ORDER C. P. Sen. J. 1. This is a petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution filed by Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan, who died during pendency of the petition and his L. Rs. have been brought on record, praying for quashing of the temporary injunction granted by the trial Court and affirmed in appeal. This Order will also dispose of MCC No. 74/86 (Ashfaq Ahmad & others v. Nehru Singh & others) which is an application for taking action under Contempt of Courts Act against the respondents. 2. Original Petitioner Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan owned khasra nos. 189, 199, 201, 202, 230 247, 248, 19 and 21 area 42.52 acres in village Dhamdhoosar, Tahsil Goharganj, District Raisen. As he fell into arrears of Takavi dues, revenue recovery proceedings for Rs. 1055.19/- were started against him and the entire land was attached in 1958 and sold in auction on 20-3-1958 under Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1931, as arrears of land revenue. But the auction was set aside by Collector on 5-9-1958 and directed readction of the lands in blocks. Therefore, proclamation were issued and auction sale was held on the spot on 2-5-1962 by Naib Tahsildar and the auctions were knocked down for Rs. 3,200/- in favour of respondents 1 & 2 Nehru Singh and Lalaram. The Naib Tahsildar forwarded the papers to Tahsildar who accepted the bids on the same day The auction purchasers deposited 1/4th of the auction amount of Rs. 800/- on that day Sale certificate was issued on 23-6-1962. Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan filed an application before the Collector under Rule 44 of Scheduled of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, on the ground that Tahsildar was in error in confirming the auction sale when the balance amount of the auction money was not deposited by auction purchasers within the prescribed period of 15 days from the date of sale. The Collector by his order dated 21-5-1963 held that the case was governed by Bhopal State Land Revenue Act which was in force when the recovery proceedings were started and, as such, the application under Rule 44 of Schedule-I of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, was not maintainable. The application could also be not treated as one under section 153 of the Bhopal Act as it was not forwarded by Tahsildar. The application could also be not treated as one under section 153 of the Bhopal Act as it was not forwarded by Tahsildar. But in appeal preferred by Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan, the Additional Commissioner set aside the auction on 5-8-1964 after finding the auction sale to be void because the auction purchasers did not deposit balance 3/4th amount of the auction money within the prescribed period. Second appeal preferred by the auction purchasers to the Board of Revenue was rejected on 22-5-1967 on the ground that the case was governed under Bhopal Act which did not provide for any second appeal. The auction purchasers filed M P. No. 301/68 in this Court and by order dated 25-11-1968 this Court held that the auction was held under the 1959 Code and second appeal lay to the Board of Revenue. The case was, therefore, remanded for a fresh decision. The Board of Revenue on 17-7-1969 on reconsideration of the matter held that the sale took place on 2-5-1962 when 1/4th of the auction money was deposited and the balance 3/4th of the amount was deposited on 28-5-1962 and the deposit being not within the prescribed period of 15 days, the sale became void and of no effect. The contention of the auction purchasers that they were informed about confirmation of the auction by Tahsildar by notice dated 14-5-1962 which was received by them on 25-5-1962 and, therefore, the period of 15 days should be counted from 25-5-62 and as such the amount was deposited within the prescribed period of is days, was not accepted. The auction purchasers after learning about acceptance of their bids by Tahsildar had deposited 1/4th of the amount on 2-5-1962 itself and they had the knowledge of acceptance of their bids on that date itself. The auction purchasers then filed M. P. No. 213/70 which was dismissed on 6-8-1970 holding that the auction purchasers having not deposited 3/4th of the auction price within is days from the date of sale, the sale was bound to be set aside. The auction purchasers then filed M. P. No. 213/70 which was dismissed on 6-8-1970 holding that the auction purchasers having not deposited 3/4th of the auction price within is days from the date of sale, the sale was bound to be set aside. The auction purchasers then filed Special Leave Petition No. 463/71 which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16-1-1985 holding that on the finding of the Board of Revenue that 3/4th of the auction price was not deposited within 15 days of the date of sale, the sale has to be set aside, The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the Supreme Court found no reason the interfere with the order of the High Court. 3, Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan then filed an application before Naib Tahsildar, Goharganj, to restore possession of his lands to him, but immediately thereafter the auction purchasers, respondents 1 & 2, filed civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan and the State of M. P. that the sale has become absolute and for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession. It may be mentioned that no notice under section 80 CPC was served before filing of the suit. The case of the auction purchasers, respondents 1 & 2, seems to be that the Supreme Court did not take into consideration the pleas raised by these respondents and held without evidence and enquiry and without giving due consideration to the facts as borne on record and without adverting to the different proceedings regarding auction sales in civil Courts and the revenue Courts, affirmed illegal and baseless finding that 3/4th of the amount was not deposited in time. The Supreme Court further failed to see that the findings of the High Court, Board of Revenue and the Commissioner were no findings and the findings of fact not based on enquiry but on conjectures were without jurisdiction. The said findings are not binding on the civil Court, having been given by Revenue Courts and on revenue side and are void without jurisdiction, baseless, based on no evidence and given in flagrant violation of law, equity and natural justice. The said findings are not binding on the civil Court, having been given by Revenue Courts and on revenue side and are void without jurisdiction, baseless, based on no evidence and given in flagrant violation of law, equity and natural justice. The learned trial judge granted ad-interim temporary injunction on 2-4-1985 by directing the parties to maintain status quo and the temporary injunction was affirmed on 30-4-1985 after the trial Judge found that since there is a serious question to be tried as to whether the auction sale was validly confirmed by Tahsildar by relying on a decision of this Court in Shankarlal v. State 1978 JLJ 51 , and so there was a prima facie Case and the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs. Sarfaraj Ahmad Khan preferred an appeal before the District Judge who by order dated 19-11-85 affirmed the findings of the trial Judge and confirmed the temporary injunction. 4. After having heard the parties we are of the opinion that the respondents 1 & 2 have shown utter contempt to the decision of the Supreme Court and the trial Court and the appellate Court have shown their ignorance about the provisions of law and the binding nature of the decision of the Supreme Court and about the principles of res judicata contained in S. 11, CPC. To some extent, the Civil Judge can be excused that he had not much experience but that cannot be said of the District Judge who was a senior judicial officer. Both of them acted in a very casual manner without looking into the provisions and ignoring the decision of the highest Court which is the last Court for adjudication. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India Under section 11, CPC, no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Under Explanation IV, any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Under Explanation IV, any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Further, under Explanation VIII an issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised. It has clearly been held by the Supreme Court on the finding of the Board of Revenue that 3/4th of the auction price was not deposited within 15 days from the date of sale, the sale bas to be set aside. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on this ground and the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the order. The auction having been set aside, it is not open to the parties to reagitate the question as to whether the Tahsildar was justified in confirming the sale in view of the decision of the Supreme Court that the sale was void and of no effect. The same question cannot be reagitated in civil Court on the ground that the earlier decision was by a revenue Court. The decision of the revenue Court has been affirmed in writ petition by the High Court and further by the Supreme Court. That decision is as much binding as a decision in a former suit. The Supreme Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 151 held that the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. Again the Supreme Court in T.D. Mudaliar v. State of T.N. AIR 1973 SC 974 , held that merely because the aspect presented in the present appeal was not expressly considered or a decision given that will not take away the binding effect of the decision of the Supreme Court. Again the Supreme Court in T.D. Mudaliar v. State of T.N. AIR 1973 SC 974 , held that merely because the aspect presented in the present appeal was not expressly considered or a decision given that will not take away the binding effect of the decision of the Supreme Court. Recently, the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1353 has held about the binding nature of the decision of the Supreme Court under Art.141 and the plea that certain points were not urged cannot be raised The Supreme Court in Makhan Lal v. State of J. & K., AIR 1971 SC 2206 held that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on the respondents state and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether the majority of the present respondents were parties or not to the previous litigation. The Supreme Court in Narinder Singh v. Surjit Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1359 held that the duty of the High Court is to obey the order of the Supreme Court without finding fault with it. Again the Supreme Court in M/s Shenoy & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore AIR 1985 SC 621 held that the Supreme Court's decision is binding on all persons though they were not parties to the appeal. Again the Supreme Court in G. K. Dudani v. S. D. Sharma AIR 1986 SC 1455 held that principle of res judicata is applicable even though section 11 in terms does not apply to writ petition and the Division Bench of the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the Supreme Court's decision. The Supreme Court in M/s. Star Diamond Co India v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 179 held that the party need not be served with any notice or be a party to the said proceedings in order that the decision of the Supreme Court may be binding on him. However, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 & 2 relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1986 SC 1780 that when there is dismissal of special leave petition by Supreme Court by non speaking order, there is no bar for trial of the same issue in High Court under Article 226. That case is clearly distinguishable. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1986 SC 1780 that when there is dismissal of special leave petition by Supreme Court by non speaking order, there is no bar for trial of the same issue in High Court under Article 226. That case is clearly distinguishable. There, the State of Bihar had referred certain dispute to the labour Court which gave its award holding that the respondent no. 3 was entitled to be paid salary of the scale 1025-1625 with effect from 30-12-1970, that being the date on which his juniors were promoted to that scale. Against the award, the appellant moved the Supreme Court under Art. 136 by filing special leave petition which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by mentioning 'Special leave petition is dismissed'. Thereafter, the appellant approached the High Court by preferring a writ petition under Article 276 seeking to quash the said award and the High Court refused to interfere in view of the earlier rejection of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court. In that case, there was no decision on the questions raised in the Supreme Court and the Court simply dismissed the special leave petition. The effect of the dismissal only meant that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted. There was no adjudication as such. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that it is open to the High Court to examine the issues raised in the subsequent writ petition. In view of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs' present suit is not maintainable nor the application for temporary injunction. The plaintiffs have neither the prima facie case nor balance of convenience in their favour. In fact, after the auction sale has been held to be void, the possession of the respondents 1 & 2 is unauthorised and illegal and the petitioner is entitled to restoration of possession with damages. The findings of the trial Judge and that of the District Judge that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case and the balance of convenience was in their favour are perverse and not tenable in law. Therefore, the petition is allowed and the order of the trial Judge dated 2-4-85 & 30-4-85 and that of the District Judge dated 19-11-1985 are quashed. 5. Therefore, the petition is allowed and the order of the trial Judge dated 2-4-85 & 30-4-85 and that of the District Judge dated 19-11-1985 are quashed. 5. Regarding contempt, we are of the view that the respondents 1 & 2 are prima facie liable to be punished for disobeying the order of the Supreme Court. They themselves being the parties to the proceedings, it can be said that their filing of the present suit is nothing but abuse of the process of the Court and amounts to contempt of the Supreme Court and of this Court in view of the earlier decisions given by both these Courts. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the counsel for respondents 1 & 2 should also be hauled up for contempt, but then he has not been made a party in the contempt case though he is equally responsible for filing such a frivolous suit. Regarding the trial Judge and the District Judge, it cannot be said that they deliberately violated the decision of the Supreme Court but they hove shown utter ignorance about the provisions of law and they are warned to be careful in future. 6. Accordingly, the petition is allowed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 500/- if certified. The application for contempt is allowed against respondents 1 & 2, Nehrusingh and Lalaram, and each of them is punished under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and each of them is directed to pay fine of rupees one thousand or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.