Hansaria, J. — The appellant was involved in a motor accident on. 5.10.67. He was then aged about 31 years. On the ill fated day he was travelling from Shillong to Guwahati by a bus belonging to the .State Transport Department of the Government of Assam. The accident took place -about 9 miles away from Guwahati. At that place there was a collision between the bus and a truck coming from opposite direction. In the accident the appellant suffered fractures of different bones including the neck of right femur and right fibula. The injuries were so grave that the appellant became permanently disabled. The accident has also affected his longevity. The great impact on the health, of the appellant can be well imagined by the fact that though the accident took place on 5. 10. 67 he could join his service only on 1. 12. 73 which shows that for more than 6 years he could not regain sufficient strength to join his service which was of Claims Inspector under the Railways. 2. The appellant claimed a sum of Rs. 5. 5 lakhs as compensation under the following heads : (1) Pain and suffering … Rs. 10,000.00 (2) Nervous shock … Rs. 10,000.00 (3) Loss of income in life … Rs. 3,00,000.00 (4) Loss on account of shortening of life and loss of enjoyment Rs, 1,50,000.00 (5) Medical expenses ••• Rs. 30,000.00 (6) Personal inconvenience … Rs. 50,000.00 Total Rs. 5,50,000.00 3. The learned Member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has however awarded a sum of Rs. 76,327.87 paise as below ; (1) For pain, suffering and nervous shock. ••• Rs. 20,000.00 (2) For loss of income ••• Rs. 21,000.00 (3) For loss on account of persona 1 inconvenience and shortening of life. … Rs. 30,000.00 (4) For medical expenses. ••• Rs. 5,327.87 Total Rs. 76,327.87 This apart, the entire amount has been made payable by the owner and insurer of the truck-the insurer having been made liable to pay Rs. 2000000 and the owner of the truck having been saddled with th$ liability to pay the remaining sum of Rs. 56,32787. … Rs. 30,000.00 (4) For medical expenses. ••• Rs. 5,327.87 Total Rs. 76,327.87 This apart, the entire amount has been made payable by the owner and insurer of the truck-the insurer having been made liable to pay Rs. 2000000 and the owner of the truck having been saddled with th$ liability to pay the remaining sum of Rs. 56,32787. Nothing has been awarded against the State, which had owned the bus at the relevant time which now belongs to the Assam State Road Transport Corporation, for short the Corporation, inasmuch as accor­ding to the learned Member the bus had not been driven in a rash or negligent manner. Feeling aggrieved with the quantum of award and exoneration of the State to pay compensation the appellant has filed this appeal. 3. The first question to be determined is whether there was any negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. On this aspect of the matter we have on record the deposition of PW. 1 Bandhuram Das and of O. P. W. No. 3 who was the driver of the bus. The evidence of PW. 1 who was travelling in the bus along with the appellant is that at about 7 P. M. on 5. 10. 67 when the bus was about 9 miles away from Guwahati he saw a truck coming from opposite direction which was in high speed, as was the bus. The truck hit against the right side of the bus as a result of which the timber of the body of the bus entered appellant's body and remained stuck there. The appellant became unconscious on the spot and later he was brought to Gauhati Medical College Hospital for treatment. According to PW. 1 the accident would not have occurred if any of the vehicles had been driven carefully. This witness had not been cross-examined on 7. 5.76 when his evidence was recorded. He was, however, recalled for cross-examination on 16.2. 78 when he soft paddled his earlier evidence and stated that he had seen the truck coming from front which had not switched off the light while crossing the bus. According to the later version given by this witness the bus was being driven at a speed of 25 miles per hour ; it was, not in high speed. 78 when he soft paddled his earlier evidence and stated that he had seen the truck coming from front which had not switched off the light while crossing the bus. According to the later version given by this witness the bus was being driven at a speed of 25 miles per hour ; it was, not in high speed. The accident took place as per the second version given by this witness due to the fault of the driver of the truck. According to this witness the bus driver could not see the road because of the light coming from front. 4. Relying on the evidence of this sole eye witness examined on behalf of the claimant, Shri Deka has urged that no fault can reasonably be found with the driver of the bus. Learned counsel has, therefore, supported the view taken by the Claims Tribunal to fortify which he has also referred to the evidence of the driver. Let us see what did the driver say who was examined as O. P.W. 3. According to the driver, on the date of occurrence the bus had started from Shillong at 5 P. M. and he stated in cross-examination that normally it took three and half hours to reach Guwahati from Shillong. This shows that if the bus would have been driven' in normal speed it would not have reached the place of occurrence which was only about 9 miles away from Guwahati at about 7 P. M which was within about two hours of leaving Shillong. This fact itself shows that the bus was driven in high speed. