JUDGMENT 1. - A very interesting question in the field of law of arbitration which 'honest man dread more than the dreaded law suits' arises for consideration in this appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the judgment passed by the District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 8th August, 1987, whereby the Award passed by the Arbitrators has been set aside, holding it to be vague, and beyond the reference. 2. Factual matrix necessary for appreciating the controversy convassed at the hearing and which gave rise to this misc. appeal can be opitomized. 3. To make the award given on December 8, 1985, by both Sarva Shri D.P. Jain & Swami Dial, the Arbitrators, as rule of the Court, and pass to a decree on its basis, an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act (10 of 1940) (for brevity 'the Act'), has been filed by M/s. R.S Sharma and Company, the applicant -appellant praying therein that the Arbitrators be directed to file he Award dated December 5, 1985 in the Court and on that basis the decree be passed in favour of the appellant. The respondent-State of Rajasthan resorted to the application under Section 14 by way of first raising its objection on March 31, 1986. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties as many as eight issues were framed by the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. 4. The chronology of events herein epitomised would bring to surface the contentions raised in this appeal and on that basis the award was given by the Arbitrators. 5. By a notice dated April 16, 1974, the tenders for construction of complete masonry dam (Civil Engineering Work) Mahi Bajaj Sagar Project Part I Block No. 1 to 11, were invited and pursuant to it, the appellant-Company presented tender on July 31, 1974 which has ultimately accepted by the Irrigation Department of the respondent State for a sum of Rs. 5.90,30,791.00p. (Rupees Five Crores ninety lacs thirty thousand seven hundred ninty one only) vide a communication dated April 29, 1975. Consequently provisionally, an agreement was executed on May 23, 1985 (sic 1975)in between the appellant and the respondent Accordingly, the construction work was commenced by the appellant. During the course of said work certain claims were presented by the appellant to the department with reference to different items of works. Consequently provisionally, an agreement was executed on May 23, 1985 (sic 1975)in between the appellant and the respondent Accordingly, the construction work was commenced by the appellant. During the course of said work certain claims were presented by the appellant to the department with reference to different items of works. On the department having failed to settle the said claims, the appellant-Company wrote the Chief Engineer on 29th September, 1977 asking him to refer their claims for arbitration. Vide letter dated December 17, 1977, the Company appointed Shri S.N. Mukherjee as their Arbitrator, and the respondent State appointed Shri B.D. Mathur on 28th December, 1977 as their arbitrator who vide his letter dated 21st June, 1978 refused to act as Arbitrator. Then the Company appointed Shri. S.N. Mukherjee as the sole arbitrator. Against this. the respondent-State preferred a petition under Section 9 of the Act in the Court of District Judge, Banswara City seeking a declaration and injunction. The District Judge Banswara by an order dated Feb. 6, 1979 declared that Shri S. N. Mukherjee was not entitled to act as an Arbitrator. Having aggrieved against such a declaration the appellant-Company filed a revision petition before the principal seat of this Court at Jodhpur During the pendency of the aforesaid revision petition a compromise was arrived at between the parties on April 13, 1982 in writing-the contents of which need not be made a part of this judgment because its contents are not disputed in between the parties. Then, a supplementary compromise deed dated 13th June, 1982 came to be arrived in between the parties and as a result of which the appellant-Company agreed to appoint Shri D.P. Jain. Retired Additional Chief Engineer (PWD B & R), Jaipur whereas the Government of Rajasthan agreed to appoint Shri Swami Dayal. Retired Chief Engineer, Central PWD as their respective Arbitrators. By that agreement the appellant-Company further agreed that on withdrawal of case from Banswara District Court with regard to equipment and machinery against which advances were given by the department, the equipment and machinery lying at project will continue to be hypothecated with the project authorities till the Award is given by the Arbitrators or department would be free to recover the loan and advances made against the equipment and machinery by any method as agreed by two parties. Consequently, the Arbitrators, Shri Swami Dayal and Shri D.P. Jain, entered upon the reference on June 19, 1982. The appellant-Company presented their Statement of Claim under thirty eight heads items on August 5, 1982-against which, the respondent- State filed their reply to the claims No. A-l & A-2 as also their counter claims No. 1-6 on August 31, 1982. Thereafter, the respondent-State submitted on October 30, 1992 their reply with respect to the rest of the claims i.e. Claims No. B-1 to Claim No. G and on November 29, 1982 the appellant-Company filed their rejoinder to the respondents' reply and their counter Claims. 6. Claim No. A-1, was to the effect that the department should withdraw their illegal actions under Cls. 2 & 3 of the agreement, whereas all other claims were for monetry compensation in respect of the different items as referred to in the claim statement, and claim No. F. was in regard to the interest. 7. However, the appellant-company revised their claim on May 4, 1983 and reduced the amount claimed against Claim No. A-2 from Rs. 8952,1431 to Rs. 73,21,239/-, and further an amount of Rs. 476,829/- was claimed by the department. Apart from others, under revised claim by the respondent. the claim against counter claim No. A-5 was reduced by the respondent; an additional claim for Rs. 3,00,918/- was made by them towards the appellant's failure to raise certain blocks. 8. The Arbitrators, after considering the respective statement of claims, its replies, counter-claims, its replies and appellant's rejoinder to the respondent's reply etc., formulated as many as forty seven issues on April 14, 1983 purporting to be the points arising for determination in the Reference made to them. 9. A look at the formulated issues mainfests that issues No. 1 to 39 are the exact reproduction of various claims of the appellant-Company under beads A-1 to E-20, issue No. 40 is the appellant's claim No. F. whereas issues No. 41 to 46 are reproduction of the respondent's counter claims No. 1 to 6 and Issue No. 47 was with respect to the relief sought. 10. In 25 sittings, the Arbitrators drew detailed proceedings and during the course of these proceedings, time for completion of arbitration proceedings was also extended by the Arbitrators from time to time on joint requests of both the parties. 11. On December 8, 1985, the Arbitrators pronounced their joint award. 10. In 25 sittings, the Arbitrators drew detailed proceedings and during the course of these proceedings, time for completion of arbitration proceedings was also extended by the Arbitrators from time to time on joint requests of both the parties. 