JUDGMENT - LONEY G.G., J.:---The appellant is invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code to set aside the concurrent finding of Revisional Court as well as that of the J.M.F.C. granting maintenance to wife Anjanabai and daughter Ku. Archana. The applicant did not attend the proceedings in the trial Court despite service by Registered Post. The Magistrate proceeded ex parte and by the impugned order awarded maintenance of Rs. 300/- per month to the wife and Rs. 150/- per month to the daughter. The applicant through this application has challenged the legality of the ex parte order on the ground that he was not properly served and that the service by Registered Post is not a valid service as provided in Chapter VI of the Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The point which arises for consideration is whether in the maintenance proceeding under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, notice sent by registered post is a valid service to opposite party in a case where service of summons as provided under Chapter VI, Criminal Procedure Code in normal course is not served. 3. The proceedings of maintenance were commenced in this case on an application by wife and daughter dated 21st March, 1984. Summonses were issued on 12th March, 21st March, 18th July, 1985 to serve the non-applicant through police machinery. However, no summons was returned back either served or not served. Therefore, the wife filed an application on 30th October, 1985 praying for issuing a notice by registered post. In that application, it has been contended that the summons issued by the Court could not be served by the police authorities. The summonses were retained by the police. It has been further alleged that the applicant is an Assistant Public Prosecutor in the Court and that he might have exerted his influence on the police to avoid the service of summons. The wife therefore prayed for permission to serve the summons by registered post. The application was granted by the Magistrate. The process to issue notice by post was paid on 16th May, 1986. The next date of hearing was fixed on 17th June, 1986. It is an admitted fact that the notice by registered post was served on the husband on 19th June, 1986. The postal acknowledgment is on record. The application was granted by the Magistrate. The process to issue notice by post was paid on 16th May, 1986. The next date of hearing was fixed on 17th June, 1986. It is an admitted fact that the notice by registered post was served on the husband on 19th June, 1986. The postal acknowledgment is on record. Thereafter, the hearing of the case appears to have been fixed by the Magistrate on various dates. On 29-7-1986, the Magistrate by an order proceeded ex parte against the husband in his absence. The Magistrate had fixed the hearing on 17th August, 19th September, 16th October and passed the final ex parte order on 21st November, 1986. The certified copy of the order was received by the husband on 31st December, 1986 within a period of less than two months. The husband instead of approaching the Court of Magistrate under the proviso to section 126, Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte order, filed revision before the Sessions Court which came to be dismissed. Thereafter, the husband has approached this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 4. It has been contended by Shri Sirpurkar, the learned Counsel for the applicant, that Chapter VI of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the issuance of process to compel the appearance of the accused as well as the witnesses. According to Shri Sirpurkar, section 62 provides that every summons shall be served by a Police Officer, or subject to such Rules as the State Government may take in this behalf, by an officer of the Court issuing it or other public servant. Section 65 provides the procedure when the service cannot be effected as provided. Section 69 provides for service of summons on witness by post. According to Shri Sirpurkar, the service of summons by post cannot be invoked in this case since the said provisions is confined to issuance of summons to a witness only. It is further contended that the said summons sent by registered post was received by the applicant on 19th June, 1986 when the date fixed on 17th June, 1986 had expired. According to Shri Sirpurkar, the impugned order suffers for want of legal service of summons and also for no proper notice of the proceedings. The order which is passed ex parte behind the back is a nullity and contrary to the provisions of law. According to Shri Sirpurkar, the impugned order suffers for want of legal service of summons and also for no proper notice of the proceedings. The order which is passed ex parte behind the back is a nullity and contrary to the provisions of law. In support of this proposition, Shri Sirpurkar placed reliance on some decisions of various High Courts. The first case referred is appearing in A.I.R 1959 Patna 433, (Pahilajrai v. Jethi Bai)1. It has been held in the aforesaid case that an ex parte order passed under section 488 of the old Criminal Procedure Code (corresponding to section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) service of notice of proceedings not effected as contemplated by section 68 read with section 69 or 70. The ex parte order made under section 488 was set aside. The next case is from Allahabad High Court in the case of (Maqsood Ahmad v. Musammat Arifa Khatoon and others)2, 1983 All.L.J. 493. It has been held in this case that the service of summons in a maintenance proceeding on the opposite party by registered post was not legal. In this case, the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court relied on a decision of the case reported in (1963 Vol. I Criminal Law Journal 346)3. The judgments in the aforesaid cases are by the Single Judges. 5. The provisions relating to maintenance of wives, children and parents are provided in Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Section 125 is corresponding to section 488 of the old Criminal Procedure Code. Similarly, section 126 which provides the procedure governing these case, was also provided under the old Code under section 488. Chapter IX in itself is a self-contained Code for the purpose of maintenance of wives, children and parents. The proceedings are commenced by the aggrieved party on an application made to the Magistrate of the First Class. The procedure is provided in section 126. Sub-section (1) of section 126 provides the place where the Court has a jurisdiction to decide the cases. Sub-section (2) of the said section provides about the recording of the evidence. Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 provides the discretion to the Magistrate to hear and decide the case ex parte and also for setting aside the ex parte order of grant of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of the said section provides about the recording of the evidence. Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 provides the discretion to the Magistrate to hear and decide the case ex parte and also for setting aside the ex parte order of grant of maintenance. It reads as under: "If the Magistrate is satisfied that the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte and any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on an application made within three months from the date thereof subject to such terms including terms as to payment of costs to the opposite party as the Magistrate may think just and proper." The aforesaid proviso clearly provides that if the Magistrate trying the case is satisfied that a person who has to provide maintenance is avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte. There is again a provision made that the aggrieved party within a period of three months from the date of order may apply for setting aside that ex parte order. The proviso clearly provides wide discretion to the Magistrate to decide the application for maintenance or to proceed to hear and decide it ex parte if he is satisfied that there is wilful avoidance of service or neglect to attend the Court. He is also given a discretion to set aside the ex parte order provided a good cause is shown within the given period of three months. Needless to say that the discretion has to be exercised judicially by the Magistrate. But the absence of jurisdiction to exercise the discretion cannot be raised. Obviously, the reason to provide such a discretion is to enable the Magistrate to decide the application for maintenance as expeditiously as possible. If in the circumstance of a particular case, the Magistrate is satisfied that any party who is to provide maintenance is avoiding service, or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, then in that event, the Magistrate has been given the discretion to proceed ex parte and make an order. If in the circumstance of a particular case, the Magistrate is satisfied that any party who is to provide maintenance is avoiding service, or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, then in that event, the Magistrate has been given the discretion to proceed ex parte and make an order. This subjective satisfaction has to be reached by the Magistrate taking into consideration the facts and circumstances appearing in a given case. The subjective satisfaction to exercise the discretion has to be reached by the Magistrate taking into consideration the manner and circumstances in each case as to how a party is avoiding service of summons or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court. There may be different circumstances in each case. But the discretion given to a Magistrate to come to a finding in a given case has to be exercised on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. 6. The maintenance proceedings cannot be treated on par with other criminal proceedings inasmuch as there is an element of expeditious consideration for the grant of maintenance. Secondly, the proceedings under this Chapter are of civil nature. They are not meant for subjecting a person for a criminal liability. No sentence of imprisonment is provided. It is established by various judicial pronouncements that the maintenance proceeding by a helpless wife, compelling the man to maintain his wife or children is a civil proceeding with a summary remedy. This Court in the case of (Baburao Akaram Kalaskar v. Kusum Baburao Kalaskar)4, 1980 Mh.L.J. 871 has reaffirmed the view that the proceedings under section 125 are essentially of a civil nature. The learned Judge has relied on the decision of Supreme Court in the said judgment. The relevant discussion is found in para 8 of the said decision. 7. Shri Shelat, the learned Counsel appearing for the non-applicants 1 and 2, placed reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of (Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma)5, 1987 Cri.L.J. 399. It has been observed by the Full Bench that : "Proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code, however, stand on a different footing. The person against whom claim for maintenance is made is not accused of any offence; nor can he be convicted or sentenced. The proceedings against him are essentially of a civil nature, since the claim against him is essentially of a civil nature. The person against whom claim for maintenance is made is not accused of any offence; nor can he be convicted or sentenced. The proceedings against him are essentially of a civil nature, since the claim against him is essentially of a civil nature. The Court, naturally, has a duty to inform him about the proceedings and of his right to appear and contest. The normal duty of the Court is to record evidence in the presence of the person against whom the claim is made. That does not and cannot mean that the Court can compel his appearance. Whether he should appear or not is a matter left to his own decision. A person against whom a claim is made may not desire to contest the case at all. He cannot be compelled to appear in Court and to be present during the recording of the evidence. If he cannot be so compelled, the Court cannot have power to compel his appearance. This is the rationable for the provision in the proviso to section 126(2) which empowers the Court under certain circumstances to proceed ex parte. The circumstances are where the Court is satisfied that the person against whom the claim for maintenance is made is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court. Of course, it is not mere avoidance of service or failure to attend the Court which attracts the operation of the proviso. Avoidance of service or failure to attend the Court must be wilful, that is deliberate. Where such a person wilfully avoids service or neglects to attend the Court, the law enables the Magistrate to determine the case ex parte, after recording the evidence in his absence. This would also indicate that the Magistrate cannot compel appearance of such a person in the same manner in which he can compel appearance of an accused person by resorting to provisions relating to summons, warrant