JUDGMENT Mohan, J. 1. The legal representatives of the original plaintiff who came to be impleaded pending suit by an order in I.A. No. 7800 of 1974 in O.S. No. 2125 of 1970 on the file of the City Civil Court are the appellants in this appeal. 2. The suit was originally laid on the file of the City Civil Court which later on came to be transferred to this Court and numbered as O.S. No. 49 of 1975. The plaint allegations are shortly as follows: 3. The plaintiff purchased a house site, Plot No. 3, Door Nos.1/1 and 2/2, Cenotaph Road Teynampet, Madras. The sale deed is dated 10.12.1957. She was in her possession of it. The first defendant is the natural son of the plaintiff. He was given away in adoption to one Ramanathan Chettiar, his consanguine brother, namely, the son of the original plaintiffs husband, born through his first wife. The second defendant is the plaintiffs daughter-in law. 4. The plaintiff executed a power of attorney on 28th October, 1935 in favour of the first defendant. The said deed was registered on 29.10.1935. The object of executing the document was to enable the first defendant to manage the plaintiff's business affairs in foreign territories, principally in Malaya and Singapore. It was done as the plaintiff has absolute confidence in her natural son. Taking advantage of the plaintiffs old age and the complete confidence reposed in him by the plaintiff, the first defendant, with an intent to defraud the plaintiff and to cause wrongful loss to her and wrongful gain to himself, purported to sell the valuable house site belonging to the Plaintiff in Cenotaph Road, Madras, in favour of his wife Meenakshi Achi, the second defendant. The sale consideration of Rs. 10,000 is a nominal one. The sale deed is dated 20.5.1965 and was registered on 21.5.1965. 5. The plaintiff came to know about the existence of this document in September, 1965 when there was no receipt of demand from the Corporation relating to property tax and urban land tax. Besides, the plaintiff also wanted to dispose of the property to make provision for the marriage of her grand-daughter (daughter's daughter). Therefore, she caused her son-in-law Subramanian Chettiar to make enquiries about the price and prospects of sale of the property and also to get an encumbrance certificate. Besides, the plaintiff also wanted to dispose of the property to make provision for the marriage of her grand-daughter (daughter's daughter). Therefore, she caused her son-in-law Subramanian Chettiar to make enquiries about the price and prospects of sale of the property and also to get an encumbrance certificate. While applying for the same, the plaintiff was astonished to learn that the first defendant had purported to sell the same in favour of his wife. Therefore a notice was sent to the first defendant on 5-6-1968 cancelling the power of attorney and demanding general accounting between the principal and agent. That notice has not been replied to. Concerning the same separate legal proceedings are being instituted for accounting, mense profits and other reliefs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai. 6. The sale deed dated 20.5.1965 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant is without authority or power. It is void in law. It conveys no title to the second defendant. Nor does it affect the title of the plaintiff in any manner. Since the plaintiff apprehends that the sale deed if left outstanding, may cause serious injury later. Therefore, steps have been taken and or Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act to have the said document declared void and of no legal effect, to have the same cancelled and delivered to the principal. Since the suit property is a vacant site, it is claimed to be in her possession. The plaintiff has prayed for permanent injunction from interfering with her possession and enjoyment of the vacant land. Alternatively, she prayed for the following reliefs. (i) To declare the sale seed dated 20.5.1965 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant in respect of house site, Plot No. 3, Municipal Door Nosil/1 and 2/2, Cenotaph Road, Teynampet, Madras, as void, non est of no legal effect; (ii) Consequently, cancelling and delivering the same; (iii) For a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her possession; (iv) Alternatively or for delivery of possession. 7. In the written statement of the first defendant, first and foremost, it is submitted that the plaintiffs are not the only legal representatives of the deceased Visalakshi, the original plaintiff. Though the first defendant had been given away in adoption, he is the legal representative of the deceased Visalakshi. The plaintiffs alone cannot represent the deceased. 7. In the written statement of the first defendant, first and foremost, it is submitted that the plaintiffs are not the only legal representatives of the deceased Visalakshi, the original plaintiff. Though the first defendant had been given away in adoption, he is the legal representative of the deceased Visalakshi. The plaintiffs alone cannot represent the deceased. Consequently, this defendant also ought to have been arrayed as a legal representative. 