11. On December 8, 1985, the Arbitrators pronounced their joint award. Here it would be expedient and appropriate for better resolving and scrutiny of the controversy in issue to reproduce hereunder what has been held by the Arbitrators in their joint Award : And whereas the 1st hearing was held on 19.7.82 at Jaipur and in all we had hearings on 52 days; and whereas after the pleadings were completed and the documents on which the respective parties relied upon for their claims and counter-claims were also filed in the first instance and we further gave the parties full opportunities to submit further documents. statements, calculations, drawings and charts, and any other thing that they thought fit to rely upon in support of their contention; And whereas we inspected the site of work also alongwith the parties; "And whereas the arguments were concluded on 4.10.1985 by consent of the parties and their counsels; And whereas the claimants had initially submitted their claims and contentions under 38 beads (including sub-heads) and claimed that the respondent's action under clauses 2 & 3 of the Agreement were illegal and their claim aggregated to Rs. 1,92,53,54,856 in addition their claims of interest and cost : And whereas the Government of Rajasthan originally submitted their counter-claims under - beads for a total sum of Rs. 1,70,13,613.00 in addition to their claim of interest and cost : And whereas both the parties revised their claims and counter-claims during the course of hearings: And whereas their parties have consented to extend the time to make and publish the Award till 31st December, 1985; And now, therefore having applied our minds to the pleadings of the parties their claims and counter-claims the oral and documentary evidence adduced and relied upon by the parties and the arguments of the learned counsels of both sides and also the authorities cited by them in support of their arguments and giving consideration to all the above and after deliberations we have arrived at the following decisions and AWARD as follows:- 1. The Respondents (State of Rajasthan) committed breach of contract and were also guilty of wrongful revocation of the Agreement. The Respondents (State of Rajasthan) committed breach of contract and were also guilty of wrongful revocation of the Agreement. The actions taken under clauses 2 and 3 of the contract conditions were wrong and unjustified; 2. By adjustment of the amount held justified under the counter-claims with that held justified under the claims, we hold that the respondents (State of Rajasthan) shall pay to the Claimants (M/s. R.S. Sharma & Co.) a sum of Rs. 75,41,755/- (Rupees seventy five lacs forty one thousand seven hundred fifty five only) in full settlement of the claims and counter-claims. Claimants further do pay to the respondents Rs. nil. 3. By adjustment of interest held to be due to the respondents with coat held to be due to the claimants on their items of claims which were not in the nature of claim for damages for breach, we hold that the Respondents do pay Rs. 17,92,957/- (Rupees seventeen lacs ninty two thousand nine hundred fifty seven only) as interest, to the claimants upto the date of the Award. Claimants further do pay to the respondents Rs. nil. 4. There will be no future interest on the amount awarded under para 2 above, i.e. on Rs. 75,41,755/- if the respondents do pay in terms of AWARD to the claimants within a period of two months from the date of this award. However, if the said payment is not made by the respondents within the period of two months stipulated above. the claimants shall be entitled to the payment of simple interest at 12% (Twelve percent) per annum calculated on the said sum of Rs. 75,41,755/- reckoned from the date of the Award. 5. All tools, tackles, plants, equipments machinery, materials, stone boulders, enabling structures, etc. left at site by the claimants shall belong to and vest in the respondents. 6. The parties shall bear their own cost." 12. A petition under Section 14 (1) of the Act was filed by the appellant company on January 2, 1986 in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City, After service of the notice on the respondent-State, an application was moved by the respondent under Section 33 read with Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the Award dated December 8, 1986. The District Judge first vide an order dated August 11, 1987, decided the objection petition filed by the respondent-State. 13. The District Judge first vide an order dated August 11, 1987, decided the objection petition filed by the respondent-State. 13. As stated earlier on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned District Judge had framed eight issues The issue with regard to the competence of the Arbitrators to extend the time for giving the Award under Section 28 (2) of the Act was decided by the learned District Judge in favour of the appellant-Company. Issues No. 1 to 5 dealing with the validity & legality of the Award were decided in favour of the respondent State and the Award dated December 8, 1985 was set aside holding it to be vague, beyond the reference and invalid. 14. What have been the grounds for setting aside the Award, are being quoted here under: (i) The Award was vitiated by the Arbitrators' failure to decide the issues framed by them inasmuch as the framing of the issues showed that the Arbitrator', had initially intended to decide the claims and counter claims issue wise; that an issue wise decision was necessary to show the proper application of mind by the Arbitrators to the material on record; and that the removal of issues from the record showed that the Arbitrators had deliberately not decided the issues framed by them. (ii) The Award dated December 3, 1985 was beyond the scope of reference, inasmuch as the Arbitrators had created and decided a new issue about machines, although this point was neither in their claim nor in the counter claim was quite irrelevant to the reference, and that the Arbitrators had decided this point without hearing the parties. (iii) The Award dated the 8th December, 1985 was completely vague and under tain and showed non-application of mind, inasmuch as although the amount of claims and counter claims were admittedly revised, the award did not disclose the extent of the revision; as to which of the claims and counter claims and counter claims were the total amount for which the claims and counter claims were accepted; and the amount on which, the date on which and the rate at which the interest had been awarded etc. 15. Arguments were heard at length. 15. Arguments were heard at length. During the course of arguments, Shri B.L. Sarupria learned counsel appearing for the State, fairly and frankly conceded that the correctness of the order August 11, 1981 is not disputed on the question of territorial jurisdiction. However, as regards extension of time, Shri Sarupria contended that while the Arbitrators were not competent to extend time under Section 28 (2) of the Act, this Court is entitled to do so even at this stage under that section subject to an application for extension if moved by the appellant-Company. But, on the question of validity of an unspeaking and lumpsum Award, Shri Sarupria wrangled that while the Arbitrators were competent to pass a non-speaking and lumpsum Award. even that award was amenable to scrutiny by the Court on the ground of arbitrariness, non- application of mind and non-consideration of documents etc. 16. Frankly concession made by Shri Sarupria considerably reduced the scope of controversy and accordingly the arguments were addressed on the limited questions which survived for determination. 17. First of all, it would be appropriate before entering into and resolving the crux of the controversy, to decide a mini point as to the arbitrators' alleged incompetence to extend the time for submission of Award Hence I first take up that mini controversy raised at the Bar. 18. In that context. Shri Sarupria cited apex authorities of law in the following cases : (I) H.K. Wattal Vs V.N. Pandya, ( AIR 1973 SC 2479 ) ; (2) State of Punjab v. Hardayal AIR 1985 SC 920 ) . Shri Sarupria specifically relied on the following observations from the decision in State of Punjab v. Hardayal (supra) in support of his contention : 'Sub-section (2) of Section 28 also makes it evident that the Court alone has the power to extend time. It further provide that a clause in the arbitration agreement giving the Arbitrator's power to enlarge time shall be void and no effect except when all the parties consent to such enlargement." 