Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 17-5-1985 passed by Sri M. D Dikshit, Director General/r. P, F. Railway Board rejecting the petitioners appeal tiled by him against an order dated 14-12-1984 passed by the respondent No.3 whereby and whereunder the services of the petitioner was directed to be terminated, purporting to act under Rule 47 (D) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 , and as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition respectively. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner at the material time had been working as an Inspector of railway Protection Force. According to the petitioner, his sons have got pro-perties at their maternal uncles place which they allegedly acquired by reason of two deeds, one being a registered deed of gift and another being a registered deed of sale. According to the petitioner there exisced disputes with regard to the said lands by and between the petitioners family and one Bindabasini Rai, who was a co-sharer of the petitioners father-in-law. In relation to the said dispute a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called the Code) was initiated wherein allegedly a report was submitted against the petitioner, his sons and their servants. In the said report it was alleged that the petitioner had organised a raid on 15-7-1984 to dispossess one Bindabasini Rai. In the said report it was further alleged that two Rakshaks of the Railway protection Force namely, Ram Pravesh Rai and Ramugrah Singh were arrested with their own private licenced gun at village Deorai. The said proceeding was, however, ultimately dropped. According to the petitioner, the aforementioned two Rakshak did not say to any body that they had gone to the aforementioned village Deorai at the instance of the petitioner. It is stated that a departmental proceeding has been initiated against the aforementioned two Rakshaks. 4. However, it appears from the order, dated 14-12-1984 and as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition that the Inspector General ciim-Chief Security officer, R. P, F. /eastern Railway Calcutta, on the basis of the aforementioned incidents, which took place in village Deorai came to the conclusion that the petitioner utilised his official authouty and power in the fulfilment of his private gains. In the said order it was further stated as follows :- "the circumstances of the whole incident masterminded by Sri K. N. Rai, R. P. F. cooked as such that it would not be possible and practicale to bring on record all the important witnesses of the incident or a part of it necessary to initiate disciplinary procedure against him under the provision of the R. P. F. Rules, 1959, and as referred to in Article 311 (A) of the Constitution of India. Also the witnesses from public body shall not venture to depose against him out of fear of their own life as the conspirator is a man of influence in the locality backed by his own relatives. Similarly concerned r. S. F. staff, who ventured to oblige his Inspector and took part in the raid are also not likely to narrate the fact which is likely to implicate themselves. " "the undersigned is fully convinced that Sri K. N. Rai is guilty of preplanning and masterminding a serious offence with personal profit motive and in fulfilment had utilised Government force with arms and ammunitions and his own official capacity. " 5. By reason of the aforementioned order the petitioner was directed to be removed from service by the respondent No.3 in purported exercise of his power conferred upon him under Rule 47 (b) of the R. P. F. Rules. 6. The petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order preferred an appeal before the respondent No.2, who was also pleased to dismiss the said appeal. 7. In this case a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no.1. In the said counter affidavit inter alia, it has been alleged that although the proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code was dropped but the same was done on a technical ground. It has further been alleged that the statement of the Rakshaks in question, who were arrested were not convincing and acceptable. In the said counter affidavit, however, it was admitted that the departmental enquiry against the aforementioned two Rakshaks is still pending. 8. It is now well settled that recourse to the provisions of Rule 41 of the railway Protection Rules can be taken only in exceptional cases. In the said counter affidavit, however, it was admitted that the departmental enquiry against the aforementioned two Rakshaks is still pending. 8. It is now well settled that recourse to the provisions of Rule 41 of the railway Protection Rules can be taken only in exceptional cases. The fact that an exception has been made out to the general rules to proceed against the delinquent officer in a regular manner i. e. by initiating a departmental proceeding therefore, must be manifest from the order itself. Second proviso appended to clause 2 of Article 311 of the Constitution of India postulates that such power must be exercised reasonably and fairly. It is true that the object underlying the aforementioned 2nd proviso to clause 2 of Article 311 of the Constitution is based on public policy, public interest and public good. But there is no doubt that the disciplinary authority upon whom such a wide discretionary power has been conferred must take into consideration the gravity of the misconduct committed by the delinquent the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features. 9. In my opinion, recourse to the aforementioned second proviso to article 311 (2) of the Constitution can be taken only if all the factors enumerated hereinbefore exist as thereby the rule if audi alteram partem of natural justice has expressly been excluded. 10. In the instant case, from a bare perusal of the order as contained in annexure 2 to the writ petition, it is evident that the evidences in the shape of documents were available for scruituy of the enquiring officer, if a departmental proceeding would have been initiated against the petitioner. Not only the reports made by the officer-in-charge of the Buxar Police Station but also the other statements made by the witnesses including the statements made by the Rakshaks, who were allegedly at the spot, were and/or might have been available. It is also pertinent to consider that the petitioner was not arrested on the spot but serious allegations to the effect that the master minded the whole operation, were made against him. 11. The reasons stated in the said order under Rule 47 (b) of R. P. F. Rules must be such so as to uphold the ultimate satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority. 11. The reasons stated in the said order under Rule 47 (b) of R. P. F. Rules must be such so as to uphold the ultimate satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority. The very fact that the respondent No.3 in his order dated 14-12-1984 as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition purported to have been arrived at his satisfaction relating to the alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner on the basis of the report submitted by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station in connection with a criminal case under Sections 152, 116 and 107 of the code of Criminal Procedure; it is evident that documentary evidences were available before him for the purpose of establishing the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. It is curious that in the said order dated 14-12-1984 the respondent no.3 proceeded to hold that the petitioner became disentitled to the properties in question in view of the purported decision of the Village Panchayat. 