8. The allegation that the plaintiff owns property and business in India and abroad is false. The plaintiff owns only a half share in the landed property situate in the Village Cheppilanpatti. The allegation that the plaintiff purchased the house site, Plot No. 3, Municipal Door Nos.1/1 and 1/2. Cenotaph Road, Madras, and continues to be in possession is false. Purposely, the plaint does not mention whether she paid the consideration or not. No consideration was paid by the plaintiff under this sale deed. The property was conveyed in the name of the plaintiff benami as desired by this defendant who was then at Malaya. 9. The property covered by the sale deed and a number of other properties were purchased in common as a lot by ten persons, one of whom was Ramaswami Chettiar. This defendant was a sub-partner with the said Ramaswami Chettiar. This defendant's father advanced a sum of Rs. 3,900 to the said Ramaswami Chettiar and debited the amount to this defendant's account. The said ten persons effected a partition amongst themselves. Plot Nos.3 and 4 and 5 were-allotted to Ramaswami Chettiar. The said Ramaswami Chettiar sold away Plot No. 5. In a partition arrangement between Ramaswami and this defendant Plot No. 4 was allotted to Ramaswami and Plot No. 3 was allotted to this defendant. Since this defendant was only a sub-partner, document was needed to perfect the title. So, the said Ramaswami Chettiar executed the sale deed as desired by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff who was none else than the natural mother of this defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, was only a benamidar. She had no right, title or interest. This defendant is the beneficial owner. Throughout it was this defendant who was in possession and enjoyment. The contrary allegations are false. 10. This defendant admits the power of attorney. The construction of power of attorney by the plaintiff is wrong. The plaintiff, therefore, was only a benamidar. She had no right, title or interest. This defendant is the beneficial owner. Throughout it was this defendant who was in possession and enjoyment. The contrary allegations are false. 10. This defendant admits the power of attorney. The construction of power of attorney by the plaintiff is wrong. The power conferred on him the right to sell the property as we'll. It is riot restricted to managing the plaintiffs business affairs in foreign territories alone. This defendant submits that it is a general power and clothed this defendant with the power to deal with the entirety of the plaintiffs properties then in existence and likely to be acquired later on. Therefore, it is incorrect to allege that this defendant has no power to sell. 11. Being the real owner, this defendant had every authority to sell. Even assuming that this defendant did execute the sale deed only as a power of attorney agent, even then, this defendant had every right to do so under the power of attorney deed. It is incorrect to contend that she came to be aware of it only in 1967. The sale is valid. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act has no application. 12. The suit land is not a vacant site. It is a built up one. Only the remaining area is under cultivation. The plaintiff was never in possession. This defendant was through out in possession. After the purchase, the second defendant had been in possession and enjoyment. In so far as the suit was not filed within three years from the date of sale, the plaintiff had lost her right to have the sale set aside and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. 13. The second defendant filed a separate written statement saying that she is a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the alleged defective title. Hence, no reliefs could be granted against her. 14. On these contentions, the following issues came to be framed for trail. 1. Whether Visalakshi Achi was the absolute owner of the suit house site? 2. Whether the power of attorney dated 28th October, 1935 empowers the first defendant to sell the suit house site to his wife, the second defendant? 3. Whether the sale deed in favour of the second defendant conveys any title to her? 4. 1. Whether Visalakshi Achi was the absolute owner of the suit house site? 2. Whether the power of attorney dated 28th October, 1935 empowers the first defendant to sell the suit house site to his wife, the second defendant? 3. Whether the sale deed in favour of the second defendant conveys any title to her? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration asked for and for possession of the suit property? 5. Whether the second defendant prescribed title by adverse possession? 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the present plaintiffs alone are entitled to represent the deceased Visalakshi Achi? 8. To what relief the parties are entitled? 