19. It further provide that a clause in the arbitration agreement giving the Arbitrator's power to enlarge time shall be void and no effect except when all the parties consent to such enlargement." 19. I may say that both the afore-cited decisions in no manner support the contention of Shri Sarupria because, in fact, in H.K. Wattal v. V.N. Pandya (supra) their Lordships of the Apex Court had clearly held that Arbitrator can enlarge time for making award if after entering on the arbitration the parties mutually agreed to such enlargement; whereas in State of Punjab v. Hardayal (Supra) also, the Apex Court held that section 8 ( ) provides that a clause in the arbitration agreement giving the Arbitrator power to enlarge time shall be void and has no effect except when all the parties consent to such enlargement. And, this clearly manifests that the Arbitrators could extend time under the proviso to Section 28 (2) of the Act on the consent of the parties. 20. Next futile exercise of Shri Sarupria is to refer a latest decision in (3) Hindustan Steel Works v. C. Rajashekharan Rao (1987 (4) S.C.C. p. 93) because it sets the entire controversy at rest beyond any scope of doubt. In supra case, it was held that under Section 28 and in the light of Section 3 of the First Schedule. the parties, were allowed to extend the time, and in this context, reference was made to the decision in H.K. Wattal v. V.N Pandya (supra) where, according to their Lordships, the Court reiterated that sub-section (2) of Section 28 indicated one exception to the rule that the Arbitrator could not enlarge the time and that was when the parties did not agree to such an enlargement. It was further observed that the Arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the arbitration, the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time. 21. Thus, a bare reading of the afore-extracted principle of law makes the position patent and not latent that the Arbitrators are fully empowered to extent time for making the Award in a case where after entering into an arbitration, the parties consent of such enlargement of time. 21. Thus, a bare reading of the afore-extracted principle of law makes the position patent and not latent that the Arbitrators are fully empowered to extent time for making the Award in a case where after entering into an arbitration, the parties consent of such enlargement of time. Viewed in the context of law of arbitration, and the decisions of the Supreme Court, in the instant case where the position remained undisputed, the time for making Award was extended by the Arbitrators only on the joint requests made by both the parties from time to time. there can be no doubt that the time for making the Award was validly extended by the Arbitrators. 22. Again before adverting to the controversy as to the infirmities affecting the reasons given by the lower Court for setting aside the Award dated 8th December, 1985, 1 would examine first the scope of interference by this court in such matter and that too, firstly by brief resume of the proposition of law laid down in some of the decisions. 23. In (4) A.M. Mair & Company v.Gordhandas ( AIR 1951 SC 9 ) , it was held as under : "If, therefore, we come to the conclusion that both the disputes raised by the respondent fall within the scope of Arbitration clause then that is the end of the matter, for the Arbitrators would have jurisdiction on the disputes, and we are not concerned with any error of law of fact committed by them or any omission on their part to consider any of the matter. In this view it would not be for us to determine the true construction of the contract and find out whether the respondent's contention is correct or not. Once the dispute is found to be within the scope of the Arbitration clause, it is no part of the province of the Court to enter into the merits of the dispute." 24. In (5) Jivraj Bhai Ujamshl Seth v. Clrintaman Rao Balaji ( AIR 1965 SC 214 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that. Once the dispute is found to be within the scope of the Arbitration clause, it is no part of the province of the Court to enter into the merits of the dispute." 24. In (5) Jivraj Bhai Ujamshl Seth v. Clrintaman Rao Balaji ( AIR 1965 SC 214 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that. "An award made by an Arbitrator is conclusive as a judgment between the parties and the Court is entitled to set aside the Award only if the Arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceeding or when the Award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superceding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act or where an Award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid (Sec. 10 of the Arbitration Act) an Award may be set aside by the court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and agreement it may be demonstrated that the Arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion " 25. The privy council in (6) Champsi Bhara & Company Vs Jivraj Ballo Spinning & Weaving Company ( AIR 1923 PC 66 ) , observed as under : "An error in law on the face of the award means in the Lordship view, the view find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto as per the instance a note appended by the Arbitrater stating the reasons for its judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then see is erroneous. It does not mean that if any narrative or references made to a contention of one party that opens the door to see first what that contention is, and then acting to the contract on which the parties rights depend to see if that contention is bound " Thus the Court while dealing with an application to set aside an award has not to consider whether the view of the Arbitrater on the evidence is justified. The Arbitrator's adjudication is generally considered binding on the parties for, he is a Tribunal selected by the parties and the power of the Court to set aside the Award is restricted and fettered to cases set out in Section 30 of the Act Moreover, it is not open to the Court to speculate, where on reasons are given by the Arbitrator as to what impelled the Arbitrators to arrive at their conclusion Even if it is assumed that the Arbitrators must have arrived at his conclusion by a certain process of reasoning. the Court cannot proceed to determine whether the conclusion is right or wrong. As laid down by the Apex Court it is not open to the Court to attempt to prove () the mental process by which the Arbitrater has reached his conclusion which were and does not disclose by the terms of his Award. 26. The afore proposition of law makes clear the decks that the arbitrator's adjudication is final and binding between the parties and that an award cannot be set aside by speculating at the reasons which might have impelled the Arbitrators to arrived at the conclusion. In the instant case, the Arbitrators have not given any reason for their conclusions, and in view of that, the Award cannot be challenged on this ground, alone by saying that the, Arbitrators should have given reasons to arrive at their conclusions or by attempting to probe as to how the arbitrators might have reached at their conclusion. 