JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 28-3-1987 passed by Sri Ramesh Prasad, Munsif East Muzzaffarpur in Misc. Case No. 42 of 1984 where by and where under he directed the petitioner to pay unto the opposite party a sum of Rs. 22, 746/- for occupying the building in question for the period 1-9-1984 to 11-12-1985 by way of damages calculated at the rate of Rs. 51/- per day. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner was a tenant in respect of the building in question for a fixed period. The said tenancy was created by an instrument dated 9-6-1983. The monthly rental in respect of the aforementioned building in question was Rs. 51/- However in the said instrument dated 9-6-1983 there was a stipulation that if the petitioner fails to vacate the house in question by 31-8-1984 he will have to pay the damages at the rate of Rs. 51/- per day. In terms of the aforementioned stipulation in the instrument dated 9-6-1983 the opposite party filed all application in the court of Munsif, East Muzzaffarpur purported to be in terms of section 18 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act. 1982. Section 18 of the said Act, reads as follows:- “18, Extension of period limited by lease - (1) If a tenant in possession of any building, held on a lease for a specified period, intends to extend the period limited by such lease, he may give the landlord at least one month before the expiry of the period limited by the lease a written notice of his intention to do so, and upon the delivery of such notice the said time shall subject to the provision of section 11 be deemed to have been extended by double the period covered by the original lease subject to a maximum of one year only. (2) Where the landlord to whom notice has been given under sub-section (1) wishes to object to the extension demanded by the tenet on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 11 or on the ground that the landlord has any other good and sufficient cause for terminating the lease on the expiry of period limited thereby, he may within fifteen days of the delivery of such notice apply to the Court in that behalf and the Court after hearing the parties may terminate the lease or extend the same for such period as it deems proper in the circumstances : Provided that the tenant shall not in any case to remain in possession of the building beyond the period permissible under sub-section (1). (3) If the tenant fails to vacate the building on the termination of lease or as the case may be on the expiry of the period fixed by the Court under sub-section (2), the Court shall on an application by the landlord, pass an order for enjectment, which shall be executed as a decree and may further order that the tenant shall pay to the landlord such amount as may be determined by it as daily compensation.” 4. From a perusal of the aforementioned provision it is absolutely clear that the same provide for an extra ordinary remedy for the benefit of the landlord. By reason of sub-section 3 of section 18 of the said Act, an order passed by a Civil Court is executable as a decree. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether an order passed under section 18 of the said Act, is for all intent and purpose, a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil procedure or not? 5 The question which also consequently arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order whereby and where under the learned court below has determined the quantum of compensation payable by the petitioner to the opposite party in terms of the provision of section 18 (3) of the said Act, is an appeal-able order or not? 6 Any order which is a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act, is normally appeal-able unless and until a contrary provision exists in the Code of Civil Procedure or in any other law for the time being in farce. 7. 6 Any order which is a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act, is normally appeal-able unless and until a contrary provision exists in the Code of Civil Procedure or in any other law for the time being in farce. 7. In terms of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure all decrees are appeal-able as provided for under the other provisions of the said Act. Any decree passed in a suit under section 11 of the said Act, is also appeal-able. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the instant case, the plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy as also for damages. Learned counsel therefore submitted that in view of the facts that a decree for eviction on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy by efflux of time come within the purview of section 11 (1) (e) of the said Act, the procedure as laid down under Section 14 (4) thereof must be followed. In such an event the learned counsel contends, only a revision petition would be maintainable from a decree directing eviction of tenant as provided for under section 14 [8] of the said Act. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in Narayan Pd. Tulsian-vs-Shital Prasad Saha & anr, Ramji sharana-vs-Krishna Chandra Khanna, the procedure which is to be adopted for disposal of such an application is a summary one and as such the impugned order passed is a revisional one. 10. The order passed under section 18 [3] of the said Act, cannot be said to be a decree within the meaning of section 2[2] of the Code of Civil Procedure and in this view of the matter, in my opinion, the provision of section 96 C. P. C. is not attracted. 11. According to the learned counsel a summary remedy has been provided for in terms of the aforementioned provision the same cannot take place of a suit. 12. The procedure as contemplated under section 14 [4] of the Act, can be taken recourse to only in a case where the landlord seeks a decree for eviction against his tenant on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy by afflux of time. 12. The procedure as contemplated under section 14 [4] of the Act, can be taken recourse to only in a case where the landlord seeks a decree for eviction against his tenant on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy by afflux of time. Such a procedure, in my opinion, is not available to a landlord who not only taken recourse to the summary proceeding as provided for under section 18 [1] of the Act, but also prays for a decree for damages on the ground that the tenant had continued to occupy the premised inspite of expiry of the period of tenancy. In any event as the application was filed under section 18 of the Act, the question of taking recourse to the special procedure as provided for under section 14 [4] of the Act, does not arise. 