of arrest, proclamation and attachment contained in Chapter VI of the Code. Chapter IX of the Code is, as observed by the Supreme Court in (Nand Lal Misra v. Kanhaiya Lal Misra)6, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 882 a self contained Code. Yet, the Chapter does not contain specific provisions indicating the manner in which the person against whom claim for maintenance is made is to be informed about the claim and his right to appear and contest the claim. Yet, the Chapter does not contain specific provisions indicating the manner in which the person against whom claim for maintenance is made is to be informed about the claim and his right to appear and contest the claim. Naturally, the Criminal Court will have to devise its own procedure in this regard. To this limited extent, no doubt, the Criminal Court could look into the provisions in Part A of Chapter VI dealing with summons. But the Criminal Court cannot invoke the provisions regarding warrant of arrest, proclamation and attachment contained in Chapter VI. When we indicate that the Criminal Court will be guided by the principles in Part A of Chapter VI, we do not mean to say that the Court should rigidly follow the same. Such rigid adherence to those provisions would not be practicable and would be counter-productive in a large number of cases. In a case, as in the present one, where the person against whom claim for maintenance is made is residing abroad, it is not practicable for the Court to ensure that summons is served on him by a Police Officer or by an officer of the Court issuing summons, or even by other public servants. It will not be possible for the Court to cause service to be made under section 64 on an adult member of his family residing with him for, he would be residing abroad; affixure under section 64 also may not be possible since he may not have residence within the jurisdiction to the Court or anywhere within India. It may also be impracticable to cause service to be effected under section 67 through the Magistrate within whose local jurisdiction the person concerned ordinarily resides. We have indicated that the Magistrate, guided by the broad principles contained in Part A of Chapter VI will have to devise ways for service or process. We see no legal difficulty, in the light to these circumstances, in service being effected by registered post or even through a public servant working in Indian Embassy or Consulate in a foreign country." It has been further observed in the aforesaid case in para 26 as under : "We have already indicated that Chapter IX of the Code does not specifically indicate that the process to be issued is in the form of summons as contemplated in Chapter VI of the Code. In essence and substance, what the Magistrate should issue is a notice to the person against whom claim is made, informing him that such a claim has been made and that it is open to him to appear in Court and contest the claim. In serving the process, the broad principles contained in Part A of Chapter VI of the Code have to be followed. Other recognised ways of effecting services of notice such as by registered post also could be followed. We notice that one of us (Bhat, J.) in (Chathu v. Gopalan)7, 1981 Ker.L.T. 103 indicated that the person against whom maintenance claim has been made and working abroad could be served through a public servant employed in Indian Embassy. The decision proceeded on the assumption that Part A of Chapter VI of the Code is applicable to maintenance proceedings. It was not argued before that Bench that those provisions are not strictly applicable. But on a liberal interpretation of section 65 of the Code, this Court indicated that the second part of section 65 could be utilised by Court for service in contingencies where the person sought to be summoned is actually working abroad. The Court also noticed that section 65 conferred power on the Magistrate to order fresh notice in such manner as he consider proper and read into this provision a very wide discretion of very broad import. We agree that the liberal interpretation given to the provision is warranted but we are of opinion that strict application of Part A of Chapter VI itself is not called for in such cases. We therefore, hold that service in regard to proceedings under Chapter IX is not to be effected strictly in terms of the provisions in Part A of Chapter VI of the Code, though the broad principles of the latter chapter could be invoked and service by registered post and through an officer of India Embassy abroad would also be valid service. Where service is effected by registered post or through an Indian Embassy abroad, that would be sufficiently service. Where service is effected by registered post or through an Indian Embassy abroad, that would be sufficiently service. Such service cannot be challenged on the ground that service has not been attempted in terms of the provisions of Part A of Chapter VI of the Code." On the basis of the aforesaid observations, it has been further observed : "Where such service has been attempted and the person concerned wilfully avoids service and again where such service has been effected and the person concerned wilfully neglects to attend the Court, the Magistrate is competent to determine the case ex parte in accordance with the provisions in the proviso to section 126(2) of the Code." The ratio of the aforesaid decision clearly justifies the Magistrate in an appropriate case to serve the notice by registered post to the person who is called upon to pay maintenance if it is found that normal procedure of service provided under Chapter VI-A of Criminal Procedure Code is dilatory and time consuming, indicating avoidance or wilful neglect to attend the Court. The view taken by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court is based on the view taken by the Supreme Court. In the Madras case, (1963(I) Cri.L.J. 546)8, the revision was against the ex parte order passed by the Magistrate and therefore, the Madras High Court sent back the case taking the view that it was necessary to hold that the notice is not proper under the circumstances of that case. The views of the Madras High Court and Patna High Court are the views by the Single Judge. 