15. Nainar Sundaram, J., who has tried the suit along with T.O.S. No. 11 if 1975 and C.S. No. 122 of 1976, held on Issue No. 1 relating to the question of benami that the funds of Arunachalam Chattier were advanced for the purchase under Ex.D. 1 dated 10.12.1957. The plaintiffs has made no endeavour to place any material in relation to payment of consideration by Visalakshi. Thereafter, he considered the question of custody of the title deeds, and possession and held that the real owner was Arunachalam Chettiar and Visalakshi was only a benamidar or a name lender. On issue 2 he came to the conclusion that the power of attorney dated 28th October, 1935 did not confer any authority for sale. On issue No. 3 he held that no decision was required since Arunachalam was the real owner. Under issue No. 5, it was held that though the possession of Meenakshi Achi had been only for a period less than the statutory one, her possession must be tacked on to the possession of Arunachalam Chettiar through whom only she claims and if this is so, their possession being adverse to that of Visalakshi Achi must ensure to perfect their title by prescription. Hence, the second defendant had perfected his tile by adverse possession. Under Issue No. 6; it was concluded that even assuming that the knowledge of the details of the alienation came to Arunachalam Chettiar and through him to Visalakshi Achi on the obtaining or the registration copy on or after 3.5.1967, the suit having been filed on 6.4.1970 cannot be said to be barred by limitation on this ground. Under Issue No. 6; it was concluded that even assuming that the knowledge of the details of the alienation came to Arunachalam Chettiar and through him to Visalakshi Achi on the obtaining or the registration copy on or after 3.5.1967, the suit having been filed on 6.4.1970 cannot be said to be barred by limitation on this ground. However, in view of the earlier finding of adverse possession, the suit was held to be barred by limitation. Issue No. 7 was found in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 4 was answered against the plaintiff. In the result, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. 16. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits as follows. (i) The case of the first defendant-first respondent was that under the power of attorney, he had every right to convey the property. As a matter of fact, under Ex.P.5 power has been given only for managing the business affairs of the first plaintiff; but yet he would categorically take the stand that by virtue of the power he had every right to sell away the property. (ii) In paragraph 4 and 5 of the written statement in no uncertain terms he would assert his right under the said power of attorney. In so as he reiterates this position, with regard to the right to convey the property under the power of attorney, he cannot be allowed to resile from that stand and take some other plea. Even under Ex.P.2 sale deed, nowhere does he whisper about his right of ownership but would stand by the power under which power alone, he had chosen to execute the sale deed. Here again, without any room for ambiguity he exercised his right under which power alone, he had chosen execute the sale deed. Here again, without any room for ambiguity he exercised his right under the power of attorney; the valuable admissions contained therein cannot be brushed also easily. It is upto him to explain as to the circumstances under which he came to execute the sale in that capacity. Admission under law is substantive evidence; of course, it is not conclusive proof but it can be used against the maker under two circumstances, namely, (a) where it has not been withdrawn; (b) where it has not been explained properly. Admission under law is substantive evidence; of course, it is not conclusive proof but it can be used against the maker under two circumstances, namely, (a) where it has not been withdrawn; (b) where it has not been explained properly. In this case, no attempt whatsoever has been made to explain the admission. He would only acknowledge the title of the first plaintiff Visalakshi. Having so acknowledged, the title, ignoring the same, he cannot be allowed to set up the plea of benami. As a matter of fact, it is that question which loomed large before the learned trial Judge. Of course the learned Judge has applied the relevant tests in relation to benami and has come to one conclusion. But the important question is, whether the plea of benami would arise under the circumstances. In support of this submission reliance is placed in Sailendra Nath v. Saroj Kumar A.I.R. 1935 P.C.73. (iii) The finding of the learned single Judge on the question of limitation cannot be supported. The sale deed Ex.P.1 is dated 20.5.1965 while" Ex.B.1 is dated 10.12.1957, i.e., eight years after the date of Ex.B.1. If, within 12 years, therefore, the first defendant acknowledged the title under Ex.P.2 the suit is well within time. The question of adverse possession also cannot arise because under Ex.P.2 the suit is well within time. The question of adverse possession also cannot arise because under Ex.P.2, the categoric statement is that Visalakshi had held and enjoyed the same ever since with an absolute right as a full owner thereof. Then again, the statement that the vendor (Visalakshi) had paid all the taxes, rates and other public charges, is a clear evidence of her possession and enjoyment. Then again, adverse possession cannot arise. From this that finding cannot be supported. Therefore the dismissal of the suit is incorrect. (iv) 17. Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, learned Counsel for the first defendant would state, in counter to these submissions, that: (i) a case of estoppel would not arise. An admission can be explained. There is nothing conclusive. As to what is the evidentiary value of admission can be gathered from the decision in Depuni Veeraraghavan Reddi v. Depum Kamalanna and Anr. In that case, the statement of a Hindu widow in relation to adoption was held not conclusive and binding. The same principle can be called out from Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai. There is nothing conclusive. As to what is the evidentiary value of admission can be gathered from the decision in Depuni Veeraraghavan Reddi v. Depum Kamalanna and Anr. In that case, the statement of a Hindu widow in relation to adoption was held not conclusive and binding. The same principle can be called out from Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai. At page 511 in paragraph 14 it is stated that admission is a mere piece of evidence and it can be successfully explained. (ii) Relying on Jadho Nagu Bai v. Jadho Gangu Bai A.I.R. 11958 A P. 19 it is submitted that admissions constitute good evidence but not conclusive, if the admission was given under a mistake or if it is untrue. In this case, the parties knew very well that the property belonged to the first defendant; the mother the first plaintiff (Visalakshi) agreed that the first defendant could convey the property. Where, therefore, the statement and the property belonged to Visalakshi is untrue, such an admission cannot be held to be binding. In this connection, the decision in Dattatraya v. Ranganath , was also cited. (iii) In an election case in John v. Returning Officer (1977)2 S.C.W.R. 295, the Supreme Court has complained who effect of admission. (iv) The statement under Ex.P.2 is untrue because it has been held by the learned single Judge that the power of attorney does not confer any authority to convey the property. Under those circumstances, even if the power purports to convey, that will be of no consequence and such an admission cannot be held to deprive the right of the first defendant. In this connection, the decision in Jadho Nagu Bai v. Jadho Gangu Bai A.I.R. 1958 A.P.19 is relied on. (v) If the evidence is analysed, it will be clear that the mother was living with the first defendant at the time of sale under Ex.P.3; the relationship was cordial; there was on occasion to question the validity of the same. If this is the resultant position, then it would follow that the findings in relation to benami which are not assailed before this Court and the findings relating to limitation also will have to be upheld. The dismissal of the suit by the learned single Judge is, therefore, unassailable. If this is the resultant position, then it would follow that the findings in relation to benami which are not assailed before this Court and the findings relating to limitation also will have to be upheld. The dismissal of the suit by the learned single Judge is, therefore, unassailable. Having regard to the above submissions, the two points that arise for our determination are: (1) Whether the plan of benami could be reused disregardful of the assertions in Ex.P.2 and the conduct of the first defendant? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 17. Point No. 1: As early as on 28.1.1935 under Ex.P.5 the power of attorney was executed by the first plaintiff (Visalakshi) in favour of the first defendant. Concerning the scope of power of attorney, the learned single Judge has held under issue No. 2 are as follows: There is no clause specifically empowering Arunachalam Chettiar to sell any immovable property of Visalakshi Achi. The power empowers Arunachalam Chettiar to take action on behalf of Visalakshi Achi. The power empowers Arunachalam Chettiar to take action on behalf of Visalakshi Achi regarding the outstanding due to her. With this end in view, various other ancillary powers are conferred upon Arunachalam Chettiar to sell any immovable property of Visalakshi Achi. In the absence of such a specific power, it would be dangerous and not proper to strain to construct the document in such away as to spell out a power to sell away the immovable property of Visalakshi Achi. Hence, I have to hold that the exercise of power by Arunachalam Chettiar to sell any immovable property of Visalakshi Achi would be incompetent and Issue No. 2. In C.S. No. 49 of 1975 is answered accordingly. Therefore, it is clear that under the power, the right of sale could not be exercised. The property forming the subject matter was purchased under Ex.B.1, dated 10.12.1957 from Ramaswami Chettiar. The sale deed is in favour of the plaintiff. The sale consideration is a sum of Rs. 3,900. That states and whereas the purchaser has paid to the Vendor a sum of Rs. The property forming the subject matter was purchased under Ex.B.1, dated 10.12.1957 from Ramaswami Chettiar. The sale deed is in favour of the plaintiff. The sale consideration is a sum of Rs. 3,900. That states and whereas the purchaser has paid to the Vendor a sum of Rs. 3,900 Three thousand and nine hundred by means of a Bank Draft on 24th Chitrai Vikram Year with the intention of purchasing one plot of land out of the plots allotted to the vendor as aforesaid and the vendor has acknowledged the receipt of the said amount and has agreed to convey plot No. 3 out of the two plots of land belonging to the Vendor to the purchaser for the consideration of Rs. 3,900 paid as aforesaid. 