13. As it appears from the case at hand, the learned court below disposed of the application filed on behalf of the opposite party as a separate application. Such a separate application was evidentially maintainable under section 18 [3] of the said Act. 14. An order under section 18 [3] is executable as a decree but that does not mean that it becomes a decree within the meaning of section 2 [2] of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order passed by the Munsif on an application under section 18 [3] of the Act, is merely executable as a decree so that the landlord in whose favour such an order is passed is not driven to file another suit. An order which is executed as a decree on an application under special statute cannot be said to be a decree passed in a suit. 15. In Narayan Pd. Tulsian-v-Shital Pd. Saha and another, (Supra) it has clearly been held by the Division Bench that a summary proceeding under section 12 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 can not take place of a suit nor an application filed there under can take place of a plaint. Evidentially therefore an application which is to be disposed of in a summary manner cannot be said to be a suit and in that view of the matter any order passed there under although final by and between the parties, will not amount to a decree passed in a suit. Evidentially therefore an application which is to be disposed of in a summary manner cannot be said to be a suit and in that view of the matter any order passed there under although final by and between the parties, will not amount to a decree passed in a suit. Such order has been made executable as a decree, only for a limited purpose and it is not possible to give an extended meaning in respect thereof Reference in this connection may also be made to Ramji Sharan-vs-Krishna Chandra Khanna (Supra). In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this revision petition is maintainable. 16. Mr. Mazumdar, thereafter the contended that the learned court below has committed an error in granting compensation at the rate of Rs. 51/- per day merely on the basis of the agreement entered into by and between the parties to this civil revision application. 17. Mr. Mazumdar in this connection has drawn my attention to Butto Kristo-vs-Govindram, as also to Sasank Sekhar Pal and others-vs-Dinanath Gorain. 18. In these decisions this court has held that what is enforceable in the preliminary contract by and between the parties to the agreement and the consequences of the breach is the first contract was inter oven and was in the nature of a penalty and thus the same was not independent of the primary contract. 19. According to Mr. Mazumdar, although Rs. 51/- per day was stipulated in the agreement by way of damages but the said sum was not a reasonable one and terms of the provision of section 18 (3) of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the learned court below to come to all independent finding as to whether a sum of Rs. 51/- per day is a reasonable amount of compensation which should be awarded in favour of the landlord or not. 20. Mr. Maitin the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the rate of, damages fixed by the parties must be held to be a reasonable one. He drew my attention to the statements made in the agreement dated 9.6.1983 wherefrom it appears that the opposite party agreed to let out the premises in question on a monthly rental of Rs. He drew my attention to the statements made in the agreement dated 9.6.1983 wherefrom it appears that the opposite party agreed to let out the premises in question on a monthly rental of Rs. 51/- on the ground that the opposite party was to run an educational institution for some time Mr. Maitin has further drawn my attention to the fact that the opposite party had pleaded that a sum of Rs 51/- per day would be the normal rate of rent in respect of the building in question taking into consideration the place where it is situated. 21. In para 8 of its judgment the learned court below has held as follows:- “It is alleged by the applicant that first floor consisting of five rooms and one verandah was leased to the O. P. on a monthly rent of Rs. 51/- only because O. P. were carrying an education institution. This clearly indicates that applicants were charging much less than what would be the reasonable rent in the said locality for the said premises.” 22. In this connection Mr. Maitin has also referred to the case of Sri Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd.-v-Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in the said decision it was held as follows:- “Now, when parties name a sum of money to be paid as liquidated damages, they must be deemed to exclude the right to claim an unascertained sum of money as damages.” 23. There cannot be any, doubt that even if a sum of damages is fixed by way of contract which is to be paid by the erring party in case of breach in contract, such amount of damages, if penal in nature, must be a reasonable sum. The question as to whether an amount which has been fixed by the contract is reasonable or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. In the instant case as pointed out by the learned court below, parties themselves agreed that the aforementioned sum of Rs. 51/- per day would a reasonable amount. As a matter of fact even in the civil revision application no statement has been made on behalf of the petitioner that the finding of the learned court below in para 8 of the judgment and as quoted hereinbefore is incorrect or contents thereof contain error of records. 25. 51/- per day would a reasonable amount. As a matter of fact even in the civil revision application no statement has been made on behalf of the petitioner that the finding of the learned court below in para 8 of the judgment and as quoted hereinbefore is incorrect or contents thereof contain error of records. 25. In this view of the matter I am bound by the findings arrived at by the learned court below in the impugned order and I cannot interfere therewith in exercise of my jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 26. In the result this civil revision petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Application dismissed.