COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION IN STATE OF H. P. v. JAGAR SINGH
1988-05-27
R.S.THAKUR
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This suo motu criminal revision was entertained by this Court after perusing the record of the case on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nahan, bearing the title Dhian Singh v. Jagir Singh and others, in a criminal case which action was prompted by a report which appeared in the Indian Express dated December 23, 1987 to the effect that the said Chief Judicial Magistrate had acquitted the accused persons in that case of a very serious offence alleged against them on their taking an oath in a temple to the effect that they had not committed any such offence. 2. It transpires from the record of the trial Court that one Dhian Singh (hereinafter referred to the complainant) filed a criminal complaint against as many as nine accused (respondents herein) under sections 147, 148, 149, 506, 392, 394 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code wherein the complainant alleged that on July 29, 19«6 his son met him in his shop at Ghandri after he came from Delhi and handed over to him a sum of Rs. 18,000 which amount he (his son) had received from the agents at Delhi as price of potatoes which the complainant and his son had sold to them. Thereafter sometime in the evening round about 6, when he was going home in Kando, after closing his shop at Ghandri with this amount kept in a bag which he was carrying in his hand, he was way laid by the accused on his way, when they gave him beating and also relieved him of the bag containing the said amount and also his wrist watch. He then went to report the matter at the police station at Renuka but when the police officials over there tried to put him off without recording any report, he went to Nahan and then filed this private complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nahan The learned Judicial Officer ultimately examined the preliminary evidence produced by the complainant on August 7, i986 under section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code and then sent the complaint for enquiry to the S. H O. Police Station Renuka.
After this enquiry report was made by the said S. H. O., the Judicial Magistrate passed an order on October 27, 1986, which is as follows :— Present: 27-10-l986.— The complainant with counsel Shri Jagat Singh Negi Advocate. The report of the S. H. O. considered. Let the remaining complainants preliminary evidence be produced on 21-11-1986 for further order." This evidence was then closed on November 21, 1986 and the case was adjourned to December 1,1986 on which date the judicial officer passed the following order :— Present: 1-12-1986.— The complainant with counsel Shri J. S. Negi Advocate. The complainant and his counsel heard. The preliminary evidence adduced by complainant also perused. Prima facie the offence under section 147 and 392 I.P.C. appears to have been committed by all the accused persons. All the accused persons be summoned under section 147 and 392, I. P. C. for 29-12-1986. The copy of complainant and process fee be filed within 2 days," 3. It appears that all the accused ultimately attended the court on July 3, 1987 and the Court ordered for production of evidence of the complainant at the pre-charge stage. On August 5, 1987, the trial Court passed another order which deserves reproduction:— "5-8-1987. — Present: - Complainant with Sh. Jagat Singh Negi, Advocate. All accused with Counsel Sh. N. S. Tomar, Advocate. Today was fixed for pre-charge evidence of the complainant. At this stage with the pursuation of the Court parties have agreed to effect a compromise between them and settle their dispute amicably in village Panchayat. They pray for short date which is allowed. PWs present Bhagwan Singh, Hirda Ram and Hira Singh are as such discharged. To come up on 3-9-1987 for further proceedings". 4. Then on December 3, 1987 the trial Court passed three separate orders which are reproduced below:— 3-12-1987. — Present—Complainant with Sh. Jagat Singh Negi, Advocate. All the accused with Counsel Sh. N. S. Tomar, Advocate. Three PWs examined in pre-charge evidence of the complainant. One PW given up by the complainant. At this stage the parties expressed an intention to reconcile the matter but prayed some time to settle the negotiation between themselves. The case be taken up after an hour or so for further proceedings. Sd/- CJM, Nahan. 3-12-1987. — Complainant with counsel Sh. Jagat Siogh Negi, Advocate. All the accused persons with counsel Sh. N. S. Tomar, Advocate.