18. The first defendant would put forth a reasoning for the execution of the document in favour of the first plaintiff in paragraph 3 of his written statement as follows: This defendant states that the property was conveyed in the name of the plaintiff benami as desired by this defendant who was then at Malaya. The property covered by the sale deed and a number of other properties were purchased in common as a lot by ten persons, of whom one Ramaswamy Chettiar was one. This defendant was a sub-partner with the said Ramaswami Chettiar. This defendant's father advanced a sum of Rs. 3,900 to the said Ramaswami Chettiar and debited the amount to this defendant's account. The ten persons effected a partition amongst themselves and plot Nos.3 4 and 25 in Cenatoph Road were allotted to Ramaswami Chettiar. The said Ramaswami Chettiar had sold away plot No. 25. In a partition arrangement between Ramaswami Chettiar and this defendant, Plot No. 4 was allotted to Ramaswami Chettiar and Plot No. 3 was allotted to this defendant. Since the defendant was only a sub-partner, document was needed to perfect the title. So the said Ramaswami Chettiar executed the sale deed as desired by this defendant in favour of the plaintiff, who was the natural mother of this defendant. The plaintiff was therefore only a benamidar of this defendant. She had no right, title or interest in the said property. This defendant is the beneficial owner of the said property. The question is, whether this plea could be raised without regard to the subsequent conduct of the first defendant or the recitals in Ex.P.2. The plaintiff was therefore only a benamidar of this defendant. She had no right, title or interest in the said property. This defendant is the beneficial owner of the said property. The question is, whether this plea could be raised without regard to the subsequent conduct of the first defendant or the recitals in Ex.P.2. Unfortunately, the parties have directed themselves on the question of benami before the learned single Judge, No-doubt, the learned single Judge had applied the various tests for determination of the question of benami and come to a conclusion that under Ex.D-1 the plaintiff Visalakshi was a name-lender and therefore the real title vested only in the first defendant. In our considered view, the more fundamental question is whether the first defendant could be allowed to raise such a plea at all, as though nothing had happened subsequently. 19. What is the subsequent conduct? First and foremost, what surprises us is that for eight long years, there has been no demur whatsoever from the side of the first defendant to assert his independent title. Secondly, the following relevant recitals in Ex.P.2 are of immense value. This deed of sale executed at Madras this 20th day of May, 1965 by P.P. AR.RM.PL. Visalakshi Achi, Wife of P.P.AR.RM. Palaniappa Chettiar alias Kasi Chettiar residing at Puduvayal, Ramanathapuram District, represented by her agent by general Power of Attorney PL.RM Arunachalam Chettiar, adopted son of Ramanathan Chettiar, residing at Puduvayal Ramanathapuram District now at Madras hereinafter referred to as the Vendor in favour of and unto Srimathi AR. Meenakshi Achi, wife of PL.RM. Arunachalam Chettiar, residing at Puduvayal, Ramanathapuram District, hereinafter referred to as the purchaser. Whereas the vendor above named Visalakshi Achi had by a registered deed of sale dated 10th day of December, 1957 obtained a conveyance by way of absolute sale the property Plot No. 3, R.S. No. 3844/5 Cenotoph road 1st Street, Teynampet, Madras-18, more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder for a sum of Rs. 3,900 and had held and enjoyed the same ever since in absolute right as a full owner thereof. The Vendor doth hereby covenant with the Purchaser that she hath pull rights and competence to convey the said property to the purchaser and the same is free of all encumbrances claims attachment lis pendent and of any other claims whatsoever. 3,900 and had held and enjoyed the same ever since in absolute right as a full owner thereof. The Vendor doth hereby covenant with the Purchaser that she hath pull rights and competence to convey the said property to the purchaser and the same is free of all encumbrances claims attachment lis pendent and of any other claims whatsoever. The vendor doth hereby covenant with the purchaser that she had paid all taxes rates and other public charges pertaining to the land hereby conveyed upto the date of those presents and-there are no arrears yet remaining unpaid in respect thereof the vendor through her power of attorney agent hath this day delivered to the purchaser the original registered conveyance dated 10th December 1957 and registered as document No. 1875 of 1957 recited supra as document of tile to the land hereby conveyed, (underlining ours) 20. If really the first defendant was the owner we hardly find any scope for these recitals. The above extracts from the sale deed Ex.P.2 clearly prove that the first defendant stood by the power of attorney and acknowledge the tile of the vendors therein, namely, Visalakshi, the first plaintiff, in no unambiguous terms. These admissions are very valuable. Not one attempt had been made to explain these recitals, in a registered document. If really the first defendant is the owner, nothing would have been easier than to state so; more so, when it is claimed that the relationship between him and his mother was cordial during the relevant time. One thing is beyond doubt. These admissions have not been withdrawn. Whether these admissions have been explained so as to demerit their value, we will consider a little later in the light of the relevant case law and on an analysis of the evidence. 