had to deal with the question as to whether the Act was an existing law on July 1, 1949. Their Lordships had to consider the effect of a provision like S.1(3). Their Lordships posed the question as to bow S.1(3) could operate to postpone the commencement of the Act unless that section itself was in force, and continued: "One must, therefore, concede that S.1(3) came into operation immediately the Act was passed, for otherwise it could not postpone the coming into operation of the Act. To put the same argument in another way. if the entire Act Including S.1(3) was not In operation at the date of its passing, how could the Government issue any notification under that very Section? There must be some law authorising the Government to bring the Act into force. Where is that law to be found unless it were In S.1(3)? In answer, Shri. Nambiyar referred us to the principle embodied in S.37 of the English Interpretation Act which corresponds to S.22 of our General Clauses Act. That section does not help the petitioner at all. All that it does is to authorise the making of rules or bye-laws and the issuing of orders between the passing and the commencement of the enactment but the last sentence of the section clearly says that "rules, bye-laws or orders so made or Issued shall not take effect till the commencement of the Act or Regulation." Suppose Shri. Nambiyar is right in saying that the Government could Issue a notification under S.1(3) by virtue of the principle embodied in S.22, General Clauses Act, it will not take his argument an inch forward, for that notification, by reason of the last sentence of S.22 quoted above, will not take effect till the commencement of the Act it will bring about a stalemate. It is, therefore, clear that a notification bringing an Act into force is not contemplated by S.22 General Clauses Act. Seeing, therefore, that it is S.1(3) which operates to prevent the commencement of the Act until a notification is issued thereunder by the Government and that it is S.1(3) which operates to authorise the Government to issue a notification thereunder, it must be conceded that that S.1(3) came into force immediately on the passing of the Act." 11. Seeing, therefore, that it is S.1(3) which operates to prevent the commencement of the Act until a notification is issued thereunder by the Government and that it is S.1(3) which operates to authorise the Government to issue a notification thereunder, it must be conceded that that S.1(3) came into force immediately on the passing of the Act." 11. It was therefore held that this provision in the Act come into force at once. Otherwise the results would be startling and leading to a stalemate. (See also Rajendra Kumar v. State AIR 1957 M.P. 60 Para.43). 12. As painted out by the Supreme Court, unless S.1(3) operated, how could there be a postponement of the enforcement of the Act? Equally so, unless S.1(3) operated, how could the Act itself be brought into force? Such anomalies are avoided by reading S.1(3) as coming into operation at once, and by virtue of that operation, postponing the commencement of the other elections to such dates as may be appointed by notification. 13. The petitioner's contention that S.1(3) of the Act never came into farce is not therefore valid. The investigation initiated against him under the previsions of the Act are not open to challenge on the ground raised in the Original Petition. No other contentions are raised. The Original Petition is therefore dismissed in limine.