Judgment :- 1. Four persons claiming themselves to be worshippers of a temple applied for leave to institute a suit for settling a scheme for administration and management of the temple Leave was granted by the District judge as provided in S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short'the Cods'). The petitioner herein opposed the application for leave and hence he is aggrieved as the lower court granted leave. 2. The scheme is for the administration of "Kozhuvalloor Bhagavathi Temple". It is claimed that the said temple originally belonged to the Illom of which the persons who applied for leave are members. Under a partition arrangement, the senior most male member of the Illom was authorised to manage and administer the affairs of the temple. According to the applicants, the earlier efforts to confer the power of temple administration on the Hindu public of the locality did not succeed due to rivalry among them and the affairs of the temple reached a torpid stags when bickerings persisted for long. It is contended that a public religious trust has been created for the temple and it is for the administration of the said trust that a scheme has become a pressing need. Hence the applicator seeking leave to institute a suit. Petitioner, while resisting the application for leave, contended that the temple is being managed by N.S.S. Karayogam pursuant to a grant made by alt members of the Kozhuvalloor Madom conferring management of the temple on the aforesaid body. 3. Learned District Judge perused the averments set out in the draft plaint produced. As the suit is for settlement of a scheme for the administration of the temple, learned District Judge accorded leave on a prima facie satisfaction that a public trust of religious nature does exist in respect of the temple properties. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that leave ought to have been refused by the District judge for the main reason that a suit in respect of the temple properties, without the deity (or idol) on the party array, is cot maintainable. The draft plain contains names of eleven persons, but none of them represents the temple or the deity. The contention is that settlement of any scheme for the temple properties would be ineffective as the temple can at any time adopt the stand that it won't abide by such scheme. 5. The draft plain contains names of eleven persons, but none of them represents the temple or the deity. The contention is that settlement of any scheme for the temple properties would be ineffective as the temple can at any time adopt the stand that it won't abide by such scheme. 5. The decisions of the courts in India have almost uniformly held that a Hindu idol is a juristic person in whom the dedicated property vests. The Privy Council has also accorded the same status to a Hindu idol in Promotha v. Pradyumna (L R.52 A A. 245). The Privy Council has held that a Hindu idol is a juristic person and it has juridical status with the power of suing and being sued The following passage is extracted from B. K. Mukherjee on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (at page 157): "When property is given absolutely by a pious Hindu for worship of an idol, the property vests in the idol itself as a juristic person. This view, as I have explained in the first lecture, is quite in accordance with Hindu ideas and has been uniformly accepted in a long series of decisions of different High Courts in India as well as by the Judicial Committee". The Supreme Court has recognised the aforesaid legal status for a Hindu idol. It was held in Official Trustee v C.I. T. ((1974) 2 S.C. R 583) that a Hindu deity is a juristic person capable of holding property. In Deck Nandan v. Muralidkar (AIR 1975 S C. 133) Supreme Court held that an idol of a temple is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the temple vest in the idol. In Jogendra Nath Naskar v. C.I.T. (AIR 1969 S. C. 1089) a distinction was drawn between the spiritual and legal aspects of the Hindu idol. From the spiritual stand point the idol may be a symbol of the supreme God-head intended to invoke a sense of the vast and intimate reality, and as such the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the supernatural being. From the legal stand point, a deity is a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusted with possession and management of its properties. 6. From the legal stand point, a deity is a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusted with possession and management of its properties. 6. The position is thus well settled regarding the legal status of an idol in a Hindu temple. The properties of the temple belong to the deity symbolised by the idol. Learned counsel for the petitioner built up bis arguments on the aforesaid basis. He contended that a suit without such a juristic person on the party array ii of no consequence so far as the properties of the temple are concerned and no scheme could be effectively implemented without involving the temple or the deity. 7. But the question has to be viewed from a different angle altogether. In a suit where the relief claimed is for settlement of a scheme for administration of the temple properties there is no scope for contending that any of the properties did cot or does not vest in the idol. No doubt in suits where the right or title over the properties is questioned, the deity is a necessary party which could then be represented by a natural person having no interest or claim over such properties. But, in a suit where rules are sought to be framed for administration of the properties, the deity is not a necessary party. In Bimal Krishna v. Iswar Radha Eallav (AIR 1937 Calcutta 338) a contention was raised that in a suit for settling scheme in relation to a private debutter the deity is a necessary party. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court after referring to some decisions on the point held that where in a case none else except the parties to the suit were interested in the deity and when it was not suggested that the deity's interest would in any way be affected by adjustment of the rights of management among the shebaits inter se, the deity was not a necessary party to the suit. But when the Shebaits have any interest adverse to that of the deity, it is necessary that the idol should be represented by a perfectly disinterested person. But when the Shebaits have any interest adverse to that of the deity, it is necessary that the idol should be represented by a perfectly disinterested person. In Monindra Mohan v. Shamnagar Jute Factory (AIR 1939 Calcutta 699) a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed en behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question is a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship. Still later another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held in Upendra Nath v. Nilmony (AIR 1957 Calcutta 342) that in a suit for framing a scheme as between co-shebaits a deity is not a necessary party unless its interests are likely to be affected by the scheme proposed. Though these decisions are not direct authorities on the question whether the deity should be made a party in the suit for settlement of scheme, those decisions help to sort out the exceptions in which a suit cannot be maintained without the deity on the parly array. 8. It cannot be held in this case that the suit is bad without the deity (or the idol) on the party array. That apart, when such a question cannot be decided easily at the stage of considering the question of leave to file a suit, it is not proper to refuse leave, because, such questions can be decided in the suit as well. Granting leave does not mean that a suit cannot later be dismissed for non joinder of parties. For the aforesaid reasons, I am not inclined to interfere with the order challenged. Hence this C. R. P. is dismissed. Dismissed.