B. M. LAT, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER unexplained delayed First Information Report of four months could be a ground for acquitting the appellants? ( 2 ) THE appellants stand convicted and sentenced as under: (1) Appellant No. 1 Parma Under section 316, I. P. C and sentenced to the years rigorous imprisonment. (2) Appellant No. 2 Ramratan Under section 376/34, I. P. C. and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment. Under section 201, I. P. C. and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment, Under section 323, I. P. C. and sentenced to six month, rigorous imprisonment. Under section S06-B, I. P. C. and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment. All the sentences to appellant Ramaratan have been ordered to run concurrently. Against the aforesaid conviction and sentences the appellant have filed this appeal. ( 3 ) VIDE First Information Report (Ex. p. 7) dated 4. 2. 83, P. W. 1 Mst. Dukhia lodged a written complaint (Ex. p. 1) against the appellants alleging that when she was working in her field and cutting grass, appellant No. 1 Parma suddenly came over there, and over pouring her, committed rape at the point of knife the appellant No. 1 who was armed with a gun was standing nearby and giving filthy abuses to her. After reaching home, Mst. Dukhia Bai (P. W. 1) narrated the incident to her husband (P. W. 3) Haridin and to her father-in-law P. W. 4 Bahadur. The cause for delay in lodging the First Information Report was that she was criminally intimidated by appellant No. 2. However, a written complaint was submitted on 23. 11. 82 to Superintendent of Police, Satna and another to Station House Officer, Harijan and Adivasi Cell, Satna and thereafter First Information Report (Ex, p. 7,) was recorded on 4 2 83. ( 4 ) ON 8. 2. 83 the prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. (Smt) K. Majumdar vide her report Ex. P 8-A. The Doctor opined that the prosecutrix, was accustomed to sexual intercourse. Similarly, on 20. 2. 83. Dr. J. P. Pandey, examined appellant Parma and vide his report Ex P-5, he opined that Parma was capable for committing sexual intercourse. 2. 83 the prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. (Smt) K. Majumdar vide her report Ex. P 8-A. The Doctor opined that the prosecutrix, was accustomed to sexual intercourse. Similarly, on 20. 2. 83. Dr. J. P. Pandey, examined appellant Parma and vide his report Ex P-5, he opined that Parma was capable for committing sexual intercourse. After investigation, both the appellants were charge-sheeted under sections 376, 341, 323, 294 and 506-B, I. P. C. ( 5 ) THE accused/appellants abjured the guilt and stated that they have been falsely implicated in the alleged offences on account of village party factions. ( 6 ) THE trial Court by the impugned judgment dated 3. 8. 88 convicted the appellants as stated above against which the present appeal has been filed. ( 7 ) THE medical examination of the prosecutrix and that of the appellant Parma is not of much consequence, al after four months of the alleged occurrence the prosecutrix and the appellant Parma were medically examined. Besides this, the prosecutrix is a married lady and in her medical examination, Dr. K. Majumdar found that Mst. Dukhia was accustomed to sexual intercourse, being a married lady. Though the medical examination of the prosecutrix took place after four months of the incident, yet no other marks of injuries etc. were found on her person, which could relate back to the date of incident that such injuries were caused on account of any sort of resistance on the part of the prosecutrix. Similar is the case of appellant No, 1 Parma. This being so, the medical evidence negatives the offence alleged. ( 8 ) THE trial Court, while relying upon Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. Stare of Gujarat the decision of the Apex Court of the land in Sheikh Zakir v. State of Bihar wherein it is held that where the prosecutrix belonging to down trodden class, by threatening her, made to compel her for satisfying the lust of the accused; in such cases, even in the absence of medical evidence conviction can be based, convicted the appellants. ( 9 ) THE approach of the trial Court is not in confirmity with the ratio laid down in Bharwada Bhoginhhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat wherein vide para n of the judgment. ( 9 ) THE approach of the trial Court is not in confirmity with the ratio laid down in Bharwada Bhoginhhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat wherein vide para n of the judgment. Their Lordships have expressed the opinion: We are therefore of the opinion that If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the (probabilities factor does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason, to insist on corroboration except from the medical This being so, in such cases where the statement of the prosecutrix does not suffer from any basic, infirmity and the probabilities factor, only relying upon her statement, conviction can be based. ( 10 ) APPLYING the above test to the facts of the instant case, the statement of the prosecutrix itself suffers from numerous infirmities and even does not find corroboration by medical evidence. Their Lordships in Bhaginbhai's case (supra) expressed the opinion that corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account to the instinct of self preservation. On when the Probabilities factor is found to be out of tune. In the instant case, the prosecutrix P. W. 1 Mst. Dukhia Bai was definitely a major woman and what she has stated against the appellants, does not find, corroboration from any corner to level the charge as alleged by the prosecution against the appellant. Therefore, it appears that the trial Court has merely by reading the proposition of the above two cases convicted the appellants without looking to the ratio laid down in the above, cases. ( 11 ) THE next important question arises for decision, is as to what would be the legal impact of the delayed First Information Report. No doubt in Harpalsingh and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, It has been held that where the honour of the family is involved, then in such cases, at times, the members of the family take sometime to decide whether to take the matter to the court or not. In Harpal Singhs case (supra) delay of 10 days was held to be reasonable, being not fatal to the prosecution case. In Harpal Singhs case (supra) delay of 10 days was held to be reasonable, being not fatal to the prosecution case. But, in the instant case inordinate delay of four months in lodging the First Information Report has not been explained by the prosecution. On the face of the record, this position is not disputed that in village Tagmaniya at the time of the alleged occurrence there were two village Kotwals but the explanation offered for the delay was that the prosecutrix: was criminally intimidated by appellant No. 2 Ramratan who threatened her with dire consequences P. W. 4 Bahadur, the father-in law of the prosecution stated that just after 10 or 12 days of the alleged incident, the police had come to his village. If it was so, then, this P. W. 4 Bahadur could have very well in formed the police, about the said incident; but he neither disclosed the incident to the police nor did he lodge report in the police station, Malhar, which is hardly 10 kilometers away from village Tagmaniya. This gives reasonable doubt about the alleged incident of thus, the appellants deserves to get benefit of doubt on account of delayed First Information Report. In a recent decision in Awadhesh and another v. State of Madhya Ptadesh delay of few hours in lodging First Information Report when the police station was hardly two furlongs away from the p lace of incident, was held to be fatal. Therefore, Harpalsinghs case (supra) is of no help to the prosecution on, the face of the record when the police visited the village, as has come from the mouth of P. W. 4 Bahadur. ( 12 ) FROM the discussion aforesaid, the appellants deserve to be acquitted. The appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentences of the appellants, as stated above, are set aside. The appellants are on bail, their bail bonds stand discharged. .