21. Not only this, what is the stand of the first defendant in the written statement? Not that he discards or disregards the power of attorney but that he affirms the same in no uncertain terms. In paragraph 4 of the written statement, the opening sentence states: This defendant admits the power of attorney. Again in paragraph 5 it is stated as follows: This defendant could have ignored the sale deed standing in the name of the plaintiff and could have sold the property in his own name without reference to the plaintiff. In paragraph 4 of the written statement, the opening sentence states: This defendant admits the power of attorney. Again in paragraph 5 it is stated as follows: This defendant could have ignored the sale deed standing in the name of the plaintiff and could have sold the property in his own name without reference to the plaintiff. But since the property stood in the name of the plaintiff and this defendant had also the power of attorney in his favour and since the plaintiff also knew that she had no right or title to the suit property and was also aware of the sale, 1st defendant did not think it fit to execute the sale deed in his own name, though as a matter of fact; even to the knowledge of the plaintiff, he mean to deal and in fact did deal with his own property. This defendant submits that even assuming that this defendant did execute only as a power of attorney agent, even then, this defendant submits that he had every right to do so under the power of attorney deed. Therefore, he stands by the power of attorney. With this factual background, we will now proceed to consider the relevant case law. 22. The general principle is that an admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted therein if it is clear and unambiguous (vide Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi , Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad , and Sitaram v. Ram Chandra. 23. An admission, though not conclusive, is decisive, on the point unless: (i) It is successfully withdrawn; or (ii) proved to be erroneous (vide Narayan v. Gopal 24. Mr. S.V. Jayaraman would contend that this is not a case of estoppel but a mere admission which was made under a mistake and which has been successfully explained. He would rely on Veeraraghava Reddi v. Kamalamma. The head note therein is sufficient for our purpose and it is as under. Where a Hindu widow makes statements admitting an adoption and the alleged adoptee had not altered his position on those statements to his detriment the widow is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue and is not estopped or concluded by them. 25. In Kishori Lal v. MT. Where a Hindu widow makes statements admitting an adoption and the alleged adoptee had not altered his position on those statements to his detriment the widow is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue and is not estopped or concluded by them. 25. In Kishori Lal v. MT. Chaitibai , in Paragraph 14 it is observed as follows: The question of onus loses its efficacy because it was never objected to in the courts below and evidence having been led by the parties, at this stage the Court has to adjudicate on the material before it. And admissions are not conclusive, and unless they constitute estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue. Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Coryat 1896 A.C.587. Admissions are mere pieces of evidence and if the truth of the matter is known to both parties the principle stated in Chandra Kumar's case, (34 I A.27) would be inapplicable. In Jadhu Nagu Bai v. Jadho Gangu Bai A.I.R.1958 A.P.19 the same principle is reiterated. The head note therein reads as under: It is well established that although admissions constitute good evidence against the party making them and his representatives-in-interest he is not concluded by them unless they operate as estoppels and he is at liberty to show that they were mistaken or untrue. Admissions are valuable evidence because, what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established. The effect of admissions is merely to shift the onus of disproving them on the party making them unless a plea of estoppel can be successfully invoked. The evidentiary value of admissions depends upon the circumstances in which they are made and the possibility of incorrect statements being misguidedly made by ignorant persons should not be overlooked. If it is proved by other evidence that the facts admitted cannot be true, no court of justice will hesitate to give effect to the conclusion. In Pullan Code Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1975)2 S.C.J.538 it is held as follows: An admission is an extremely important piece of evidence but it cannot be said that it is conclusive. It is open to the person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect. In Pullan Code Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1975)2 S.C.J.538 it is held as follows: An admission is an extremely important piece of evidence but it cannot be said that it is conclusive. It is open to the person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect. In John v. Returning Officer (1977) 2 S.C.W.R.295 the head note reads as follows: It is well settled that a party's admission is defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence propric vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established. 