At this stage the parties expressed an intention to reconcile the matter but prayed some time to settle the negotiation between themselves. The case be taken up after an hour or so for further proceedings. Sd/- CJM, Nahan. 3-12-1987. — Complainant with counsel Sh. Jagat Siogh Negi, Advocate. All the accused persons with counsel Sh. N. S. Tomar, Advocate. Today was fixed for the pre-charge evidence of the complainant and three witnesses were examined. At this stage, at the persuation of the Court the parties agreed to compromise the case. The case is as such, identified for conciliation. It be entered as such. The complainant agreed that in case the accused are ready to take oath in the following words before Her Holiness Goddess Kali Mata in the Kalisthan temple at Nahan, he is prepared to withdraw his complaint against the accused. "Ham Mahan Mai Ke Samakhsh Ye Kasam Kha Kar Kaihate Hai Ki Hamne Mustgis Dhian Singh Ko Mar Peet Na Ki Hai Aur Na Hi Iska Bag Main Para 18,000 Rupaya Wa Ghari (Wrist Watch) 29-7-1986 Ko Looti Hai.” Statement of the complainant was accordingly recorded alongwith specific words which are to be uttered by the accused party before the Goddess Kali Mata. The accused persons vide their statements recorded separately have also agreed to take such oath and to utter the aforesaid words in the Kalisthan temple. Thus, in view of the statements of the parties recorded, I appoint Shri D D. Sharma, C.OC. of this Court to accompany the parties to the Kalisthan temple. The accused shall take oath and utter the aforesaid words before Goddess Kali Mata in presence of the complainant and Shri D. D. Sharma, clerk of Court and thereafter Shri D. D Sharma, shall submit his report that he has acted according to the directions of the court after the submission of the report of Shri D. D. Sharma, the complaint shall stands Withdrawn and accused shall stand discharged. The parties shall pay Rs. 50 only to Shri D. D. Sharma as his L. C. fee. Case be put again after an hour, for submission of report by the L, C. Sd/- CJM, Nahan. 3-12-1987.—Case Called. Shri D. D. Sharma, C.O.C. of this Court has put his report. As per his report the accused persons have take the oath as aforesaid. The complaint stands withdrawn and the accused persons stand discharged.
Case be put again after an hour, for submission of report by the L, C. Sd/- CJM, Nahan. 3-12-1987.—Case Called. Shri D. D. Sharma, C.O.C. of this Court has put his report. As per his report the accused persons have take the oath as aforesaid. The complaint stands withdrawn and the accused persons stand discharged. File after completion be consigned the record room. It took 1-1/2 hour in all to dispose of this case. Sd/-(B. D. Sharma) C J. M., Sirmour Distt. Nahan. " 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and the learned Deputy Advocate General has also very kindly extended his valuable assistance to this Court i he learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that the sum and substance of all these proceedings only comes to this that the complainant has withdrawn the complaint and, therefore, the respondents were rightly discharged by the trial Court since this case was yet at the stage where no charge had been framed by the Court and the trial Court was justified in doing so under the provisions of section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This contention has to be stated to be rejected forthwith since this provision is applicable to the trial of summons cases under Chapter XX only. Even according to the trial Court the offences prima facie made out in this case were under sections 147 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code which are both triable as a warrant case under Chapter XIX of the Criminal Procedure Code and there is no provision anywhere under this Chapter which entitles the complainant to withdraw his complaint. 6. At this stage, it would be proper to take note of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the filing of complaints before a Magistrate. Section 200 inter alia, lays down that when the Magistrate proceeds to take cognizance of an offence on complaint, he is to forthwith examine on oath the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, and record their statements unless it is a complaint in writing by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or by a Court etc.
Section 202 says that it is open to the Magistrate concerned on such complaint being made to him, either to enquire into the same himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or some other person for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Then the first proviso to this section lays down that the court shall not direct any such investigation to be made if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions and further where the complaint has been made by a private person unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200. Then the second proviso to the same section lays down that when it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall call upon the complainant to produce his witnesses and examine them on oath. Section 203 says that after recording such evidence or considering the result of the enquiry or investigation under section 201, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint and he is also required to briefly record his reasons for doing so. If, however, the Magistrate concerned finds sufficient grounds for proceeding, the provisions of section 204 come into play and he is required to issue summons or warrants as the case may be after coming to a conclusion as to whether a prima facie case on the basis of the evidence on record is triable as summons case or a warrant case etc. 7. Now in the instant case it is quite apparent that the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned does not appear to have applied his mind in a proper manner to these provisions of the Code as also of the relevant provisions of the Penal Code and has thus passed orders which are vitiated by illegality. In the first place, after he (the Chief Judicial Magistrate) had recorded the preliminary evidence he has wholly misconstrued as to what offences prima facie were made out on the basis of the evidence.
