V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) ORDER :- This revision is preferred against the judgement of the learned Additional Session Judge, Sambalpur in Criminate peal No. 90/64 of 1983 confirming the order of the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sambalpur, in 2 (c) C. C. No. 136 of 1981 convicting the petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'e. C. Act') for having violated Clause 3 of the Orissa Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') and sentencing him thereunder to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five days and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default, to undergo R. I. for one month more. ( 2 ) THE gist of the prosecution care is that on 28-10-1980 the Inspector of Supplies (P. W. 1) inspected the shop of the accused petitioner and found that the petitioner did not display in his shop the opening stock of peas, ground-nut seeds, lever spray, torch cells and potatoes though he was a dealer in these essential commodities and thereby violated Clause 3 of the Order and rendered himself liable under Section 7 of the E. C. Act. ( 3 ) THE plea of the accused-petition or was that the peas, ground nut seeds, potatoes and lever spray found in hie shop on the relevant day were not fit for human consumption and the batteries too were discharged and therefore, they were not mount for sale and so ho did not indicate the opening stock position of there commodities in the board meant for displaying the stock position of the essential commodities sold in his shop. ( 4 ) CLAUSE 3 of the Order provides that every dealer of essential commodities shall display prominently in his shop a list indicating the opening stock of such commodities. Under this Order "essential commodity" is defined to mean any of the commodities specified in the schedule. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that peas, ground-nut seeds and lever spray are not essential commodities within the meaning of that definition. Under this Order "essential commodity" is defined to mean any of the commodities specified in the schedule. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that peas, ground-nut seeds and lever spray are not essential commodities within the meaning of that definition. In this context he relied on Silla Narayanamurty v. State of Orissa, (1979) 48 Cut LT 132 : (AIR 1980 NOC 63), a decision dealing with Orissa Baby Food Licencing Order, 1966, wherein distinguishing between "amul Apray" and "amul" it was held that from the mention of "amul" as a baby food in the relevant schedule, it does not follow that "amul Spray" is also a baby food without its inclusion as an item in the schedule. On the same analogy, as ground-nut seeds are not included in the schedule, it cannot be treated as an essential commodity for the purpose of this Order. Likewise, as peas and lever spray are not mentioned in the schedule, they too cannot be treated as essential commodities. P. Ws. 1 and 2, the only witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution, deposed that potatoes were found in the shop of the accused at the time of the inspection. They do not expressly state that torch cells were also found in the shop of the accused. They merely stated that "batteries" were found in the shop. In the schedule the expression "torch cells" is used and it should be strictly construed. So there is no evidence to hold that "torch cells" were also found in the shop of the accused-petitioner on the relevant occasion. Hence it is seen that even though the petitioner was having stock of peas, ground-nut seeds and lever spray in his shop, as the same are not essential commodities for the purpose of this Order, it cannot be said that the petitioner had violated Clause 3 of the Order, even if he had not displayed their stock position. But so far as potatoes are concerned, by Gazette Notification dated 13-10-1980 "potato" was also included as an item in the schedule of essential commodities. From the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 it is established that at the time of their inspection of the shop of the accused-petitioner they found in his shop 20 Kgs. of potatoes. But the opening stock position of the same was not displayed by the petitioner. From the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 it is established that at the time of their inspection of the shop of the accused-petitioner they found in his shop 20 Kgs. of potatoes. But the opening stock position of the same was not displayed by the petitioner. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the absence of any documentary evidences to how that P. W. 1 was the duly appointed Inspector of Supra, the courts below should have hold to the had no authority either to conduct the search or seizure in the shop of the accosted or to file the prosecution report against him P. W. 1 stated on oath that ho was work as the Inspector in Supplies Department into the year 1974, on his being appointed to act as such by the Government of Orissa. He further stated that ho had jurisdiction over Sambalpur town during the relevant period. There is nothing in his evidence to discard his claim that he was the duly appointed Inspector of Supplies having jurisdiction over Sambalpur town. As it is proved that P. W. 1 has acted as the Inspector of Supplies, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that P. W. 1 cannot be accepted as the duty appointed Supply Inspector, in the absence of proof of the order of his appointment. ( 6 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 reveals that the petitioner was a dealer in potatoes within the meaning of Clause 2 (a) of the Order. During the course of his examination by the Magistrate, the petitioner has also admitted that he is a dealer in essential commodities. From the examination of accused and the cross-examination of the P. Ws. it is seen that the petitioner did not deny that he was a dealer in potatoes. On the other hand, the defence plea that as the 20 Kgs. of potatoes found in the shop were not fit for human consumption and were not meant for sale, the stock position of potatoes was not displayed on the relevant day, discloses that he impliedly admits that he is a dealer in potatoes. On the other hand, the defence plea that as the 20 Kgs. of potatoes found in the shop were not fit for human consumption and were not meant for sale, the stock position of potatoes was not displayed on the relevant day, discloses that he impliedly admits that he is a dealer in potatoes. But all the same he pleads that as there were no potatoes to be sold on the relevant day, there was no occasion for him to display the opening stock position of potatoes. The learned counsel relied on the decision reported in (1986) 62 Cut LT 656 Govind Prasad Jaiswal v. State of Orissa, which lays down the proposition that in a case where the accused asserts that he is not a dealer within the meaning of Clause 3 of the Order, the burden of proving that he is a dealer lies on the prosecution. In the present case, that the petitioner is a dealer of potatoes it not in dispute and so the above cited decision has no relevance to the point in issue. ( 7 ) ON a careful analysis of the materials on record it is seen that the prosecution has conclusively established that the petitioner had violated Clause 3 of the Order as he did not display the opening stock of the potatoes in his shop. The learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that even if the petitioner is found guilty under Section 7 of the E. C. Act this is a fit case for applying the provisions of S. 360, Cr. P. C. By Section 18 of Act 34 of 1976, Section 20aa was inserted in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 declaring that the offender under that Act are no longer covered by the probation laws. Before that, in P. K. Tojani v. M. R. Dange, AIR 1974 SC 228 , it was observed that the ruling in Isher Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1295 , is an authority for the proposition that the rehabilitatory purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is pervasive enough technically to take under its wings an offence even under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. As there is no provision in that E. C. Act similar to Section 20aa of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, relying on AIR 1972 SC 1295 (supra) it can be held that the benefits of the probation laws are available to an offender under the E. C. Act as well. In fact that is what this Court held in P. Shusila Patra v. State, (1987) 63 Cut LT 559, and on considering the peculiar facts and circumstance of the case, released Shusila Patra, a lady, on probation. As observed by the Supreme Court in Tejani's case (supra), white-collar criminals committing economic offences are unlikely to be dissuaded by gentle probationary process and that it is not without significance that the 47th report of the Law Commission of India had recommended the exclusion of the Probation of Offenders Act to the special and economic offences by suitable amendments. ( 8 ) THE prescription of a minimum sentence is no bar to the applicability of section 360, Cr. P. C. , but whether the beneficial provisions of that Section should be applied in favour of the accused in a given case would depend upon the facts of the case. While imposing a sentence, its legality and propriety are the two aspects which should be kept in view. Misplaced leniency and sympathy for the accused are likely to defeat the very object for which punishments imprisonment only for five days (sic) and the appellate court did not consider it heavy. Considering the facts of the case, I find that this is not a fit case for invoking the provisions of Section 360 Cr. P. C. , and therefore, I see no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court. ( 9 ) IN the result, I see no merit in the revision petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. Petition dismissed. .