R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition by the school-management is directed against an order passed by the 1st respondent-District Education Officer refusing to ratify suspension of respondent No. 2. The learned Counsel for the and respondent has raised a preliminary objection that a dispute under Sec. 38 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act can be raised before the Secondary Education Tribunal and it has an alternative and efficacious remedy and therefore this Court should not entertain this petition. ( 2 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is really speaking no dispute between the management and the teacher (the Principal) and that the challenge is to the order of 1st respondent and therefore it is a dispute between the petitioner-Management and the 1st respondent-Officer and therefore there is no remedy under Sec. 38 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act. A parallel is sought to be drawn from the provisions of Sec. 36 wherein also there is an intervening authority who is required to approve an order of termination and such order is appealable to Tribunal and it is submitted that when the legislature has thought it fit not to provide any appeal against the order granting refusal of ratification of the order of suspension it would be reasonable to believe that there is no remedy before the Tribunal. Section 38 (1) reads as follows:"38 (1): Where there is any dispute or difference between the manager or a registered private secondary school and any person in service of such school as head-master a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff which is connected with the conditions of service of such person the manager or as the case may be the person may make an appplication to the Tribunal for the decision of the dispute". From the bare reading of the language of the Section it is clear that whenever there is any dispute or difference which is connected with the conditions of service between the management of a school and an employee the application would lie to the Tribunal for decision of the dispute and such application can be filed by the management as well as by such person as expressly provided in Sec. 38 (1 ). ( 3 ) THE dispute regarding suspension of an employee is a dispute and difference between them and it cannot be said that it is a dispute with the authority which ratifies or refuses to ratify the suspension. In fact that authority is an absolutely disinterested party and no party to the dispute. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the observations made by learned authors-in the book Service Law for Secondary School Employees 1982 Edition page 104 which reads as under:" (1) Appeal when maintainable : It is to be noted that appeal under Sec. 36 (5) is limited to the orders of approval under Sec. 36 (1) (b) alone. In case of suspension under Sec. 36 (3) no appeal is provided. Therefore the District Education officers order ratifying or not ratifying the suspension by management cannot be challenged by way of an appeal under See. 36 (5) of course if there is any dispute regarding the reasonableness of suspension or regarding the continuance or cessation of suspension or regarding payment of salaries during the period of suspension an application may be filed under See. 38 but District Education Officers order ratifying or refusing to ratify the suspension is final No provision for challenging the said order is made. However if that order is arbitrary or unreasonable it can certainly be challenged by filing a writ petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution". ( 5 ) THE learned authors have no doubt observed that no provision for challenging the order ratifying or refusing to ratify the suspension is made and it can be challenged under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. This is a commentary in Sec. 36 of the Act. But having regard to the language of Sec. 38 the learned authors have also observed that:"if there is any dispute regarding the reasonableness of suspension or regarding the continuance of cessation of suspension or regarding payment of salaries during the period of suspension application may be filed under Sec. 38". Therefore in a matter of dispute regarding suspension an application under Sec. 38 is competent according to the learned authors also. In any case the language on Sec. 38 is very cleat and is of wide connotation. Therefore in a matter of dispute regarding suspension an application under Sec. 38 is competent according to the learned authors also. In any case the language on Sec. 38 is very cleat and is of wide connotation. If there is any dispute or difference whatsoever between the parties mentioned in the Section namely the management of the school and the employee of the school connected with the conditions of service the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain and decide such a dispute. ( 6 ) I do not find any substance in the argument that the dispute in regarding ratification or refusal to ratify and therefore it is the action of the authority which is challenged. The authority is a disinterested authority and it has no interest in upholding its own order whether it is of granting ratification or refusing ratification. 1t is the dispute between the interested parties. ( 7 ) A parallel can also be seen under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act where under Sec. 33 during the pendency of an industrial dispute if any action is taken which requires approval or permission of the authority before which the dispute is pending such authority may or may not grant such permission or approval. However that would not affect the existence or otherwise of the dispute regarding that action between the parties. Even if tile approval or permission is granted by the concerned authority like the Conciliation Officer it would not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute regarding the action which is already approved by the authority. ( 8 ) IN the case of T. K. Rabari v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1988 (2) GLH 62 : [ 1988 (2) GLR 875 ] it is held that remedy under Art 226 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary remedy which suggests that it is not to be resorted to where ordinary remedy is available. It is also observed that at times a statute is challenged for failure to provide a remedy of appeal and when such remedy is provided the Courts have found reasonableness of such statute because of such provision. It is also observed that at times a statute is challenged for failure to provide a remedy of appeal and when such remedy is provided the Courts have found reasonableness of such statute because of such provision. It is also observed that even though High Court has constitutional power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which cannot be taken away by any ordinary legislation and it is only as a matter of sound discretion that the High Court refuses to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution when an alternative remedy is available. ( 9 ) IT is to be remembered and emphasized that the extraordinary powers conferred by the Constitution on the High Courts are not exercised in any and every matter regardless of its importance when an alternative forum is available. Unless the High Court restrains itself it would not be in a position to give attention to really more important matters which require to be dealt with under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In fact encouraging and entertaining petitions to the High Court when other forum is available really defeats the very purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution because by entertaining too many such petitions the High Court does not have the time and ability to deal with the really important matters. In fact there is all round criticism that the judicial system is collapsing under its own weight of arrears. When a litigant is directed to go to the alternative forum the High Court does not deny him justice but High Court tells that the High Court is not the only place where justice can be obtained. law of the land creates ordinary or special forum for redressal of grievance. It is more likely that such forum would be in a position to do more expeditious justice having regard to its experience and expertise in the subject. There is no reason why that avenue and forum should be by-passed and the High Court be unnecessarily burdened. ( 10 ) IN view of the fact that there is an alternative and efficacious remedy before the Secondary Educational Tribunal I am not inclined entertain this petition and without going into merits this petition is summarily dismissed. There is no reason why that avenue and forum should be by-passed and the High Court be unnecessarily burdened. ( 10 ) IN view of the fact that there is an alternative and efficacious remedy before the Secondary Educational Tribunal I am not inclined entertain this petition and without going into merits this petition is summarily dismissed. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress that this is a gross case where the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I am of the view that the Tribunal can equally deal with these questions and the High Court which is already over-burdened should not encourage such petitions when Tribunals have been specially constituted and are expert in their subject of dealing with such matters and such Tribunals are in a position to give justice more expeditiously. ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the second respondent Mr. G. N. Desai states that the second respondent will appear before the Tribunal whenever a copy of the application to the Tribunal is served upon him and Mr. Desai agrees to accept the service of such application on behalf of the respondent No. 2. Petition dismissed. .