26. In the light of these cases, let us see whether the first respondent can get over this admission. On a fair reading of the entire material before us, we find that no attempt had been made to explain the admission. It is very significant to note that the written statement of the first defendant does not utter anything to show as to why and again under what circumstances the first defendant was obliged to acknowledge the title of the first plaintiff. On the contrary, as we have seen earlier, the first defendant asserts and admits the power of attorney. He stands and swears by the power of attorney. 27. An attempt is made by Mr. Jayaraman, learned Counsel for the first respondent, to show that the relationship between his client and his mother was cordial and therefore, there was no necessity to take the stand that the mother is not the real owner. 28. The evidence of the first defendant is to the following effects. Q: Prior to selling the property in favour of your wife, did you get any advice? A: I consulted Mr. Rangachari, advocate, in Madras before the sale in favour of my wife. Q. Before lunch you said that you consulted. When you executed the sale deed in favour of your wife, whom did you consult? A: I went to Advocate Mr. R. Rangachari and consulted him. A: I consulted Mr. Rangachari, advocate, in Madras before the sale in favour of my wife. Q. Before lunch you said that you consulted. When you executed the sale deed in favour of your wife, whom did you consult? A: I went to Advocate Mr. R. Rangachari and consulted him. I gave the sale deed and the power of attorney to him and told him that a sale deed had to be prepared in favour of my wife. Q: Which sale deed did you give? A: The earlier title deeds in respect of the property. Q: What did he advise you, according to you? A: He told me that the property stands in the name of my mother. I said that I had the power of attorney. Then he went through the power of attorney and also enquired me as to the relationship between myself and my mother. I informed him that the relationship was cordial and then he agreed to prepare the sale deed. Q: Did you tell your advocate at that time that your relationship with your mother was cordial? A: Yes, I did tell him. Q: At that time, where was your mother living? A: She was living with me. Q: So, according to you, you executed the sale deed in favour of your wife as a power of attorney on the advice given by the advocate? A: Yes Q: At the time when you executed the sale deed in favour of your wife, where was your mother? A. She was in my house. Q: What was the nature of the relationship between you two? A: We were cordial. Q: Was she aware of the sale deed executed by you in favour of your wife? A: Yes, she was aware. Q: She did not object? A: She did not: Q: You said that the relationship was cordial. But how is it that a suit in the City Civil Court has been filed against you by your mother? A: My mother did not file the suit. My sister's husband was responsible for it. 29. With this scanty evidence, the Court is called upon to presume that the admission has been explained. First of all, the relationship was not cordial, is evident from the fact that the suit had come to be filed. The explanation that the sister's husband was responsible for it, is neither here nor there. 29. With this scanty evidence, the Court is called upon to presume that the admission has been explained. First of all, the relationship was not cordial, is evident from the fact that the suit had come to be filed. The explanation that the sister's husband was responsible for it, is neither here nor there. Why the mother was not the attester is not even attempted to be explained. Why, was it because the tax authorities were at the doors of the first defendant and if sale deed were to be executed by him, he would suffer capital gains and therefore it was executed by him as power of attorney agent or again whether the vendee insisted upon the sale being executed by him as a power of attorney agent are not at all explained. It is curious that the sale deed is executed in favour of none else than the wife of the first defendant, namely, the second defendant. The easiest course would have been to explain all the relevant circumstances since, according to the first defendant, it was known to all the parties that the property really belonged to the first defendant and make the mother join the sale deed as well so that proper title could be assured to the vendee. Then again, what is sought to be urged is that since it has been held that under the power of attorney there is no scope for executing a sale deed it must be held to be a mistake and therefore if the admission has been made under a mistake, that cannot constitute a substantive evidence. Apart from this argument sounding strange, we are totally unable to accept the same. The real question is, whether the admission has been either explained which, in our considered opinion, 'not' or whether it was made under a mistake in our opinion, there is no such mistake. Under these circumstances, what is the relevant law that would be applicable. We are of the view that the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Sailendra Nath