JUDGMENT B. L. Yadav, J. 1. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has prayed for a writ of Certiorari quashing the disciplinary proceedings and the order dated 7th October, 1986 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition) debarring him from all remunerative works and benefits extended to a teacher by the Board of High School in connection with the examination. 2. In brief the facts are that the petitioner was the Principal of the institution but he was not appointed as a Centre Superintendent for the Intermediate Examination commencing from 11-3-86 to 8-4-86 and one Ajit Singh Yadav, a teacher of the institution was appointed as a Centre Superintendent but the latter did not join on account of some ailment and the petitioner worked as Centre Superintendent since 11th March to 14th March, 1986. On 14th March, 1986 petitioner handed over the charge of Centre Superintendent to one Hardev Singh Yadav who was next junior to the petitioner. All this was treated to be a misconduct on the part of the petitioner and he was served with a notice containing several questions about his misconduct (Annexure 11 to the writ petition), in which IIIrd question was as to why the petitioner did not hand over the charge to his next junior when the person appointed as Centre Superintendent did not turn up on the date of examination. Petitioner submitted the explanation and after considering the same impugned order dated 7-10-86 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition) was passed debarring the petitioner from all remunerative work of the Board of High School and Intermediate in connection with examination for 5 years. Mr. Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that no Regulation was framed in respect of such misconduct hence action taken against the petitioner is without any basis and that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing, therefore impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed. 3. Standing Counsel on the other hand urged that the provisions made under Chapter 6 of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act 1921, are the sufficient provisions for taking action against misconduct and questionnaire supplied to the petitioner was sufficient opportunity to him, and therefore, impugned order is not violative of principles of natural justice and is not liable to be quashed by this Court. 4. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties questions for consideration are as to whether there was any provision for taking action against the misconduct committed in examination work and whether the principles of natural justice have been complied with. As regards the first question regarding provision for taking action against the misconduct, suffice it to say that section 20 of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (for short the Act) provides power to the Board and Committees to make bye-laws consistent with the Act and the Regulations. Section 20 (1) (b) of the Act is to the effect that the Board and its Committees may make bye-laws consistent with the Act and the Regulations providing for all matters which consistently with the Act and the Regulations are to be prescribed by bye-laws, and section 20 (1) (c) of the Act provides that the bye- laws can be made for all other matters solely concerning the Board and its Committees and not provided for by the Act and the Regulations. Chapter 6, of the Regulations deals with the Examination Committees and Regulation 2 (1) provides that the examination committee may recommend in regard to the punishment to be awarded to the Examiners, Moderators, Tabulators and Screeners etc found guilty of any misconduct or negligence. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that there was no provision under the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder for taking action against the negligence or lapse on the part of the Centre Superintendent or the examiners etc. 5. Reverting to the next submission as to whether the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, it has to be considered that under Article 21 of the Constitution of India protection of life and personal liberty is a fundamental right. The concept of protection of life has been extended to the means of livelihood. The deprivation of remunerative work can be said to be deprivation of livelihood, but Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life except according to the procedure established by law. As such deprivation of petitioners livelihood i.e. deprivation of financial assistance from the Board for 5 years can be done in accordance with the procedure established by law. As such deprivation of petitioners livelihood i.e. deprivation of financial assistance from the Board for 5 years can be done in accordance with the procedure established by law. Provisions of section 20 (1) and the Regulation 2 (1) under Chapter 6 of the Regulations are the procedure established by the law. 6. So far as the principles of natural justice are concerned, it is a wide term and the maxim Audi Alteram Partem is to the effect that no one is to be condemned unheard and it is a part of the elements of fair trial and hearing included in the administrative jurisprudence. Nature of hearing depends upon the circumstances of the case. It is not an absolute right. Hearing actually does not mean actual or personal hearing but it is in so many stages apart from personal hearing. The opportunity of hearing must be assumed if the person concerned is given an opportunity of giving reply to the charges levelled against him. In other words person concerned must not be taken by surprise rather there must be full disclosure of all the points to be met by him In the instant case the Regulation 2 (1) under Chapter 6 and other relevant bye- laws of the Board do not admit the personal hearing. It appears that for the expeditious disposal of the cases of unfair means or misconduct by the Centre Superintendents etc. the rule of personal hearing was not enacted. The principles of natural justice are flexible and can be modified and adopted. Accordingly we are of the opinion that in a case where prompt action is to be taken against the negligent Centre Superintendent, the right of personal hearing was correctly curtailed. In Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , following observations were made which are relevant : "The rules of natural justice are not statutory Rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed...... it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion." 7. In the instant case the (sic) of the action necessitated that personal hearing need not be given to the petitioner. The questionnaire (Annexure 11) gave sufficient indication that all the circumstances relevant to the negligence or misconduct were to be explained by the petitioner. He replied the same and that was taken into consideration. The principles of natural justice do not admit actual personal hearing rather it admits, in view of the circumstances of the case, sufficient opportunity to explain the conduct. IN the present case that opportunity was afforded by serving questionnaire, and we think that under the circumstances of present case, it was sufficient opportunity of showing cause, which may be a little less than actual or personal hearing. 8. At the close Mr. Khare cited a Division Bench decision of this Court where petitioner Ajit Singh Yadav was exonerated on the ground that due to illness he could not join as Centre Superintendent. In that case ground, on which action against him was quashed, was entirely different. In view of the premises aforesaid we do not find any substance in the present writ petition. This petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case we refrain from making any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.