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that the bus was not being driven rashly. The further evidence of the driver is that near the place of occurrence he saw two trucks coming from Guwahati towards Shillong. At the place of occurrence the second truck tried to over-take the first one as a result of which it hit against the right side of the bus. It is further stated that the truck which had tried to overtake had no light. The driver further deposed that the light of the first truck dazzled his eyes because of which he could not see anything. 5. It is further stated that the truck which had tried to overtake had no light. The driver further deposed that the light of the first truck dazzled his eyes because of which he could not see anything. 5. The story of the two trucks coming from Guwahati side and one trying to overtake the other is a creation of the driver inasmuch as there is not even a whisper about it in the written statement filed on behalf of the State, in para 9 of which while describing the manner of accident mention has been made about one truck only. Even P.W.I who was cross-examined after about two years who was not asked anything about the presence of two trucks near the place of occurrence. It has been contended by Shri Chaliha that we may not accept this version of the accident given by the driver of the bus. It has also been urged by the learned counsel that if the eyes of the driver got dazzled, he should have stopped the vehicle instead of taking the risk of driving by guess, as deposed by the driver. Shri Dska would not, however, accept negli­gence of the driver of the bus in causing the accident inasmuch as he submits that the bus was being driven on its own side and it was encroachment of the road by the truck driver which had caused the accident. To support him in this regard our attention has been invited to Ext. A which is a sketch map of the place of accident which shows that of about 20 ft. width of the road the bus had occupied about 9 ft. leaving about 11 ft, for the truck. The sketch map was prepared by the Divisional Superintendent of the Corporation. If reliance on the map can be placed, the same would no doubt show that the bus was being driven on its correct side, but then that is not enough to hold that the driver of the bus was not negligent inasmuch as-driving it at high speed about which reference has been made earlier would itself be a negligent act on the part of the driver. We may state here that the road connecting Shillong and Guwahati is about 64 miles and is hilly and full of curves. We may state here that the road connecting Shillong and Guwahati is about 64 miles and is hilly and full of curves. It may also be mentioned that according to the driver of the bus, at the relevant time the bus was coming down and the truck was climbing up. This in itself would indicate that the truck could not have been in high spied at the relevant time, whereas the bus could have well been. 6. In view of what has been stated above we are of the view that the negligence of the driver of the bus was also one of the causes of the accident. The accident was thus a result of composite negligence of the two drivers. The Corporation cannot, therefore, escape its liability in the matter. 7. Let us now see what is the extent of liability of both the tortfeasors. In so far as compensation on account of pain, suffering and nervous shock is concerned the appellant had claimed Rs. 20,000- in all and has been awarded this amount. So the award on this count is upheld. 8. One of the main grievances of Shri Chaliha is related to the granting of only Rs. 21, 000/- towards loss of income as against the claim of Rs. 3,00,000/-. The learned Tribunal however awarded Rs.2l,000/- taking into consideration the fact that the claimant who was on leave for about 74 months after the accident had been given full pay and half average pay for about two and half years with the result that he did not receive any pay for about three and half years. As the monthly salary of the claimant-appellant at the relevant time was Rs. 500/- it was concluded by the Tribunal that the claimant suffered total loss of Rs. 21,000/-during the period he was on leave without pay. Shri Chaliha has urged that the claimant had been gi­ven leave without pay for a period of about five years one month and as such the total loss on this count was Rs. 30.500/-if the monthly loss is calculated at Rs. 500/-. We have ourselves gone thr­ough the calculation made by Shri Chaliha and we find that this submission is correct. Thus the loss during the period the claimant was on leave comes to Rs. 30,500/-. If nothing further would have happened we would have allowed compensation of Rs. 30.500/-if the monthly loss is calculated at Rs. 500/-. We have ourselves gone thr­ough the calculation made by Shri Chaliha and we find that this submission is correct. Thus the loss during the period the claimant was on leave comes to Rs. 30,500/-. If nothing further would have happened we would have allowed compensation of Rs. 30,500/ only on this count, but then the subsequent event which is of seeking voluntary retirement by the claimant w.e.f. 1.6.8"' cannot be overlooked or ignored inasmuch as the same was sought due to "continuous ill health and partial disability (caused in the motor accident on 5.10. 