v. Saroj Kumar A.I.R.1935 P.C.73 would apply. In that case, the following observations are found: The relevant document is dated 27th August, 1894, and is a deed signed by Haralal's widow by which she released her interest to her three sons, Mahendra, Narendra and Kedar. In that case, the following observations are found: The relevant document is dated 27th August, 1894, and is a deed signed by Haralal's widow by which she released her interest to her three sons, Mahendra, Narendra and Kedar. It is in these terms: I have been in possession of the lands and buildings with all rights and appurtenances thereto, which my husband, Baba Haralal Das acquired during his life time, in my own name with my big funds given by him for the purpose of my maintenance and religious rites; and my acts are being performed, carried on with the profits, that is, rents, etc., thereof. My husband is dead. You, three brothers, enjoy the profits of the immovable properties that stand in his own name by possessing the same in equal shares as his heirs. There is no other heir besides you three brothers. I cease to have any claim to the profits of the properties that stand in the name of my husband, the late Haralal Das, and which are enjoyed and possessed by you three brothers as charge for my maintenance and religious rites etc. save and except in the properties that stand in my own name and enjoyed and possessed by me. If I put forward any claim to profits arising out of the properties that stand in my husband's own name, it will be null and void. Now the question is whether on the true construction of that document the widow of Haralal in effect admitted that the property was property which belonged to Haralal, subject to her rights for maintenance and religious rites, so that in effect she held it as benami for his estate? There is, in substance, no other material than this document upon which a conclusion can be reached. The courts below have come to the conclusion that on the language of this document the property was held by the lady as benami for Hiralal. There is, in substance, no other material than this document upon which a conclusion can be reached. The courts below have come to the conclusion that on the language of this document the property was held by the lady as benami for Hiralal. Their Lordships are of opinion that the language of the document is consistent only with that view, especially having regard to the latter portion of the instrument, where the phrase occurs: I cease to have any claim to the profits of the properties that stand in the name of my husband, the late Hiralal Das, and which are enjoyed and possessed by you, the three brothers, as charge for my maintenance and religious rites, etc., save and except in the properties that stand in my own name and enjoyed and possessed by me. It seems to Their Lordships that language can only mean that all the properties were the properties of Haralal, subject only to the right of the widow to maintenance and charge for religious rites, and that she was releasing her interest in the properties that stood in Haralal's own name, while still retaining her right to be maintained and have the expenses of religious rites provided for out of the property which had been placed in her name by her husband. In their Lordships opinion, the appeal on this point fails. The ratio of this judgment squarely applies to this case. Therefore, we conclude that in the absence of a very important admission being explained or established to have been made under a mistake, the first defendant cannot be allowed to get over the same and put forth a plea of benami contrary to the deed and conduct. Therefore, he must be held to be bound by the said admission. That is our answer to the first point. 30. Point No. 2: On the point of limitation, the learned single Judge held that the possession by the second defendant constitutes adverse possession. But in our considered view that approach is not correct. The sale under Ex.P.2 is within eight years from the date of D-1, namely, 10.12.1957. If, within twelve years, there has been an unambiguous acknowledgement of the title, there is no question of adverse possession. But in our considered view that approach is not correct. The sale under Ex.P.2 is within eight years from the date of D-1, namely, 10.12.1957. If, within twelve years, there has been an unambiguous acknowledgement of the title, there is no question of adverse possession. The fact that the property was a vacant site would also belie the contention of any adverse possession because the general principle ' possession follows title' will have to be applied. As a matter of fact, on this issue the learned single Judge himself found as follows: On the question of possession, we have to remember that the property was and is a vacant land. Of course, the first defendant Arunachalam Chettiar, would allege that there is a built up portion in the property; but no evidence worth mentioning has been placed before this Court on this. Hence, it is not possible to harp upon physical possession and enjoyment of the property. 31. In view of the above, we hold that the suit is not barred by limitation. 32. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the dismissal of the suit. The suit will stand decreed as prayed for with costs. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.