27. For the above observations, reliance can be placed upon the decisions which I would discuss in the next para. 28. In (7) A Berry & Company v. Union of India, ( AIR 1971 SC 696 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that as the parties chose their own arbitrators they cannot, when the award is not bad in the face of it. object to the decision either on law or facts-therefore, even when an arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or fact in determining the matters referred by him but such mi takes does not appear on the face of the award or in a documents appended to or incorporated in it, so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake. Thus, it is manifestly clear that unless there is an error of law apparent on the Award, the Award is absolutely final and cannot be set aside on any other ground. 29. The decision in (8) Smt. Santa Sila v. Dharendra Nath, (AIR 1976 SC 1677) , lays down that where an award given by the arbitrator is filed in a court and it is challenged on the ground of its incompleteness, the Court has to bear in mind certain basic positions, such as (i) a Court should approach the award with a desire to support it if that is reasonably possible rather than to destory it by calling it illegal. (ii) unless the contrary appears the court will persume that the award disposses of finally all the matters and disputes and (iii) where an award is made depraemisis i.e. concerning all the matters in dispute referred to the arbitrator and intending to dispose finally all the matters in difference the Award will be held final if by any reasoning it can be made so. Thus, the afore proposition of law in the context of the scope of interference by the Courts in arbitration matters, has been consistently fortifying by the Apex Court and in this view of the matter, it is absolutely clear that the award of an Arbitrator is final both with respect to questions or fact and law referred to him and that a Court can interfere with an award only on the ground of an error of law apparent to the award. 30. That leads me to examine the question as to whether the award suffers from an error of law apparent on the award and it is to be determined with reference to the reasons given in the Award and the validity of the award however cannot be examined on the question as to whether it suffers from an error of law apparent on the award. And, in cases of non-speaking award, a probe can only be made in regard to the limited question as to whether the procedural requirements for conducting arbitration have been complied with or not e.g., whether adequate opportunity of hearing had been given the evidence brought on record had been considered, the award was pronounced within time etc. 31. And, in cases of non-speaking award, a probe can only be made in regard to the limited question as to whether the procedural requirements for conducting arbitration have been complied with or not e.g., whether adequate opportunity of hearing had been given the evidence brought on record had been considered, the award was pronounced within time etc. 31. Now I am persuaded to consider the correctness of the reasons assigned by the learned lower court under its order dated August 11, 1987 for setting aside the Award dated December 8, 1985. The foremost point emerged is as to whether the lower court failed to decide the issues framed by the Arbitrators-the findings on which consist of three parts-(i) that, while framing the issues on April 14, 1983, the Arbitrators had ordered that further proceedings be taken in terms of the issues; (It) that, the issues were not available on the record of the Arbitrators at the time of passing the award; & (iii) that, the absence of issues on record showed that the Arbitrators had deliberately not decided the issues framed by them. 32. A bare look at the Minutes of the proceeding dated April 14, 1983, makes it clear that immediately after having framed the issues on the basis of the draft issues prepared by the parties, the issues framed were observed by the Arbitrators to be a mere reproduction of the claims and counter claims and thus, for the sake of clarity and convenience, the arguments and its consideration in the matter were ordered to be in terms of the claims and counter claims only. Further, the arbitration proceedings dated April 4, 1983, fortifies manifesting that though the issues were framed on April 4, 1983, it was never decided that the matter should be considered in terms of the issues but, on that very day, the Arbitrators had decided for considering the matter according to the claims and counter-claims only. 33. The subordinate Court while rejecting the Award also found that in the present case, the issues were framed on April 4, 1983-47 in numbers, which is Exhibit 8 filed by the respondent - but the same was found to be not available on record of the Arbitrators. 33. The subordinate Court while rejecting the Award also found that in the present case, the issues were framed on April 4, 1983-47 in numbers, which is Exhibit 8 filed by the respondent - but the same was found to be not available on record of the Arbitrators. On a careful perusal of the relevant record it is distinctly clear that in the objection filed by the respondent, nowhere it was mentioned that Exhibit 8 is has been missing, or that the Arbitrators had removed the issues from the record. Contrary to it a clear admission or, the part of the respondent exists at para 9 of the objection petition to the effect that pursuant to an application moved under Section 14 (2) of the Act, Shri Swami Dayal, Arbitrator had filed original Award dated December 8, 1985 and other papers alongwith documents were also filed by him and it makes obvious that all the papers relating to the arbitration proceedings in fact have also been filed by the Arbitrators before the Court in pursuance of the petition under Section 14 (2) of the Act. Hence it is precise that the finding that the issues were not available on record at the time of passing the Award is fallacious without any evidence, oral or documentary nor was disclosed in the order of August 11, 1987 which could show that the issues had been removed from the record or were not available to the Arbitrators at the time of passing the Award. Moreover, the mere fact that the issues were not traceable before the subordinate Court during bearing in the month of July/August, 1987 certainly could not have led to draw or arrive at the conclusion that the issues framed were not available on record at the time of passing of the Award. The learned subordinate Court. on the ground that the issues were not available on record, has drawn adverse inference coupled with the reason that non-availability of the issues on record of the Arbitrators would be the non-consideration of the issue by the Arbitrators. On these premises, the Award his been set aside by subordinate Court. 34. At the cost of repetition, a bare perusal of the issues (see exhibit 8) clearly shows that issues framed by the Arbitrators were exactly the reproduction of the claim and counter-claims filed by the parties. On these premises, the Award his been set aside by subordinate Court. 