67)" as stated in the letter of voluntary retirement a copy of wh­ich is filed before us. In the normal course the claimant would have reached the age of superannuation in 1994 and as such he has lost his full pay for about 8 years. At the time when he so­ught premature retirement the salary of the petitioner was Rs.3, 000/-p.m. and as such the annual loss comes to Rs.36,000/-. Shri Deka urges that from this loss the monthly pension granted to the petitioner @ Rs. 1220/-p,m. has to be deducted inasmuch as the app­ellant cannot claim full salary and pension at the same time. Though in this connection Shri Chaliha has referred to Saminder Kanr vs. Union of India, (1986) IGLR 446, the same cannot assist the appellant inasmuch as what has been held in the aforesaid decision is that family pension was not deductible inasmuch as that pension would have been payable even in case of natural death. In the present case we are not concerned with family pension but with the pension of the incumbent himself which has to be deducted because as already stated above an incumbent cannot claim both full salary and pension. The monthly loss is therefore .assessed at about Rs. 1800/- and the yearly loss thus comes to Rs. 21,600/-. Loss for eight years would thus be about Rs. 1,73,000/-. If to this sum we add Rs. 30,500/-which the claimant had lost during the period of his absence from duty, the total loss on this count comes to about Rs. 1,93,000/-. 9. Shri Deka has urged that the total loss of income of the appe­llant may not be taken as Rs. L,93,000/-but should be assessed at about three and half times of the yearly salary. 30,500/-which the claimant had lost during the period of his absence from duty, the total loss on this count comes to about Rs. 1,93,000/-. 9. Shri Deka has urged that the total loss of income of the appe­llant may not be taken as Rs. L,93,000/-but should be assessed at about three and half times of the yearly salary. This submission has been made by the learned counsel on the basis of O. P. Bhandari ts. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 111 wherein the multiplier of 3.33 was made applicable while deciding how much of compensation should be paid to a workman in lieu of re-instatement. In that case also the date of superannuation was more than 8 years away and therefore the claim for full salary and allowances till the date of superannuation was not held to be reasonable. We do not, however, think if the aforesaid basis of calculating compensation to be paid to a workman in lieu of re­instatement would provide a safe guard to determine compensation for a case like the one at hand. But then some deduction has to be made on account of lump sum payment and also because of uncertainty of life. According to Hira Devi vs. Bhaba Kanti, AIR 1977 Gauhati 31, which is a Full Bench decision of this Court, 20% has to be deducted towards uncertainty of life and 10% on account of lump-sum payment. If 30% is deducted from Rs. 1, 93.000/-, the total amount payable comes to-nab-out Rs. 1,29,000/- which can be rounded to Rs. 1, 30.000/. We shall grant this amount to the appellant on account of loss of income. 10. The next head of compensation is relatable to medical expenses. In this connection the claimant prayed for compensation of Rs. 30,000/-but as vouchers worth Rs. 5,327.87 were produced, the learned Tribunal granted this amount. It is stated by Shri Chaliha that it was too much to expect from the claimant to preserve all the vouchers of payments made by him during the course of more than six years he was under treatment after the accident. Not only this, it appears from the evidence of P.W.2 Dr. Chakravorty that the 'claimant was in touch with the doctors even by 1977. Not only this, it appears from the evidence of P.W.2 Dr. Chakravorty that the 'claimant was in touch with the doctors even by 1977. Reference has been made to Rukmani Devi vs. Basantilal, 1984 ACJ 548 in which on the failure of the claimant to produce receipts of medical expenses denial of reasonable expenditure was not upheld. We are of the firm opinion that keeping in view 10 years period during which the claimant was in constant touch with the doctor he must incur expenditure much more than Rs. 5,327.87. During this period the claimant was required to go to Patna on three occasions to have consultations with and treatment of Dr. Mukhupadhy. We are, therefore, of the view that this amount needs enhancement and we do so by fixing Rs. 20,000/-as payable on this count. 11. The last head of the amount claimed as compensation is relatable to the loss on account of shortening of life, loss of enjoyment and of personal inconvenience. A total sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- has been claimed on this count but the learned Tribunal has awarded Rs. 30.000/-. On this aspect of the case we may refer to the evidence of P.W. 2 besides what has been deposed by the claimant himself. As per P.W.2 who at the relevant time was Resident Surgeon, Orthopedic Department, Silchar Medical College, the claimant's right knee and hip will never come back to normalcy and he would face much difficulty in walking. According to this witness the claimant is crippled and he will remain as such for the rest of his life. As per this witness the claimant who was around 31 years at the time of occurrence would not be able to perform normal sexual activities. The further opinion of P.W. 2 is that the health of the claimant may deteriorate further and his longevity may be shortened. According to the claimant though before the accident he could drive his own car but after the accident he has been required to engage driver. This is likely to continue throughout his life. The difficulty and distress caused to the claimant can well be imagined by the fact that he had to go on voluntary retirement due to ill health and partial disability. Nobody would normally like to leave his job if there be no compelling circumstances. This is likely to continue throughout his life. The difficulty and distress caused to the claimant can well be imagined by the fact that he had to go on voluntary retirement due to ill health and partial disability. Nobody would normally like to leave his job if there be no compelling circumstances. The job was quite respe­ctable as at the time of going on voluntary retirement he was draw­ing a salary of Rs. 3,000/- p.m. Keeping in view all these we are of the view that sum of Rs. 60.000/- in place of Rs. 30.000/-awarded by the learned Tribunal can safely be awarded on this count. 