8. It is found in the instant case that the notices were sent to the husband the petitioner through police but were neither served nor returned by the Police in the Court. Hence in view of the facts proved, it is a sufficient service and even then he wilfully neglects to appear in the proceedings before the Magistrate within the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126, Criminal Procedure Code. The paramount purpose of the provisions of maintenance made in Chapter IX, Criminal Procedure Code is to achieve not only speedy determination, but determination with utmost dispatch, as it is meant to provide maintenance to a needy dependent. It is concerning the very survival of a person when he approaches the Court for grant of maintenance. The paramount purpose of the provisions of maintenance made in Chapter IX, Criminal Procedure Code is to achieve not only speedy determination, but determination with utmost dispatch, as it is meant to provide maintenance to a needy dependent. It is concerning the very survival of a person when he approaches the Court for grant of maintenance. Therefore, the provisions under Chapter IX must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means to adopt dilatory tactics by the opposite party. Hence a direction is given under this Code to minimise the delay in the disposal of these matters. Any amount of delay would amount to frustrating the very purpose of these provisions. Hence a discretion is given to the Magistrate under proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 that if the Magistrate is satisfied that a person is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, he may proceed to hear the case ex parte. It is obvious that the discretion has to be exercised judicially and duly supported on the basis of the facts appearing in each case. In the instant case, from the facts it is found that the applicant had received a notice by registered post on 19th June, 1986 informing him that his wife had initiated proceedings claiming maintenance in the Court of the Magistrate. It has come on record that both the husband and the wife are living under the same roof, but in different rooms. The applicant is also said to have been practising in the same Court premises and under these circumstances, it cannot be imagined that it was not a sufficient notice of proceedings pending against him where he was supposed to pay the maintenance in case he does not attend the Court. With due diligence, he applicant could come to know the nature of the case, the stage of the proceedings and he could join himself in the case pending against him. It seems that since 19th June, 1986 till the date of passing the order i.e. 21st November, 1986 for a period of 5 months, he remained silent and did not take the troubles to know about the proceedings. The Magistrate made repeated attempts to issue the summons on previous four occasions. It seems that since 19th June, 1986 till the date of passing the order i.e. 21st November, 1986 for a period of 5 months, he remained silent and did not take the troubles to know about the proceedings. The Magistrate made repeated attempts to issue the summons on previous four occasions. There are enough circumstances to conclude that there is an element of avoidance of service and also that after the receipt of the notice by registered post, the applicant has neglected in attending the Court of the Magistrate. In my view, these circumstances are enough for the Magistrate to proceed ex parte against the applicant. It is to be noted that the certified copy of the order was received by the applicant on 31st December, 1986, but instead of taking recourse to the provisions contained in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 for approaching the Court for setting aside the ex parte order, the applicant approached the Sessions Court in a revision. Within the limited powers of a Revisional Court, the Sessions Court appears to have rightly rejected the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant. 9. It was further argued by Shri Sirpurkar that although the applicant received the notice on 19th June, 1986, he was not bound to appear in the Court of the Magistrate since the date of appearance which was 17th June, 1986 had already passed. Therefore, his absence should not be treated as wilful in the absence of a valid notice for his appearance in the Court. 10. As discussed above, I do not find any substance in these contentions since it was open to the applicant even then to approach the Court and to participate in the proceedings and to oppose the application of the wife. Having the remedy open, the applicant has failed to approach the trial Court to explain the circumstances of his absence to set aside the ex parte order. In an application under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, it is not fair to set aside a finding of fact which has been confirmed by the Sessions Court in revision. In order to establish the good cause for the absence, a party may be required to adduce evidence. The fact to establish a good cause will have to be proved by satisfactory evidence. In order to establish the good cause for the absence, a party may be required to adduce evidence. The fact to establish a good cause will have to be proved by satisfactory evidence. If a party against whom ex parte order is passed may like to adduce oral and documentary evidence and that cannot be done in the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. In fact, the applicant has under the garb of section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, filed second revision in this Court which is not legally maintainable. Although the application is labelled as under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, I am afraid that the applicant is not able to prove reasons for his absence in the trial Court. If there is any express provision in a statute governing a particular subject-matter to seek relief, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the High Court. It is seen that proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 clearly provides an express provision to approach the Trial Court of Magistrate for setting aside the ex parte order showing good cause within the given time. The applicant could apply with a request to condone delay, if any, for approaching that Court under the aforesaid provision. But having not availed of the aforesaid remedy, the inherent powers of this Court cannot be invoked as it was open for the trial Court on finding a good cause to set aside the ex parte order granting maintenance. Under these circumstances, I find that the order of the Magistrate as well as that of the learned Sessions Judge is correct and does not call for any interference. The application is, therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged. Application rejected. -----