In the first place, after he (the Chief Judicial Magistrate) had recorded the preliminary evidence he has wholly misconstrued as to what offences prima facie were made out on the basis of the evidence. As per the order of December 1, 1986, reproduced above, he has come to the conclusion that the offences under sections 147 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code appear to have been made out on the basis of evidence on record. This, however, was quite erroneous. It is apparent that as per the facts on record the complainant had tried to prove that as many as nine accused had way-laid him and relieved him of his cash and wrist watch after belabouring him. Obviously, the trial Court then issued process under section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code against all the nine accused. Thus in the face of these facts and circumstances, the only offence that was prima facie made out against the accused was dacoity and not robbery since the accused were admittedly more than five persons, which offence is punishable under section 395 and not under section 392 of the Indian Penal Code and in these circumstances there was no question of the Commission of any offence under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code as well. 8. Assuming that the offences made out were those as stated by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, then re is presumed to have resorted to section 344 of the Code under Chapter XIX meant for the trial of warrant case on such complaint and he was at the stage of section 245 when he passed the order dated August 5, 1987 wherein he records that on the persuation of the court, the parties have agreed to effect a compromise between them and settle their dispute amicably in village Panchayat and the subsequent orders whereby the oath was administered to the accused as desired by the complainant and thus the accused were discharged. All these orders, however, are wholly illegal and unsustainable.
All these orders, however, are wholly illegal and unsustainable. Even as the case was before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, all that he could do was either to hold that no case against the accused was made out, for reasons to be recorded in writing, and thus discharge the accused or in case there was no discharge, he ought to have proceeded further in accordance with the provisions of section 246 of the Criminal Procedure Code There is absolutely no provision of law whereby the trial Court could allow the accused and the complainant to amicably settle this dispute in a Panchayat or to allow the complainant to withdraw the complaint or to discharge the accused after they had taken the oath as desired by the complainant by way of compounding. In fact neither of these two offences is compoundable even with the permission of the Court. 9. However, as I have already held, the offence which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ought to have held, as made out, was the one under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code (Dacoity) and not under sections 147 or 392 of the Indian Penal Code and in these circumstances all the orders passed subsequent to the order of December I, 1986, are vitiated since the offence under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is triable not by the Chief Judicial Magistrate himself but by the Court of Sessions. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the Chief Judicial Magistrate to have followed the provisions of section 202, proviso (2), namely, to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath and thereafter in consonance with the provisions of section 204, he should have issued appropriate process to procure the presence of the accused and then commit them to the court of Sessions under section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code after complying with the provisions of section 208 thereof. 10. I, therefore, accept the revision petition and quash the orders passed by the trial court on August 7, 1986 whereby the case was sent to the police for investigation and the orders dated July 3, 1987, Aug. 5, 1987, and all the three orders of December 3, 1987 and modify the order dated Dec.
10. I, therefore, accept the revision petition and quash the orders passed by the trial court on August 7, 1986 whereby the case was sent to the police for investigation and the orders dated July 3, 1987, Aug. 5, 1987, and all the three orders of December 3, 1987 and modify the order dated Dec. 1, 19F6 to this extent that the accused shall be deemed to have been summoned in respect of the offence under section 393 of the IPC as having been prima facie found against them by the trial court and remand the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for retrial. He is also directed that after the respondents accused come present in the court as also the complainant, the Court shall call upon the complainant to produce any further witnesses, if any, he sought to examine, who, however, if examined, shall not be allowed to be cross examined by the accused and after due compliance of the provisions of section 208 of the Cr. P. C, he shall commit the accused to the Court of Sessions in consonance with the provisions of section 209 thereof. 11. Before parting with this case this Court feels duty bound to observe that the learned C .J. M. has not brought to bear upon this case the necessary judicial approach and acumen during the course of this trial. For instance, he did not care to find out whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the offence which was actually prima facie made out was robbery or dacoity. Then although the offence of such a serious nature was alleged against the accused which was not compoundable under any circumstances, the Court, however, took things in such a light hearted manner that he would sometime permit the accused and the complainant to come to a compromise in their local Panchayat and some time identify the case for conciliation as if it was a suit of a civil nature and he crowned this whole illegality further with gross illegality by resorting to administration of oath to the accused through a Commissioner appointed by him by sending them to a temple which is something astounding and unheard of. It is hoped that in future the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate would conduct such cases in all seriousness and not resort to such outright illegalities. Order accordingly.