JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - The short question that arises for consideration in this revision is whether a second complaint petition is permissible to be entertained after an earlier complaint for the same occurrence was dismissed and the .accused acquitted u/s 256 (i), Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The opposite party-complainant, who has not appeared in spite of notice, had flied an earlier complaint under Sections 447, 504, 506, 307 and 352, L P. C. against the Petitioner, but cognizance was taken under Sections 504 and 506, I..P.C.. The complaint was dismissed due to his absence and the Petitioner acquitted u/s 256 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure on 1-11-1983 in T. C. No. 190 of 1983 (1. C. C. No. 21 of 1983) in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Udala. Such dismissal of the complaint was never challenged either in appeals or in revision. Thereafter, a second complaint was filed for the identical occurrence mentioning therein the fact of the dismissal of the earlier complaint. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of such complaint under Sections 447 and 506, 1. P. C.. The accused, Petitioner in this revision filed an objection before the Magistrate challenging the maintainability of the fresh complaint in view of his acquittal u/s 256 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure in the earlier case. The learned Magistrate rejected the petition being of the view that since cognisance had already been taken, he had no scope to interfere with the matter. 3. An acquittal u/s 256 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure has no qualitative difference than an acquittal after full trial of the case. Section 300 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure incorporates a bar against subsequent trial of the accused for the same offence in the event of his acquittal in an earlier trial. The section does not make any distinction between an acquittal otherwise and one u/s 256 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure It is worthwhile to note that even an acquittal u/s 258, Cr. P. C is also covered u/s 330 (1) having been specifically so provided for u/s 300 (5) and that such specific provision was made only to refute possible objections regarding acquittals u/s 258 but that no such objection was contemplated as regards Section 256 (1). P. C is also covered u/s 330 (1) having been specifically so provided for u/s 300 (5) and that such specific provision was made only to refute possible objections regarding acquittals u/s 258 but that no such objection was contemplated as regards Section 256 (1). If acquittals u/s .258 are included, there could be possibly no doubt of acquittals u/s 256 (1) being also within the ambit of Section 300, Cr.P.C. 4. The submission that an acquittal u/s 256 (1) Code of Criminal Procedure is not covered u/s 300 (1) Code of Criminal Procedure appears to be based upon the words "has once been tried" in that section, it being usually contended that when an order is passed u/s 256 (1) acquitting the accused, it could not be said of him having been tried and acquitted. The contention is not acceptable since it is evident that the word "tried" would include all stages after taking of cognizance by the Court and the date fixed for appearance of the accused pursuant to the summons. The order may be passed even without any evidence being recorded or after all or some evidence being recorded. But in all such cases the accused would be deemed to have been tried and acquitted. 5. There seems to be unanimity of authorities on the subject. In Rasik Tatma Vs. Bhagwat Tanti dealing with a case under the old Code, it was held that an order passed u/s 247 (corresponding to Section 256 of the new Code) is a protection u/s 403 against the subsequent trial of the accused for the offence. In Buchana Roy and Ors. v. Peresh Kr. Ray, the question directly came for consideration where, for the very same reasons as discussed above the same conclusion was reached. A case which throws much light on the question is State of Karnataka v. K. H. Annegowda and Anr. 1917 1 S.C.C. 417, where the facts were that after committal of a case to the Court of Session and fixing of the date of trial by that Court, an application was moved by the Public Prosecutor praying for withdrawal from the prosecution u/s 494 of the old Code. The prayer was accepted and the learned Sessions Judge "discharged'; the Respondents. Thereafter, a fresh investigation was directed by the State in respect of the same offence and a new Charge-sheet was filed under the new Code. The prayer was accepted and the learned Sessions Judge "discharged'; the Respondents. Thereafter, a fresh investigation was directed by the State in respect of the same offence and a new Charge-sheet was filed under the new Code. An objection was taken by the Respondents u/s 300 Code of Criminal Procedure that in view of their earlier acquittal they could not be tried again. Their plea being negatived; they came before the High Court which allowed the case being of the view that the Order "discharged" was actually an order of acquittal and hence the provisions of Section 300 would apply. On appeal by the State the Supreme Court affirmed the view of the High Court deciding that nomenclature of the order by the Sessions Judge as "discharged" would not alter the fact of acquittal of the Respondents since the earlier order was passed only after charge had been framed by the Magistrate and commitment bad been made to the Sessions Court where the trial on the charge, unless otherwise modified by the Sessions Court, was to take place and inasmuch as the order of discharge came after framing of the charge, it was in effect an order of acquittal and in that view of the matter, the Respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 300, Cr. P. G. The case is an authority for the present case and fortifies my view that "tried" u/s 300 (1) would include all steps taken after taking of cognizance and the date of appearing of 'the accused after issue of summons. 6. In that view of the matter, the revision must succeed and the impugned order is quashed.