12. In my opinion, the very fact that even the police has made a report against the petitioner and further the very fact that enquiry as against the aforementioned two Rakshaks, who were arrested on the spot, are being departmentally proceeded against clearly go to show that in the facts and circumstances of the case it was both possible and practicable to bring on record the important evidences of the incident or a part thereof if a departmental proceeding against the petitioner under the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 , was initiated. 13. The respondent No.2 while hearing the appeal based his decision, inter alia, on the decision of Calcutta High Court in Ramakant Singh V/s. Union of india, 1984 LIC 193. In the said case before Calcutta High Court the concerned officer had not only been indulging in undesirable activities but also was creating all possible desperate attempts to spoil the evidence in close association with the veteran criminals involved in the crime. In the instant case, it has not been suggested by respondent No.3 that the petitioner had been attempting to spoil evidences. 14. In the instant case, it has not been suggested by respondent No.3 that the petitioner had been attempting to spoil evidences. 14. It further appears that the petitionerhad requested the appellate authority to call for the records and give an opportunity of personal hearing to him by his petitions dated 13-3-1985 and 15-3-1985 but it does not appear as to how the respondent No.2 crime to the conclusion that the petitioner obviously has given up his prayer o an opportunity to be heard in person. The appellate authority has further stated that personal hearing at that stage was also not provided for under the R. P. F. Rules. 15. In Union of India V/s. Tulsiram Patel, reported in 1985 Vol.3 SCC 398 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while upholding the validity of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and partly overruling the well known decision of the Supreme Court in Challappans case held that a Govern-ment servant to whom the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has been applied may in the appeal show before the authority that the charges made against him are not true. 16. As indicated hereinbefore even the minimal requirement of calling for the records of the case and giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard in person were not acceded to by the appellate authority. 16-A. In the said decision it has further been held as follows :- "the condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not impracticable. According to the Oxford english Dictionary practicable means "capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done ; feasible". Websters Third New International Dictionary defines the word practicable inter alia, meaning possible to practice or perform ; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished ; feasible. Further, the words used are not not practicable but not reasonably practicable. Websters Third New International Dictionary defines the word practicable inter alia, meaning possible to practice or perform ; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished ; feasible. Further, the words used are not not practicable but not reasonably practicable. Websters Third New International dictionary defines the word reasonably as in a reasonable manner; to a fairly sufflcient extent, Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b ). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illu tration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry where the Government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of repraisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the Government servant by himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to ba held, [t would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insub ordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such at atmosphere. In this connection, we must bsar in mind that numbers coerce and terrily while an individual may not. The reasonable practicaoility of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is be best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. The reasonable practicaoility of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is be best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Departments case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311 (3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. " (Underlining is mine ). 17 With regard to the courts power to interfere with such an order it has been held by the Supreme Court in the following terms :- "the court will also examine the charge of mala fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In examining the relevancy of the reasons, the court will consider the situation which according to the disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order to decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done. In order to decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a court-room, removed in time from the situation in question. " 18. The aforementioned decision in Tulsiram Patels case (supra) has also been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyavir Singh V/s. Union of India, 1986 SC 555. 19. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the supreme Court in Workman of Hindustan Steel Ltd. V/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and others, AIR 1985 SC 251 : 1985 LIC 534, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows :- "obviously, therefore, the reasons which would permit exercise of power must be such as would clearly spell out that the enquiry if held would be counter productive. " 20. In Ram Chander V/s. Union of India, 1986 Vol.3 SCC 103 it has been held by the Supreme Court that dismissal or removal from the service is a matter of grave concern to a civil servant. In the said case the Supreme court has further held as follows :- "we wish to emphasise that reasoned decisions by tribunals, such as the railway Board in the present case, will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given. " 21. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the supreme Court there cannot be any doubt that both the orders passed by the respondents Nos.3 and 2 respectively and as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition suffers from the infirmities as mentioned hereinbefore and as such the said orders cannot be sustained. 22. " 21. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the supreme Court there cannot be any doubt that both the orders passed by the respondents Nos.3 and 2 respectively and as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition suffers from the infirmities as mentioned hereinbefore and as such the said orders cannot be sustained. 22. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the orders as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 are hereby quashed but without any order as to costs. 23. It is, however, made clear that the disciplinary authority shall be entitled to initiate a regular departmental proceeding as against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Rules 44 to 46 of the Railway Protection force Rules. Petition allowed.