34. At the cost of repetition, a bare perusal of the issues (see exhibit 8) clearly shows that issues framed by the Arbitrators were exactly the reproduction of the claim and counter-claims filed by the parties. Moreover, the arbitration minutes also shows that claims and counter-claims were considered and the arguments were heard claims-wise and counter-claim wise. It has not been disputed that the claims and counter-claims were exactly identical to the issues framed by the Arbitrators and vice versa. Thus, it is in-conceivable as to how could the alleged absence of the issues from the record in any manner establish non- consideration of the claims and counter claims by the Arbitrators However, the minutes of the Arbitration proceedings clearly makes it apparent that all the claims and counter-claims which covered the, entire spectrum of the disputed referred to the Arbitrators were considered by them at length in 25 sittings within 52 days. On the above premises the subordinate court found that the Arbitrator's failure to pronounce issue wise award despite there having framed issues showed that the Arbitrators had failed to decide a part of the reference made to them. This approach of the subordinate Court appears to be without any basis for the reasons that the absence of an issue wise award could have been construed to be a non-decision of a part of the reference, only if it were to be held that the Arbitrators were obliged to give either a speaking award or atleast a claimwise/issuewise award. But, once it is held that a non-speaking and lumpsum award was also valid and permissible, the alleged absence of issue-wise decision does not effect the Award given by the Arbitrators. 35. Are the Arbitrators not required to give a speaking and item-wise award is the crux of he matter which I would deal with a little later. The learned subordinate court though itself found that it is true that it is not necessary for the Arbitrators to give his decision item wise or to discuss every claim, but it is also necessary that from the Award passed by the Arbitrator, the Court should know as to which of the claims have been considered and how much claim has been accented by him. The subordinate Court further observed that even if it is accepted that for each claim or counter-claims, a detailed discussion was not necessary but still it was necessary to mention in the award that out of the total counter claim how much claim was accepted and how much claim was rejected-which is absent in the present award and only one line has been written that after considering the counter-claim of the State Government, the award has been passed in favour of the appellant which in its opinion was completely vague; and convinced it that both the Arbitrators did not apply their mind. 36. The second limb which led the subordinate Court to set aside the Award was that the Award travelled beyond scope of reference in so far as it relates that the Arbitrators have awarded all tools, tackles, plants, equipment, machineries, materials, stores, bulldozers etc. which had been left by the appellant-Company on the site, to the State Government although he proceedings showed that the said points had also not been mentioned in the claim or counter claims, and further that the parties had also not been heard on this aspect. 37. Looking to the claim and counter-claims of the parties. I am of the opinion that the findings arrived at of the Arbitrators with respect of the plants machineries and tools etc. were neither beyond the scope of reference nor irrelevant to the reference nor were given without hearing the parties. The question in regard to the plaint (), machinery, and materials etc was specifically referred to in both, the claims filed by the appellant and the counter-claims filed by the respondents. Under the revised claim A-2 of the appellant-Company, it has specifically claimed total sum of Rs. 4,76 829/- towards loss due to the machinery withheld by the department and details of which have also been given by the appellant-Company. Under counter-claim No. 3, the State respondent has made counter-claim for Rs. 28,92,602/- towards amount allegedly outstanding against the advances made by the respondent to the Company in the matter of purpose of new 2nd old equipment and interest thereon. In this context, the respondent-State under para II of their counter claim No. 3 stated that a sum of Rs. 277 lacs was advanced to the appellant-Company against 56 equipments brought by them for use on works according to the statement appended there- under. In this context, the respondent-State under para II of their counter claim No. 3 stated that a sum of Rs. 277 lacs was advanced to the appellant-Company against 56 equipments brought by them for use on works according to the statement appended there- under. That apart, the machineries and equipments are stated to have been hypothecated in favour of the respondent-State. Further, para VII says that the mortagage bonds and special condition No. 15 conferred unequivocal rights on the State to take all machines/equipment under their possession and to sell the same by public action or private agreement etc. Similarly in para 8 further averments have been made by the respondent State with regard to the tools and equipments and under counter-claim A-4 the respondent State claimed the amount of Rs. 18,54,54/- towards the value of the materials i.e. cement, steel etc. issued by the department for which the recoveries were yet to be made. 38. From a perusal of the record it appears that the Arbitrators inspected the site at the commencement of the proceedings on February 8, 1983, and the godowns of the appellant Company where the cement stones, machineries equipments stored, were inspected. At the conclusion of the inspection, the respondent had also offered to take over the materials (stones, sand etc.) on the terms and conditions referred to therein. From the minutes it also clear that on February 10, 1984 and August 29, 1984, both the parties advanced their arguments in support of their claims and counter-claims with regard to the tools and machineries. That apart on August 30, 1984 and September 16, 1984, the arguments were advanced on behalf of the respondent with regard to the counter- claim A-4. i.e. for the value of the material supplied. A rejoinder was also filed on behalf of the appellant-Company on August 7, 1985 with respect to the respondent's counter-claim No. 3. A perusal of pages 269-271, 279, 306 and 309 of the Minutes shows that the question in regard to the plants, machineries equipments and materials were not only referred for determination to the Arbitrators but the submissions were also made by the parties before the Arbitrators on different dates and that, the list as for value of the machines, equipments and plants were very much on record-moreso, the Arbitrators had also personally inspected the work site and the godowns etc. both to ascertain that the machines, materials existed there, as also to ascertain to the valuation thereof. Thus, it could not have been said that the award given by the Arbitrators in that context was beyond the reference or vitiated by the non-consideration of the value of machines, equipment, etc. 39. And Shri Sarupria, learned counsel for the respondent-State contended that the infirmity attaching to the award was in fact that no issue was framed by the Arbitrators on this point; that the Arbitrators had not taken valuation of the plant. machinery; that the list of the plant, machinery, equipment, etc., were not available with the Arbitrators and that the entire plant. machinery and equipment had been removed by the appellants from the site. In this view of the matter, the Arbitrators gave Award for the machineries and equipments. 40. As stated earlier, there was specific claim and counter claim before the Arbitrators with respect to the plant, machineries and equipments and that the list of valuation of the plant and machineries coupled with the equipments and materials was made available to the Arbitrators by the respondent- State, itself, and as per its own statement of claims, only nine truck have been removed from the site and this fact had also been verified by the Arbitrators during their inspection. Confronted with the above situation the grievance made by Sri Sarupria is contrived in an attempt willy-nilly to have the award set aside. The attempt must fail. 41. As stated earlier, the learned subordinate Court set aside the award on the third ground, namely that the Arbitrators failed to disclose the reasons forming the basis of the award and that the award did not disclose the amount awarded separtely for each item or claim and further that the award did not even disclose the total amount of principal and interest awarded towards the claims and counter-claims respectively. 