Judgment 1. This application in revision under Ss.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the Code) is directed against the order dated 17-3-1985 passed by Shri Mahendra Prasad Gupta, 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Nawadah, in Criminal Appeal No. where by he dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and affirmed the order passed by Shri Raghupati Prasad, Special Judicial Magistrate, Nawadah, in Case No. 261 of 1984-85 convicting the petitioner under Ss.112, 123 and 125 of the Motor Vehicles Act and also under S.12 of the Motor Vehicles (Taxation) Act 2. It appears that the petitioner was the driver of Jeep Taxi No. BHM 961. On 22-61984 the learned Special Judicial Magistrate along with the S.I. of Police, Nawadah had checked this jeep on the road running between Nawadah and Kadirganj. The learned Magistrate received the complaint petition of the S.I. of Police at the spot. He took cognizance then and there, allocated the case to his personal file for disposal and ordered for issue of summons to the accused fixing 9-7-1984 for their appearance. However, the learned Magistrate on the same day recorded the plea of guilty of the petitioner and found him guilty thereon at the spot. He, accordingly, proceeded to convict him under the sections mentioned above and imposed a total fine of Rs. 4100.00 under Ss.112, 123 and 125 of the Motor Vehicles Act and under S.12 of the Motor Vehicles (Taxation) Act 3. On appeal the learned appellate Court dismissed the same on the ground that the record of the case did not show that the relevant documents were produced by the petitioner at that time. It was further held that the statement of the petitioner was properly recorded under S.313 of the Code 4. In this revision petition it has been submitted that the learned trial Court as well as the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who had heard the appeal, had committed an error of record resulting in miscarriage of justice, since the order of the learned Magistrate itself shows that the documents were produced by the petitioner before him on the spot. The learned appellate Court also committed an error of haw by accepting that the petitioner had pleaded guilty and his examination was properly recorded under S.313 of the Code. The learned appellate Court also committed an error of haw by accepting that the petitioner had pleaded guilty and his examination was properly recorded under S.313 of the Code. The judgement of the learned Magistrate was bad on account of the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Ss.252, 262(1) and 263 of the Code. The examination of the petitioner under S.313 of the Code, even if lawfully done, does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of the sections mentioned above. No offence against the petitioner could be proved. Under Ss.123 and 125 of the Motor Vehicles Act and S.12 of the Motor Vehicles (Taxation) Act are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Once having adjourned the case to 9-7-1984 for the appearance of the accused the learned Magistrate had committed an error of jurisdiction by convicting the petitioner then and there on the acceptance of his guilt. On these grounds it has been contended that the judgement and order passed by the two courts below be set aside 5. The only point for decision before me is whether this petition is fit to be allowed or not ? 6. It appears that the petitioner has been convicted by the Special Judicial Magistrate on his pleading guilty of the offence alleged against him. It further appears that the conviction of the petitioner has been upheld by the learned appellate Court. Shri Jayanandan Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted before me that since the learned Magistrate, by his order dated 22-6-1984, had fixed 9-7-1984 for appearance of the accused and for issuing summons to them it was not proper for him to convict the petitioner on the same day (22-6-1984) on pleading his guilt said to have been recorded by him under S.313 of the Code. In view of Shri Sharma the learned Magistrate should have waited till 9-7-1984 which was the date fixed for the appearance of the accused for which he had ordered for the issue of the summons. He should not have proceeded to examine the petitioner on the same day and to record the plea of his guilt resulting in his conviction 7. I do not find any force in this contention. He should not have proceeded to examine the petitioner on the same day and to record the plea of his guilt resulting in his conviction 7. I do not find any force in this contention. The order dated 22-6-1984 passed by the learned Magistrate shows that as per the prosecution report submitted by the police officer one Radhey Shyam Prasad was said to be the owner of the vehicle B.H.M. 961. Evidently he was not present before the learned Magistrate on that day. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and ordered for issue of summons. No doubt, in the order dated 22-6-1984 the name of the present petitioner also figures as one of the accused and it was against him also that cognizance has been taken. The concluding portion of the order of the learned Magistrate dated 22-6-1984 runs as follows : 8. Mrs. Indu Sinha, the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that this order clearly shows that the learned Magistrate had ordered for the issue of summons to accused namely, Radhey Shyam Prasad only since no summons was required to be issued against the petitioner who was already present before the learned Magistrate. On a perusal of the order dated 22-6-1984 I feel inclined to agree with this submission of the learned A.P.P. Evidently the petitioner was present before the learned Magistrate and, therefore, there was no question of issuing of any summons to him for his appearance on 9-7-1984. He could have been informed of this day and his bail bond or P.R. bond for his appearance could have been taken. In any view of the matter, there was no occasion to issue the summons to the petitioner for his appearance inasmuch as he was personally present before the learned Magistrate. In this view of the matter, I do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the learned Magistrate in recording the plea of guilty of the petitioner on the same day and convicting him. No doubt, 9-7-1984 was a date fixed by the learned Magistrate for appearance of the accused. Since, however, the petitioner was already present before him this date for appearance was meant only for other accused, namely, Radhey Shyam Prasad. There was nothing in law to prevent the Magistrate to record the plea of guilty of the petitioner on the same day. Since, however, the petitioner was already present before him this date for appearance was meant only for other accused, namely, Radhey Shyam Prasad. There was nothing in law to prevent the Magistrate to record the plea of guilty of the petitioner on the same day. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to various sections of the Code 9. Sec.251 of the Code provides that when in a summons case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. In the present case the accused was brought before the learned Magistrate on 22-6-1984 therefore, in terms of S.251 of the Code it was not only lawful but rather obligatory for the Magistrate to inform him the particulars of the offence of which he was accused and to ask him whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. Hence, I do not find that the action of the learned Magistrate suffers from any illegality 10. It has been further contended by Shri Sharma that the impugned order shows that when the petitioner had pleaded guilty to the allegations made against him, his statement was recorded under S.313 of the Code in which also he has confessed his guilt. The main grievance of Shri Sharma is that S.313 of the Code is not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as S.313 of the Code applies only in a case where the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called for his defence. Since in the present case no witness was examined as yet, therefore the stage of S.313 of the Code had not come, and therefore the learned Magistrate was not correct in recording the plea of guilty of the petitioner under S.313 of the Code. This submission of the learned counsel is, however, without any force. No doubt, in impugned order the learned Magistrate has stated that the statement of the petitioner has been recorded under S.313 of the Code. Simple mention of this Section will not go to show that the confessional statement of the accused had not been correctly recorded even if this Section was wrong, mentioned by the learned Magistrate. No doubt, in impugned order the learned Magistrate has stated that the statement of the petitioner has been recorded under S.313 of the Code. Simple mention of this Section will not go to show that the confessional statement of the accused had not been correctly recorded even if this Section was wrong, mentioned by the learned Magistrate. It is not the form but the substance which will be the determining factor in deciding whether or not the particular procedure enjoined by law has been followed 11. In this connection a reference may be made to S.252 of the Code which runs as follows : 252 : "Conviction on plea of guilty - If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon." This shows that when the plea of guilty is to be recorded by the Magistrate such plea should be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused 12. The mode of recording the examination of the accused has also been provided in S.281 of the Code. Its Sub-Sec. (2) says that the whole of such examination, including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full by the Magistrate himself. The record shall be shown or read to the accused and has to be signed by him and also by the Magistrate. In the present case, the main grievance of the petitioner is not that his examination was not properly recorded by the learned Magistrate. The main grievance is that this examination was done under S.313 of the Code as will a from the impugned order. As stated above, the label of a particular Section is hardly material and even if it is found that a Section has been wrongly mentioned but the action as required by law has been taken, it can be safely concluded that no illegality or irregularity has been committed 13. In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance on certain reported decisions. Firstly, the reliance has been placed on the case of Sachindra Nath V/s. State of Bihar, 1962 BLJR 390. There were 26 accused in that case. In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance on certain reported decisions. Firstly, the reliance has been placed on the case of Sachindra Nath V/s. State of Bihar, 1962 BLJR 390. There were 26 accused in that case. There was no mention in the order sheet of that case that the statements of the accused under S.242 of the Old Code were separately recorded at the time of the trial. The accused were Bengala-speaking but were examined in Hindi. There was no certificate by the Magistrate showing that the accused also knew Hindi or that questions were interpreted to them in Bengali. It was under these circumstances that it was held that the examination of the accused under S.243 of the Old Code was not proper and the conviction was set aside. The facts of the present case are, however, quite different. Here there is only one accused and he has been examined by the learned Magistrate though it has been wrongly mentioned to be tinder S.313 of the Code 14. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on the case of Bhima Shaw V/s. State, AIR 1956 Orissa 177 : (1956 Cri LJ 1208). While dealing with the nature of the examination of the accused under S.342(1) of the Old Code it was held that this Section was meant to provide an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence, since in that case no evidence has been led. It was held that it was not proper for the Court to ask the accused whether the alleged articles were recovered from his house and to account for the same. This Section corresponds to S.313 of the Code of the present Code. As stated above, the stage for this Section had not come as yet and the learned Magistrate has wrongly stated that he had examined the petitioner under S.313 of the Code. Therefore, this decision is also of no help to the petitioner. The learned advocate has also placed reliance on the case of B.A. Sawant V/s. State, AIR 1969 Bom 353 : (1969 Cri LJ 1344). Therefore, this decision is also of no help to the petitioner. The learned advocate has also placed reliance on the case of B.A. Sawant V/s. State, AIR 1969 Bom 353 : (1969 Cri LJ 1344). This case will also not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case at the time (sic) of the accused under S.342 of the Code the circumstances appearing against the accused were not put in question to him and he was not given an opportunity to explain these circumstances. As stated above, in the present case the stage had not come for the examination under S.313 of the new Code and, therefore, this decision will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Abdul Rahman V/s. State, AIR 1970 J. and K. 135 : (1970 Cri LJ 1228). This was a case of summary trial in which the accused was put the question whether he had brought adulterated milk for sale which he answered in affirmative and he was convicted. It was held this conviction was not proper inasmuch as the accused was, not informed that the carrying adulterated milk within the municipal area was an offence. This case does not apply to the facts of the present case. Reliance has also been placed on the case of State of Sikkim V/s. Futi Sherpani, 1980 Cri LJ 114 in which the accused was convicted on the plea of guilty which was not recorded as required by S.243 of the Old Code. This does not apply to the present case inasmuch as here the statement of the accused was properly recorded 15. From the discussions made above, it becomes clear that there is no merit in this criminal revision petition, since the petitioner has not been able to show that any illegality or irregularity was committed by the learned Courts below. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this criminal revision petition which is, accordingly, dismissed