12. The total amount payable thus comes to Rs. 2,30,000/- as below : (1) Pain, suffering and nervous shock … Rs. 20,000|- (2) Loss of income … Rs. L.30.000/- (3) Medical expense … Rs. 20,000/- (4) Shortening of life, loss of enjoyment and personal inconvenience. … Rs. 60,000/- Total Rs. 2.30,000/- 13. The question is who should be called upon to pay this amount. It would depend upon the question whether the two driv­ers can be regarded as joint tortfeasors. The submission of Shri Chaliha is that they are so, and hence the liability has to be borne jointly and severally by the owners of the truck and bus. It is settled law that in case of joint tortfeasors the liability is joint and several. In this connection we may refer to Lakshmamma vs. C. Das, 1985 ACJ 199 wherein it was stated in para 21 that in case of composite negligence it is not necessary to apportion the neglig­ence but an award can be passed against all the joint tortfeasors making the liability joint an I several. In coming to this conclusion reference was made to K. Gopalkrishnan vs. Sankara Narayanan, 1969 ACJ 34 (Madras) ; Golok Chandra vs Konsalya Nayak, 1978 ACJ 48 (Orissa); Karunakar vs. Sarojini, 1980 ACJ 121 (Orissa ; A. Shivarud-rappa vs. General Manager, Mysore Road Transport Corporation, 1973 ACJ 302 (Mysore) and K. V. Narasappa vs. Kamalamma 1969 ACJ 127 (Mysore). This view has also been adopted in General Manager, Karnataka State Transport Corporation vs. Krishnan, AIR 1981 Karn-ataka 11; United India Fire and General Insurance Co. vs. U.E. Prasad, AIR 1985 Karnataka 160. This view has also been adopted in General Manager, Karnataka State Transport Corporation vs. Krishnan, AIR 1981 Karn-ataka 11; United India Fire and General Insurance Co. vs. U.E. Prasad, AIR 1985 Karnataka 160. In this connection we may also refer with profit to tie observations made in para 24 of Hira Devi (supra) where it was stated that in case of composite negligence as distinguished from contributory negligence, there can be no apportionment of damage. It was further pointed out that in case of joint tortfeasors the claimants are entitled to a decree against both the tortfeasors. 14. The same view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rehana vs. Abdul Majeed, 1985 (2) TAC 32 in which case while referring to distinction between composite negligence and con­tributory negligence it was stated that when a person is injured without any negligence on his part but as a result of combined effect of negligence of two other persons it is not a case of cont­ributory negligence but is what is styled as composite negligence. In such a case the persons causing injury can both be sued for the whole damage. Similar views have been expressed in Flemings' Law, of Torts, 5th Edn. Pp. 239-40 ; and Salmond's Law of Torts, 17th Edo. P. 443. 15. Shri Deka has, however, drawn our attention to a Bench decision of this Court in Jamuna Singha vs. Ram Chandra, 1983 TAC 447 in which the responsibility for the accident was placed equally on both the car and truck drivers and the awarded amount was apportioned equally between the two insurers. This decision cannot really assist the respondents inasmuch as the award was passed in that case without adverting to the question posed in this case. 16. Important question is whether the present was a case of caus­ing injury to the claimant as joint tortfeasors or were the wrong doers several tortfeasors. A reference to standard text books on Law of Torts shows that a tort is imputed to several persons as joint tortfeasors in at least three instances viz. (1) agency, (21 vicarious liability and (3) concerted action. For the case at hand the first two instances are not applicable. As to the third the critical element is that those participating in the commission of the tort must have acted in furtherance of a common design. (1) agency, (21 vicarious liability and (3) concerted action. For the case at hand the first two instances are not applicable. As to the third the critical element is that those participating in the commission of the tort must have acted in furtherance of a common design. To put it differently there must be "concerted action to a common end" not merely "a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage”. Broadly speaking this means a conspiracy with all participants acting in furtherance of the wrong though it is probably not necessary that they should realise that they are committing a tort. This is how the law has been put at page 237 of Fleming's Law of Torts, 5th Edn. In Salmond's Law of Torts this aspect has been dealt with at page 442 of 17th Edn. As per Salmond persons are deemed to be joint tortfeasors whenever they are respon­sible for the same tort, that is to say, whenever the law for any reason imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. This happens in at least three classes of cases-namely, agency, vicarious liability and concerted action i.e. where a tort is committed in the course of a common action; a joint act is done in pursuance of a concerted purpose. For example, in Brooke vs. Bool (1928) 2 KB 578 the defendant, accompanied by one Morris, entered premises occupied by the plaintiff in order to search for an escape of gas. The defendant examined a gas pipe with a naked flame. Morris followed his example and the resultant expl­osion damaged the premises. The defendant was held responsible for the act of Morris. Thus in order to be joint tortfeasors there must be concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincid­ence of separate acts which by the conjoined effect cause damage. 