JUDGMENT P.C. Pathak, J. 1. This is Plaintiff's appeal against dismissal of his suit for eviction of the Respondent on the grounds Under Section 12(1) (c) and (f) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter in short 'the Act'). 2. By order dated 31-3-1987, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: (i) Whether the Defendant was debarred from raising a question that the Plaintiff was not his landlord on general principles of res judicata on principles enunciated in Deepchand v. Narendra AIR 1971 MP 138 . ? (ii) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case a decree under Section 12(1) (a), (c) and (f) of the Act is warranted.? 3. On 11-12-78, the Plaintiff instituted suit for ejectment on the allegation that he was a member of the Hindu family headed by Makanchand, his father. The members of his family, through relinquishment deeds dated 6-12-77 (Ex. P. 1), dated 8-9-74 (Ex P. 4), dated 6-7-76 (Ex. P. 5) partitioned their joint property and the Plaintiff became the owner and landlord of the suit house, occupied then by the Defendant as the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/- inducted by Manakchand as 'Karta' of the joint family. The Defendant runs a shoe-shop in the suit premises and his tenancy commenced from 7th of each English Calendar month. By notice dated 16-12-1977 (Ex. P. 6) Manakchand and notice of even dated (Ex. P. 2) by Plaintiff, the Defendant was informed that by virtue of relinquishment deed dated 6-12-77 (Ex. P. 1) the Plaintiff had become the landlord of the suit block and therefore he should thenceforth pay rent to him. The notice was served on the Defendant on 22-12-77, vide acknowledgements Exs. P. 3 and P. 7. The Defendant however failed to pay any rent to the Plaintiff and by his reply dated 3-1-78 sent to the Plaintiff and to Manakchand, he declined to accept the Plaintiff as his landlord. The Plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for his eviction on the grounds (1) of bona fide need to start a cloth shop in the suit block for which he had no other shop reasonably suitable in Balaghat town and (2) of denial of title. The Plaintiff also claimed arrears of rent from 1-12-77 to 6-12-78 Rs. 960/- and damages by way of mesne profits @ Rs. 5/-per day total Rs. The Plaintiff also claimed arrears of rent from 1-12-77 to 6-12-78 Rs. 960/- and damages by way of mesne profits @ Rs. 5/-per day total Rs. 20/- till the date of the suit and future damages at that rate till the date of delivery of possession. 4. The Defendant through his written statement denied that the Plaintiff is the owner and landlord of the suit shop. He submitted that he had been sending the rent through money-orders, which was refused by Manakchand. Therefore on 15-12-1978 he deposited the sum of Rs. 960/- with the Controlling Authority, Balaghat. He also denied alleged need so also that he has no other shop in the town. 5. The learned trial Court decreed the suit for eviction on the grounds of denial of title and the bona fide need and for the arrears of rent as claimed in the suit, in addition to future damages at the contractual rate. 6. The Defendant preferred appeal Under Section 96 Code of Code of Civil Procedure against the decree relating to eviction only and not against the decree for arrears of rent. The appeal Court, on findings that relinquishment deed (Ex. P. 1) did not confer any title upon the Plaintiff, being a sham transaction, that Manakchand continues to be the landlord, that the need for starting the business is not bona fide, set aside the eviction decree. Hence this appeal Under Section 100 Code of Code of Civil Procedure by the Plaintiff. 7. The first question for decision is whether the Defendant is debarred from raising the question that the Plaintiff was not his landlord on general principles of res judicata as enunciated in Deep Chand v. Narendra Prasad AIR 1971 MP 138 . There is no dispute that the trial Court decree related to two distinct parts viz. for eviction and the other for arrears of rent. Admittedly the appeal filed by the Defendant was restricted to his eviction and not against the decree for arrears of rent (past and future both). In other words the decree for arrears of rent and future rent became final. The decree for rent implies relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, which having not been challenged, was not within the scope of challenge in first appeal. The conclusion is fortified by two decisions; namely A. J. Pinto and Anr. In other words the decree for arrears of rent and future rent became final. The decree for rent implies relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, which having not been challenged, was not within the scope of challenge in first appeal. The conclusion is fortified by two decisions; namely A. J. Pinto and Anr. v. Sahebbi Kom Muktum Saheb AIR 1971 SC 2070 , para 6. and Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee and Ors. 1970 MPLJ 568. Mulla in his Code of Civil Procedure Code, 14th. Edt under Section 144, has quoted host of cases dealing with this point. I therefore hold that the Defendant was debarred from the raising the question that the Plaintiff was not his landlord on principles of res judicata. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent argued that this Court has wide power under Order 41, Rule 33 and can set aside that part of the decree also against which he did not file any appeal. The Defendant did not advance any such argument in first appeal. I fear if this argument can be advanced by the Defendant in the present appeal in the second appeal filed by the Plaintiff This apart in Nirmala Bala Ghosh v. Balaichand Ghosh AIR 1965 SC 1874 ., it was held that the Rule 33 does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decree which has become final merely, because the appeal Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. The power has to be applied to cases where interference in favour of the Appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has become final by acceptance or acquiescence, so as to adjust the rights of the parties. While exercising the power, the Court should not lose sight of other provisions of the Code itself, nor the provisions of the other law viz. the law of limitation or the law of the Court-fees etc. Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar (1982) 1 S.C.C 232 . Therefore the request of the Defendant to exercise the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 cannot be entertained. 9. The Defendant next argued that the relinquishment deed (Ex. P. 1) was executed by the Plaintiff giving up his claims in respect of other joint family properties in lieu of allotment of the suit shop to him. Therefore the request of the Defendant to exercise the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 cannot be entertained. 9. The Defendant next argued that the relinquishment deed (Ex. P. 1) was executed by the Plaintiff giving up his claims in respect of other joint family properties in lieu of allotment of the suit shop to him. It was argued that such a document cannot confer any title and thereby the Plaintiff does not become landlord. The Plaintiff has filed relinquishment deeds executed by other members of the family which are (Ex. P 4 and Ex. P. 5) which have not been subjected to any challenge. They have been proved by Suresh-chand (P. W. 2) and Manakchand (P. W. 3). These two witnesses also corroborated the Plaintiff to the effect that the Plaintiff after accepting suit shop as his own relinquished his claim over other joint family property. No flaw can be found out to this course of relinquishment and has always been accepted as valid. See Guru Swami Goundon v. Marappa Goundan AIR 1950 Mad. 140 . I may also usefully refer to the cases annotated by Mulla, in his Principles of Hindu Law 15th Edt. under para 264 and para 328 (6). Thus the oral and documentary evidence both prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the Plaintiff became the owner and landlord of suit shop by relinquishment deed (Ex. P. 1). 10. I may also refer to yet another circumstance which fortifies my conclusion. As seen above, the Plaintiff had filed suit for the arrears of rent. UNDER SECTION 13(1) of the Act, the Defendant deposited the said amount in the Court and subsequent rent, by 15th of each succeeding month in pursuance of order dated 6-3-80 Under Section 13(3) of the Act. The said order was affirmed in civil revision No. 523/80 by order dated 25-4-80. The Plaintiff withdrew that amount vide two receipts, dt. 12-12-83 and 27-7-84 without any objection from the Defendant. Learned Counsel for the Defendant tried to explain by submitting that the rent deposited in the Court was for the benefit of the successful party and that the Plaintiff withdrew the amount surreptitiously without any notice to him. The argument cannot be accepted. 12-12-83 and 27-7-84 without any objection from the Defendant. Learned Counsel for the Defendant tried to explain by submitting that the rent deposited in the Court was for the benefit of the successful party and that the Plaintiff withdrew the amount surreptitiously without any notice to him. The argument cannot be accepted. Those receipts are on the record of the trial Court and even if the Defendant had no notice, at least after those receipts became part of the trial Court record, the Defendant must be presumed to have notice of those withdrawals and his failure to raise any objection must be construed against him. 11. On merits of the grounds of Section 12 (1) (c) namely denial of title, there is overwhelming evidence on record. After acquiring title over the suit shop, the Plaintiff so also erstwhile landlord Manakchand sent separate notices to the Defendant in answer to which the Defendant sent written reply denying the Plaintiff's title. The relevant plea is in para 4-A of the plaint. The Defendant in his written statement filed on 30-1-79 paragraphs 3,4-A and 5 admitted that he denied the Plaintiff's title. Before filing the written statement, the Defendant initiated proceedings Under Section 25 of the Act against the erstwhile landlord Manakchand and also deposited the arrears of rent vide challan dt. 15-11-78 which is at page 11 of the trial Court record. That application was dismissed by order dated 5-5-79 of the Rent Controlling Authority vide copy of order at page 21 of the record Again on 25-5-79 the Defendant filed another application to the same effect describing Manakchand as his landlord as is evident from order-sheet at page 22 of the record. The Rent Controlling Authority dismissed this application also by order dated 25-9-79 (page 23 of the record). Manakchand reiterated his earlier reply that he was not the landlord of the suit shop which was accepted by that authority. Thus the Defendant denied Plaintiff's title before filing of the suit and persisted in denying it even after filing of the suit in his written statement as also before the Rent Controlling Authority. Therefore, it must be held that the Defendant did an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. 12. Thus the Defendant denied Plaintiff's title before filing of the suit and persisted in denying it even after filing of the suit in his written statement as also before the Rent Controlling Authority. Therefore, it must be held that the Defendant did an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. 