42. In this context, Shri Sarupria fairly and frankly conceded on behalf of the respondent that the law as it existed presently permits the Arbitrators to make a non-speaking award and therefore. Shri Sarupria did not propose to support the order dated August 11, 1987, which sought to set aside the Award on the ground of its not being a speaking award. Shri Sarupria did not propose to support the order dated August 11, 1987, which sought to set aside the Award on the ground of its not being a speaking award. Considerable and frank concession rightly made by Shri Sarupira is because of persistent authority or law of arbitration laid down in a cateno of decisions of the Apex Court of this Country such as in (9) M/s. Gungo Steel Furniture v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 378 ) ; M/s. Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukam Chand ( AIR 1967 SC 1030 ) ; (11) M/s. N. Chellappun v. Kerala State Electricity Board ( AIR 1975 SC 230 ) and the recent decision of the Apex Court passed on 19th August 1983 in (12) Indian Rare Earths v. M.N. Dastur and Co. (Appeal (Civil) No. 7030 of 1983) . 43. As a corollary to this well established proposition, the next question emerges for consideration is, whether the Arbitrators were in the instant case obliged to pronounce an itemwise or claimwise award. I must say that it has authoritatively been laid down in a plethora of decisions of the Apex judicial authority that unless the agreement for reference so provides, the Arbitrators are not obliged to give an itemwise or claimwise award, and that it is permissible for them to give a lumpsum award. 44. After an exhaustive consideration of almost all decisions bearing on the question presently evolved herein, the Apex Court in (13) Santokh Singh v. Union of India (Judgment Today 1987 (4) sep. 79) restated the settled propositions which emerged from the catena of decisions of the Apex Court undoubtedly in so far as they were relevant to the decision on the points arising for consideration in that matter A few of them are apt and relevant for the present purpose and may be extracted, in chronology. 45. In Smt. Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath, ( AIR 1963 SC 1677 ) , the Apex Court made the legal position clear saying that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express she decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference. (Vide (14) Re Brown and the Croydon Canal Co., (1839) 9 Ad and Ell 532 and (15) Jewell v. Christie, (1867) 2 CP 296) . (Vide (14) Re Brown and the Croydon Canal Co., (1839) 9 Ad and Ell 532 and (15) Jewell v. Christie, (1867) 2 CP 296) . Then, their Lordships observed as under : 'Further, as Parke, B. himself put it during the course of arguments in (1853) 138 ER 1244 : 'Unless the contrary appears the Court will presume that the award disposes finally of all the matters in difference fit and to repeat a sentence from the extract quoted earlier : 'Earlier where an award in made de praemissis, the presumption is, that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference; and his award will be held final, if by any intendment it can be made so." After considering the argument addressed to the Court in the light of the afore quoted consideration, their Lordships, in that case observed and held that the award therefore, on its face intended and purported to decide all the disputes raised for adjudication and therefore, the Court will assurne that he has considered and disposed of every claim made or defence raised. Then the Court added that since the award impugned expressly stated that it is made "de praemissis" i.e. of and concerning all the matters in dispute referred to the Arbitrator, there would be a presumption that the award was complete. In the net result, the principle of construction enunciated by Parke, B (quoted above) was held to have aptly covered the case. 46. Viewed in these considerations I may state that in the instant case, the award opens with the Para after setting out the reference which recites as under (which is reiterated by reproduction for the sake of convenience). In the net result, the principle of construction enunciated by Parke, B (quoted above) was held to have aptly covered the case. 46. Viewed in these considerations I may state that in the instant case, the award opens with the Para after setting out the reference which recites as under (which is reiterated by reproduction for the sake of convenience). "And now, therefore having applied our minds to the pleadings of the parties, their claims and counter claims, the oral & documentary evidences adduced and relied upon by the parties, and the arguments of the learned counsel of both the sides, and also the authorities cited by them in support of their arguments, and having given consideration to all the above, and after deliberations, we have arrived at the following decision and award as follows:- The above quotation clearly makes it explicit that the Arbitrators had both applied their mind and considered, each and every aspect of the matter and thus it world be unsafe to say that the award was incomplete or that the Arbitrators had tailed to decide any of the points referred to them. Thus, in view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court-unless so specifically required, the arbitrators were not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately but could deliver a consolidated award, no exception can be taken to the fact that the Arbitrators have not expressed their decision separately on each matter of difference. 47. In M/s. Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan Vs Hukumchand Mills Ltd., (AIR 1907 SC 1030 ), their Lordships observed that the Arbitrator could give a lump sum award he was not bound to give a separate award for each claim- his award on both fact and law is final. Their Lordship added that the Court cannot review his award and correct any mistake in his adjudication, unless an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. Their Lordship also took note of the decision of the Privy council in Champscy Bhara & Co. Vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., ( AIR 1923 PC 66 ) . Their Lordship also took note of the decision of the Privy council in Champscy Bhara & Co. Vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., ( AIR 1923 PC 66 ) . Thus it is explicit that the Arbitrators are not bound to give separate award for each item or claim and that their Award is final both with respect to the facts and law except on the ground of objection to the legality of the award being apparent on the face of it. In this view of the matter namely the Award has not even been challenged on the ground of error apparent on the lace of the record, it is not required to be examined at all and the only ground for challenge was that the Arbitrators had not given separate award for each claim or item but as evident from the above narration of position of law there was no such requirement. 