17. In the Law of Torts by Street four categories of joint tortfeasors have been mentioned (see page 473 of 7th Edn). Thus in order to be joint tortfeasors there must be concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincid­ence of separate acts which by the conjoined effect cause damage. 17. In the Law of Torts by Street four categories of joint tortfeasors have been mentioned (see page 473 of 7th Edn). (a) master and servant in those cases where the master is vicar­iously liable for the tort of the servant; (b) where one person instigates another to commit a tort -, (c) where there is a breach of duty imposed jointly on two or more persons e.g. two occupiers are joint tortfeasors if they are sued by a visitor for failure to take reasonable care in respect of the premises jointly occupied by them ; and (d) where persons take "concerted action to a common end" and in the course of executing that joint purpose, any one of them commits tort. 18. According to Street, several or separate or independent tor­tfeasors are of two kinds-either those whose tortious acts combine to produce the same damage, or those whose acts cause different damages to the same plaintiff. An illustration of the first, reference has been made to the case of Drinkwater vs. Kimber, (1952) 2 KB 281 where a passenger in a motor car was injured in a collision between that car and another. Morris L. J. said that the two drivers both of whom were negligent were separate tortfeasors whose concurrent acts caused injury to the female plaintiff. Thompson vs. London County Council (1899; 1 QB 840 furnished another example of tortfeasors wno were not joint, but several, concurrent tortfeasors. In that case the plaintiff's house was damaged when its foundation subsided. This was caused by (1) negligent excavation by D 1, and (2) D 2 a water company negligently allowing water to escape from their main. We may lastly refer to Law of Torts by Winfield and Jolowicz (10th Edn). Toe question of joint several tortfeasors has been dealt with at pages 545 6. Joint tortfeasors are those persons when their sep­arate shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design. Reference, was made to Brooke vs. Bool (supra). We may lastly refer to Law of Torts by Winfield and Jolowicz (10th Edn). Toe question of joint several tortfeasors has been dealt with at pages 545 6. Joint tortfeasors are those persons when their sep­arate shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design. Reference, was made to Brooke vs. Bool (supra). But where two ships collided with each other because of the ind­ependent of negligence of each, of them, which were the facts in Kurask (1924) p. 140, and one of them then without further negli­gence collided with a third. It was heJ4 that owner of the third ship had independent cause of action against the two negligent ships. 19. The law relating to joint tortfeasors may thus be expiamed by stating that except in case of agency, or vicarious liability or imposition of joint duty, the tortfeasors must act ' in furtherance" of common design or concerted action to a common end to be regarded as joint tortfeasors. To give an analogy which is. Well known in criminal law joint tortfeasors would be one who acts as stated in section 34 of the IPC in furtherance of the common intention or in prosecution of the common object of which mention has been made in section 149 of the IPC. 20. In the present case none of the aforesaid elements is present. Two bus drivers cannot therefore be regarded as joint tortfeasors but they are in law several tortfeasors so, for the acts of one the other cannot be held liable jointly or severally. 21. This being the legal position, it has to be seen as to what was the degree of negligence of each of the two concerned drivers. From the facts stated above, we hold that they were equally liable and so we fasten the liability of each of the tortfeasors in the ratio of fifty-fifty, that is to say, that the owner of the truck shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,15,000/-(50% of Rs. 2,30,000/-) of which amount the insurer of the truck shall pay Rs. 20.000/-. Remaining sum (Rs. 1, 15,000/-) shall de paid by the Corporation. This apart, both the parties including the insurer shall pay interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, which was 5.8.68 till today. The interest would run 12% per annum from today. 22. 20.000/-. Remaining sum (Rs. 1, 15,000/-) shall de paid by the Corporation. This apart, both the parties including the insurer shall pay interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, which was 5.8.68 till today. The interest would run 12% per annum from today. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed as indicated above. J. Sangma, J — I agree.`