12. It was further argued that the disclaimer of the landlord's title is not covered under Section 12(1) (c) of the Act in as much as in Section 4(1) (f)of the repealed M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 there was a specific provision in that behalf but that clause is deleted in the present analogous Section 12 (1) (c). Section 4 (1) (f) of the repealed Act of 1955 is reproduced below: (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right. Section 12(1) (c) of the present Act runs as under: That the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein: Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy. A similar argument was rejected in Ghulam Mohammad v. Punam Chand 1969 MPLJ 843. It was held that eviction of a tenant on disclaimer of title is included within the ambits of 12 (1) (c). 13. It was next argued that the Defendant is not debarred from challenging the derivative title of the landlord as was held in Mirkhan v. Kutub Ali 1979 MPLJ 155 . So far as the legal proposition is concerned, that has been the consistent view right from Krishna Prasad v. B. C. Concern AIR 1937 PC 251. Similar view was taken by another division bench of this Court in Pt. Ramjilal v. Vijaykumar 1970 MPLJ 50 . In the present appeal the question is merely academic. So far as the legal proposition is concerned, that has been the consistent view right from Krishna Prasad v. B. C. Concern AIR 1937 PC 251. Similar view was taken by another division bench of this Court in Pt. Ramjilal v. Vijaykumar 1970 MPLJ 50 . In the present appeal the question is merely academic. Since the Defendant did not file any appeal against the decree relating to arrears of rent and on that count he is now precluded from getting out of the result flowing from it. Since the decree for arrears of rent became final, the relationship of landlord and tenant is implicit and is unassailable. This apart, the previous landlord Manakchand as also the present Appellant gave notices as Under Section 109 of the T. P. Act informing him that his liability to pay rent is towards the Plaintiff. The tenant himself agitated the same issue by filing application Under Section 25 of the Act complaining that Manakchand, his erstwhile landlord, did not accept the rent tendered by him, and therefore he may be permitted to deposit that rent with the Rent Controlling Authority to operate as discharge of his liability to pay the rent. The Rent Controlling Authority rejected the Defendant's applications on both the occasions after accepting Manakchand's statement that he was not the landlord. This being the state of affairs Plaintiff's capacity as landlord of the suit house became unassailable. In such a case denial of the Plaintiff's title must be accepted as a ground for his eviction Under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. In Nebraj v. Smt. Amrit Kaur 1973 MPLJ 386 . it was held that in every case it will have to be seen whether in particular facts of that case, denial of the title by the tenant is such which is likely to effect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. Pt. Ramjilal's case (supra) was also referred in this judgment. On weighing the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the denial of the Plaintiff's title adversely affected the Plaintiff's interest over the suit house and must be construed as a ground for his eviction. 14. The next question for decision is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to decree Under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 14. The next question for decision is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to decree Under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The relevant plea is in para 5 of the plaint while the reply is in para 5 of the written statement. The learned trial Court discussed this ground under issues 3 (b) and (c) in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment, and held it in Plaintiff's favour. The first appeal Court did not discuss this ground. The only one line conclusion recorded by him in para 12 of the impugned judgment, is that the need for starting business is also not bona fide. In the absence of any discussion, this Court could remit the issue and obtain a finding from the first appeal Court, but I do not propose to do so since both the parties addressed this Court at length with reference to the evidence led by them. The Plaintiff Rajendra Kumar stated that he required bona fide the suit shop for starting cloth business and that he had no other shop reasonably suitable for that business in Balaghat town. Suresh Chand (P. W. 2), Manakchand (P. W. 3) and Anil Kumar (P. W. 4) corroborated him. As against this the Defendant examined himself as (DW. 2), Maharchand (DW. 1), Suresh Kumar (DW. 3) and Ladharam (DW. 4), who all stated that the Plaintiff lived with his father Manakchand as a member of joint Hindu family. The Plaintiff along with his other brothers carries on the joint family business of cloth, gold and silver and the Plaintiff is seen sitting in those shops. Even if this evidence is accepted, since the joint property stood divided and the suit shop fall to the share of Plaintiff, his right to start his own business cannot be denied. So long he has no independent business, even if he continued to sit in his father's shop, that may be with a view to gain more experience. No material was brought out on record to show that the Plaintiff was seen in those shops as owner or partner. The Plaintiff has proved his felt need for the suit shop and is entitled to a decree on this ground as well. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the first appeal Court is set aside. The Plaintiff has proved his felt need for the suit shop and is entitled to a decree on this ground as well. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the first appeal Court is set aside. Instead the decree for eviction on both the grounds as passed by the trial Court is restored with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-, if certified.