Judgment :- 1. The accused is the appellant. 2. The appeal arises from Sessions Case No. 40 of 1985 in the court of the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Trivandrum. 3. The facts of the case can comparatively briefly be stated because the only question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant-accused has been successful in establishing his plea of right of private defence: 3. The stabbing incident which resulted in the death of Salim, occurred in front of the shop of one Aliyarukunju situated at Kottoor Junction at about 5.30 p.m. on 26-11-1984. pws.1 and 2 who had worked for Salim as wood-cutters on that day, were being given their wages by Salim in front of the shop of Aliyarukunju which remained closed on that day. The appellant-accused was found standing in front of the said shop room. On seeing Salim with the money, the accused-appellant asked Salim to pay him the one rupee due to him. Salim told the accused that he will pay the amount but not then. The accused, then abused Salim. Salim thereupon told the accused not to abuse him on the public road. The accused immediately took out MO2 knife from his waist and asking him whether the road belongs to his father so' stabbed him. Salim tried to ward off the attack with his left hand which in that process got injured. Salim thereupon took a broken sweet-meat jar (fig which was seen in front of Aliyarukunju's shop and bit the accused on his head. The bottle broke into pieces, causing injuries on the head of the accused. Salim stabbed the accused with the broken piece of the jar in his band and moved thereafter towards the shop of pw. 3. The accused chased Salim and stabbed him with the knife, which stab however, was warded off by him with the help of MO 1 cycle wheel, he had picked up from the floor in front of the shop of pw.3. The accused managed to wrest MO1 cycle wheel from Salim and after throwing it away, he stabbed Salim with the knife at the left side of the neck near the collar bone. He repeated the stabs which resulted in the death of Salim. The above prosecution case is established by the evidence of Pws.1 and 3. The accused managed to wrest MO1 cycle wheel from Salim and after throwing it away, he stabbed Salim with the knife at the left side of the neck near the collar bone. He repeated the stabs which resulted in the death of Salim. The above prosecution case is established by the evidence of Pws.1 and 3. Recovery of the dagger from pw 6 on the basis of the information passed on by the accused-appellant corroborates the evidence of Pws.1 to 3. The doctor has opined that injury No. 12 could be caused by a weapon like MO2 and the same is sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. 4. Evaluating the evidence the Sessions Judge found that the accused-appellant "had no right of private defence in the circumstances of the case". 5. We want to make it clear that the law discussed below takes in its fold only the law pertaining to homicide committed se defendendo or what is known as homicide committed in defence of one's person: It is generally said that death inflicted by a man in self defence against an unlawful assailant would be a justifiable homicide. Bishop in bis Criminal Law has defined 'defence of one's person' thus: ".....a man may do what seems necessary to preserve himself from personal danger; with this limitation, that he must never take the life of a fellow-being assaulting him, when such fellow-being is no more than committing an assault; unless in the case of extreme necessity, as the only practicable method of saving his own life", 6. In American cases the right of self defence is generally stated thus: "If the person assaulted, being himself without fault, reasonably apprehends death or great bodily harm to himself, unless he kills the assailant, the killing is justifiable". The European Convention of Human Rights has recognised the principle that if someone makes a murderous attack on another, he should forfeit his right to life if that appears to be the only way by which the life of the victim is saved. The European Convention of Human Rights has recognised the principle that if someone makes a murderous attack on another, he should forfeit his right to life if that appears to be the only way by which the life of the victim is saved. The convention of Human Right thus provides by Art.2 that deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of the rule (contained in the same Article) namely "every one's right to life shall be protected by law" when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence. It is therefore relevant in this context to bear in mind the distinction between such a deadly assault and and an ordinary assault. Where the assailant intends just an assault the right of private defence does not exist. In such cases the person assaulted has no right to kill his aggressor and justify the killing on the ground of private defence. If the person assaulted can repell force by force or give blow for blow, then also he cannot justify homicide by pressing into service the plea of private defence. Yet another aspect which should be borne in mind is that the party assaulting must have taken some overt steps before the other is permitted to resist by force. In other words the person setting up this defence if found to be an aggressor, cannot sustain the plea. Suffice it to say that an aggressor cannot avail of this defence. Similarly there is no private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities. 