48. In (16) Union of India v. Jai Narayan Mishra, ( AIR 1970 SC 753 ) , the High Court held that the award suffered from a patent ambiguity for the reasons as the dispute consisted of 29 items of claims and a counter claim the arbitrator should have made an award in respect of all the items separately or in combination or should have made a lump award in respect of all the items. However their Lordships of the Apex Court showed inability to accept the aforesaid line of reasoning and it was observed that the ward on the face of it professes to be of and concerning all matters submitted to the arbitrator. Reliance was also placed on English law and decisions of Privy council. And it would be merely adding to the length of this judgment to recapitulate all those decisons and it is better to avoid that exercise save and except thus referring to the latest decision on the subject in Santokh Singh v. Union of India (Judgment Today 1987 (4) SC 79) , from which the following observation may be extracted: "There is no doubt or difficulty to the law applicable, the impugned award being for a lumpsum in view of the cases of Chamsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning Balaji & others and Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd v. C. Raja ekbar Rao . v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning Balaji & others and Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd v. C. Raja ekbar Rao . We have accordingly indicated to the appellant who argued his case personally, that it was not open to the court to question the correctness of the adjudication made by the learned Arbitrator and that the awards were binding on the parties. The learned arbitrator has rendered a lumpsum award with respect to the disputes arising out of the three contracts aforesaid. but he was required in view of the specific conditions contained in para 6 of the cell 70 to deal with each item of claim separately and to make an award thereon. In view of this, it cannot be doubted that there is an error apparent on the face of record within the meaning of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act." This recent decision clearly lays down that in normal circumstances a lumpsum award cannot be interfered with by the Court and that a lumpsum award can be interfered with only if it is contrary to the terms of reference. In view of the admitted position that in the instant case, the reference did not provide for a separate claimwise or itemwise award and that the reference in fact on the contrary provided that, "the arbitrators will give only one composite award in all the disputes claims referred to them by both the parties", it is clear that the lumpsum award pronounced by the Arbitrators was in accordance with the arbitration law. 49. The same crux of the matter has been the subject mattes of intensive examination by different High Court of this country in a catena of decisions wherein the High Courts formulated propositions emerging from an analysis and examination of earlier decisions and precedents as extracted above. 49. The same crux of the matter has been the subject mattes of intensive examination by different High Court of this country in a catena of decisions wherein the High Courts formulated propositions emerging from an analysis and examination of earlier decisions and precedents as extracted above. And it is better to recapitulate all those decisions save and except referring to the latest decision on the subject, of the Bombay High Court in (11) Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd v. M/s Mohinder Singh and Company (AIR 1985 Bombay 381) , wherein it has been held as under: "There is nothing in the Arbitration Act and the law as it stands which makes it obligatory on an arbitrator, whether he is given summary powers or not, to adjudicated each claim separately or to give a reasoned award unless of course the parties require him to do so by the terms of the reference, it is enough if he gives a lumpsum award without disclosing how he arrived at the amount. He is bound to give no reasons nor lay down principles on which he has based his decision (Madanlal Roshalal Vs Hukumchand Mills. AIR 1967 SC 1060 . Bungo Steel v. Union of India. AIR 1967 SC 378 and N. Chellappan v. Kerala S. E. Board, AIR 1975 SC 230 ) . On the contrary. it is when the arbitrator gives reasons or lays down principles on which he has based his decision, that the award becomes vulnerable to the scrutiny of the Court." and I, myself, confine to only refer the authorities hereunder without recapitulating what has been precedented in those decisions: 18. U.P. State Electricity Board v. Vijay Pictures (AIR 1981 Allahabad p. 34) ; 19. Kali Charan Sharma Vs Municipal Corporation (AIR 1981 Delhi 301) ; 20. M/s. N.P.C.C Ltd. v. Madhusudan, (AIR 1979 Gauhati p. 62) ; 21. M/s. Steel Co. (Construction) Vs Union of India (AIR 1976 Patna 334) ; 22. G.R. Bhargava & Sons v. Brij Mohan Sharma (AIR 1972 Delhi p. 242) ; 23. Shivlal Prasad v. Union of India (AIR 1975 MP 10) ; 50. M/s. N.P.C.C Ltd. v. Madhusudan, (AIR 1979 Gauhati p. 62) ; 21. M/s. Steel Co. (Construction) Vs Union of India (AIR 1976 Patna 334) ; 22. G.R. Bhargava & Sons v. Brij Mohan Sharma (AIR 1972 Delhi p. 242) ; 23. Shivlal Prasad v. Union of India (AIR 1975 MP 10) ; 50. Viewed in the light of the above notions and precedents, the arbitrators were neither required to make any separate itemwise or claimwise award nor required to disclose separately the total amount awarded against the claims and counter-claims or the amount and the period for which the interest was award etc. In these circumstances and settled legal position the finding arrived at by the learned subordinate court on the above premises on failure to do so, is per se erroneous and illegal. Moreover, it was not at all necessary for the Award to discuss any detail whatsoever with respect to the basis thereof, and that a lumpsum amount could be validly awarded both with respect to the claims and counter claims Thus, the impugned order deserves reversal. 51. Next and last but not least attempt of wrangle by Shri Sarupria in the field of legal gimmicks is that the Award of interest was erroneous as the interest has been awarded against the amount claimed and awarded by way of damages. 'That is also fallacious. This grievance made by Shri Sarupria is merely a red herring sought to be laid across the trail. It may be stated that this plea was never raised either in the objection petition or before the District Judge and in view of that, the respondent-State is not entitled to raise the same at this stage.As per the contention of the appellant, the said plea of the respondent appears to be incorrect and misconceived and baseless inasmuch as the appellant in fact never sought interest on the amount of claim by way of damages. The appellant had in fact specifically contended in the course of hearing before the Arbitrators that the interest was not sought by them on the amount claim a as damages for the defaults made by the respondents. The eat-act of which is stated here under : "The claimants' counsel stated that the amount of claim as damages may not be included in the interest calculations. The eat-act of which is stated here under : "The claimants' counsel stated that the amount of claim as damages may not be included in the interest calculations. Items/claims/on which I claim interest may be considered in the grant of interest are B-I, B-2, B-3, B-7, C-l, C-2, D-1, D-3, D-4, D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8, E-3, E-4, E-5 to E-13, E-15, E-16, E-18, E-19 and E-20. We do not claim interest on our claim A?. This is my prayer. Law does not require it to be itemwise. Items not pressed by the claimants need not be allowed for interest". In view of the aforesaid contents of the proceedings before the Arbitrators, it is clear that the interest on the amount of damages was not claimed by the appellants. In view of this fact it can be assumed that while granting interest. the Arbitrators could have considered the aforesaid admission of the appellant in not pressing the aforesaid interest on the amount of damages and the interest which has been awarded by the Arbitrators is not for the amount of damages claimed by the appellants. The award being non-speaking on this point and being totally silent on the question as to the basis of the amount awarded as interest the respondents cannot speculate the basis on which the interest might have been awarded and challenged the award of interest on that basis. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-State that the Arbitrators had no power to award interest during the pendency of the proceeding. This contention of the learned counsel is also not tenable, in view of the principles laid down in Firm Madanial Roshanlal v. Hukumchand, ( AIR 1967 SC 1030 ), wherein it has been observed as under : "One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled to pendente lite interest. The Arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could award pendente lite interest just as a Court could do so under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Though in terms. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. Though in terms. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act, 1940, The contention that in an arbitration in a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite interest must be rejected." In the present case. the appellants claimed interest under Item F or their claim. In view of the decision quoted above it was obligatory on the part of the Arbitrators that they would have decided the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to the pendente lite interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the Arbitrator was not fettered. Now, the question emerges is as to whether the amount of interest awarded was reasonable. In the Award it has not been calculated by the Arbitrators. The lumpsum interest has been awarded by the Arbitrators. In view of the foregoing discussions. on the question of amount of interest, I am of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to get interest but, the question is what should be the rate of interest. As stated earlier, the Arbitrators have not decided the rate of Interest. In these circumstances, 1 think it just and proper to define a reasonable rate of interest which is to be awarded to the appellant-Company. While quashing the lumpsum interest to the tune of Rs. 17,92,957/- it will be just and proper to award interest to the appellant-Company on a sum of Rs. 75,41,755/- @ 5% p.a. from 12.1.1982 the date when the claim was filed by the appellant, to the date of Award, i.e. 5,12.1985. 52. Faced with the above situation Shri Sarupria then contended that the Award was also vitiated on the premises that the Arbitrators had failed to decide the claim A-1 which was distinct and separate from their claims. Perverse, expostulates Shri Sarupria Such an exercise is his futile one because nothing of the kind was raised in objection petition or before the District Judge and this cannot be permitted at this stage. Perverse, expostulates Shri Sarupria Such an exercise is his futile one because nothing of the kind was raised in objection petition or before the District Judge and this cannot be permitted at this stage. The fallacy of such an exercise is moreso apparent from the fact that the very first part of the award was with respect to claim No. A-I the relevant part is extracted below : "The respondents (State of Rajasthan) committed breach of contract and were also guilty of wrongful revocation of the agreement. The actions taken under clauses 2 and 3 of the contract conditions were wrong and unjustified." 53. However, Shri Sarupria says that the award was vitiated both by non-application of mind and non- consideration of material documents. But, except as referred to in the context under order dated August 11, 1981 and already discussed herein before Shri Sarupria was not able to spell out any new limb of arguments in support of his contention (supra) and thus any further discussion would be merely exhortation adding to the length of this judgment. On the contrary, an abstract allegation about the award being vitiated by non-application of mind and non-consideration of documents etc. is an exercise of fallacy in the absence of any details as to the basis of such a contention namely disclosure of the facts on which the plea of non-application of mind or non-consideration of documents was made. Nothing of the kind. The very basis of the deductive piece of logic resorted to by Shri Sarupria is fallacious. 54. Shri Sarupria on the above premises, relied on the following decisions: 24. A. Irani v. State of M. P. ( AIR 1974 MP 199 ) ; 25. Orissa State Electricity Board v. Jaya Shree Chemicals ( AIR 1980 Ori. 20 ) ; 26. Fertilizer Corpn. of India v. Bharat Paints (AIR 1986 Ori. p. 8) ; 27. M/s. Alopi Prasad v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 588 ) ; 28. K.P. Poulouse v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1975 SC 1259 ) ; 29. Rohtas Industries Vs Staff Union ( AIR 1976 SC 425 ) ; and 30. Union of India Vs J. P. Sharma (AIR 1965 Rajasthan p. 99) . 55. M/s. Alopi Prasad v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 588 ) ; 28. K.P. Poulouse v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1975 SC 1259 ) ; 29. Rohtas Industries Vs Staff Union ( AIR 1976 SC 425 ) ; and 30. Union of India Vs J. P. Sharma (AIR 1965 Rajasthan p. 99) . 55. A plain reading of these cited decisions, coupled with viewed in the context of law of arbitration, and the decisions of the Supreme Court, shows that Shri Sarupria's attempts are as fallacious and untenable as his reliance on these authorities is, misplaced. What particular authority shall apply to a given case must depend on the facts and circumstances of that case. Thus, these authorities can avail the respondent nothing. 56. To a querry made by me. Shri Sarupria also conceded that each and every minute detail brought before the arbitrators was not required to be discussed in the award by the arbitrators, and that the Court was not required to examine as to why amount had been awarded and the Court could only examine as to whether the correct procedure had been followed by the arbitrators Shri Satupria any how did not refer to any specific procedure infirmity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. It is only contended after when adverse situation has arisen. In the light of the discussion earlier, there is nothing to commend any more. That is the end of the journey. 57. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The appeal is allowed. I set aside the judgment dated August 11, 1987 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur City. Jaipur in civil misc. (Arbitration) case No. 1/86. And, I pass a decree in favour of the appellant to the effect that, the respondent State of Rajasthan will pay to the appellant (M/s. R.S. Sharma & Co.) a sum of Rs. 75,41,755/- (Rupees seventy five lacs forty one thousand seven hundred fifty five only) in full settlement of the claims and counter-claims, that, the respondent State of Rajasthan would pay interest @ 5% p. a. on the amount of Rs. 75,41.755/- and this interest is to be paid for the period from 1.8.82 to 5.12.1985. 75,41,755/- (Rupees seventy five lacs forty one thousand seven hundred fifty five only) in full settlement of the claims and counter-claims, that, the respondent State of Rajasthan would pay interest @ 5% p. a. on the amount of Rs. 75,41.755/- and this interest is to be paid for the period from 1.8.82 to 5.12.1985. The respondent State of Rajasthan and its department are directed to pay the aforesaid principal amount alongwith interest within a period of three months from today failing which the appellant-Company shall be entitled to the payment of simple interest @ 12% (twelve percent) per annum calculated on a sum of Rs. 75,41,755/- reckoned from the date of the Award. In view of the peculiar circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******