7. Scanning through the literature on the right of private defence it is seen that private defence has sometimes been defined as prevention of crime. That is how the killing in the defence of others has been defined as prevention of crime. That is why it has been declared by judicial pronouncements that "there is a general liberty as between strangers to prevent a felony". (Vide In Re Duffy, 1967(1) Q.B. 63). The degree of force permissible however, should not differ from the degree offeree one could have in self-defence. It is so because when one acts in defence of his own person, that also in fact is acting in the prevention of crime. 8. (Vide In Re Duffy, 1967(1) Q.B. 63). The degree of force permissible however, should not differ from the degree offeree one could have in self-defence. It is so because when one acts in defence of his own person, that also in fact is acting in the prevention of crime. 8. Though the criminal law of modern times does not insist upon the observance by the person threatened with attack the technical rule about the duty to retreat before using force or at least fatal force, it may be a factor that may be taken into account in deciding the issue whether it was necessary to use force at all and whether the force used was reasonable. Whatever that he there is no rule of law which insists that a person attacked is bound to run away if he can. Elucidating this factor Widgery, L.J. in R. v. Julien, (1969(2) All E. R.856 at 858) has observed thus: "what is necessary is that he should demonstrate by his actions that be does not want to fight. He must demonstrate that he is prepared to temporise and disengage and perhaps to make some physical withdrawal;". The above elucidation notwithstanding, there may be instances where a person may, in some circumstances act without temporising, disengaging or withdrawing; yet entitled to set up self defence provided the conditions highlighted herein before exist. The of-quoted observation of Holmes J. in this context is apposite: "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence, of an uplifted knife". (See Brown v. US. (1921) 256 US. 335 at 343.) 9. The assaults which justify killing of the assailant are defined in the Indian Penal Code. S.100 and 101 deal with this. To complete the picture we shall reproduce them: (1) "Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; (2) Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; (3) An assault with the intention of committing rape; (4) An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; (5) An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting; (6) An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release". If the offence be not of any of the descriptions narrated above, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death of the assailant. (S. 101). 10. To sum up: Every person has the right of private defence even against the act of a person of unsound mind (S. 98) subject to the restrictions (highlighted in the preceding paragraphs) contained in S.99. It is not every assault but only assaults enumerated in S.100 and qualified by S.101 which would justify killing. However so far as assaults Nos.1 and 2 are concerned, the person concerned will forfeit the right of private defence if he exceeds the limitations namely (a) he bad not done more harm than that was necessary and (b) be bad a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. But in the case of assaults No. 3, 4 and 5, the party concerned shall establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the assailant had the intention of committing the offences highlighted thereunder, to sustain the plea of self defence. The assault shown as No. 6 however, comes under different group. There the person concerned in order to sustain plea of self defence, has to establish that the assailant had the intention of wrongly confining him under circumstances which would reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to public authorities for bis release. A reference in this connection to the rulings cited hereunder is profitable: Puran Singh v. State of Punjab (1975 Cr. L. J.1479(SC) : AIR. 1975 S. C. 1674; Brown v. United States (1921) 256 US 335; and Mc Inns (1971)3 All ER 295). The answer to the question whether a person having a right of self defence had used more force than that was necessary, however, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It should however be remembered that where two factions come armed with the resoluteness to settle a dispute by force and in the fight that ensued both sides receive injuries, no right of private defence arises; reason being that in a case of free fight both parties are aggressors. (See Onkarnath Singh, 1974 Cr. L. J. 1015 (SC). 11. Applying the above principles to the facts of the case it is clear that the appellant-accused being the aggressor is not entitled to set up private defence. (See Onkarnath Singh, 1974 Cr. L. J. 1015 (SC). 11. Applying the above principles to the facts of the case it is clear that the appellant-accused being the aggressor is not entitled to set up private defence. A reference in this connection to the evidence of Pws.1 to 3 is profitable. On going through the cross examination of these witnesses it is clear that their credibility has not been shaken. The learned prosecutor is right when be argues that the deceased after the first attack by the appellant-accused in front of the shop of Aliyarukunju, retreated and on seeing the appellant chasing him, picked up MO.1 with a view to shield himself from further attacks. The accused appellant wrested the cycle wheel MO. 1, threw it away and then inflicted number of stab injuries resulting in the death of Salim. 12. The private defence set up by the accused-appellant therefore has rightly been rejected by the Sessions Judge. 13. No other questions arise for consideration. For the reasons stated above the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the same is dismissed. Dismissed.